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SUSTAINING OIL EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN THE EMERGING 
CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF THE NIGER-
DELTA 
Abstract 
Sustaining oil exploration and exploitation in Nigeria’s Niger-delta in harmony with 
sustainable development forms the topic and core of this thesis. This research considers a 
beleaguered Nigerian oil industry and the pervasive contemporary struggles to sustain lucrative 
oil production in the Niger-delta. Currently, Nigeria grapples with unrelenting and intractable 
challenges in its oil industry and apparently, a plausible means of alleviating the extensive 
negative impacts of untenable oil exploitation patterns in the Niger-delta have remained 
elusive.  
From the foregoing, the missing ingredient seems to be a dismal lack of sustainability endeared 
approaches to guarantee a green petroleum industry, economic growth and poverty eradication 
which remain vital considerations for a developing state like Nigeria. Apparently, the 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the interests, options 
and indeed, the needs of future generations, summed-up in the definition of sustainable 
development,1 appears to be a maxim with minimal recognition or import in the Niger-Delta. 
This Research is thus motivated by the constantly evolving, yet irrefutable implications arising 
from the concept of Sustainable Development and how it can be realistically applied to oil and 
gas exploitation. Undoubtedly, the pivotal principles of Sustainable development as enunciated 
                                                             





in: Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration2, the WSSD of 2002 as well as the Rio+203 which have 
triggered extraordinary impact on the development policies, goals, projects and infrastructure 
of nations on a global scale ironically constitute the missing elements in Nigeria’s quest for 
sustaining oil production in the Niger-delta. Likewise, the awareness of this phenomenal 
concept and its application in petroleum industries of more developed states has awakened a 
considerable situation of unrest in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. This is because the 
immense petroleum resources in the Niger-delta have not translated into societal or economic 
wealth of the Niger-delta people.  Undoubtedly, the vast network of petroleum resource 
development paraphernalia in the region which served to trigger tremendous economic growth 
in Nigeria for 6 decades has simultaneously and adversely impacted all aspects of the 
economic, environmental and social life of the indigenes due to unsustainable petroleum 
exploitation practices.4 
A stark contrast is thus evident when the Niger-delta is considered in this thesis alongside 
developed economies which have better aligned with international law provisions to achieve 
greener oil industries like the UK and Norway. A comparison with these jurisdictions is 
provoked by the more tangible impact of sustainable development principles in the petroleum 
regulations of these jurisdictions. More so, oil exploitation in these countries appear to be 
conducted more harmoniously with nature, whilst depicting a tapestry of multifarious synergies 
interwoven and intersecting across the sustainable development goals.5   
                                                             
2 See, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) UN. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, Vol. 
II. 17 (1982), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/milestones/unced See also, Agenda 21, available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf 
3 See, World Summit on Sustainable Development or the Johannesburg Convention (WSSD 2002. Available at: 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/131302_wssd_report_reissued.pdf See also, United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development “The Future We Want” (UNCSD 2012), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/rio20 . 
4See, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Report on the Niger-delta available at: 
http://www.unep.org/science/chief-scientist/Activities/DisastersandConflicts/OilPollutionintheNigerDeltaNigeria.aspx  
5 See, “Transforming Our World: The UN 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development” A/RES/70/1 - Transforming our 
world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development See also, Report of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable 
Development Goal Indicators (E/CN.3/2016/2/Rev.1) 
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Furthermore, an analysis of the Nigerian petroleum regulatory framework and policies 
pinpoints the loopholes which serve to undermine a sustainable or green oil industry in the 
Niger-delta, inadvertently engendering environmental degradation and poverty. 
Notwithstanding this array of negative externalities accruing from unsustainable oil 
exploitation in the Niger-delta, this research proposes optimism and insight regarding the way 
forward. The research properly endorses sustainable development of oil and gas resources to 
chart an acceptable course from the petroleum induced dilemma in the Niger-delta, whilst 
prompting crucial policy and regulatory reforms to sustain and “green” oil exploration and 
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0.1. Nigeria’s Niger-Delta and Petroleum Exploitation: A Contextual Overview   
The Niger Delta is geographically situated along the Atlantic coasts of southern Nigeria. It is 
notably the world’s second largest delta as well as Africa’s largest wetland.6 The Niger-delta 
region of Nigeria specifically comprises of 9 states: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, 
Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers states out of the 36 states that make up the federal Republic 
of Nigeria.7 It spreads over 70,000 km and forms 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass.8 Moreover, the 
Niger-delta accommodates an estimated 31 million people and at least 40 ethnic groups.9 It was 
primarily sustained by a system of rich agriculture, dense rainforests, numerous rivers, streams 
and natural resources with most of the population deriving sustainable livelihoods from fishing, 
hunting and farming.10 
Oil exploration in Nigeria kick-started in 1907 when the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation 
conducted the earliest exploratory activity.11 Actual drilling only commenced in 1951 resulting 
in the discovery of non-commercial quantities of oil in 1953. Shell-BP discovered oil in 
commercial quantities at Oloibiri in the Niger-delta in 1956 and the first export of 847,000 
tonnes of crude oil eventually occurred in 1960.12 More recently, the Niger-delta which has 
been playing host to the Nigerian petroleum industry for about 6 decades appears quite 
overcome by its culturally diverse and dense population, residing amidst 7,000 km of pipelines, 
                                                             
6 Kadafa, Adati Ayuba. "Oil exploration and spillage in the Niger Delta of Nigeria." Civil and Environmental Research 2, no. 
3 (2012): 38-51. 
7 See, Part I, S. 3, Federal Republican Constitution of Nigeria (FRCN) 1999. 
8 See, A. Ikelegbe, "The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria." Nordic Journal of African Studies 
14, no. 2 (2005): 208-234. 




11 See, J.G. Frynas, Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and litigation between oil companies and village communities. (2000) Vol. 1. 





5,000 oil wells, over 300 oil fields, 275 flow stations, ten export terminals, 22 petroleum 
storage depots, numerous gas plants, petro-chemical plants and four state-owned refineries.13 
Unsurprisingly, the people of the region are frustrated with the extensive level of environmental 
damage, bio-diversity loss and decades of degradation arising from oil exploitation. 
Consequently, the extreme level of environmental contamination has engendered social 
instability, human rights violations, weak institutions which foment corruption, economic 
relapse, paucity of resources and is accountable for the excruciating poverty and incessant civil 
unrests in the region.14 In addition, whole communities have been annihilated due to fire 
disasters resulting from oil spills. Ultimately, the resounding clamour for urgent environmental 
restorative actions has become inevitable because of the deplorable living conditions prevalent 
in the region. Despite the existence of a few urban communities with affluent residents, a 
considerable fraction of the local population remains confronted with the undeniable and 
unattractive side-effects of crude oil exploitation. This catalogue of issues effectively 
constitutes collateral damage resulting from decades of unsustainable patterns of oil and gas 
exploitation in the Niger-Delta. 
Due to the foregoing supervening problems plaguing the region, the Nigerian government 
however sought effective measures to sustainably develop petroleum resources and address oil 
exploitation induced challenges in the Niger-delta by proposing oil and gas industry reforms.15 
More importantly, the government’s quest to mitigate the situation via comprehensive 
petroleum regulations and the initiation of an omnibus Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) appeared 
                                                             
13 Freedom Onuoha ”Poverty, pipeline vandalization/explosion and human security. Integrating disaster management into 
poverty education in Nigeria (2010). See also, Onuoha, F. (2009)’’ Why the poor pay with their lives: Oil pipeline 
vandalization, fires and human Security in Nigeria, (2009) (3):369-389. 17. Ugwuanyi, E. (2013). 
14 Snapps, Oboreh, and Donald I. Hamilton. "Youth restiveness and industrial disruption in the Niger Delta." American 
Review of Political Economy 9, no. 1 (2011): 18. 
15 Iledare, Wumi. "An appraisal of oil and gas industry reform and institutional restructuring in Nigeria." International 




to be logical steps to achieve these reforms.16 Nevertheless, the government’s sincerity or 
commitment to the proposed reforms have been called into question as the Petroleum Industry 
Bill (PIB) which was first introduced a decade ago in 2007, is still yet to materialize as a statute 
in Nigeria’s oil regulatory framework.17 This invariably leads us to the crucial questions raised 
by this research regarding the sustainability or otherwise of oil and gas exploitation in the 
Niger-delta. 
0.2. Research Questions and Objectives 
This research considers petroleum exploitation in the context of sustainable development. It 
considers how a comprehensive, evolutive and dynamic concept such as sustainable 
development can be confined and operationalized via its principles, goals and targets within an 
oil industry context to engender a green economy in developing oil producing states. The 
research also appraises the level to which elements of sustainable development can interlink 
the sustainable development goals (SDGs) to engender tools and partnerships for 
environmental protection, economic growth and social development during petroleum 
exploitation, whilst verifying the extent to which sustainability tools can strengthen equity 
goals towards poverty eradication in petro-states.    
Moreover, the research purposely targets oil exploitation in Nigeria via sustainability tinted 
lenses in accordance with the three-pillar paradigm of sustainable development: environmental 
protection, economic growth and social development. This scrutiny aims to identify and 
expatiate on the existence or absence of integral weaknesses in the Nigerian rules which 
justifies the need for regulatory enhancements. This exercise certainly considers whether any 
                                                             
16 Oyewunmi, Olabode, and Olusola J. Olujobi. "Transparency in Nigeria's Oil and Gas Industry: Is Policy Re-Engineering 
the Way Out?." International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 6, no. 3 (2016). 
17 See, http://thenationonlineng.net/nigeria-loses-200b-non-passage-pib/ Accessed at 07 Jun. 17 
https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/04/26/avoiding-a-pib-of-controversy/ Accessed at 07 Jun. 17 
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evident factors that militate against sustainable oil exploitation in the Niger-delta could be 
positively influenced by regulatory or policy change, international law and global best practices 
in the oil industry. Accordingly, this research is premised on the hypothesis that oil and gas 
exploitation in Nigeria and as currently operational in the Niger-delta, is perhaps inimical to 
the interests of sustainable development. This hypothesis fundamentally raises two research 
questions. Firstly, can Nigeria’s legal approach to oil and gas exploration in the Niger-Delta 
possibly incorporate the norms of sustainable development enshrined in international legal 
instruments? Secondly, to what extent can the Nigerian oil and gas exploitation regime be 
impacted by experiences and lessons from jurisdictions with more sustainable petroleum 
exploitation practices like Norway and the United Kingdom?  
In furtherance of these research questions, this thesis considers how far it is possible to argue 
for the improvement of Nigerian petroleum laws to achieve a more holistic, cohesive and 
sustainability engendered regulatory framework. The research therefore addresses pertinent 
issues regarding the means and extent to which Nigerian petroleum regulations can sustain a 
petroleum industry in harmony with nature in the Niger-delta whilst reconciling gaps between 
the current petroleum laws and the achievement of the sustainable development goals (SDGs).  
Bearing in mind that sustainable development is an all-encompassing, fluid and evolutive 
concept, its application in the context of oil and gas exploitation in relation to a developing 
petro-state like Nigeria, potentially and unarguably poses complexities. Nevertheless, this 
thesis by means of specific tools and partnerships identified in this research engages with the 
principles of sustainable development and the subsequent SDGs as a means of operationalizing 
this dynamic concept in the petroleum industry context. 
Furthermore, the research addresses the Nigerian oil and gas laws and their lack of strategic 
focus on issues of environmental protection, economic growth and social development. The 
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reason for this assessment is predicated on the increasing global trend of sustainable 
development and sustainable use of natural resources that make it essential for governments to 
provide coordinated and pro-active regulations for hydrocarbons exploitation. Indeed, 
competent, efficiently coordinated and implemented regulations in the oil industry mutually 
reinforce each component of the sustainable development paradigm to actualize oil industry 
sustainability. Whereas, the converse holds true, as: inefficient, weak or unclear petroleum 
regulations reinforce resource waste, environmental degradation, economic deficits, 
corruption, petro-curse, inequities and social malaise, as is all too evident in the Niger-delta, 
thus necessitating urgent policy and regulatory reforms. 
0.3. Research Topicality/Originality and Significant Contribution to Knowledge 
Sustainable development is re-contextualized in this thesis to assess its utility in triggering 
development devoid of negative environmental and social externalities in developing oil 
producing states. Moreover, the extent to which sustainable development can eradicate poverty 
and inequality to achieve green economic growth in petro-states is verified on all pillars of the 
SD paradigm. Whereas the research validates and builds on existent theoretical frameworks 
afforded by international law and principles of sustainable development, it goes further to 
expand contemporary discourse on the concept of sustainable development by incorporating 
and assessing the interlinkages and tensions between the SDGs.  
The research further expatiates on how petroleum exploitation directly impacts the interplay 
between the SDGs and how it can potentially amount to a lever towards synergies for 
sustainable development or become antithetical to sustainable growth by prompting trade-offs 
and tensions across the SDGs. In the same vein, the research provides insightful applications 
of SD principles and the SDGs to formulate tools capable of catalysing sustainable 
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development within the petroleum industry context, to drive national and regional efforts 
towards achieving the sustainable development goals.  
Moreover, these formulated tools are denoted as, governance tools to attenuate governance or 
institutional challenges in petro-states and substantive tools which are derived from SD 
elements articulated in the Rio Declaration to temper oil exploitation processes. These tools 
are carefully designed to protect and preserve eco-systems and society, including boosting 
equity goals and poverty eradication. Thus, the institutional/governance tools include: 
International and multi-stakeholder partnerships, efficient regulatory guidelines/policies, 
transparency and accountability mechanisms, green taxation and sovereign wealth funds. 
While substantive tools embrace: Environmental Impacts Assessments (ELAs), Strategic 
Environmental Assessments (SEAs) and Human Rights Impacts Assessments (HRIAs). 
Likewise included are, pollution controls, innovative technology, access to information, justice 
and public participation. 
An additional significant contribution to knowledge in keeping with a recurring theme of the 
research, accrues from goals 16 and 17 of the SDGs. It relates to adapting multi-stakeholder 
engagement and international partnerships, into core drivers of sustainable governance in 
developing, oil-producing states. The research proposes these collaborations as crucial links 
towards enhancing the competence of reforms in the petroleum industry value-chain. Likewise, 
such partnerships are posited as essential towards enhancing eco-system and habitats protection 
of off-shore oil producing areas in developing states in a regional or sub-regional context.  
Evidently, sustainable development and sustainable use of natural resources habitually applies 
to living natural resources. This research however, reconfigures sustainable development and 
adapts its incumbent principle of sustainable use to determine how it can impact on the control 
and use of finite petroleum resources to extend the life-span and utility of petroleum, whilst 
 xxvi 
 
targeting petroleum resource use patterns in developing states to eliminate waste, unsustainable 
consumption and high carbon footprint. 
Moreover, this thesis provides a significant and methodological contribution to knowledge via 
its adoption of the comparative approach. The research embraces this means to chart a novel 
pathway of demonstrating the utility of the designated tools in reconciling, oil exploitation in 
the Niger-Delta, with sustainability infused regulations posited by international law and the 
UK/Norwegian prototypes.  
A final original contribution to knowledge of this research, is the advocating of Human Rights 
Impacts Assessments (HRIAs) as a core aspect of a state’s fulfilment of due diligence 
obligations to prevent against state and corporate violations of human rights in the oil industry. 
This research thus argues for HRIAs with specific focus on the Nigerian oil industry, as a 
fundamental safe-guard to reinforce social development objectives and enhance human rights 
protection during oil exploitation. 
To substantiate the fore-going assertions relating to research originality and topicality, it is 
clarified that to a considerable extent, the bulk of materials relating to sustainable development 
in an oil industry context, usually tackle the geological, scientific or engineering aspects,18 of 
oil exploitation or address either one of: the environmental pillar, economic growth pillar,19 or 
social development pillar or in some cases, human rights. Indeed, literature encapsulating all 3 
pillars of the SD paradigm, including equity and sustainable use of petroleum resources are 
rare. Nevertheless, this research pushes beyond existing boundaries and examines these pivotal 
elements of sustainable development. Moreover, it analyses the positive impacts of 
                                                             
18 Wellmer, F-W., and J. Becker-Platen. "Sustainable development and the exploitation of mineral and energy resources: a 
review." International Journal of Earth Sciences91, no. 5 (2002): 723-745. 
19 Steinbach, Volker, and Friedrich-W. Wellmer. "Consumption and use of non-renewable mineral and energy raw materials 




operationalizing sustainable development in a diverse national and cultural context such as 
Nigeria’s Niger-Delta.20  
Similarly, while there exists Nigerian literature addressing petroleum exploitation in the Niger-
Delta, the majority of such materials often target either the socio-economic21, scientific22 or 
social23 aspects of oil induced pollution in the Niger-Delta and are lacking in a holistic or robust 
assessment from international law perspectives.24  In view of the foregoing compelling reasons, 
this research posits a means towards bridging these gaps and proffers positive steps to influence 
sustainable development and poverty eradication in the Niger-Delta. The research thus argues 
for oil sector sustainability in Nigeria in accordance with international law provisions. This 
potentially serves to benefit a massive population of about 180 million people25, without 
mentioning the positive regional implications, including successive generations via buttressing 
ways by which the oil sector can foster the SDGs. 
0.4. Methodology 
This research undertakes a multidisciplinary approach since it considers economic, social and 
legal views for enhancing the sustainable development debate as a feasible solution for 
                                                             
20 See, Jike, V. Teddy. "Environmental degradation, social disequilibrium, and the dilemma of sustainable development in 
the Niger-Delta of Nigeria." Journal of Black Studies 34, no. 5 (2004): 686-701. See also, Moffat, David, and Olaf Lindén. 
"Perception and reality: assessing priorities for sustainable development in the Niger River Delta." Ambio (Sweden) (1995). 
21 See, K. Omeje, "Petrobusiness and security threats in the Niger Delta, Nigeria." Current Sociology 54, no. 3 (2006): 477-
499. 
22 See, B. Ordinioha, and S.  Brisibe. "The human health implications of crude oil spills in the Niger delta, Nigeria: An 
interpretation of published studies." Nigerian Medical Journal 54, no. 1 (2013): 10. See also, Nwilo, Peter C., and Olusegun 
T. Badejo. "Impacts and management of oil spill pollution along the Nigerian coastal areas." Administering Marine Spaces: 
International Issues 119 (2006): 1-15. 
23 See, Boele, Richard, Heike Fabig, and David Wheeler. "Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. A study in unsustainable 
development: I. The story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni people–environment, economy, relationships: conflict and 
prospects for resolution." Sustainable development 9, no. 2 (2001): 74-86. See also, Boele, Richard, Heike Fabig, and David 
Wheeler. "Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. A study in unsustainable development: II. Corporate social responsibility and 
‘stakeholder management’ versus a rights‐based approach to sustainable development." Sustainable Development 9, no. 3 
(2001): 121-135. 
24 See, J.C. Ebegbulem, D. Ekpe, and T. O. Adejumo. "Oil exploration and poverty in the Niger delta region of Nigeria: A 
critical analysis." International Journal of Business and Social Science 4, no. 3 (2013): 279-287. Also, Odalonu H. Boris, 
"The Upsurge of Oil Theft and Illegal Bunkering in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Is There a Way Out?." Mediterranean 
Journal of Social Sciences 6, no. 3 S2 (2015): 563. See also, P. N. Mba, and Uchechi R. Ogbuagu. "Environmental and 
Socio-Economic Impact of Oil Exploration on the Niger Delta Region: A Case Study of Ibeno, Nigeria." (2012). 
25 See, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division, available at: 
http://countrymeters.info/en/Nigeria Accessed at 15/06/17 
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restoring the Niger-Delta whilst sustaining oil exploration. The methodology adopted is a 
combination of methods. The research employs the Doctrinal methodology, the “Law in 
Action” approach and the Comparative methodology. The essence of combining research 
methods in this thesis extends beyond the need to enhance knowledge and academic 
contribution relating to the subject matter of the thesis, but also to achieve an efficient, realistic 
and theoretically precise means of resolving the research questions. The research undertakes 
an appraisal of international law embodying the tenets of sustainable development and the oil 
and gas laws of the UK and Norway. The research through the comparative approach identifies 
how the existent Nigerian petroleum laws may be improved by constructive lessons and 
experiences from the UK, Norway and international law.  
Moreover, the research via the doctrinal approach, considers the meaning and extended 
implications of the complex and sometimes interconnected body of local and international law 
governing sustainable development. The thesis therefore, utilizes the “law in action” approach 
to assess not just the national laws, and in this context, the Nigerian petroleum legislation as 
codified, but examines, how Nigerian petroleum law has been applied, and how the law ought 
to be.26 At this juncture, it is important to clarify that, the law in action approach adopted in 
this thesis is differentiated from the socio-legal research27, or sociology of law28 approaches 
which are grossly dependent on empirical data, normally derived from: interviews, opinion 
polls, questionnaires and other metrics based assessments.29 Law in action in this thesis is 
substantiated by the assessment of Nigerian petroleum policy and regulations, as well as the 
                                                             
26 See D. Nelken, ‘The “Gap Problem” in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review’ (1981) 1 Windsor 
Yearbook of Access to Justice. (35), addressing the idea that there is frequently a ‘gap’ between the ‘paper rules’ 
systematised in law books and law in action. 
27 See Nelken, (Ibid.)  
28 The Sociology of law approach aims to discover the causal relationships between law and society, it seeks to discover the 
patterns from which one can infer whether and under what circumstances law affects human behaviour and conversely, how 
law is affected by social change, whether of a political, economic, psychological, or demographic nature. 
29 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, “Writing law dissertations: an introduction and guide to the conduct of legal research” 
(Harlow, England, Longman, 2007) 153 
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potential societal impacts generated by the implementation or non-implementation of such 
policies. This approach thus emphasises the missing links, or legal problems or needs in the 
Nigerian oil and gas laws that justify the call for reforms and greening of the oil industry as 
crucial aspects of sustaining oil exploratory activity in the Niger-delta.   
This research also undertakes the Comparative approach in the third chapter essentially to 
compare the petroleum regulatory framework of two different states, the UK and Norway. This 
is because the comparative approach allows for the juxtaposition of the spirit and style of 
different legal systems, including the utilized methods of thought and procedures.30 
Comparative analysis can also be a particularly useful methodology for considering the 
desirability of introducing forms of legal regulation that have been successfully introduced in 
other jurisdictions as a response to analogous or corresponding issues. For these compelling 
reasons therefore, the fourth chapter of the thesis similarly adopts the comparative method as 
it embraces sustainability geared reforms discernible from international law which are already 
operational in the UK and Norway and are considered in terms of their suitability for Nigeria.31 
Consequently, the issues of function and compatibility are stressed as the vital ingredients for 
the comparison of foreign rules. It is for these same reasons that this research hinges on the 
functional approach to decipher sustainability endeared approaches from these jurisdictions to 
solve the challenges of the Niger-delta. 
Notwithstanding, the underlying basis for a comparative research envisages that only rules 
which perform the same function and address the same real problem or conflict can be 
profitably or usefully compared.32  This remains the justification for adopting the comparative 
analysis approach in this thesis as it is used to ascertain how the positive laws, specifically 
                                                             
30 K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, “An Introduction to Comparative Law” 3rd. Ed, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) 4. 
31See Macro-comparison in K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, “An Introduction to Comparative Law” 3rd. Ed, (Oxford, 




Nigerian petroleum laws compare with international law in the context of the sustainable 
development goals and tools identified in this research. It also examines how the legislative 
lacunae in Nigerian petroleum regulations can be eliminated. A similar aim of the comparative 
analysis approach in this thesis is to provide a broader or more inclusive range of model 
solutions available from other jurisdictions to resolve the environmental, social and economic 
gaps in the Nigerian petroleum regulations.  
Consequently, the jurisdictions predominantly discussed include the UK and Norwegian laws 
in the oil industry context. The research considers these countries as they maintain vibrant 
economies that have crucially escaped the “petro-curse phenomenon”33 whilst retaining 
reasonable environmental and social standards despite decades of petroleum exploitation. This 
approach is thus in furtherance of the claim that, “comparative analysis extends and enriches 
the supply of solutions and offers the scholar of critical capacity the opportunity of finding the 
better solutions for his time and space”.34 Thus, underscoring why this method is considered 
useful for law reform in developing countries, with authors claiming that the reception of 
foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality but of usefulness and need.35   
0.4.1. Addressing Relevant Challenges of Juxtaposing Jurisdictions via Legal Transfers  
This sub-section thus raises the issue of legal transfers which in very basic terms is considered 
as a movement of law from one legal tradition to another by conscious process of law-making 
or legal reform.36 Although a contested concept developed by Alan Watson, and claimed as a 
detracting aspect of the functional approach, it highlights the notable factors that influence the 
                                                             
33 Resource curse or Petro-curse phenomenon is addressed in later sub-sections 
34 See, K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, “An Introduction to Comparative Law” 3rd. Ed, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) 
4. 
22 Ibid 
36 A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press, 1974; American ed. 
University Press of Virginia, 1974). See also, Tatiana Kyselova, “The Concept of Legal Transplant:” (Literature Review  




legal transplantation process as well as their corresponding impact on comparative analysis.37 
These factors identified as: the source of law, pressure force or opposition force, transplant 
bias, amongst others are deemed accountable for the success or compatibility of the adopted 
foreign or transplanted laws in national contexts. Despite contrary views on the implausibility 
of legal transplants38, regarding this research, it is quite adequate that Nigerian Petroleum 
regulations would be primarily compared with international standards evident in jurisdictions 
of common law extraction which already bear similarities in legal systems. These include, the 
UK from where Nigeria’s legal system evolved through colonization. This justifies the basis 
for comparison and assessment of the sustainability indices or potential of the petroleum 
regulations and policies operational in the Niger-delta. It is also the underlying reason for the 
recommendations on how the laws may be strengthened to achieve sustainable development of 
petroleum resources in the Niger-delta. 
0.4.2. Diffusion and Infusion of laws 
It is further clarified that, the possibility of creating virtual laws pose serious threats to the 
effectiveness of comparative approaches via legal transplants. As also posited by Orucu, these 
virtual laws refer to rules or legal doctrine that fail to achieve the desired effect or positive 
outcomes. They are thus bereft of influence.39 Such regulatory or legal handicaps are often 
outcomes of conflicts between legal rules and pervading local, social or political interests, non-
enforcement of the rules, failure of sanctions, lack of awareness of such rules and even local 
and social perceptions regarding the relevance of those rules.40 This challenging situation posed 
                                                             
37 Alan Watson, From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants, 43 AM. J. Comp. L 469-70 (1995) 
38  O Kahn-Freund ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1974) 7, 11-13. See also, O Chase 
‘Cultural Dimensions in Civil Procedure’ 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 861 (1997) 863. 
39 See, Esin Őrücü “Infusion Of The Diffused: Four Circles Of Diffusion Infusing The Legal System Of Turkey” In, Sue 
Farran, James Gallen, Jennifer Hendry, Christa Rautenbach. (eds) The Diffusion Of Law : The Movement Of Laws And 
Norms Around The World  (Farnham, Surrey, UK England ; Burlington, VT, USA : Ashgate Publishing, 2015) 
40 See, J.M. Smiths “Systems Mixing and In Transition, Import and Export of Legal Models: The Dutch Experience” In E.H. 




by virtual laws can be avoided by the process of diffusion and infusion of law.41 This entails 
that the recipient or borrowing state must simulate a steeping or internalization process to 
expedite the absorption or permeation of the foreign rule, law or doctrine with local values to 
guarantee that it serves its aims or “is fit for purpose”.42 The diffused must thus get infused 
through the effort of “domestic improvers and renovators”.43 This is often achievable through 
the process of technical infusion of the law, engendered by teaching in secondary schools or 
legal education in tertiary institutions, seminars, lectures, public awareness schemes, NGO 
collaboration and other forms of re-education.  
There is also the possibility of preventing virtual laws via positive impact from judicial and 
legislative influencers, international organizations, international finance or development 
institutions, as well as civil rights groups. Furthermore, the criteria of using the law to go to 
court on specific grounds and in this case going to court for enforcement of social, 
environmental, human and access rights or to seek redress for environmental violations in 
relation to petroleum exploitation would serve as a yardstick for measuring the success of the 
transplant or infusion of sustainable development norms in the Nigerian oil industry. 
0.5. Thesis Structure 
This thesis comprises of an introductory chapter, four substantive chapters, conclusion and 
bibliography. The first chapter is subdivided into two parts, A and B. The aim of such division 
is to accommodate core areas affecting the conceptualization of sustainable development at 
international law. Part A therefore, examines the origins, highlights and achievements of 
sustainable development in international law. It articulates the theoretical components of the 
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concept of sustainable development whilst determining its legal status at international law. 
Also, Part A crucially sets out the international law approaches used to concretize this pliable 
concept, including a foray into the ways the SD concept has evolved over time to accommodate 
not just the principles or elements of sustainable development, but contemporary goals and 
indicator frameworks as pathways towards its operationalization.  
Notwithstanding, potential or palpable areas of tensions or trade-offs are all too evident and 
inevitable in reconciling these varied goals and diverging objectives. Albeit, the chapter in Part 
B, scrutinizes SD operationalization at international law specifically from an oil industry 
context. It thus makes credible efforts via designated governance and substantive tools in 
tackling these knotty issues accruing from integrating core elements of the SD paradigm. The 
chapter stays true to the essence of the SD concept and highlights areas and the means of 
competent goal synergies to drive the sustainable development agenda in the context of 
petroleum exploitation. 
The second chapter of the thesis portrays the Nigerian oil and gas regulations as they are, both 
in their positive and detracting aspects. Likewise, these regulations are assessed in accordance 
with the identified sustainable development tools identified in chapter 1 as prerequisites for a 
green oil and gas industry. It examines these regulations to determine their sustainability 
quotient and to ascertain their capacity to achieve the sustainable development goals essential 
for not just a robust and dynamic petroleum industry, but also a transformed Niger-Delta. The 
chapter further assesses the incontrovertible governance challenges plaguing the Nigerian oil 
industry and portrays how corruption, inchoate or inept oil industry guidelines, including how 
regulatory and technical incapacities, reinforce each other to render the Nigerian oil industry 
unsustainable on all pillars of the SD paradigm.  
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The third chapter of the thesis considers the oil and gas laws of the United Kingdom and 
Norway in line with the thesis’ designated tools of sustainable development. It also undertakes 
a comparative and systematic appraisal of the petroleum regulations of both jurisdictions to 
more clearly ascertain the areas of congruence or divergence that triggered sustainable and 
dynamic growth of these economies without undermining the options or opportunities of 
succeeding generations.  
Ultimately, the fourth chapter entails a submission of critical and informed reforms based on 
international law obligations and appropriate examples from the UK and Norwegian 
jurisdictions. These reforms also harmonize with the specific tools of sustainable development 
of petroleum resources identified in this thesis. All the foregoing approaches are thus 
considered as they constitute the essential means of filling the legislative gaps in the Nigerian 












Sustainable development is a recognised concept of international law and a principle of 
international environmental law.44 It has even been further argued to be a principle of 
international law with significant normative value.45 However, it has been trailed by 
controversy46 mostly because of the inherent difficulties in the integration of two 
fundamentally divergent goals,47 environmental protection and economic development.48 
Indeed, Principle 4 of the Rio declaration provides; “In order to achieve sustainable 
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development 
process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”.49 This entrenches the concept of 
sustainable development as an incorporation of development goals and environmental 
protection. Sustainable development is likewise deemed a vague and elusive concept,50 even 
                                                             
44See, The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226,9 Sands, P. (2003) 
Principles of International Environmental Law, (2nd edn, Cambridge, pp. 4). See also, the ICJ opinion of sustainable 
development as a concept in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project case between Hungary and Slovakia (1997) ICJ Report 
(1997) 7 at 78, Including; P. Sands, ‘UNCED and the Development of International Environmental Law’ 3 YBIEL, (1992) 
17. And, P. Sands, ‘International Courts and the Application of the Concept of “Sustainable Development”’, 3 Max Planck, 
Yearbook of United Nations Law (1999) 404 
45 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the ICJ ruling in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case (supra) at 90 And see, 
D. French, International Law and the Policy of Sustainable Development, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005) 
47 at 51.  
46 A Dobson, Green Political Thought (London, Routledge, 2000) 62. See also, Wilfred Beckerman, “Sustainable 
Development”: Is it A Useful Concept? (3 Environmental Values, 1994) 191, at 191-206 
47 M. Fitzmaurice, Contemporary Issues in International Environmental Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 
67 
48 G. Carvalho, ‘Sustainable development: Is it Achievable Within the Existing International Political Economy Context? 
(2001) 9 Sustainable Development 61–73; H. E Daly, Beyond Growth: the Economics of Sustainable Development (Beacon 
Press: Boston, 1997). 
49Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, 31 ILM 874.  
50 M.C. Cordonier Segger & C. G. Weeramantry, eds.,” Introduction to Sustainable Development;” Implementing 
International Sustainable Development Law. Also, Sustainable Justice: Reconciling Economic, Social and Environmental 




considered to be, “one orthodoxy with many interpretations”51 and lacking in any universally 
agreed upon definition.  
 
Notwithstanding, sustainable development has evolved into an acceptable and ever recurrent 
feature in international legal and political discourse relating to virtually all spheres of human 
endeavour.52 Also of crucial relevance to the meaning of sustainable development are the core 
elements of conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. More so, the concept 
characteristically circumscribes the integrated themes of economic development, 
environmental protection, equity and empowerment.53 However, these rather contradictory 
tenets have also significantly belied its adoption and practical implementation. Reason being 
that, sustainable development requires the amalgamation of its constituent elements to optimize 
its aims. Therefore, striking the appropriate balance between these disparate elements, whilst 
prioritizing amongst mutually reinforcing interests, in diverse contexts, renders the concept 
supremely challenging.54 
 
Nevertheless, the dominant theme of this chapter is ‘sustainable development’.  This extensive 
concept is yet narrowed down to ascertain its relevance to petroleum exploitation. The chapter 
examines sustainable development as a fundamental tool for regulatory and policy change to 
sustain the production of petroleum resources in a developing state like Nigeria. It thus 
identifies the links and the extent to which it is possible to argue for the application of 
sustainable development principles in the exploration and production of hydrocarbon 
resources. Likewise, the chapter examines the concerns and challenges arising from the 
                                                             
51 See, D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
2005) at 14.   
52 D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005) 67 
53 M. Jacobs, Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept, in A. Dobson (ed.), Fairness and Futurity, Essays on 
Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999)37 
54 These complications will be all too evident in the course of further deliberations. 
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operationalization of such an all-encompassing concept in the petroleum industry, especially 
in developing states. It thus articulates a multi-disciplinary approach to tackle these challenges 
by means of a framework anchoring on key themes elaborated in the Rio Declaration and the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable development.55 The chapter appraises the sustainable 
development goals (SDGs) and identifies what circumstances they can be more specifically 
relevant as tools for the operationalization of sustainable development in the oil industry 
context. Unarguably, sustainable development remains a dynamic and broad-based concept 
with potential to engender viable synergies or trigger trade-offs, due to its innately integrative 
element. The chapter nonetheless considers the trade-offs that interlinks the sustainability 
discourse in conjunction with fossil fuels use, whether they are avoidable and if not, the extent 
to which sustainable development concepts imbedded in regulatory mechanisms can mitigate 
their impacts in the oil industry. 
 
The first part of the chapter denoted as Part A, commences with an overview of sustainable 
development, its conceptual challenges, controversies, application and consequent progression 
into the sustainable development goals (SDGs). The first part of the chapter further elucidates 
on the operationalization of sustainable development at international law. The second part of 
the chapter anchors on sustainable development and its implementation in the petroleum 
industry. This section also examines the international legal framework governing sustainable 
development and oil exploitation whilst appraising the role of international organisations and 
partnerships like the World Bank, the UNEP, the EITI, including International finance 
institutions in charting a nexus between sustainable development and petroleum exploitation 
in developing states. A systematic analysis regarding the implications and complex challenges 
                                                             
55 See, UNGA/RES/70/1 – “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development£, See also, the SDGs 
and Global Indicator Framework Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on Work of the Statistical Commission 
pertaining to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/71/313).  
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accruing from this collaboration with international organisations for sustainable development 
in petro-states is subsequently addressed.  
 
Ultimately, the chapter assesses how far it is possible to argue for the integration of all pillars 
of the sustainable development paradigm, including enhancing synergies across the SDGs to 
achieve crucial targets of the 2030 Agenda in the oil industry and within emerging petro-states. 
Thus, in fulfilling these aims, the chapter designates tools to optimize oil sector governance 
and substantive tools. These include: International and multi-stakeholder partnerships, efficient 
regulatory guidelines/policies, transparency and accountability mechanisms, green taxation 
and sovereign wealth funds. The substantive tools on the other hand, embrace: EIAs, SEAs, 
HRIAs, including, pollution controls, innovative technology, access to information, justice and 
public participation. 
 
1.1. Sustainable Development at International Law: Background and Progression 
Earliest support for the sustainable development agenda commenced in the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment.56 The conference initiated discussions on the human 
right to a healthy and productive environment.57 Thereafter, in 1983 the UN set up the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)58 also known as the Brundtland 
Commission to seek or harness support from governments on the pursuit and realization of 
sustainable development. The report of the commission “Our Common Future” 59 which was 
                                                             
56 See, Principle 1 Stockholm Declaration (1972); F. Dodds, M. Strauss, and M. F. Strong. "Only one earth: the long road 
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57 See, Principles 2-3 of the Stockholm Declaration (1972). Available at: http://www.un-documents.net/aconf48-14r1.pdf  
58 UN General Assembly Resolution 38/161 "Process of preparation of the Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and 
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December 1987. See also, I. Borowy, Defining Sustainable Development for Our Common Future: A History of the World 




published in 1987 articulated the popular definition of sustainable development as, 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”.60  
 
The Brundtland report evoked optimism regarding a future, that could reconcile development 
aspirations of states with environmental protection. Moreover, it held the promise of tackling 
inequities and poverty eradication via the equitable distribution of opportunities and resources 
within present generations and across successive ones. The Brundtland definition of sustainable 
development thus embraces such a fair distribution and optimization of natural resources or 
wealth for economic growth whilst counteracting environmental degradation. Thus, indicative 
of the fact that, development can only be sustainable when it is within the carrying capacity of 
the environment, or within limits imposed by environmental constraints. Indeed, the 
Brundtland definition and sustainable development have been criticized as purely 
“anthropocentric in nature”, focusing more on development than environmental sustainability, 
or the needless harnessing of nature to meet human needs or growth and unduly optimistic.61  
 
Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that, the Brundtland definition and Report served to 
revolutionize the concept of sustainable development whilst launching it on a more globalized 
and far-reaching platform to address development challenges of states. The Report is arguably 
more than an assumption of the needs of the world’s poor, it goes further to articulate the extent 
to which underdevelopment interlinks with poverty, which in turn correlates with 
environmental stress and ecological challenges. For instance, the Brundtland Report clarifies 
                                                             
60 See, The Report of the Commission, World Commission On Environment And Development, “Our Common Future” 43 
(1987). 
61 See, M. McCloskey, ‘The Emperor has no Clothes: The Conundrum of Sustainable Development’, 9 Duke Environmental 




that “many forms of development erode the environmental resources upon which they may be 
based,” and “that environmental” degradation can undermine economic development.62  
 
Evidently, the report maintains that “[a] world in which poverty and inequity are endemic will 
always be prone to ecological and other crises“.63 The Report thus elucidates on the 
interconnectedness between economic development, environmental sustainability, fueled by 
innovative technologies which is invariably dependent on the considerable funding accruable 
from sustainable economic growth. 
 
The Sustainable development agenda as facilitated by the Brundtland Report progressed even 
further and ushered in the 1992 Earth summit in Rio or the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED).64 The vital aims of the conference entailed 
identifying rallying points for reconciling economic growth objectives of states with 
environmental protection for the benefit of the global community. These summits were also 
notable for producing crucial outcome documents and international legal instruments such as 
the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the Biological Diversity Convention, (CBD) which have even 
more clearly outlined the meaning of sustainable development.65  
 
Moreover, Principles 2 - 5 of the Rio Declaration, clarify that environmental protection for the 
benefit of present and successive generations, should form an essential part of development 
                                                             
62 See, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, General Assembly Resolution 42/187, 11 
December 1987. 
63 See, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, General Assembly Resolution 42/187, 11 
December 1987, (3, 6, 43-44.)   
64 See, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.I.8 and corrigenda), vol. I: Resolutions adopted by the Conference, resolution 1, annex I. 
65 See, The Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.I.8 and corrigenda), vol. I: Resolutions adopted by the 
Conference, resolution 1, annex I. Also, Annex I and II; See also, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) that led to the Kyoto Protocol, Agenda 21, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 




plans and their implementation as crucial steps to tackle poverty. These form the core points 
integral to the meaning of sustainable development subsumed in the Brundtland definition and 
replicated in the Rio Declaration bordering on: poverty eradication, environmental protection, 
economic growth and equity.66 
 
Consequent to the endorsement of sustainable development as part of the international political 
debate in 1992, there was a progression from the consideration of sustainable development in 
terms of the binary relationship of economic development and environmental protection to 
include social development.67 The UNCED articulated a paradigmatic shift from 
“environmental protection as a goal in its own right to be a means of achieving economic and 
social development”.68 Agenda 21 enunciated the integration of environment and development 
concerns, also initiating the idea of according greater attention to social development for the 
fulfilment of basic needs.69 A partnership was thus proposed which would respect the 
indivisibility of environmental protection and economic growth as a crucial component of the 
development process.70 Sustainable development thereafter proceeded to encompass social 
development as indicated by the Johannesburg Plan of implementation, WSSD (2002) which 
provides, “efforts will also promote the integration of the three components of Sustainable 
Development – economic development, social development and environmental protection – as 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars”.71  
 
                                                             
66World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
67 Ibid 
68 D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005) 15 
69 Paragraph 1.1, Agenda 21, UNCED 1992. See also, the 1997 Programme for further Implementation of Agenda 21 to “A 
new global partnership for Sustainable Development”. 
70 Paragraph 2, Agenda 21. See also, D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development, (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2005) 19 
71 UN Doc A/CONF.199/20. For critical discussion, see M Pallemaerts, ‘International Law and 
Sustainable Development: Any Progress in Johannesburg?’ (2003) 12 Review of European Community and International 




Undoubtedly, this expansion of sustainable development as a concept to include social 
development has been riddled with criticisms. Critics mostly condemned the inclusion of social 
development as an acute digression from the paramount matter of “environmental protection 
and sustainable development”.72 However, it is pertinent to acknowledge that the approach 
adopted by the WSSD, sought to rely less on political expressions, but instead focused on 
practical approaches to actualize sustainable development for the meaningful improvement of 
the environment and society, through poverty alleviation in developing states. This it does with 
the use of identifiable indicators and targets.73 These indicators essentially strive to measure 
sustainable development in its entirety, by considering the multi-dimensional aspects which 
require integration for actualizing sustainable development.74  
 
Albeit, the concept of sustainable development has advanced to accommodate the current 
notions of sustainability which incorporate the idea of a “green economy”75 in the context of 
sustainable development and poverty eradication.76 Notions of a green economy indicate 
significant emphasis on the need to promote social and economic development within the 
carrying capacity of the environment and delink77 economic growth and environmental 
degradation via improved efficiency and sustainability.78 It is further emphasized that an 
accompanying or recurring facet of the sustainable development discourse has remained 
                                                             
72 A. Ross, ‘Is the Environment Getting Squeezed Out of Sustainable Development?’ [2003] Public Law 249. See also, P. 
Galizzi “From Stockholm to New York, via Rio and Johannesburg, Has the Environment Lost its Way On the Global 
Agenda?” (2006) 29 Fordham Intl Law Journal 952. 
73 K. Gray, “World Summit on Sustainable Development: Accomplishments and New Directions?”, 52 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2003) 267. See also, United Nations, Indicators of Sustainable Development: Guidelines and 
Methodologies, Second Edition, UN Sales Publication No. E.01.II.A.6 (New York, September 2001) with specific indicators 
like; Poverty, Governance, Health, Consumption and production patterns, Economic development, biodiversity, etc. Specific 
discussion of sustainable development goals and indicators will be addressed in subsequent sections. 
74 See, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, (DESA) Publication “Indicators of 
Sustainable Development: Guidelines and Methodologies”. 3rd Edn. October 2007. 
75 In, Pearce, Markandya and Barbier’s, “Blueprint for a Green Economy” (1989). The term “green economy” was first 
adopted in their pioneering report in 1989 for the Government of the United Kingdom. 
76 A/CONF.216/PC/6 and A/CONF.216/PC/1, See also, Principle 4 (Rio+20). 
77 Entails dissociating the achievement of economic growth through wanton environmental exploitation.  




poverty eradication. This enduring theme as also re-echoed in the Rio+20 “The future We 
Want”79 consistently appeals to developing states and is instrumental to the SD’s continued 
relevance as an evolutive or dynamic concept with requisite potential to target: global 
development, poverty and environmental challenges without neglecting social development on 
a multi-lateral scale. 
 
The concept has even more recently evolved or advanced into the 17 Sustainable development 
goals and 169 targets articulated in “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development”.80 The foregoing milestones from Brundtland to contemporary 
times indicate an escalating profile of sustainable development at international law. The 
pertinent issue for subsequent consideration however, is whether or not this global status of 
sustainable development is entirely political or if it bears any legal significance. 
1.2. Legal Nature of Sustainable Development 
Following from preceding postulations regarding the progression and increasing relevance of 
sustainable development at international law, this sub-section expatiates on the crucial points 
bordering on the status of sustainable development at international law. Whether or not it is a 
binding principle of international law? In as much as sustainable development is a dynamic 
and multi-faceted concept, it is apposite to question if its relevance on the global scale remains 
political or if it embodies any kind of legal obligation, legal duties or normativity at 
international law. To answer these questions or ascertain the legal nature of sustainable 
development, it is thus relevant to assess its legal scope to determine whether the concept 
imposes legal obligations or that it constitutes a binding positive rule at international law. 
                                                             
79 “Rio+20” United Nations A/RES/66/288-The Future We Want, Available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/futurewewant.html  
80 See, United Nations Docs. A/RES/70/1 - Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
Available at:  https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld Accessed at 03 March 2017 
To be discussed in proceeding subsections. 
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Typically, a concept, agreement or proposition is legally binding if it is formulated to have 
legal scope or obligations. As opined by Barral, a proposition will have legal scope when it is 
formulated ‘with the intention to modify . . . elements of the existing legal order, or . . . that its 
implementation effectively achieves this result’.81 In this context, the Rio Declaration and 
Agenda 21 which set the backdrop for sustainable development may be considered to have 
legal scope as they propose rights and duties for states, with evident intention to modify the 
existent legal order and state conduct.82 Albeit, the mix of prescriptive and flexible language 
in both instruments has been considered an attenuating factor.83 It is however clarified that 
occasionally, the legal scope of a proposition, agreement or concept can prove inadequate to 
bequeath it a legally binding status at international law.  
Notwithstanding, a concept, agreement or proposition becomes a binding or valid, positive rule 
at international law if it falls within the sources of law articulated by Art. 38 (1) (a-d) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).84 These include: conventions, custom, 
general principles of law and subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified writers, scholars or jurists as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. Of relevance therefore is whether the concept of sustainable 
development may be considered as coming within the confines of international law sources 
articulated by Art. 38 (1) of the Statute of the ICJ.  
In view of the fore-going requirements of international law sources imposed by Art.38 (1) of 
the ICJ Statute, can sustainable development expressed in international legal instruments, 
therefore be deemed as binding in accordance with Art. 38 (1)(a) concerning “Conventions”? 
                                                             
81See, Barral, Virginie. "Sustainable Development In International Law: Nature And Operation Of An Evolutive Legal 
Norm." European Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 (2012): 377-400.  
82 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I). See principles 2–7, 
10, 11, 13, 15, 17–19. 
83 See, Vaughan Lowe, "Sustainable development and unsustainable arguments." International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges 19 (1999): 36-37. 
84 See, Art. 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. 384 EJIL 23 (2012), 377–400 
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Certainly, sustainable development is reflected in numerous non-binding international legal 
instruments. Sustainable development is also mentioned in incalculable Declarations of 
countries or resolutions of international organisations. As a matter of fact, sustainable 
development is articulated in 112 multilateral treaties, with an estimated 30 of such treaties 
aimed at universal application.85 However, sustainable development as mostly represented in 
these multifarious treaties is confined to the preamble, which creates non-binding 
connotations.86 Even when sustainable development is retained in the operative parts of treaty 
texts and therefore prima facie binding on the contracting parties, its validity would operate in 
respect of specifically laid out measures to actualize the treaty objectives and obligations.87 In 
as much as the plethora of international agreements proposing sustainable development 
principles appears indicative of an appreciable degree of consensus and acceptance of the 
concept at international law, it is still debatable whether it embodies the “hardness” or 
formalized status envisaged by Art. 38(1)(a) of the ICJ Statute relating to conventions.  
Evidently, treaties or conventions are considered “hard law” or sources of international law,88 
nonetheless, sustainable development is arguably at a point where it veers of creating a legally 
binding obligation, regardless of the validity or strength of its formulation.89 Moreover, Lowe 
argues that, sustainable development as echoed in the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, or WSSD 
plans of implementation, etc. usually reflects vague, conditional or even imprecise terms or 
language, that this renders it inadequate as a binding treaty on state parties.90 He proposes that 
such vague terminology is incapable of constraining state conduct in terms of Art.38(1)(a) and 
                                                             
85 See, Barral, Virginie. "Sustainable Development In International Law: Nature And Operation Of An Evolutive Legal 
Norm." European Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 (2012): 377-400. 
86 See, Baxter, ‘International Law “In Her Infinite Variety”’, 29 ICLQ (1980) 549, at 554. 
87 See, Baxter, ‘International Law “In Her Infinite Variety”’, 29 ICLQ (1980) 549, at 554. 
88 Ian Brownlie, “Principles of Public International Law” (5th ed.). Oxford University Press. (1998) pp. 607–08. ISBN 0-19-
876299-2. 
89  Virginie, Barral, "Sustainable Development In International Law: Nature And Operation Of An Evolutive Legal Norm." 
European Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 (2012): 377-400 
90 See, Vaughan Lowe, "Sustainable development and unsustainable arguments." International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges 19 (1999): 36-37. 
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also detracts from the capacity to operate as custom in the context of Art. 38(1)(b) of the ICJ 
Statute. Also, that treaty formulations and other provisions relating to sustainable development 
lack fundamentally norm-creating character and cannot, as such, form the basis of a general 
rule of international law as envisaged by Art. 38(1)(c). Ultimately purporting that the use of 
statements such as “states should develop sustainably” as opposed to ‘states must develop 
sustainably’ undermines the character of sustainable development as a binding norm of 
international law.91  
Apparently, Lowe’s position is buttressed by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases92 
relating to customary norms or custom in terms of Art.38(1)(b), which purport that actions by 
States ‘not only must amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out 
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of the rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, ie the existence of a 
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.93 The 
States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
obligation’.94 Thus, custom as a source of international law applies, where it fulfils the: 
subjective criteria, the objective criteria and where it is evident that such custom is of a general 
and accepted practice.95 
Undoubtedly, while there is no general obligation on states to develop sustainably, there is 
however, relative evidence of progressive state practice or opinio juris on states’ adoption of 
measures that reflect sustainable development. For example, Art. 3 of the UNFCCC which is 
                                                             
91 Ibid. 
92See, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) 
(Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 44 (‘North Sea Continental Shelf Cases’). 
93 As to evidence of state practice and belief necessary to establish a customary law principle, see Jan Klabbers, 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 26-30; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 24. 
94 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) 
(Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 44 (‘North Sea Continental Shelf Cases’). 
95 David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, Seventh Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, 2010. 
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quite instructive for oil producing states, provides Principles to guide state conduct in 
combating climate change. It clearly articulates aspects of the Rio Declaration embracing: inter 
and intra-generational equity, precautionary measures, providing that, “Parties should take 
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimise the causes of climate change and 
mitigate its adverse effects. That the Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable 
development”.96  Although the provisions are expressed in relative terms, with the use of 
“should” qualifying its application, they are not, as considered by some legally irrelevant.97  
In as much as, the flexibility of many formulations of sustainable development places it within 
the purview of “soft law”98 it is nevertheless argued that such a placement does not necessarily 
detract from the relevance of sustainable development at international law, as an instigator of 
change in the positive reconciliation of development goals with environmental and social 
considerations.99 Basically, it’s non-binding form in many instruments does not limit it in the 
context of customary international law making as in the words of Boyle,  
[… “Treaties do not generate or codify customary law because of their binding form 
but because they either influence state practice and provide evidence of opinio juris for 
new or emerging rules, or because they are good evidence of what the existing law is. 
In many cases this is no different from the potential effect of non-binding soft law 
instruments. Both treaties and soft law instruments can be vehicles for focusing 
                                                             
96 See, Art. 3 of the UNFCCC 1992. 
97 See the debate between Sands and Mann in W. Lang (ed.) Sustainable Development and International Law (London, 
1995), 53-74. 35. The so-called "Berlin mandate": Decision 1/CP.l, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 1st 
Session, UN Doc.FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add. Indeed, given how weak the rest of the treaty is, the principles found in Article 3 
are arguably the most important "law" in the whole agreement because they prescribe how the regime should operate. 
98 See, Dupuy, "Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment" (1991) 12 Michigan J.I.L 42 
99 Constancy and generality being two essential conditions for precedents to contribute to the formation of state practice. 54 
See The Case of the SS ‘Lotus’, 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10, at 21. 




consensus on rules and principles, and for mobilising a consistent, general response on 
the part of states.]” 100 
It is thus reasonable to concede that treaties could be more effective than soft law instruments 
where a stronger commitment to the objectives of an agreement is sought to impose obligations 
on the parties, or to drive harder forms of enforcement or compliance. However, to presume 
that treaties are necessarily more authoritative is erroneous.101 The Rio Declaration for 
instance, could harness speedier consensus and support from states mostly due to its soft nature. 
It is indeed arguable that a treaty with similar provisions on the other hand would have gained 
as much momentum or been as effective in securing such expedited global cooperation or 
participation. 
Moreover, sustainable development in terms of Art. 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, relating to 
scholarly contributions,102 judicial assertions and ICJ decisions indicates a progression beyond 
mere conceptualization into a substantive principle of international law. However, divergent 
views propose that, sustainable development can only properly claim a normative status as an 
element of the process of judicial reasoning.103 Inferring that sustainable development retains 
“interstitial normativity”,104 only capable of clarifying or balancing conflicting norms in 
specific cases.105  
In as much as, credence for sustainable development’s integration and reconciling function is 
reposed in cases like the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case between (Hungary v. Slovakia) 
                                                             
100 See, A. E. Boyle, “Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law” (1999) 48 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 901. 
101 See A. E. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future 
Prospects (Oxford, 1999), Ch.l; Sands (ed.), Greening International Law (London, 1993), Chs.l and 3 
102 See, P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) .254 
103 See, Vaughan Lowe, "Sustainable development and unsustainable arguments." International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges 19 (1999): 36-37. 
104 Ibid. 
105 See, Vaughan Lowe, "Sustainable development and unsustainable arguments." International Law and Sustainable 




106, where a dispute arose in relation to a development project previously concluded by the 
imposition of treaty obligations between the state parties, of Hungary and the defunct 
Czechoslovakia. The court concluded that, “this need to reconcile economic development with 
protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development”107. 
Moreover, Judge Weeramantry in his separate opinion, regarding sustainable development, 
asserted that it is more than a concept, but a rule and principle of international law with 
normative value, which is fundamental to the determination of competing considerations. 
Indeed, he further contends that, “it is an integral principle of modern international law”.108 
Likewise, in the Pulp Mills Case109 where the ICJ adjudicated over the dispute between 
Argentina and Uruguay concerning the latter’s use of the River Uruguay for the construction 
of pulp mills. The Court stated that the integration principle was relevant in reconciling the 
economic development objectives of Uruguay without neglecting Argentina’s environmental 
concerns and tourism interests. That the integration principle is crucial in striking the balance 
between economic development and environmental protection which forms the defining core 
of sustainable development.110  
Notwithstanding, in “The Iron Rhine” case111 the arbitral tribunal’s efforts to clarify the 
contemporary position of sustainable development went further and beyond the Gabcikovo and 
Pulp Mills cases to maintain that sustainable development is a “rule and general duty”112 at 
                                                             
106 See Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment ICJ Reports (1997) 7, at para. 140. 
107 Ibid 
108 108 See Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment ICJ Reports (1997) 7, Available at; 
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-03-EN.pdf  
109 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 133, para. 80) and, Case Concerning 
Pulp Mills On The River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 60 (April 20). See also, McCaffrey, Stephen. 
"Chapter 2: The UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses". United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe. p. 17. And, Alan, Boyle. “Pulp Mills Case: A Commentary” University of Edinburgh. 
(2010) 
110 Lending support to Argentina’s further assertion that the substantive obligations under the 1975 Statute included 
Uruguay’s obligation not to cause environmental pollution or consequential economic losses…. 
111 Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium and 





international law. Although the tribunal emphasized on Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration and 
stressed its significance as a component of sustainable development, it however considered 
sustainable development as more than a concept and rightly denoted it as ‘a principle of general 
international law’.113 These foregoing cases are thus illustrative of the normative status of 
sustainable development at international law. They substantiate its relevance as a principle of 
international law with remarkable potential to guide state conduct in development planning and 
policy towards ensuring a green economy and poverty eradication.  
Accordingly, it is thus posited that contrary to Lowe’s proposition, sustainable development 
constitutes far more than a judicial accessory, with a strictly jurisprudential or hermeneutical 
relevance.114 Sustainable development is certainly proving relevant on a multi-lateral scale with 
considerable capacity to influence policy and regulate state conduct. More so, it’s Principles 
are directed at States and not to judges, even though multi-level collaboration and participation 
with specialized state and non-state actors or organisations is sought for its realization. Even 
though sustainable development’s unique capacity in reconciling economic growth with 
environmental protection or indeed, international economic law with international 
environmental law remains a defining attribute as evident in case law, that however remains 
one of its other uncontested elements or attributes at international law. 
Undoubtedly, sustainable development, despite its limitations in terms of Art. 38(1) (a-d) of 
the ICJ Statute and its lack of a peremptory status at international law still remains an all-
encompassing principle with substantive and procedural elements. These are articulated by 
Principles 3-8, including Principles, 10, 16 and 17 of the Rio Declaration.115 These principles 
which are further analysed in other sections, range from sustainable use of resources, 
                                                             
113Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 27 RIAA (2005) 35, at para. 59.  
114 Hermeneutics refers to the theory and methodology of interpretation in relation to law. 
115 See, Principles 3-8 of the Rio Declaration, relating to: Sustainable Use of Resources, Integration, Inter and Intra-
Generational Equity, Precautionary Principle and Right to Development. 
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environmental protection, economic growth, including equity, EIAs, access rights and 
participation. Although these elements require integration, contextualization and 
operationalization via realistic standards, they ultimately serve to optimize efforts of the 
sustainability agenda in guiding state conduct for development devoid of environmental 
impairment.116  
1.2.1. Conceptualizing Sustainable Development: The Role of Principles, Goals, Tools and 
Indicators 
In consonance with prior deliberations regarding the role and significance of sustainable 
development at international law, this subsection considers the conceptual approaches to 
operationalizing sustainable development at international law and on a national scale. The 
subsection thus appraises the relevance, if any, of the various denotations relating to 
“Principles”, “Goals”, “tools” or “indicators”, in the sustainable development discourse.  
Undoubtedly, the concept of Sustainable development combines a complex, yet fluid or multi-
faceted character which makes it rather difficult to measure or assess in terms of securing its 
practical implementation. Despite its global appeal and political relevance on a multi-lateral 
scale, stake-holders comprising state and non-state actors grapple with its implementation 
challenges. Operationalizing sustainable development or translating the concept into realistic 
actions thus becomes problematic. Weaving the vital strands of the global agenda, 
“Transforming Our World: Agenda 2030” via relatable terms into decision making frameworks 
would therefore prove crucial to its objectives being met. This has necessitated the use of SD 
Principles and Goal identifiers or measurement criteria, such as, indicators or tools to 
                                                             
116 S.1.4 of this Chapter discusses the Integration principle, S.1.5.1. deliberates on EIAs, S.1.5.3.1. tackles Public 
Participation, S.1.6 addresses Sustainable Use and S.1.7 of the Chapter, elaborates on Equity.  
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realistically and objectively drive the sustainable development agenda, especially if it is to be 
relevant as a decision-making tool.  
Whereas a tool has been described as a: device, instrument, contrivance, including an ability 
that aids the performance of a task or goal,117 an indicator on the other hand, has been defined 
as something related to a reference, as the term stems from the Latin “indicare” which means 
pointing towards something.118 Thus, sustainability tools and indicators are largely relevant in 
the context of the sustainable development discourse as they ultimately influence changes in 
perceptions of the relevant stakeholders or decision makers on what constitutes sustainable 
development. In this vein, Pintér concludes that, “Changing the way society measures progress 
represents a key leverage point in tackling the root causes of unsustainable development”.119 
These tools and indicators therefore serve as entities that clarify the SD concept in a practical 
way.  
In this vein, pertinent, applicable reference terms relating to the sustainable development 
discourse comprise of: “Principles” as in the 27 Principles of the Rio Declaration or 7 Principles 
of the New Delhi Guiding Principles of sustainable development,120 “goals”, as in the 17 
sustainable development goals (SDGs), a target, for instance the 169 targets articulated by 
“Agenda 2030”, “indicators” such as the 230 indicators of the Global Indicator Framework for 
Sustainable development,121 a norm, includes as in this case sustainable development principles 
                                                             
117 See, Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018 
118 S. Bell, S. Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable; Earthscan: London, UK, 2005. 
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which have normative implications at international law122 (integration principle,123 preventive 
principle,124 polluter pays principle,125 EIAs,126) etc. 
Furthermore, sustainability tools elucidated in this research via the elements and principles of 
sustainable development, towards actualizing the SDGs, readily accommodate methodological 
applications which may be “top-down” or “bottom-up”. Top-down approaches are usually 
expert driven and adopt quantitative criteria. For instance, while environmental assessments 
like the EIAs and SEAs remain environmental protection tools, they also accommodate specific 
expert-driven, technical approaches such as the [Best Applicable Technique (BAT) or Best 
Environmental Practice (BEP) or Best Practicable Environmental Option (BEPO)]127 as 
applicable standards to preserve benchmarks in the oil industry towards optimizing 
environmental goals. However, “bottom up” approaches are more qualitative inclined and 
could for instance include, social development tools like the co-opting of local stakeholders 
through public participation or local consultations to generate consensus approval of oil and 
gas development projects. 
Notwithstanding, for sustainable development of the oil and gas industry, an integration of both 
top-down and bottom-up approaches is needful to propel the sustainable development goals. It 
is however clarified that, an overly simplistic use of sustainability tools or indicators, may 
render them susceptible to both interpretive and measurement challenges. This is because the 
integration of the varied or divergent elements in the concept of sustainable development makes 
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it fluid and responsive to multiple purposes and contexts, and likewise subject to the diverse 
perceptions of the users or interpreters.128 
Nevertheless, the articulation of the concept of sustainable development via principles at 
international law has effectively served to embody a compact or more definitive framework of 
sustainable development. For instance, the 27 Principles of the Rio Declaration and indeed the 
7 Guiding Principles of the New Delhi Declaration on Sustainable development elucidate on 
the substantive and procedural aspects of sustainable development.  
Moreover, Principles 3-8 of the Rio Declaration illuminate the substantive elements of 
sustainable development which define the overall scope of the concept, whilst highlighting its 
integral components, viz: Sustainable use of natural resources,129 the integration of 
environmental protection and economic development, Inter and intra-generational equity130, 
Common But Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR), the precautionary principle,131 and the 
right to development.132 These substantive elements of sustainable development find 
expression in various conventions and environmental treaties such as the UNFCCC,133 the 
Kyoto Protocol, the Desertification Convention, OSPAR Convention134,  Biodiversity 
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Convention135 etc. and mostly convey distinct, albeit relative standards to engender the aims of 
sustainable development. 
Furthermore, the procedural elements of sustainable development are clarified in Principles 10, 
13, 16 and 17 of the Rio Declaration. Principle 10 relating to access to environmental 
information, justice and public participation, has served to concretize core aspects of 
implementing sustainable development principles, to make access and participatory rights 
enforceable at law. These rights have also gained considerable momentum as human rights and 
are represented in case law.136 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration is also reflected in numerous 
regional agreements and national laws. One such notable regional instrument is the Arhus 
Convention.137 Principles 13 and 16 incorporate the polluter pays principle, while principle 17 
clarifies the relevance of environmental impacts assessments. These specific principles are 
important as procedural elements that serve as the tools of operationalizing or facilitating the 
implementation of the integrated themes of sustainable development at the national or regional 
levels. 
1.2.2. Conceptualization of Sustainable Development: Applying Goals, Targets, Tools and 
Indicators. 
As earlier argued, the need to manage and operationalize the concept of sustainable 
development to expedite its implementation at international law and national levels remains 
crucial for achieving the SDGs. The UN’s designation of sustainable development into goals, 
targets and indicators has served to broaden the ambit of the concept whilst retaining its integral 
elements denoted in the three-pillar paradigm. These are evident in the Millennium 
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Development Goals (MDGs)138 and subsequent adoption of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs).139 The MDGs comprised a framework of 8 goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators 
to measure progress towards the Millennium Development goals. These Goals include: 1. 
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2. Achieve universal primary education, 3. Promote 
gender equality and empower women, 4. Reduce child mortality, 5. Improve maternal health, 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, 7. Ensure environmental sustainability and 
8. Develop a global partnership for development.  
Notwithstanding that each goal of the MDGs had stated targets and stipulated dates for their 
achievements, the MDGs were however criticized for an alleged lack of analysis or failure to 
validate the criteria for selected objectives.140 More so, the heavy reliance on states for their 
achievement, the difficulty or lack of measurements for some goals and uneven progress 
amongst other goals were considered detracting factors.141 For instance, Goal 7 relating to 
ensuring environmental sustainability, comprised of 4 targets and 8 indicators. These targets 
ranged from integrating the principles of sustainable development into country policies and 
programs, its indicators denoted as 7A (1-3) include: reverse loss of environmental resources, 
reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss 
proportion of land area covered by forest, tackling CO2 emissions, Consumption of ozone-
depleting substances etc.  
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In as much as the MDG’s environmental sustainability targets and indicators were useful in 
defining or assessing how readily or effectively states were progressing towards achieving the 
environmental goals of the MDGs, they were however criticized as porous, inadequate markers, 
difficult to measure and lacking country specific contexts.142 Moreover, goal 7 of the MDGs 
crucially fails to mention agriculture which has inter-linkages with environmental 
sustainability, social development and also has implications for a majority of the world’s poor 
who are farmers. The MDGs thus failed in this instance at reconciling key aspects of the 
sustainable development agenda, relating to the environment and social pillars. These amongst 
other factors, like failure to generate consensus, inadequate consultations with relevant 
stakeholders especially the poor,143 ultimately resulted in the MDGs replacement in 2016 by 
the sustainable development goals (SDGs). The SDGs, certainly embodied a more expansive 
and quantitative framework of goals, targets and indicators, albeit with some goals considered 
by some as tenuous and capable of triggering tensions or complications that undermine 
environmental sustainability.144 
Consequently, the SDGs which are designed to build on the MDGs and “complete what they 
did not achieve”145 were adopted by 193 states of the UN in 2015 as a means of articulating a 
global consensus spanning 15 years, to advance the aims of sustainable development. The UN 
essentially targets pervasive, global, environmental, economic and social challenges by these 
SDGs to dissociate growth and development aspirations of states and private actors from 
deleterious environmental and social impacts. These 17 goals and accompanying 169 targets 
and 230 indicators serve to incorporate the substantive and procedural elements of sustainable 
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development articulated in the Rio declaration and Agenda 21, albeit with modifications, by 
expanding the concept to accommodate the dynamics of change in environmental protection or 
economic and social considerations over time. Arguably, the SDGs more or less strive to 
articulate greater detail without obfuscating the purpose of sustainable development ingrained 
in Agenda 21, the Rio declaration and accompanying principles. 
A summation of the Sustainable Development Goals include: 1. Ending poverty in all its forms 
everywhere, 2. Ending hunger, achieving food security, improved nutrition and sustainable 
agriculture, 3. Ensuring healthy lives and well-being, 4. Inclusive, equitable, quality education 
and lifelong learning opportunities, 5. Gender equality and women empowerment, 
6.Sustainable management of water and sanitation, 7. Affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
modern energy, 8. Sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, Productive 
employment and decent work, 9. Building resilient infrastructure, sustainable industrialization 
and fostering innovation, 10. Reducing inequality within and among countries, 11. Sustainable 
cities and human settlements, 12. Sustainable consumption and production patterns, 13. 
Combating climate change and its impacts, 14. Sustainable use of the oceans, seas and marine 
resources for sustainable development, 15. Sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, forests 
management, halt biodiversity loss, 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development, access to justice, effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at 
all levels, 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for 
sustainable development.146 Thus, UN member states are prompted to collaborate in applying 
the 2030 Agenda, to development plans to achieve holistic sustainable development. 
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As evident from the preceding stated goals and targets, the 17 SDGs thus mirror the core 
principles of sustainable development encompassing: The Integration principle, 
preventive/precautionary principle, sustainable use and consumption of resources, the polluter 
pays principle as well as equity.147 These SDGs are closely interconnected with the intent that 
they potentially impact on each other. Thus, positive contributions and progress in a sphere or 
set of goals improves on other goals. Hence, efforts to achieve goals 1-6, comprising: poverty 
eradication, sustainable agriculture, food security, sanitation, sustainable cities, including 
sustainable industrialization and energy are those that ultimately trigger sustainable economic 
growth.148 Moreover, whilst the MDGs thrived on average percentiles, for instance most of its 
goals included the catch phrase …”to reduce by half or by two-thirds” as evident across targets 
1A-1C on the poverty eradication goal, including health and environmental goals. The SDGs 
clearly targets all people, with the maxim, “leave no one behind”.149 
Nevertheless, these preceding glowing attributes of the SDGs raise presumptions or obvious 
questions. Are the SDGs so all-encompassing, or so formidable and full-proof that they are 
effectively capable of obliterating contemporary global problems affecting the environment, 
people and business, especially oil and gas business or its peculiar challenges? In as much as 
these questions may yield positive or negative answers as indeed sustainable development is 
an all-embracing concept represented in the SDGs, with probable keys or submissions towards 
tackling virtually all spheres of global endeavor. However, as innovative as this vehicle of 
engendering global sustainable development is, it is regrettably, not flawless. The SDGs have 
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indeed been criticized as merely aspirational goals like its predecessors,150 articulating 
excessively broad expanse of goals,151 a voluntary agreement rather than a binding treaty and 
ultimately, states might fail to perform or achieve all of the goals expectations.152  
In all probability, this flexibility of the SDGs could prove to be an attenuating factor as much 
of the responsibility for securing the SDGs is reliant on political actors, institutions or civil 
society. Nonetheless, the SDG framework creates opportunities for states in adopting more 
ambitious plans or targets due to their non-binding nature. However, a truly challenging area, 
remains that same “integrative” component inalienable to the concept of sustainable 
development, upholding the unification of divergent goals. This integration often poses 
practical application or implementation challenges. For instance, positive efforts to achieve 
goals 1, 2 and 8, relating to poverty eradication, food security, improved nutrition, sustainable 
agriculture and sustainable economic growth, may impose challenging demands on Goals 6 
and 15, relating to the sustainable use of water, including management of terrestrial spaces.  
Moreover, other potentially contradictory or criticized areas include: Goal 12 which advocates 
sustainable consumption, though laudable, is yet discordant with Goal 8, which targets 
increased inclusive and sustained economic growth, GDP growth and increased economic 
productivity everywhere else.153 Arguably, this demand for increased or sustained economic 
growth everywhere, comprising developing and least developed states without a corresponding 
articulation of how developed countries may rein-in development ambitions or over-
consumption appears counter-productive in optimizing climate action targets articulated in 
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Goal 13. Apparently, such an omission to differentiate apposite growth objectives between 
developing and developed states smacks of incoherence or discordance with scientific realities 
and could be detrimental to the actualization of the SDGs climate action and environmental 
protection goals.154 
The challenges of integrating the SDGs notwithstanding, the 17 goals and 169 targets remain 
so closely interlinked that it is inconceivable in practical terms to accomplish them on a stand-
alone basis. Presumably, the SDGs seek to circumvent its implementation challenges via 
anchoring heavily on a broad-based participation, in co-opting local and international 
partnerships for sustainable development articulated by goals 16-17.155 Nonetheless, this 
possible reliance on international partnerships articulated by Goal 17 is equally controversial. 
Goal 17 which targets broad-based partnerships, international cooperation and collaboration, 
more trade liberalisation, also alludes to the need to ‘enhance global macroeconomic stability’ 
through ‘policy coordination’.156 It is however decried for lacking specific targets towards 
providing such macro-economic stability, policy coordination, including the means towards 
achieving these aims.157  
Moreover, the SDGs have incurred scathing criticisms on neglecting the issue of tax avoidance, 
tax evasion or debt service, which as posited by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), drain developing, resource dependent countries of massive sums of 
national incomes that could better optimize poverty eradication.158 Another diminishing factor 
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of the SDGs is that, whereas they articulate ‘debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, 
as may be appropriate’ the SDGs are curiously silent on debt cancellation, which remains a 
negating feature as it weighs heavily on developing states incomes and is thus inimical to their 
sustainable development.159  
However, it may also be argued that, Goal 17 and its targets as expressed in 17.4 to “assist 
developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies 
aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address 
the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress” presents a platform 
for a downwards review, re-negotiation and possible cancellation of external debts to reduce 
debt distress of poor countries. Such a debt relief or restructuring feature, could also operate as 
a safety catch to discourage waste or arbitrary use of development funds, as indeed 
mismanagement of development funds, presents real challenges in developing countries with 
weak institutions that foment corruption. 
Arguably, the most criticized feature of the SDGs includes the absence of a hierarchy or goals 
prioritization. Kotze argues that the SDGs, “…Being fragmented, silo-ist and non-hierarchical 
merely reinforces the potential of the SDGs to be used by states as a legitimating and 
justificatory foundation to prioritise socio-economic growth over environmental protection”.160 
Undoubtedly, the SDGs could have been more proactive or incisive if it had clarified some 
hierarchical formulation for accomplishing the goals. This could better optimize its efficiency 
as a targeted governance tool for actualizing eco-systems sustainability. More so, as 
particularly prioritizing environmental goals over other goals ultimately engenders the over-
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arching aims of sustainable development. This is because, development invariably remains 
sustainable when actuated within the confines of the earth’s ecological capacity. 
Nevertheless, it is herein argued that, although the SDGs may not be considered as the “new 
global Grundnorm for achieving global governance”,161 towards catalysing the earth’s system 
integrity or ecological sustainability, the SDGs, at least from the developing country 
perspective, presents a viable launch-pad, albeit rudimentary, towards accessing pathways to 
sustainable development. Indeed, as argued in this research, the SDGs present a relatable 
compass to navigate towards oil industry sustainability that need not result in the impairment 
of both environmental and social pillars of the sustainable development paradigm during oil 












1.3. International Cooperation and Partnerships: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable 
Development? 
To advance ongoing discussions on the relevance of tools and indicators for operationalizing 
sustainable development, this section expatiates on international cooperation which is used 
broadly, in a general sense and interchangeably with international collaboration or partnerships 
for sustainable development as articulated by the SDGs. This section examines the extent, if 
any, to which international cooperation and partnerships can contribute to oil industry 
governance to engender sustainable development.  
International cooperation or collaboration towards development has been recognised as “a sine 
qua non of any meaningful international development strategy”.162 In other words, international 
cooperation connotes a vital or tactical approach towards achieving development goals. 
International cooperation can also infer a feasible means by which development assistance, 
financial, technical or human resources, may be transferred to the global South, and thus forms 
an essential part of development.163 International collaboration likewise accommodates: 
voluntary or mandatory, including, bilateral, multi-lateral, trade or aid oriented approaches. In 
fact, international collaboration can co-opt varied participation strategies, ranging from 
inter/intra state, or private and public actors, as a means of coordination or implementation to 
drive accountability and sustainability in development agendas.  
Certainly, international partnerships for sustainable development as articulated in goal 17 of 
the SDGs which posits, ‘Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global 
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partnership for sustainable development’164 is not an entirely novel feature of international 
instrumentation towards development. Earlier documents such as goal 8 of the MDGs also 
provides for instituting a global partnership for sustainable development.165 Similarly, the UN 
Charter in its Art. 55 provides, ‘[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate 
action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55’.166 These include, ‘higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development’ and ‘solutions of international economic, 
social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation’.167  
The foregoing indeed constitutes aspects of sustainable development requiring cooperation as 
articulated by the SDGs, and before them the Rio Declaration via Principle 5. Apparently, 
Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration is suggestive of a duty to Cooperate towards achieving 
sustainable development, as it provides that, “All States and all people shall co-operate in the 
essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable 
development….168  
Notwithstanding these provisions which appear very inclined towards vigorous mobilization 
of states towards international cooperation, even inferring a putative duty on states to 
endeavour international cooperation for sustainable development, the issue of any such 
incumbent duty to cooperate at international law to achieve developmental goals remains 
controversial. Whereas, developing states often attribute normativity towards international 
cooperation and deem it an essential element of sustainable development, this perceived 
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normativity is all too often refuted by the developed states which consider cooperation as 
mostly flexible, or voluntarist.169 
Arguably, a firmer or obligatory stance, denoted by French as a “rights-based approach or 
legally binding solidarity”170 towards international cooperation and international partnerships 
for fulfilling the SDGs could be more efficacious in the SDGs attainment. Such legally binding 
solidarity no doubt, could do more to expedite the achievement of the designated targets of 
Goal 17. Nevertheless, this research posits that, despite the limitations of goal 17 and the 
inherent or corresponding difficulty created by the absence of an obligation to cooperate, the 
indorsing of international cooperation as a substantive goal of the SDGs reiterates its 
significance. Better still, Goal 17 presents the possibility of arrangements or affiliations capable 
of accommodating top-down and bottom-up approaches for driving sustainable governance in 
developing petro-states. 
Furthermore, Goal 17, does indeed draw parallels from Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration and 
presents, relevant and applicable mustering points towards international collaboration for 
sustainable development, which prove instructive and implementable in an oil industry context. 
Moreover, Goal 17 targets the focal points relating to the instituting of international 
partnerships to strengthen: Finance, technology, capacity building and trade. Goal 17 further 
acknowledges the realistic challenges posed by systemic issues which circumscribe: policy and 
institutional coherence, multi-stakeholder partnerships for mobilizing and sharing knowledge, 
expertise, technology and financial resources to support the attainment of the SDGs.  
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Undoubtedly, the broad-ranging targets of Goal 17 remain vital towards harnessing oil-industry 
efficiency and constitute game-changers in actualizing sustainable development in petro-states. 
It is for precisely these reasons that this research argues for the maximizing of such 
international cooperation, partnerships and engagement to engender effective governance for 
driving the sustainable development agenda in oil producing states. 
1.3.1. Sustainable Governance and Oil Exploitation: Identifying Tools and Partnerships 
for Sustainable Development 
Progressing from the foregoing, this sub-section considers vital aspects of sustainable 
development relating to the strengthening of governance institutions within national 
governments to achieve the SDGs. The sub-section therefore hinges on identifying relevant 
tools and indicators in line with Goals 16-17 for sustainable governance, especially in 
petroleum producing states. This is because the issues of governance and international 
partnerships are stressed as requiring re-enforcements to achieve the SDGs. Rosenau defines 
governance at all levels as ‘encompassing the activities of governments, but it also includes the 
many other channels through which “commands” flow in the form of goals framed, directives 
issued, and policies pursued’.171  
It is further posited that governance in the context of sustainable development connotes a means 
towards deciphering the ways by which countries manage political and social systems 
including the exercise of power and authority that ultimately affect the achievement of 
environmental goals, social development, and economic growth in a polity. This eventually 
translates into the ways and means of distribution of national wealth or services to eliminate 
inequities whilst achieving poverty eradication. Indeed, power dynamics thrive in petro-states 
whilst imposing lucrative platforms for the powerful political elite, IOCs and other formidable 
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economic groups such as financial institutions. These powerful actors all too often, ignore the 
interests of the poor and marginalized, thus necessitating governance reforms to curtail 
corruption and rent capture of petroleum resources, including culling an existent or parasitic 
structure that fosters inequality.172 
It is thus argued that, the SDGs cannot be achieved in vacuo or in an apolitical environment. 
Acknowledging the influence of governance factors or its consequential and corresponding 
effects on oil exploitation is therefore essential. Reason being that, power relations and 
dynamics are far too real in the oil industry, whether from a global or national context. To 
assume otherwise is overly simplistic and does little to advance environmental or social, 
including equity goals in oil producing states.  
Achieving sustainable development in developing oil producing states therefore becomes 
crucially dependent on the integration of sustainable governance. Sustainable governance as 
proffered by SDG 16, recommends international partnerships for its realization. It is an 
emerging concept embracing good governance. Good governance denotes accountable, 
transparent, equitable and participatory governance which readily conforms to the rule of 
law.173 Sustainable governance thus predicates the need for corruption prevention which is 
interlinked with transparency, strong institutions and accountable governance structures. 
Evidently, the SDGs drastically improve on Agenda 21 and the MDGs by clarifying in goals 
16-17, the targets and indicators of sustainable governance, including areas for effective 
collaboration and international partnerships to achieve the SDGs.174 Moreover, Goal 16 
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specifically articulates the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels. Its associated targets entail substantially reducing corruption and 
bribery in all their forms whilst developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions, 
including capacity strengthening at all levels through international cooperation, especially in 
developing countries.175 In other words, assessing or measuring sustainable governance 
indicators within national governments would involve the levels of participation, inclusiveness, 
access to justice, level of regulatory enforcement, strength of national institutions, the degree 
or level of public sector transparency, presence or absence of bribery or corruption and level 
of national government’s accountability in terms of public revenues administration and public 
procurements evident within its oil-sector. 
More so, the UN in specifically advocating international partnerships to engender transparency 
and tackle corruption for effective, accountable and sustainable governance provides in 
Chapter, 1. Art.1. (a-b) of the UN Corruption Convention, the inevitability of international 
partnerships to combat corruption.176 The Convention further asserts that, “corruption is no 
longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, 
making international cooperation to prevent and control it essential.”177 Sustainable 
governance therefore predicates the exigency of corruption prevention which is interlinked 
with transparency, strong institutions and accountable governance structures.  178 Indeed, in 
describing the considerable menace posed by corruption, including the threats to sustainable 
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development and thus necessitating international partnerships for the control. The UN asserts 
that;   
“Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on 
societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human 
rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism 
and other threats to human security to flourish”.179 
Thus, in a bid to project these aims of sustainable governance and corruption control in national 
governments and the petroleum industry, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) was launched in 2002 at the WSSD in Johannesburg.180 EITI aims to tackle governance 
challenges, including the “resource curse”181 syndrome associated with poor governance in 
resource rich developing states.182 Undoubtedly, the EITI is proving relevant as an international 
partnership to engender the means of achieving goals 16-17 relating to transparency and 
accountability for sustainable governance of the petroleum industry in oil producing states.  
Essentially, the EITI operates a global standard for the good governance of oil and gas 
resources. EITI also identifies and tackles the key governance problems relating to 
transparency, accountability and corruption in the extractive sectors of member states. The 
essence of such tracking is to regulate member states’ behaviour for institutional and capacity 
strengthening, by engendering procurements and process transparency in the oil industry. The 
EITI secures these aims via compulsory reporting to assess member states’ performance in 
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governing petroleum resources to foster sustainable development in mineral and petro-
economies.183  
Arguably, the global significance of the EITI is predicated on the fact that corporations engaged 
in oil and gas production, likewise minerals extraction are largely plagued with: financial 
malpractices, oblique or opaque deals, illicit cash flows and other irregularities which have 
resulted in tarnished reputations in terms of corruptions perception.184 In buttressing this view, 
the Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI), identifies oil and gas 
as the fourth most corrupt international commercial sector, with mining in fifth place.185  
Likewise, in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-
bribery Convention (2014 report) targeting transnational corruption which relied on data from 
over 427 case procedures from 1999, it was quite evident that one in five cases or (19%) of 
transnational corruption took place in the oil or extractives sector. This is indicative of the fact 
that, the oil industry realistically poses a global and intransigent challenge in terms of 
corruption, even surpassing arms dealing.186 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is herein 
relevant, as it has extra-territorial implications against the bulk of IOCs which have their 
registered headquarters in OECD states. 
Evidently, the key reasons why the oil and gas industry remains susceptible to a substantial risk 
of corruption can be attributable to the fact of its high liquidity and mammoth cash or financial 
flows. Also, Petro-business or oil trade itself necessitates extensive or considerable interactions 
with numerous public officials and government agents, especially in cases of government 
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owned or national oil companies (NOCs). All too often, opportunities abound for public 
officers to abuse their office. More so, crude sales or transactions along the petroleum industry 
value chain comprising, licencing, revenues, procurement, production, expenditure, etc. and 
corresponding actors can be extremely opaque.187 Indeed, in many cases, sales transactions are 
not clearly subjected to specific regulations or international standards.188 
Thus, for targeted efforts at oil industry management aimed at corruption prevention, there 
should be transparency along the petroleum industry value chain.189 This includes: 
transparency in the allocation and registration of petroleum contracts and leases, the 
beneficiaries of those contracts should be known, as well as the overall impacts of petroleum 
sales, revenue in-flows and expenditure in the oil producing state’s economy to ascertain 
irregularities in the sector whilst prompting accountability and accurate reporting to EITI, as 
an international partner for sustainable development.  
Certainly, it is quite possible to undermine the EITI’s relevance as a tool or catalyst for 
sustainable development in petro-states as it is a voluntary initiative which has even been 
considered “toothless”.190 It is however pointed out that, oil producing states comply with these 
monitoring, or reporting criteria and transparency assessments as they generate global rankings, 
positive reviews, whilst improving a petro-state’s credibility regarding multi-lateral funding or 
technical assistance arrangements, including, boosting investor confidence in the oil sector.191 
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These contribute as constructive and measurable steps of petro-states towards achieving the 
SDGs, including exhibiting economic growth, and relevant governance indicators.192 
1.3.2. Sustainable Governance: Regulatory Controls as Tools of Transparency and 
Accountability for Oil Industry Governance  
In furtherance of earlier discussions advocating governance tools and indicators for sustainable 
development, this subsection considers the extent to which Regulatory controls can foster 
transparency and accountability within the oil industry. Basically, Regulatory controls can 
operate as considerable tools to engender transparency in the petroleum sector when the 
regulations and policies are clearly defined. Moreover, securing compliance with stipulated 
guidelines is less complicated where the rules are accessible, assessable and unambiguous. This 
subsection thus posits the efficacy of regulatory controls as useful tools to optimize 
transparency and accountability in the petroleum sector.  
The petroleum industry requires positive regulations, policies and management initiatives to 
drive sustainable development goals. These are crucial for ensuring that the positive gains or 
benefits from hydrocarbons exploitation are not altogether eroded by an extractive process that 
undermines environmental protection, social or community development, and which fosters 
irreparable damage. Thus, where the roles and responsibilities of regulators, oil producers, 
government or its agencies articulate adequate guidelines accommodating all pillars of the 
sustainable development paradigm it becomes easier to identify non-compliance with the 
petroleum regulations or guidelines and apportion responsibility to enhance their enforcement. 
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Notwithstanding, it is however clarified that, developing or other oil-rich countries are beset 
with environmental, economic and social problems not entirely from a lack of regulatory 
frameworks which articulate environmental provisions, but from complex reasons which could 
range from corruption,193 lack of political will to enforce the rules,194 or even malicious 
intent,195 Oftentimes, environmental and social issues during oil exploitation are either 
inconsistently invoked, ignored or relegated and in some instances wielded as a weapon of sorts 
for purposes unrelated to rectifying environmental damage.196 The foregoing therefore typifies 
the obvious gaps created between the laws on paper and the reality wherein they are ineffectual 
in oil producing states. This could be indicative of a manifest failure in harnessing or 
maximising regulatory potential as tools for capacity and institutional strengthening to drive 
sustainable development goals in the industry. This forms a focal point argued in this thesis as 
to how the written laws or rules can be influential and instrumental to achieving sustainable 
development goals. The essence of this argument is that, enforcement of environmental 
regulations and social policies during petroleum exploitation remain bulwarks to making laws 
and programmes work.  
Nonetheless, securing compliance with petroleum regulations and its enforcement is 
significantly contingent upon the apparent levels of petroleum process transparency. These 
processes include: contractual phase to pre-exploration and post-production procedures and 
accommodate: petroleum revenue transparency, procurement accounting and audit. Thus, 
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petroleum contracts awards should be publicised and competitive, to secure the best bids 
anchoring all pillars of the sustainable development paradigm. Similarly, discretionary contract 
awards should be avoided as they undermine transparency and accountability, inevitably 
institutionalizing corruption in the oil industry.197 Moreover, bidding processes should be 
openly advertised to prevent bribery, corruption or favouritism from marring the process. 
Evidently, the adequacy of independent, impartial and transparent review processes to make 
defaulters accountable, is suggestive of more sustainable oil industry governance procedures 
advocated by SDG16, as they engender regulatory compliance and institutional strengthening. 
Likewise, petroleum rules and policies should clearly delineate roles and responsibilities 
among the oil sector’s actors, as opaque or oblique rules attenuate transparency and 
accountability.198 Hence, the existence of paper laws and environmental agencies cannot be 
sufficient guarantees or proofs that preventive and adequate environmental safeguards, 
mitigations, pollution controls and social protection measures will be undertaken during oil 
production. The existing petroleum legal framework must thus anchor on clarity, avoid 
granting covert powers or excessive discretionary authority to top industry officials as these 
also foment corruption, abuse of powers, whilst impinging on transparency and accountability 
in the industry, to render petroleum regulations bereft of influence or incompetent as 
governance tools. 
1.3.3. Sustainable Governance: International Partnerships as Governance Tools in Petro-
states 
In advancing discussions on identifying tools and international partnerships for the sustainable 
governance of the petroleum industry, this subsection elaborates on Goal 17 of the SDGs, with 
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particular reference to international finance institutions. Goal 17 as earlier appraised, provides 
for strengthening the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for 
Sustainable Development. Goal 17 also targets domestic resource mobilization, including 
through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and 
other revenue collection, as well as enabling partnerships for social development.199 This 
subsection therefore posits the utility of international finance institutions as tools for 
strengthening the means of implementing sustainable development in developing petro-states 
via the instrumentality of development funding, provision of technical assistance and reporting 
of progress made towards the SDGs.  
The UN in promoting strategies to foster international partnerships and cooperation established 
various multilateral entities such as the World Bank, international programmes such as the UN 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) including regimes such as the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to engender cooperation and partnerships towards 
achieving development goals. These international agencies have been accountable for policy 
instruments that directly impact the oil and gas industry to advance the aims of sustainable 
development. Some of these instruments include: the UNEP/IE Guidelines for the oil industry, 
the World Bank Guidelines for the oil industry which is closely identical to the UNEP/IE 
guidelines200, including the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The OECD 
Guidelines, clarifies principles and standards for the responsible conduct of international oil 
and gas corporations (IOCs), in developing countries. The guidelines apply extra-territorially, 
to IOCs operational in both OECD adhering and non-adhering countries. Essentially, these 
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guidelines provide guidance on: environmental protection, social development, human rights 
and industrial relations in oil producing areas. 
Moreover, the targets and indicators of Goal 17 altogether highlight multi-level partnerships to 
include state and non-state actors, non-governmental organizations, international development 
or international finance organizations to collaborate in the funding, monitoring, capacity and 
institutional strengthening, including performance and reporting of the progress made towards 
the SDGs. This is because, co-opting and efficiently coordinating the appropriate mix of top-
bottom and bottom-up approaches via multi-stakeholder collaboration reinforces the means of 
implementing sustainable development and remains decisive in the achievement of the 
framework of goals. The proceeding subsections will therefore, address international 
organizations like the World Bank and Equator Finance Institutions as relevant international 
partnerships for instigating and reporting progress towards the achievement of sustainable 
development in developing petro-states.  
1.3.4. Sustainable Governance: The World Bank as a Global Partner for Sustainable 
Development in Petro-States 
This subsection propels the on-going discussions regarding sustainable governance for 
engendering the sustainable development agenda, by clarifying the position of the World Bank 
as a strategic international partner towards sustainable development. The World Bank is herein 
considered a tactical or strategic partner as it further aligns with the aims of Goal 17 of the 
SDGs, because it partners with states, private sector, civil society or IGOs towards 
progressively achieving sustainable development.201 This it does via providing essential 
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development funding or finance, technical assistance, including capacity strengthening, 
especially in developing states.202 More importantly, the World Bank also sets and implements 
crucial environmental and social standards in an oil industry specific context.203 These 
standards which will be further elaborated serve to engender eco-system sustainability and 
social welfare during petroleum exploitation. It was founded in Bretton Woods, USA as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1944, with its headquarters in 
Washington DC. Although initially established to tackle reconstructuring in Europe,204 its 
portfolio has since bourgeoned to address the environment, climate change, food and energy 
security, finance, trade and virtually all spheres of development financing and assistance.205  
Moreover, the World Bank’s policy relating to sustainable governance evolved from a 1989 
World Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa, tagging the governance situation as a “crises of 
governance”.206 This report was mostly due to a review of the World Bank’s corporate policies 
regarding the ineffectiveness of aid to the region, the apathy or non-commitment of recipient 
governments to reforms and the pervasive corruption in minerals or petro-rich developing 
countries.207 This prompted the Bank’s imposition of good governance conditionality within 
funding agreements to engender transparency, accountability, including responsible 
development financing. It is however clarified that the World Bank’s imposition of “good 
governance” criteria before developing states can access requisite bilateral and multilateral 
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financing for development projects has however been subject to controversy.208 Indeed, 
governance conditionality has faced considerable criticism as verging on the confines of states’ 
sovereignty,209 and disparaged as an ineffective measure.210 Albeit, this evokes a query 
concerning whether, acceding to a World Bank funding treaty is not perhaps sufficient exercise 
of a state’s prerogative or sovereignty? Arguably, it is within the State’s discretion to accept or 
reject the agreement on basis of the imposed or “disagreeable” conditions. Undoubtedly, such 
governance, environmental and social conditionality in the World Bank’s funding 
arrangements constitute major leverages towards sustainable development as it fosters 
platforms for institutional or capacity strengthening, including implementing the means of 
securing the targets of Goal 17. 
The World Bank (hereinafter the Bank) further proposed its own contribution to the sustainable 
development agenda by advocating a strategy that targets all three pillars of the sustainable 
development paradigm: environment, economic growth and social development in conjunction 
with intergenerational well-being during petroleum exploitation.211 Even though the Bank may 
perhaps be criticized on account of a general underperformance in the area of human rights,212 
it does however articulate specific safeguard policies and compliance procedures towards 
actualizing sustainable development in the oil and gas industry.213   
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Notwithstanding the Bank’s considerable potential as an international partner for sustainable 
development, it is conceded that its reputation as the so-called “Washington Consensus”214 or 
Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) raises concerns as to its suitability for securing 
environmental goals via development financing in developing states with weak institutions.215 
Reason being that, the BWIs neo-liberal or fundamental market-based ideologies, including 
strict economic policies targeting deregulation and privatization of nationalized industries to 
enhance GDP growth and trade liberalization are condemned as inimical to social development 
and poverty eradication in developing states.216 
Indeed, it has been argued that these BWI policies constitute hurdles to sustainable 
development by their pursuit of macro-economic policies in uneven market situations in 
developing states and as such, the Bank cannot be expected to present viable solutions while 
they remain proponents of an approach that promotes aggressive GDP growth and 
unsustainable consumption.217 Indeed, this is a broad area which exceeds the scope of this 
research. It is however proffered that, the World Bank has over-time progressed in line with 
dynamic shifts towards environmental sustainability, influenced by international 
environmental law and policy, from its erstwhile mandate which imposed strict commitments 
to purely “economic considerations”.218  
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Evidently, the Bank’s contemporary multilateral funding arrangements do incorporate specific 
guidelines known as the World Bank Safeguard Policies.219 The Safeguard policies are binding 
instruments articulating the Bank’s lending guidelines or processes, with clearly stated rules or 
obligations accruing to the borrowing state as funding pre-requisites.220 The Safeguard policies 
encompass a broad range of requirements essential for the oil and gas industry. These range 
from: technical assistance, environmental protection guidelines,221 to institutional reforms, 
human and institutional capacity strengthening, etc. The safeguards also entrench social 
development guidelines relating to public participation and consultations on case specific 
projects, including the disclosure of relevant environmental information.222 
To a substantial extent, the Bank’s mandate purports a responsibility and duty to be more than 
just a passive spectator in funding and development partnerships. Certainly, the Bank has an 
incumbent duty to engender sustainable development as expressly posited in the Bank’s 
operational guidelines.223  Thus, the Bank is prima facie constrained to refrain from projects or 
acts which are at cross-purposes to environmental sustainability and social development 
objectives. In as much as an affirmative obligation to act towards securing core environmental 
objectives in development funding, may not be expressly construed as absolute from the 
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rules,224 the Bank’s guidelines however normatively seek to address and engender positive 
steps towards environmental and social sustainability during oil and gas exploitation via the 
signing of the funding instrument to reinforce it as a binding treaty between the Bank and 
recipient state.225 It is further stressed that, the Bank is indeed uniquely positioned and 
imbedded with a distinct responsibility to trigger enormous positive difference in the 
actualization of environmental protection and social development objectives in developing 
petro-states. In this regard, the Bank currently provides funding of social welfare projects also 
known as “World Bank bottom-up projects”226 and incorporates Compliance as well as carbon 
reporting mechanisms.227  
As a matter of fact, the Bank’s considerable exposure to media or NGO pressures towards a 
more environmentally friendly stance is necessitating a proposed shift from the funding of on-
shore oil and gas projects to solely off-shore gas projects to re-align climate-action objectives 
in developing states.228 This makes the subsequent discussions on Equator banks in the next 
sub-section essential, in view of the vacuum the World bank’s departure would create in terms 
of development financing for oil and gas projects. The Bank’s fiat is thus expansive, legally 
enforceable and constitutes the Bank’s specialized or exclusive contribution to fostering 
sustainability geared financing in developing states.229 
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1.3.5. Sustainable Governance: “Equator Banks” as International Partners for 
Sustainable Development in Petro-States  
In elaborating further on the relevance of international partnerships for sustainable 
development, this subsection highlights “Equator Banks”230 as tools of such international and 
multi-stakeholder partnerships advocated by Goal 17. The Equator Principles (EPs) are a 
voluntary framework initially designed in 2003 and thereafter modified in 2006 and 2011. The 
Principles emerged from the coordinated efforts of international lending institutions and the 
International Finance Corporation (a subsidiary of the World Bank Group).231 It aimed to 
manage the social and environmental risks associated with international project finance in 
developing countries.232 Moreover, the Equator principles comprise a broader theoretical 
framework articulated in specific versions designated as EP 1, EP II, and EP III,233 The need 
for such a framework arose to optimize concerted efforts to boost the sustainability agenda in 
developing states and to fill the vacuum created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF’s) 
withdrawal from international project finance due to considerable NGO pressure.234  
Furthermore, NGO pressure led to international finance institutions conceding to voluntary 
imposition of the IFC’s Performance standards, limitations and guidelines on development 
projects.235 These Performance Standards contain a set of ten principles designed to mitigate 
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232 See, Joshua A. Lance, Equator Principles III: A Hard Look at Soft Law, 17 N.C. Banking Inst. 175 (2013). Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol17/iss1/8. See also, History of the Equator Principles, Equator Principles Ass'n, 
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about/history-of-the-eps (last visited 20 March 2018). See Thomas 
Papadopoulos, The Greening of Project Finance: Is This a Viable Project? 7 ICFAI U. J. OF BANKING L. 8, 9-12 2009). 
233 Joshua A. Lance, Equator Principles III: A Hard Look at Soft Law, 17 N.C. Banking Inst. 175 (2013). Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol17/iss1/8 11 
234 The IMF withdrew from project finance due to the high-profile protests that feared that private investment firms would 
introduce a brand of ruthless capitalism into developing countries' infrastructure projects. 
235 See, Equator Principles III. (2014). Equator principles III: An introduction and practical guide. Available at: 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/equator-principles-iii-pdf-17mb-111048.pdf. Accessed, 20 March 2018 
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the social and environmental risks associated with project financing. They include: 1, Review 
and Categorisation, 2, Environmental and Social Assessment, 3, Applicable Environmental and 
Social Standards, 4, Environmental and Social Management System and Equator Principles 
Action Plan, 5, Stakeholder Engagement, 6, Grievance Mechanism, 7, Independent Review, 8, 
Covenants, 9, Independent Monitoring and Reporting. and 10, Reporting and Transparency. In 
considering the Equator Banks standards, it is pertinent to question how these specific terms or 
conditions imposed on borrowers who in this case are non-state actors, can drive the aims of 
sustainable development in developing states. In contrast to the World Bank funding 
agreements with hosts states which are considered treaties, these multilateral funding 
arrangements with transnational oil companies are not treaties or conventions.236  
Even though, it may be construed that the more flexible EP funding arrangements which do 
not constitute treaties like the World Bank agreements are disadvantaged on that ground, it is 
nonetheless clarified, that the EP agreements remain legally binding between the parties. 
Moreover, as instruments that aspire to regulate and proffer guidance within the context of 
sustainable development and responsible financing envisaged by SDG17, their relevance at 
regulating behaviour of their specific partners to optimize sustainable development goals 
cannot be dismissed,237  
The EPFI’s impose their guidelines and standards as conditions on the borrowers in exchange 
for requisite funding to promote sustainability within the oil industry context for which the 
funds are sought. In other words, the Equator Banks evidently clarify the limits of their funding 
partnerships, provide guidance and determine how conflicts between other rules may be 
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resolved.238 The Equator Principles categorically provide that the Equator banks “will not 
provide loans directly to projects where the borrower will not or is unable to comply with [their] 
environmental and social policies and processes”.239 
Ultimately, these Equator banks need to show depth of commitment to the rules and guidelines 
by foregoing projects that fail the required standards. This is due to envisaged public scrutiny 
of their lending activities as required by Principles 9-10.240 Moreover, the failure to forego 
unsustainable projects can attract damaging publicity and compromises corporate reputation, 
creates negative media attention, as well as NGO pressure as in the earlier cited IMF’s 
withdrawal from the Chad-Cameroun Pipeline funding scenario.241 To this extent, the Equator 
banks can internalize the Principles within their lending criteria.242 Furthermore, the 
implications of EP-Principle 10, requires the Banks to publicize annual reports, relating to the 
EPs implementation processes for respective projects, as in this case oil and gas projects. Thus, 
giving NGOs or civil society leverages to tackle breaches or non-compliance with the 
Principles’ stipulations. 
Notwithstanding, these Equator Banks have faced various criticisms, ranging from inadequate 
enforcement mechanisms to absence of delisting mechanisms,243 recourse to minimal standards 
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239 See, Equator Principles III. (2014). Equator principles III: An introduction and practical guide. Available at: 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/equator-principles-iii-pdf-17mb-111048.pdf. Accessed, 20 March 2018 
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Law & Policy 33, no. 4 (2011): 542-575. See also, Missbach, Andreas. "The Equator Principles: Drawing the line for 
socially responsible banks? An interim review from an NGO perspective." Development 47, no. 3 (2004): 78-
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241 See I. Gary, and N. Reisch, “Chad's Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa's Newest Petro- State”, 
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243 See, Joshua A. Lance, Equator Principles III: A Hard Look at Soft Law, 17 N.C. Banking Inst. 175 (2013). Available at: 




in developing states, even avoiding scrutiny for their lending activities on “confidentiality 
grounds”244, and inclined to protect their fiduciary interests or substantial investments and thus 
sacrifice environmental or social goals.245 However, the nagging question remains, what better 
framework is there for achieving or operationalizing sustainable project financing in 
developing countries? As it is, these Banks/IFCs have, to a significant extent introduced some 
semblance of order, transparency and accountability in erstwhile uncharted terrains, that of 
high net worth, multilateral investments in developing nations. Some of these developing 
countries may even have undemocratic governments in place but require development 
assistance for poverty eradication. These Banks thus clarify the parameters of sustainable 
development to permeate project performance in developing countries. Hence filling up a 
yawning chasm to drive sustainable development goals via state and non-state actors, until it 
becomes the norm and practice in petroleum projects execution in developing states. 
1.4. Sustainable Development and Oil Exploitation: Integrating Viable Synergies and 
Managing Trade-offs Across the SDGs 
Having clarified the importance of operationalizing sustainable development via: principles, 
goals, targets, indicators or tools, in the previous section as fundamental means of its 
implementation at international law and on a national scale, this section considers how far it is 
possible to argue for goals integration across the SDGs to engender feasible synergies in the 
oil industry context whilst eliminating likely trade-offs. This section further identifies how 
sustainable development principles and goals can chart a credible pathway towards achieving 
the SDGs in the oil industry, by addressing the industry’s peculiar challenges. Undoubtedly, 
the contemporary oil and gas industry is confronted with irrefutable global challenges and is at 
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a critical juncture. These challenges cut across environmental, economic, political or 
technological demands to tailor exploration and production activities in accordance with wide-
ranging issues tied to the sustainable development paradigm.  
Moreover, the core of these demands includes environmental protection, (expressed via GHG 
and CO2 mitigations, including biodiversity preservation), energy security, typified by 
reliability of products supplies or their affordability and economic growth. Post the Paris 
Agreement in 2015, which reiterates the imperative of the transition into a low carbon 
economy, the industry is placed in the peculiar position of bracing up to current signals 
regarding divestments of funds from the sector. Due to these daunting challenges, creating a 
nexus between oil exploitation and sustainable development becomes imperative for 
developing petro-states as they are more reliant on hydrocarbon resources for driving their 
development agendas. 
Certainly, the petroleum industry contributes to sustainable development in multiple ways by 
creating synergies across goals like poverty eradication via direct and indirect employment 
generation, energy security, economic growth through the state’s generation of substantial tax 
incomes and other revenues, including prompting technological advancement and innovation 
from more advanced economies. However, the petroleum industry’s massive potential to 
positively or adversely impact on broad ranging factors articulated by the SDGs, traversing 
economic growth, ecosystems management and protection including social development 
makes it a topical aspect of the sustainable development discourse, with the obvious challenge 
being, how to generate more synergies across the SDGs rather than trade-offs. 
Similarly, the pursuit of SDGs such as goal 14, affecting sustainable use of oceans, or goal 15 
on terrestrial ecosystems, halting of deforestation and ensuring sustainable consumption 
directly and positively impacts goal 13, on forestalling climate change and its dire implications. 
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Nevertheless, the causal links between energy generation via fossil fuels use and climate 
change makes it a nagging issue requiring the need for targeting its amelioration via the targets 
and indicators of SDG 13, which stipulates the integration of climate change measures into 
national policies, strategies and planning.246 More so, the ability of climate change or its effects 
to severely heighten inequality or aggravate inequities against the poor or disadvantaged cannot 
be cursorily dismissed as this directly impacts upon the attainment of the SDGs. The world’s 
poor and vulnerable are most susceptible to climate change and have minimal resistance or 
adaptive capacity to cushion the shocks and harsh effects.247 Some of these harsh effects range 
from the exacerbation of hunger, poverty, or inequalities between people and across countries 
to the impairment of health and well-being goals.  
Thus, the need to effectively incorporate climate action plans into petroleum development or 
projects planning as part of national policies will serve to anticipate or put in place adaptive or 
mitigative measures to counter its debilitating effects whilst impacting positively on several 
goals. Similarly, a failure of integration or effective management efforts to tackle goals 14-15, 
affecting the sustainable use of natural resources, aquatic or terrestrial eco-systems and 
biodiversity during petroleum exploitation not only poses threats to food security but can 
severely impact SDG16 relating to peaceful societies and regional stability. This is quite 
evident from examples of oil induced conflict in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta248, Angola’s Cabinda 
region, or East and South Yemen.249  
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Also following from previous arguments, countering the challenges regarding the SDGs 
actualization anchor heavily on local, national and international collaboration, including broad-
based expert and NGO participation. More so, this interaction between state, industry and 
community objectives with the SDGs allows for not just short, but medium to long-term 
collaboration to foster economic and social sustainability, including a green oil industry.250 The 
SDGs in this regard, basically improve on the efforts of the MDGs which were heavily 
dependent on mostly state actors for their implementation. The SDGs tactically modify the 
erstwhile states-focused approach to sustainability, to act as a value-triggering means of 
operationalizing sustainable development of the petroleum sector, via a more expansive 
network of actors, including a wide-range of local and international participants who can 
contribute to relevant spheres of oil sector growth to trigger a multi-stakeholder involvement 
which leaves no one behind.251  
Notwithstanding the considerable benefits or synergies derivable across the SDGs during oil 
exploitation, the issue of trade-offs in the sustainability discourse or in the oil industry remains 
inevitable. Trade-offs therefore come into play in the sustainability discourse when a 
juxtaposition of positives or negatives is required in a selection amongst competing options 
and outcomes. Invariably, positive gains with respect to some goals will be preferred at the 
expense of other SDGs preceding the implementation of a development decision.252 
Undoubtedly, the oil industry has been the precursor of negative externalities and trade-offs.253 
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Evidently, the trade-offs and sustainability dilemmas from oil industry operations, range from 
adverse environmental footprint, carbon trails or contrary climate impacts and social 
challenges. Although these problems have triggered calls for decarbonization, the need to 
maintain global energy security, as advocated by SDG 7, intensifies the necessity of more 
impactful solutions in the industry to forestall global or regional energy crises and 
unsustainable development.254 A case of multiple trade-offs is even more glaring where petro-
rich developing states are concerned. This is because petro-states grapple with the prospect of 
extensive climate change adaptation and mitigations challenges or costs in tandem with urgent 
development needs.255 This creates a dilemma as to what priority actions to execute with 
limited funds; continued petroleum exploitation for: poverty eradication, energy security which 
in turn impacts food security, health, sustainable cities, economic growth or moderate and 
progressive steps towards climate change mitigations? This tricky issue is subsequently 
considered, as it weighs heavily on petroleum reliant developing states in their quest for 
sustainable development.  
1.4.1. Sustainable Development and Petroleum Exploitation: Synergies with Climate 
Action Indicators 
In furtherance of the preceding issues relating to integration of synergies and trade-offs during 
petroleum exploitation, especially as it impacts on developing states, this subsection considers 
steps towards achieving goal 13 relating to climate action. Indeed, a core aspect of 
operationalizing and reconciling sustainable development with petroleum exploitation relates 
to the area of climate action as articulated by goal 13 of the SDGs. Moreover, the global 
                                                             
254 Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all Also target, 7.1 By 2030, ensure 
universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services. 
255 See, Okereke, Chukwumerije, Bettina Wittneben, and Frances Bowen. "Climate change: Challenging business, 
transforming politics." Business & Society 51, no. 1 (2012): 7-30. See also, Pachauri, Rajendra K., and Andy Reisinger. 




indicator framework for sustainable development stresses the need to “Integrate climate change 
measures into national policies, strategies and planning”.256 It further clarifies that countries 
should communicate the establishment or operationalization of integrated policies, strategies 
or plans which increase their ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change, foster 
climate resilience, low emissions, albeit in a manner that does not threaten food production.257 
Thus, concrete steps towards goal 13 envisages that states, especially petroleum producers, in 
view of the propensity for CO2 emissions from the oil industry should have specific national 
plans and strategies towards climate action and mitigations. 
Moreover, Climate action comprises: climate mitigation, climate adaptation, carbon neutrality 
or decarbonization. Also, Climate mitigation is considered any action taken to permanently 
eliminate or reduce the long-term risk and hazards of climate change to human life or 
property.258 Whereas, climate adaptation refers to the ability of a system to adjust to climate 
change (including climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential damage, to take 
advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences.259 On the other hand, Carbon 
neutrality entails the eradication of carbon or CO2 emitting energy sources. It also means 
eliminating the annual zero net anthropogenic (human caused or influenced) CO2 emissions by 
stated timelines or dates. Thus, implying that every ton of anthropogenic CO2 emitted is 
compensated with an equivalent amount of CO2 removed (e.g. via carbon sequestration), or 
decarbonization. These possible steps towards climate action thus rely heavily on states’ 
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adaptive capacity which is indicative of the potential to adjust in order to minimize negative 
impacts and maximize any benefits from changes in climate.260 
Even though it might appear puzzling that a discussion regarding a sustainable oil industry 
accommodates the issue of decarbonization, as they may be considered antithetical terms. 
However, as earlier clarified, the SDGs are interconnected. The positive achievements in a 
green oil industry ultimately impacts climate change adaptation and mitigations holistically, 
whilst tackling inequality across states, especially in the interests of developing states, small 
island states and of course oil dependent developing states, cumbered with the task of poverty 
eradication, food security, or other significant development challenges. Furthermore, the 
significance of the UNFCCC and accompanying Protocols such as the Paris Agreement has 
likewise been to target departures from fossil fuel usage by 2050.261  
Following from these objectives, the Paris Agreement thus sets out a universal framework to 
‘strengthen global response to the threat of climate change’262 whilst proposing measures 
towards climate change mitigation and adaptation. Undeniably, these scenarios tending 
towards decarbonization raise obvious implications regarding the long-term sustainability of 
petroleum exploitation in oil producing states.263 These actions automatically imply more risks 
of trade-offs between climate responses and broader SD goals.264 Reason being that, such 
climate responses which include a departure from carbon emitting fuels or energy sources to 
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expedite peaking of global emissions,265 can adversely affect energy security, ultimately 
attenuating goal 7 regarding access to affordable energy, with its accompanying distributional 
effects. More so, the prohibitive costs of extensive climate responses, especially for developing 
states, entail diverting scarce resources from poverty eradication, health, social welfare and 
indeed other developmental priorities like employment creation, resilient infrastructure and 
sustainable cities.266 
Similarly, on the extreme side, deep decarbonization climate responses could become 
antithetical to growth whilst imposing development limitations on under-developed states as 
these countries currently lack the political, economic, technological and other platforms for 
handling carbon departure without exacerbating poverty or impairing food and energy security, 
which unfortunately is contrary to the aims of Goal 13 and its accompanying indicators.267 In 
order to forestall such a scenario of food and energy poverty and its attendant challenges in 
developing states, Articles 2.2 and 4.4 of the Paris Agreement  propose the implementation of 
the Agreement in accordance with the ‘principle of common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
which applies to states ‘in the light of different national circumstances’ and respective 
capabilities.268  
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The Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) principle interlinks or equates higher 
levels of development to global environmental challenges and increased contribution to the 
dilapidation of global environmental resources which encompass: atmosphere, water or land. 
CBDR proposes appropriate distribution of responsibility. It demands that developed states 
which enjoyed the liberty of developing with scant environmental restrictions over time, be 
accorded a greater share of the remedial responsibility.269 Similarly, the UNFCCC provides, 
‘parties should act to protect the climate system “on the basis of equality and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.270 Likewise, 
differential responsibility in climate action which is articulated by the Kyoto Protocol and 
recognized by SDG 13 on climate action, essentially maintains substantive equality between 
developing and developed States, to optimize efforts at securing the gradual compliance of 
developing state parties.  
Thus “grace periods” or delayed or less stringent implementation of treaty commitments are 
allowed in favour of developing states.271 The Kyoto Protocol also makes a distinction between 
proposed goals for developed and developing states by requiring “developed countries to 
reduce their emissions while developing countries only need to report their emissions.”272  
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Notwithstanding CBDR’s attractiveness to developing states it has been criticized on grounds 
of being an “outdated principle”273 which fails to address contemporary challenges or changing 
realities of parties.274 It is however argued that, CBDR remains a lifeline for developing petro-
states to plan and optimize poverty eradication efforts, including the ability to recoup the 
considerable expertise, technology or funds required to drive a low carbon economy and 
optimize mitigation or adaptation efforts. Whilst concurring with Kopela that “differentiation” 
or differential treatment of states should not be self-serving,275 it is further advocated that, 
CBDR yet provides a platform for achieving fairer and equitable solutions to climate change 
problems as it pursues and indorses synergies, collaboration and reconciliation of principles to 
optimize the sustainable development goals in petro-states. 
Likewise, a commitment to urgent oil sector reforms predicates the need to holistically tackle 
goal 8 relating to economic growth in the oil industry simultaneously with goal 13 relating to 
climate action. This is because, the significant environmental risks posed by Green House Gas 
(GHG) emissions and the need to mitigate climate change by stabilizing atmospheric 
temperatures to pre-industrial levels of 1.5⁰-2⁰C, has raised considerable support towards a 
carbon neutral future or a low carbon economy. As a result, petro-states in the long-run must 
promote awareness of climate risks, invest in alternatives and take practical steps towards 
policy and national planning to diversify their economies and emerge from petro-dependence 
as part of adaptation efforts envisaged by Goal 13 and its targets. However, in the interim, it is 
re-iterated that for developing states or non-Annex 1 countries276 to the Kyoto protocol, 
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especially those particularly vulnerable to the severe economic costs and implications of 
decarbonization277, the over-riding priorities as echoed by the Paris Agreement and the SDGs 
remain poverty eradication, food security and provision of basic needs to citizens.278  
Moreover, as much as it is one thing to speak of synergies between goals 8, affecting economic 
growth in the oil industry and environmental protection in terms of climate action (goal 13), it 
is another matter altogether to achieve workable synergies that can inter-link climate responses 
to other SD goals to achieve sustainable development.279 However, such examples are 
becoming more evident through innovation in the oil industry. One example of such effective 
synergy within the oil industry and its impact on multiple goals was that of the Lead Campaign 
Initiative.280 This initiative sought to eliminate the use of lead in petroleum products in over 
100 developing countries. The campaign involved a collaboration between governments and 
oil producers. Its positive impacts ranged from diminished atmospheric pollution levels, 
lowered GHG emissions or ozone impairing substances, which minimized climate impacts, 
increased respiratory or health benefits from reduced urban air pollution and ultimately ensured 
the elimination of lead-related health expenses on household incomes. 
However, certain unavoidable trade-offs relating to the implementation of this initiative 
included, the phasing out of vehicles or equipment reliant on leaded fuels. This phasing-out 
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process of lead reliant machinery of course impacted heavily on the poor. Even though in the 
short term, the initiative appeared to exacerbate poverty, the medium or long-term 
environmental and social benefits of the initiative far outweighed the initial drawbacks to 
engender sustainable development. 
 
1.4.2. Oil Industry Sustainability: Integrating the Environmental Protection Pillar 
Following from earlier sections regarding the indivisibility of the mutually re-enforcing pillars 
of sustainable development, entrenched in the integration principle and the exigency of 
synergies across the SDGs during oil exploitation, this section appraises the utility of 
environmental protection regulations for operationalizing sustainable development in the oil 
industry. Basically, environmentally protective regulations as advocated by Agenda 21, the 
SDGs, including the UNEP/IE Guidelines for petroleum exploitation are vital for a sustainable 
petroleum industry.281 This is because they more clearly delineate areas that enhance eco-
systems protection during oil exploitation in developing countries, which tend to have less 
comprehensive and up to date environmentally friendly regulations.  
More so, these environmental regulations effectively pose the parameters that should be 
adhered to by petroleum producing states to specifically impact the environment media 
comprising land, air, water and biodiversity during oil and gas exploitation. The core of these 
environmental regulations for the oil industry encompass substantive rules and prohibitive 
measures against hazardous waste accumulation, atmospheric, land and water pollution to 
procedural measures comprised of regulations protecting biodiversity, conducting of 
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environmental impacts assessments (SEAs and EIAs)282 before, during petroleum exploitation 
and at its concluding stages.283  
1.4.2.1. Environmental Assessment Regulations: Tools of Environmental Protection for 
Oil Industry Sustainability? 
In harmonizing with the earlier section regarding the utility of environmental regulations for 
operationalizing sustainable development in the petroleum industry, this sub-section extends 
the argument by highlighting the relevance of environmental impacts assessments (EIAs) as 
international law obligations284 and Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) which 
remain crucial tools of environmental protection in the oil industry context. An impact 
assessment can be defined as, “the process of identifying the future consequences of a current 
or proposed action”.285 Indeed, the International Association of Impact Assessment identifies 
the objectives of an impact assessment as a means of providing information for decision-
making, promoting transparency and participation of affected populations in decision-making. 
An EIA is thus a credible governance and regulatory tool that involves identifying procedures 
for mitigation of, or compensation for negative consequences arising from a proposed activity, 
as well as contributing to sound sustainable development.286 An environmental impact 
assessment accordingly relates to the need to identify and predict the effect on the environment 
and on human health or well-being, the impacts of legislative proposals, policies, programmes, 
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projects and operational procedures and to interpret and communicate such information.287 An 
EIA is thus stressed as fundamental to any regulatory system which seeks to identify 
environmental risk, integrate environmental concerns into development projects and expedite 
sustainable development.288 
To further drive the point of EIAs as relevant environmental protection tools for oil industry 
sustainability, Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration articulates the necessity of the EIA, as a 
national instrument, to be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have significant 
adverse impact on the environment.289 Similarly, other international albeit regional instruments 
like the Espoo Convention stipulate the need for EIAs for development projects with associated 
environmental risks.290 Likewise, oil industry specific guidelines such as the UNEP/IE 
Guidelines for the Oil and Gas industry mandates the need for EIAs in respect of all oil and gas 
development projects.291 At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that there are EIA variations. 
These include: "procedural EIAs” or EIAs which pre-suppose that the findings will influence 
decisions, but are not binding on decision-makers, while others such as the "substantive EIAs” 
require decision-makers to adopt measures consistent with the findings and recommendations 
of the EIA concluded.292  
Moreover, there are EIAs designated as "mitigation EIAs”, which focus on ascertaining 
mitigation measures to minimize environmental damage, and "prevention or sustainability 
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EIAs”, which focus on prohibiting projects involving environmental harm.293 Also of relevance 
is the Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) which assess the environmental impacts 
of policies or programs, rather than specific development projects.294 Clearly, the essence of 
identifying these different EIAs is to highlight their significance as viable preventive or 
precautionary measures and how they can be integrated in a holistic fashion to achieve a green 
petroleum industry and sustainable development.  
More importantly, the EIA is now considered a tool which aids informed decision making.295 
It is also expected to span though the lifetime of proposed activities, as was stated in the 
celebrated Pulp Mills Case.296 where the Court held that, “once operations have started and, 
where necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous monitoring of its effects on the 
environment shall be undertaken.”297 This ICJ decision has been hailed for comprehensively 
dealing with the issue of EIA as a procedural aspect of sustainable development as well as for 
its significance in a trans-boundary context.298 
Furthermore, noteworthy progress has been made regarding the design, scope and governance 
of EIAs in developing countries towards oil and gas projects, as part of international 
collaboration advocated by SDG 17 for strengthening national institutions and means of the 
implementation of sustainable development in states. Thus, multi-stakeholder partnerships as 
earlier identified, comprising funding institutions like the World Bank, Equator Banks, 
including the UNEP impose environmental protection conditionality in multi-lateral 
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agreements as part of funding or development arrangements to intensify and optimize EIAs 
and environmental protection in petro-states.299 The environmental guidelines of these 
international institutions reflect international best practices and UNEP/IE standards.300 They 
share similar patterns of project classification to ensure that EIAs remain systemized as orderly 
and efficient tools for securing environmental protection in the oil industry. Thus, projects are 
classified to identify high to medium risk projects as a means of ascertaining the level of 
screening required for such projects to trigger precautionary or mitigating measures.301  
Accordingly, Category “A” projects are those with potentially high magnitude, adverse 
environmental and/or social impacts with diverse, irreversible or unprecedented impacts and 
are distinguished from Category “B” projects with limited adverse environmental and/or social 
impacts that may be few or generally site specific but largely irreversible and addressed via 
mitigation measures. There are also the Category “C” projects with minimal or no 
environmental impacts. The above categorisations allow for adequate planning efforts to ensure 
that the high-risk projects typified by Categories A and B require a Social and Environmental 
Assessment.302 Similarly, the World Bank, Equator Banks and UNEP further promote the 
sustainable development agenda in developing oil producing states by means of environmental 
and social policies through ensuring that projects are designed and executed in a manner that 
evades or mitigates adverse environmental and social impacts via the Environmental, Health, 
and Safety (EHS) Guidelines which are technical reference documents with general and 
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industry-specific examples of Good International Industry Practice (GIIP).303 Any application 
of the EHS guidelines to existing oil and gas facilities often requires the establishment of site-
specific targets, with appropriate timelines for completion.  
In a nutshell, these finance/development institutions including the UNEP guidelines are 
customized to the hazards or risks for each project based on expert advice in relation to 
environmental assessments reports. These reports accommodate site-specific variables 
covering: host country context and the assimilative capacity of the environment. When host 
country regulations differ from the levels and measures presented in the EHS Guidelines, 
projects are expected to achieve whichever is more stringent. If less strict levels or measures 
than those provided in these EHS Guidelines are appropriate, in view of specific project 
circumstances, a full and detailed justification for any proposed alternatives is required as part 
of the site-specific environmental assessment. This justification should demonstrate that the 
choice for any alternate performance levels is protective of human health and the environment. 
The EHS Guidelines for Petroleum Refining also tackle environmental issues related to 
petroleum refining, emissions, handling and disposal of hazardous materials and wastes. The 
guidelines likewise provide venting and flaring rules, greenhouse gases emissions limitations, 
including community health and safety.304 
Consequently, the EIA for the petroleum industry as stressed by these international partnerships 
and UNEP/IE guidelines clarify specific rules relating to public participation of the relevant 
petroleum producing communities.305 This is supported by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills Case, 
where the court recommended that EIAs should involve public input.306 And similarly 
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buttressed by the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) which 
specifically recognises public participation as an aspect of the EIA.307 Also, a documentation 
of the conclusions or results of the impact assessment or findings which can be subject to 
judicial review must be presented to the administrative or petroleum regulatory agency. These 
reports may also propose measures to adjust the anticipated impacts from the petroleum 
exploitation process to acceptable levels or to investigate new technological solutions that 
would be less disruptive to the environment and local communities.308 
Ultimately, the environmental assessments policies promoted by the UNEP/IE guidelines and 
the World Bank standards drive environmental protection goals by stipulations requiring oil 
producers to establish and maintain a collection and evaluation of adequate and prompt 
information systems or data bank towards the environmental, health and safety impacts of oil 
and gas activities while utilizing measurable objectives and where necessary, aim at improved 
environmental performance, including prudent petroleum resource use.309 These are advocated 
as essential aspects of environmental protection which must be targeted, while working closely 
with national policies and international environmental commitments towards sustainable 
development. These guidelines altogether drive environmental goals by directly co-opting 
IOCs participation as at the end of the day, the IOCs remain the key players in the oil and gas 
terrain, who must practicalize the core industry actions that engender eco-system sustainability 
or endanger the environment and society. Oil producers are thus prompted to ensure that EIAs 
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and SEAs reflect regular monitoring and verification of progress towards the environment, 
health and safety targets proposed in the SDGs.  
Moreover, the OECD Guidelines are also instructive because the bulk of the IOCs operational 
in developing states like Nigeria, have their parent companies registered in OECD states or 
OECD adhering countries. The OECD Guidelines goes further to advocate the precautionary 
approach towards environmental protection in IOCs operational locations. Thus, IOCs are 
directed to avoid or mitigate the foreseeable environmental, health, and safety-related impacts 
of their activities; observe the precautionary principle by proactively evading serious or 
irreversible environmental damage resulting from their activities, whilst maintaining 
contingency plans for preventing, mitigating, and controlling serious environmental and health 
damage from their activities.310 It is however clarified that, whereas the World Bank, Equator 
Banks or development agencies rely on environmental conditionality clauses within funding 
agreements to drive environmental protection aims, the OECD Guidelines, rely on the National 
Contact Points (NCPs) and an Investment Committee.311 These entities are responsible for 
effective implementation of the OECD Guidelines. 
Each member-country of the OECD is mandated to establish an NCP comprised of experts, 
whose function is to undertake promotional activities and manage queries or investigations 
affecting the OECD Guidelines. The NCPs also play a conciliatory role by extending 
opportunities for discussing and dealing with the issues raised “in specific instances in a 
manner that is impartial, predictable, equitable and compatible with the principles and 
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standards of the Guidelines”.312 Thus, the OECD guidelines afford a comprehensive means of 
tackling environmental goals in the oil industry by co-opting the IOCs and their supply chains 
including, setting up operational due diligence guidelines for operating in developing states 
with weak institutions or even in conflict areas. The OECD guidelines therefore strive to ensure 
that IOCs prioritize environmental sustainability despite oil and gas activity, with or without 
the host country’s commitment to environmental goals. Otherwise, such IOCs are deemed in 
contravention of the Guidelines, and held accountable based on international standards, the 
OECD’s or indeed their home State’s and not the developing country’s standards, in a bid to 
upscale positive efforts towards sustainable development. 
1.4.2.2. Atmospheric and Climate Protection Rules as Environmental tools in the Oil 
Industry 
Following from earlier sections on operationalizing the SDGs via environmental protection 
tools, this sub-section considers the merits of atmospheric and climate protection regulations 
as vital tools and safeguards of environmental protection in the oil industry. Atmospheric 
protection regulations are covered by SDG 13 affecting climate action. Moreover, the 
integration and adoption of environmental regulations against atmospheric pollution as a means 
of combating climate change from oil exploitation is evidently supported by energy treaties,313 
and indeed the OPEC guidelines for member countries.314 OPEC members include signatories 
to treaties aimed at environmental protection as well as international treaties targeted at limiting 
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harmful emissions.315 Signatories and / or members to these instruments are thus expected to 
comply with their obligations for minimising CO2 emissions and combatting climate change.
316  
Some atmospheric protective actions entail highly restrictive measures against petroleum 
exploitation activities that harm or deplete the ozone layer.317 These areas thus constitute 
rallying points requiring regulations and policy coordination for the achievement of a green 
petroleum industry. Such environmental regulations to curb atmospheric pollution in the oil 
industry should therefore stipulate specific equipment requirements for the re-use or re-
injection of associated gas or atmospheric pollutants, rather than tacitly accepting the release 
of harmful ozone depleting gases by default in the absence of specific or practical guidelines. 
This is a more targeted approach to curb emissions from gas flares during oil exploitation as it 
allows for evaluation and identifies a transparent or verifiable way to optimize compliance with 
the rules. Moreover, this approach engenders synergies between ecosystem protection and 
climate action goals whilst interlinking with the aims of sustainable production and 
consumption articulated by goal 12 of the SDGs. 
1.4.3. Sustainable Development in the Oil Industry: Integrating the Economic Growth 
Pillar 
The integration of economic measures with environmental protection and social development 
strategies by a state in the exploitation of petroleum resources is essential for attaining 
sustainable development. This is because economic growth tactics accelerate the attainment of 
sustainable development goals whilst engendering a green economy. The evidence of economic 
                                                             
315 OPEC member countries are signatories to The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) Other 
treaties include; [Copenhagen] Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
Copenhagen, 1992, The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
Brussels, 1969 (and the 1976 Protocol) 112 
316 See, Address of OPEC Secretary General, HE Abdalla Salem El-Badri, at the UN Climate Change Conference 





growth in relation to petroleum resource use often accompany factors like the level of a state’s 
dependence on petroleum resource incomes or rents for economic development. It also involves 
the question of how such dependence affects other sectors of the national economy.318 
Similarly, the Petro-state’s growth objectives invariably underscore the extent of economic 
growth or relapse generated by the petroleum resource income and the proportion of the Gross 
domestic product (GDP) contribution of such petroleum resources to its National income.  
Another economic issue for consideration in petroleum producing states is the level and impact 
of sectorial imbalances the use of petroleum resources triggers on the state’s economic scale.319  
Tackling the above issues remain vital to achieving sustainable development. Specific 
regulations and policies to integrate economic objectives in petroleum exploitation to achieve 
sustainable development comprise budgeting and National Income accounting measures.320 
National income accounting actions entail integrating the value of petroleum resources 
produced into the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)321 to eliminate wasteful spending of the 
funds derived from the exploitation of finite petroleum resources. Further measures should 
incorporate the appropriate taxation systems for state revenue generation322 and the elimination 
of rent-seeking policies.323 Essentially, rent seeking is denoted by the level of a state’s 
dependence on resource rents and is described as the “rentier state theory”324. It specifically 
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involves seeking to increase the State's share of existing economic wealth or economic gains 
without creating new sources of wealth. Rent-seeking in the oil industry ultimately results in 
reduced economic efficiency through poor allocation of petroleum resource wealth, reduced 
actual wealth creation, lost government revenues through inappropriate taxation regulations, 
increased income inequality and corresponding national decline.325  
Moreover, rent seeking in oil producing states ultimately culminates in a situation where 
petroleum or mineral rents reduce the necessity of the government to levy domestic taxes, 
rendering leaders less accountable to citizens and more prone to corruption and patronage 
politics.326 Ultimately, sustainable development and integration of economic growth 
parameters in the petroleum industry advocates, tackling of the salient areas indicative of rent-
seeking via, prudent tax and budget mechanisms, whilst maintaining government transparency 
and accountability to ensure that the optimum benefits from oil exploitation can be harnessed 
to boost the GDP indicator and sustain economic growth. There is also the proposition to 
encourage local investors to participate in the oil industry and serve as viable competition to 
the oil multinationals to eliminate capital flight to other economies.327  
1.4.4. Sustainable Development and Oil Exploitation: Integrating the Social Development 
Pillar 
Petroleum resource exploitation and the associated benefits can only optimize sustainable 
development goals if the necessary integration of economic growth and environmental 
protection accommodates social development. The provisions of the Rio Declaration are 
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illustrative of how social development can be implemented in the exploitation of petroleum 
resources for sustainable development.328 
1.4.4.1. Access to information, Justice and Public Participation as Social Development 
Tools 
Public consultations and participation are crucial aspects of the social development pillar of 
sustainable development. Their integration into petroleum regulations are essential for a 
sustainable oil industry. By direct implication, principle 10, sets out the fundamentals of: access 
to information, access to justice and public participation as crucial to achieving 
environmentally benign, sustainable and socially beneficial, policy outcomes.329  
Moreover, goal 16 of the SDGs, reiterates the relevance of public participation, access to 
information and justice as crucial for institutional and capacity strengthening for sustainable 
development. In furtherance of this approach, the Aarhus Convention specifically sets out 
subject areas and other considerations for participation in both national and transnational 
contexts by virtue of articles: 6, 7 and 8 with elaborations in its annex 1. The convention targets 
“energy production” which comprises all spheres of hydrocarbon exploitation and production, 
refining, industry installations, waste management, extraction of petroleum, natural gas and 
pipelines transportation of petroleum products as requiring participation.330  
Furthermore, the Arhus convention proposes that national laws should also ensure participation 
during the preparation of plans and programmes with likely impacts on the environment as well 
as during the preparation, by public authorities, of executive regulations and other generally 
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applicable legally binding rules that may significantly affect the environment in relation to any 
proposed activity.331 Likewise, in expediting access rights, it has been recommended that, 
public access and participation in petroleum matters concerning affected communities be 
enhanced by discarding undue and prolonged formalities.332 Other hindrances to public 
participation like complicated bureaucratic procedures which delay or restrict public access to 
environmental information should be avoided.333 Similarly, the needs of local people who 
generally lack the financial resources and access to “technical information” to enable 
meaningful participation should be effectively addressed.334 Another way of improving public 
participation in petroleum matters is to avoid the use of culturally alien forms of inquiries, 
which often include the use of formalistic language, and technical public hearings.335 
Moreover, regarding access to justice for social development, Linn Hammergren, previously 
of the World Bank Poverty Reduction Group, argues for a broader conception of access. That 
access to justice should extend beyond random cases to encompass both individual and 
collective benefits accruing from society’s provision of the best and most equitably delivered 
justice service it can render.336 Thus, the social development theme of access to justice 
straddles: court reforms, legal services, legal aid, information dissemination and education, 
alternative dispute resolution and public-sector accountability.337 Likewise, these areas require 
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sustainability and continual funding to optimize the aims of sustainable development in the oil 
industry.  
Furthermore, the UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor identifies justice as a 
component of legal empowerment which is ‘a process of systemic change through which the 
poor and excluded become able to use the law, the legal system, and legal services to protect 
and advance their rights and interests as citizens and economic actors.’338 Similarly, strategic 
engagements with governments to challenge poor social policies and environmental choices 
during petroleum exploitation and the ability to hold both producers and regulators accountable 
for unsustainable actions, empowers oil-producing communities. These become decisive in 
achieving the SDGs whilst greening the oil industry. 
However, the justice needs of host communities might be varied. They could range from: 
educational improvements, awareness and sensitization regarding environmental and socially 
harmful activity like illegal bunkering, access to courts to seek re-dress for environmental harm 
or losses due to oil pollution, legal aid, etc. Thus, generalizations in the area of justice 
requirements of oil producing regions could prove inimical to the interests of the poor. Such 
assumptions can be avoided through strategic and regular engagement with the local oil 
producing communities to foster the social pillar of sustainable development. 
1.4.4.2. Human Rights Impact Assessments as Tools of Social Development for Oil 
Industry Sustainability 
Progressing with discussions on operationalizing sustainable development of the oil industry 
via requisite social development tools, this sub-section focuses on the efficacy of Human rights 
impacts assessment (HRIA) as a social development tool. HRIA is herein considered as a social 
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development tool, and not necessarily under other elements of sustainable development like 
equity, because human rights encompass: Social, political, cultural, economic, including, 
environmental rights, hosting the spectrum of rights that are broadly targeted by the social 
development pillar of sustainable development. Indeed, the integration and performance of 
HRIAs during petroleum exploitation could be more suggestive of a functional approach to 
enhance social development in oil producing states.  
Equally, a scrutiny of HRIA indicates its relevance for fostering not just social rights, but 
economic, cultural and environmental rights which are inextricably linked to the norms of 
sustainable development. Ultimately, issues relating to the rights to a healthy and adequate 
environment, non-discriminatory enjoyment of rights, right to property, right to health, family 
rights, rights of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources, rights of peoples 
to a satisfactory environment, standard of living, etc.339 as much as they form core human rights 
principles, also serve as the interests which engender social development, including equity in 
the context of sustainable development.340 Accordingly, an assessment of how these human 
and social rights may be impacted upon, either positively or negatively during petroleum 
exploitation remains relevant for achieving sustainable development goals in resource rich 
states.341  
HRIA, has been defined as “the process of predicting the potential consequences of a proposed 
policy, programme or project on the enjoyment of human rights.”342 It, is essentially to advise 
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decision makers and the people likely to be affected by any proposed action, to ensure 
improvements are made on the proposal and ease potential negative effects whilst increasing 
positive ones.343 Essentially, the proposition for the employment of human rights impact 
assessments (HRIA) to foster social development during petroleum exploitation is predicated 
on the fact that human rights are not only fostered by state actors but can also be impacted on 
by non-state actors such as oil producing corporations. Certainly, the oil industry has significant 
capacity to positively or adversely impact on human rights which directly raises a need for 
measuring the industry’s footprint relating to human rights. 
Moreover, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Guiding Principles”)344 
affirm that business enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights, and that States 
have a duty to ensure that they do so. The Guiding Principles describe the duty of States as 
including "appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress” human rights abuse 
“through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication."345 It thus behoves oil 
producing states to amend and upscale oil industry regulatory framework and policies to 
engender human rights protection during oil exploitation in accordance with the UN Guiding 
Principles. Arguably, the HRIAs presents such an appropriate forum to prevent or investigate 
and accordingly redress potential areas that trigger human rights violations, especially as it 
more directly targets the well-being and concerns of persons or indigenes of oil producing 
areas.346 
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Likewise, an HRIA is required to comply with the Rio Declaration, human rights principles 
and international human rights standards. HRIAs are therefore based on the framework of 
international human rights law as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),347 the international Covenants on Civil and Political Rights,348 including, 
International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.349 Similarly, international 
standards such as the ILO Conventions and Declarations,350 and the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises,351 are instructive in terms of guidance for effective HRIAs in the oil 
industry.  
More importantly, these human rights instruments, especially the OECD Guidelines, which as 
earlier clarified are crucial in terms of the direct application to IOCs which in most cases have 
their registered headquarters in OECD states or OECD adhering countries. Such a scenario 
obliges the Home Governments to ensure that the IOC subsidiaries engage in oil exploitation 
in accordance with international human rights instruments and standards without contravening 
the Guidelines. Thus, the OECD Guidelines articulate revolutionary steps towards holding 
businesses accountable for human rights abuses, via extra-territorial application of the 
Guidelines, whilst ensuring that states are compliant with their due diligence obligations.352 
Home States of the IOCs essentially optimize efforts to ensure that these IOCs subsidiaries do 
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not violate principles of conduct that have already been established as laws in their home 
countries. Consequently, Home Governments could be deemed complicit in the unlawful acts 
of IOCs which infringe human rights, when they do not take counteractive measures against 
the perpetrators of human rights abuses, as the applicable standards are not those of the 
developing host country or petro-state, but international standards, the parent-state’s or the 
OECD Guidelines.353  
These instruments are therefore foundations for state and corporate institutionalization of 
HRIAs to safe-guard the rights of persons against state or corporate violations of human 
rights.354 More so as, the Guidelines posit, “actual and potential adverse human rights impacts 
consist of taking adequate measures for their identification, prevention, where possible, and 
mitigation of potential human rights impacts….”355 Accordingly, HRIAs can effectively 
constitute such aspects of taking adequate measures required by the Guidelines to properly 
bolster corporate and state efforts towards adhering to both national and international human 
rights standards to prevent abuses or adverse impacts from oil industry activity. This is 
especially as, competent HRIAs advance the implementation of human rights at not just the 
project levels but also at the management levels by improving transparency, accountability and 
effective integration of human rights into policy-making and management processes. 
Eventually, HRIAs competently serve as tools for identifying, avoiding and managing 
potentially adversative human rights impacts from oil and gas projects.  
The foregoing issues regarding state and corporate human rights violations, including poor 
management of adverse impacts of oil industry operations which were detrimental to human 
                                                             
353 See, Part iv, Paragraphs.1-6, Paragraphs. 36-39, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Updates. 
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/49744860.pdf  
354 D. Weissbrodt, and Muria Kruger. "Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with regard to human rights." American journal of international law 97, no. 4 (2003): 901-922. 





rights, formed the thrust of the argument in the Ogoni-land Case.356 The African Human Rights 
Commission systematically considered the purport of the Nigerian government’s failure to 
monitor oil industry operations or multinational companies, including, the failure to enforce 
safety measures as well as the concealment of information relating to the dangers created by 
the oil activities carried out within the Ogoni communities.357 The African Commission 
thereafter concluded that the Nigerian government was in clear violation of Article 21 of the 
African Charter”358. That the conduct of the government, through its action and policy, directly 
violated the rights of the Ogoni population.359  
Furthermore, the African Commission referred to the Judgment of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in the Velásquez Rodríguez Case.360 In the case, the Court ruled that, “a State 
violates human rights when the State allows private persons or groups to act freely and with 
impunity to the detriment of the rights recognised by the Convention. In addition, “an illegal 
act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for 
example, because it is an act of a private person or because the person responsible has not been 
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but 
because of the breach of the obligation to protect and prevent the violation or to respond to it 
as required by the Convention.361 Thus, the Commission found that the government had failed 
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to perform its due diligence obligations as required at international law by failing to ensure the 
conducting of environmental monitoring and social impacts assessments in all relevant aspects 
during petroleum exploitation. Also, by denying access to environmental information as well 
as withholding information regarding the debilitating impacts of oil exploitation on the 
environment and failing to provide feasible alternatives or adequate compensation the 
government aggravated the problem.362  
Moreover, HRIAs can engender community participation, whilst operating as a basis to 
empower marginalized and local community stake-holders, by minimizing areas where 
government security forces coerce acquiescence to petroleum development projects as evident 
from the Ogoniland Case.363 Thus, HRIAs for the oil industry can positively optimize 
assessment of the direct results and impacts of the petroleum operations whilst tracking the 
implementation of strategies, policies and procedures for oil development projects. Altogether, 
HRIAs can determine the efficiency of the management process, including influencing policy 
co-ordination to clarify challenges and opportunities for improvements in industry operations, 
whilst properly articulating areas for corrective measures. HRIAs for the oil industry are thus 
posited as core tools of engendering the social development pillar, in concert with the aims of 
the UDHR, as they basically optimize states’ collaborative efforts towards positive actions and 
obligations of due diligence to preserve human rights during oil exploitation.  
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1.5. Sustainable Use of Petroleum Resources as a Prerequisite for Green Economic 
Growth 
The tenets of sustainable utilization of natural resources entail that, natural resources are not to 
be used in excess of their capacity for regeneration and an irreversible damage to nature must 
be prevented.364 Further elucidation of sustainable use of resources is afforded by, Principle 8 
of the Rio declaration which validates the sustainable use of natural resources for sustainable 
development, reiterated in goal 12 of the SDGs which urges the “reduction of unsustainable 
patterns of production and consumption, including preserving the natural resource base as 
being fundamental to the achievement of sustainable development. In this regard, the SDGs 
proffer in the goal indicator, the necessity of clarifying sustainable consumption and production 
(SCP) national action plans and for it to be mainstreamed into national policies.365  
Although the principle of “sustainable use” has been typically associated with living natural 
resources as in the Biological Diversity Convention,366 its scope has however broadened to 
accommodate all areas of the earth as denoted in the definition of the World Charter for Nature 
in 1982.367 This notion also serves to regulate state conduct by securing alignment with 
international instruments which emphasize on the sustainable use of natural resources. These 
resources include non-renewable natural resources,368 especially finite petroleum resources.369 
By implication petroleum resources come within the confines of “all areas of the earth” and 
therefore demand the application of the tenets of conservation and sustainable use of natural 
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resources. More importantly, the United Nations emphasises that protecting and managing the 
natural resources base for economic and social development are overarching objectives of, and 
essential requirements for sustainable development.370  
The purport of the UN’s reference to “overarching objectives” of sustainable development 
clearly suggests that the paramount aim of sustainable development remains the protection and 
management of natural resources for economic and social development. This position validates 
development aspirations of states or even specifically highlights the relevance of development 
goals which are ultimately reliant on the natural resources base. Despite on-going global 
challenges in the sustenance and management of the natural resources base, especially of finite 
natural resources, sustaining the natural resources base is certainly not a futile goal.371  
The incumbent duty on states to ensure sustainable or prudent use of natural wealth and 
resources within their jurisdiction372 envisages that in the exercise of their responsibilities to 
manage and utilize petroleum resources, the states must adopt policies and regulations which 
can engender positive changes to petroleum exploitation to actualize sustainable development 
goals. Consequently, adhering to the need to sustainably manage finite petroleum resources to 
prevent their depletion requires specific strategies. These strategies can be grouped within the 
confines of technical approaches like effective and prudent extraction techniques373 and waste 
minimisation schemes.374 
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1.5.1. Regulating Petroleum Extraction Rates: A Tool of Sustainable Use? 
The sustainable consumption or use of petroleum resources demands that the rate of extraction 
of the resources be monitored to prevent petroleum resource exhaustion. Thus, it relies on 
regulatory controls as a tool to engender sustainable consumption. Moreover, such regulatory 
controls facilitates the tracking and reporting of petroleum resource consumption and its 
footprint which is an indicator of sustainable consumption of natural resources.375 Sustainable 
use of petroleum resources also requires adoption of efficient technologies to optimize prudent 
extraction, efficient recovery of marginal or inaccessible fields to avoid field sterilization and 
waste due to premature field abandonment.376 By implication, petroleum conservation 
emphasizes the regulation of petroleum extraction to minimise the depletion rate of reserves377 
and maximise the life span of the petroleum resources without damage to the environment both 
for the benefit of present and future generations.378 It is however pertinent to admit that many 
petroleum resource endowed countries fail to prudently manage petroleum resources or 
optimize this tool of sustainable utilization and consumption of resources. The major 
challenges to the achievement of this sustainable development target is mostly due to the high 
reliance on petroleum resources for foreign direct investment and more often the lack of 
political will or technological limitations of the state regulators.379 
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1.5.2. Waste Minimisation Strategies in Petroleum Exploitation as vital tools of 
sustainable utilization 
Waste minimisation strategies are essential aspects of the sustainable use of petroleum 
resources requiring regulatory and policy input. This is because petroleum resources are 
valuable natural resources with high commercial value and incapable of regeneration. This 
imposes a heavy burden to prolong their reserves and maximize their utility. Thus, petroleum 
conserving measures to mitigate waste includes regulations encompassing, oil-wells and oil-
fields development plans. Essentially, such regulations stipulating the number of oil wells in 
specific fields are indispensable in the management of petroleum resources. This is because 
they serve to reduce competitive drilling which facilitates wastage of petroleum resources.380 
The sustainable use of petroleum resources also requires the regulation of production facilities 
with clear rules on equipment stipulations to ensure that they comply with the UNEP/IE 
operating guidelines and international best practice.381 This serves to manage the petroleum 
resources and the environment by preventing petroleum wastage due to: leakages, blow outs, 
explosions and fires, which may likely arise from drilling in districts where the pressure of gas 
or oil is high or unknown.382  
Furthermore, waste minimisation through the control or cessation of gas flaring activities 
during oil exploitation constitutes an integral part of sustainable and prudent use of petroleum 
resources because it encourages the reinjection of the associated gas which serves as a viable 
alternative to petrol and gasoline383. This measure serves to reduce the demand on the stock of 
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petroleum resources or reserves to meet the supply for petrol, gasoline or other domestic fuels. 
Another area requiring regulations to optimize the stock of petroleum resources and natural 
reserves is through the process of well-stimulation treatments and the use of enhanced 
petroleum recovery methods to retrieve petroleum residues trapped in inaccessible wells and 
enhance optimum recovery of petroleum, especially from unconventional hydrocarbon 
sources.384  This is a useful means of conservation as it delays the depletion rates of petroleum 
resources and prolongs the life-span of oil wells. However, if the process is not carefully 
monitored and regulated it can pose environmental risks.385 
1.6. Sustainable Development and Oil Exploitation: Operationalizing Equity 
Equity is a core ingredient of sustainable development articulated by Principle 3 of the Rio 
Declaration. It provides, “The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”386 This provision 
reveals an integral element of equity as a moderating factor of development which must be 
subject to environmental constraints for the benefit of present and successive generations. 
Essentially, equity is about fairness. Within the context of sustainable development, equity 
targets elimination of inequalities and forms the rationale for poverty eradication, preservation 
of the global environment and resource conservation for both present and future generations.387 
These topical issues also sum up the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) echoed in 
“Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”.388 
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Evidently, an introspection of the SDGs reveals a broad articulation of goals serving to 
optimize the equity elements of sustainable development. Admittedly, of the 17 goals, 11 
address forms of equity, inequality, and inclusiveness.389 The SDGs thus address the inter-
linkages between, development, poverty and inequity in the stated targets of SDG 10 to 
‘Reduce inequality within and among countries’, progressively achieve and sustain income 
growth of the bottom 40% of the population at a rate higher than the national average. Goal 10 
also seeks to empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, ensure 
equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome from discriminatory laws, policies and 
practices. Also, the SDGs, specifically adopt a multi-dimensional approach in tackling equity. 
Gender equality for instance, is broadly targeted and it spans across women in education, 
health, work or paid employment.390  
Furthermore, equity in the sustainable development debate accounts for concepts like: intra and 
inter-generational equity, responsibility for transboundary harm, public participation, access to 
information and justice, common but differentiated responsibilities and the polluter pays 
principle. Specific references to equity and poverty eradication are further addressed by the 
Brundtland report which provides that “overriding priority” should be given to the “concept of 
‘needs’, in particular, the essential needs of the world’s poor” as a key component of 
sustainable development.391 Additionally, equity   comprises interspecies equity, relating to 
environmental stewardship that accommodates the survival of other species on an equal basis 
to human survival,392 distributive equity affecting distribution of resources in contexts such as 
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burden sharing or distribution of well-being in the broader context of social justice, including 
a spirit of shared but differentiated responsibility also known as the principle of “Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility”, and procedural equity which reinforces democratic and 
participatory governance or participation in decision making.393 
1.6.1. Intra-Generational Equity in Petroleum Exploitation 
Following from the above issues on operationalizing equity in the context of oil exploitation 
and sustainable development, this sub-section considers equity in its intra-general dimension. 
Intra-generational equity aptly connotes “the right of all people within the current generation 
to a fair access of the current generation’s entitlement to the earth’s natural resources”.394 Thus, 
the present generation has a right to use and enjoy the resources of the earth but is under an 
obligation to consider the long-term impact of its activities. Intra-generational equity is thus 
differentiated from inter-generational equity in that it relates to fairness in the distribution of 
natural resources and accompanying benefits amongst those of present generations.  
Moreover, the Rio+20 instruments purport that, intra-generational equity should offer everyone 
the necessities of life, food, shelter, health care, education, and the essential infrastructure for 
social organization. Thus, intra-generational equity accounts for sustainable development 
indicators like the  extent or level to which gender equality is evident in a polity, the share of 
women in wage employment,395 the employment rate vis-a-vis population growth, the 
proportion of the population living below the poverty line, etc.396  It also offers social 
empowerment measures bordering on, access to environmental information, public 
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participation and access to justice which serve to erode “inequities in power397” and expedite 
public ability to enforce the right to be informed and hold regulators or polluters accountable 
for environmental harm due to oil production activities.398 More importantly, because the poor 
considerably lack the power to push their choices or even access opportunities, resources or 
services that trigger escapes out of poverty, policy and regulatory interventions that empower 
them to acquire financial resources, information, skills or education and capabilities to exercise 
more environmentally friendly choices as well as access social welfare benefits become crucial 
in oil producing areas. These serve to engender accountability and responsiveness, whilst 
balancing out unfavourable power relations in petro-states to expedite the SDGs.  
1.6.2. Equity in Sustainable Development: Relevance of the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) 
This subsection assesses the intra-generational equity element of sustainable development in 
relation to the polluter pays principle (PPP). The PPP is herein considered as a strategy towards 
strengthening intra-generational equity during oil exploitation. Reason being that, intra-
generational equity effectively advocates fairness in distribution, in this case equity is 
advocated towards the distribution of responsibility or liability for polluting activity. Likewise, 
the PPP becomes relevant to balance the burdens for oil induced pollution as it can evaluate 
environmental costs of oil pollution, project economic remedies, to advance social and 
environmental objectives. Even though the PPP is potentially functional as an environmental 
protection measure, its ambit is broader, as will be shown from proceeding deliberations. 
Consequently, the PPP’s efficacy as a tool for achieving equity and overall, sustainable 
development in the oil industry is thereafter considered. Thus, core areas of pollution 
                                                             
397 See, Bullard, Robert 1992, the Politics of Race and Pollution: An interview with Robert Bullard, Multinational Monitor, 
June, pp. 21Ð25. Inequities in power lead to inequities in people’s ability to influence decisions affecting their environment.  
398 See, previous discussions on the integration of environmental regulations with pollution controls. D. Banisar, et. al. Ibid 
at f. note 127. And, Principle 16, of the Rio Declaration which specifically provides that the polluter should be held 
accountable for pollution.  
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prevention, emergency preparedness and green accounting in oil and gas regulations to 
actualize the aims of sustainable development during petroleum exploitation are addressed.  
The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) is articulated by Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration. It posits 
that, governments should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs and 
the use of economic instruments, considering that the polluter should in principle bear the cost 
of pollution, with due regard to public interest.399 Essentially, the principle operates to shield 
government funds and the public in general from bearing the environmental and economic 
costs of pollution. The PPP is posited primarily as a useful tool for sustainable development in 
the oil industry, not just as a pollutions liability measure, but also as a precautionary measure 
to avert pollution during oil exploitation. Such a precautionary approach can be engineered to 
target pollution from the source, whilst identifying the polluter to bear responsibility for the 
extent of pollution or polluting activity.  
The PPP primarily integrates measures which enhance environmental goals of the SDGs. In 
validating the significance of this principle and its utility for optimizing all three pillars of the 
sustainable development paradigm, several international and regional instruments articulating 
the Principle include: The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Cooperation, which clearly states in its preamble that the PPP is "a general 
principle of international environmental law”.400 Likewise, Agenda 21, the Paris Agreement, 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, London 1954, 
(and its protocols) 1962 and 1969, etc. serve to facilitate the application of the PPP in respect 
of pollution. Similarly, The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Co-operation (OPRC Convention) is also relevant as it projects the aims of SDG 17 to 
                                                             
399 UNCED (1992) Principle 16 Rio Declaration. 
400 See Para. 7, 1990 IMO Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 2003 Protocol on Civil 
Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary 
Waters.   
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optimize synergies for effective cooperation towards environmental protection. It ensures 
pollution controls to forestall the dire impacts of oil pollution in the event of oil pollution 
accidents and emergencies. 
The relevance of the polluter pays principle has also been addressed in national instruments 
and judicial interpretation as in R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions ex p. Standley401, where the High Court ruled that “as regards the polluter pays 
principle, the directive does not mean that the public must take on burdens for the elimination 
of pollution to which they have not contributed…. ”402 this ruling was also upheld at the ECJ403. 
In addition, Advocate General Leger concluded that the polluter pays principle can either be 
applied as a preventive measure to avoid environmental harm through legislation and policy to 
assess the impacts of certain public and private projects.404  
Likewise, case law, international and national instruments validate the PPP as an applicable 
and relevant means of engendering sustainable development in states, as it addresses the crucial 
questions relating to: How to control pollution, how to remedy pollution and who pays for 
pollutions remediation when it occurs. Moreover, the relevance of the PPP as a tool of 
sustainable development in tackling and remediating pollution by making polluters responsible 
for the environmental harmful impacts, bear the costs, has been further considered in an oil 
industry context.405 In the Aguinda v. Chevron case406 the Court observed that the imposition 
of strict liability is appropriate where a defendant has engaged in high risk/high reward 
                                                             
401 Secretary of State for the Environment, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte: H. A. Standley and Others 
(Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court, Queen's Bench Division) (Directive 91/676/EEC regarding the 
Protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources.  
402See R. v. Sec. of State (ex. P. Standley and Ors. supra) Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 29 April (1999) at I - 2626   
403  Secretary of State for the Environment, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte: H. A. Standley and Others, 
Case (C - 293/97 European Court of Justice 1999) ECR I-2603 
404 Opinion of Advocate General Léger delivered on 8 October (1998) at I – 2606. 
405 See Aguinda & Ors. V. Chevron 
406 Aguinda v. Chevron https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador 
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/complaint-1993.pdf 




behavior, more so, in industrial cases where the burden of proving traditional fault is nearly 
impossible for the victim. Consequently, the Court concluded that the “production, transport 
and operation of hydrocarbon substances constitute without a doubt, activities of substantial 
risk” warranting the application of strict liability for the pollution caused.407  
In furtherance of these aims affecting pollution prevention and remediation, pollution can thus 
be remedied through restoration and clean-up programmes and implementation of pollution 
prevention policies.408 Similarly, the principle entails that the polluter bears the expenses of 
carrying out measures decided by public authorities for ensuring that the environment is in a 
satisfactory state. The polluter also shoulders the cost of preventing and eliminating nuisances. 
This is often guaranteed by transferring the projected costs on the goods and services which 
cause such pollution or unsustainable consumption.409 Accordingly, this principle applies in 
circumstances where people incur charges or sums because of recurrent polluting activity, thus 
forming the rationalisation for green taxes, green accounting or taxes paid for the use of fossil 
fuels and the accompanying CO2 emissions.
410  
Green accounting measures therefore involve the adoption of policy modifications in the 
petroleum industry by the employment of market based instruments to “green” key sectors of 
the national economy.411 Such accounting policy reforms include the adoption of green taxes 
which serve to discourage unsustainable patterns of fuel consumption and envisages the 
                                                             
407 See, Para. 83-86, in Judgment of Nicolas Zambrano Lozada, the Presiding Judge of the Provincial Court of Justice of 
Sucumbíos, in Aguinda et al v. Chevron. Available at: http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-02-14-summary-of-
judgment-Aguinda-v-ChevronTexaco.pdf Accessed at 2nd February 2017. Chevron was ordered to pay $8.6 billion in 
damages and clean-up costs. 
408 Harding posits that, the general public should not be made to bear the environmental costs of industry.   
409 See Principle 8 of the Rio Declaration 
410 J. Holder and M. Lee, “Environmental Protection, Law and Policy” (2nd Ed. New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2007)36-7. See also, Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162 Science 1243, pp. 1244-5, 
411See, Indicators of Sustainable Development: Guidelines and Methodologies. 3rd Edn. October 2007. “More comprehensive 
aggregated indicators on sustainable development and green accounting include the Adjusted Net Saving and the Genuine 
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deductions of the derivable costs of environmental damage arising from petroleum resource 
use from the Gross domestic product (GDP) or profits of the crude oil sales for environmental 
remediation purposes.412 The proportion of such deductions from the GDP essentially 
constitute equity, bio-diversity and environmental protection indicators for sustainable 
development, articulated in Goal 15 of the SDGs.413 Hence, the environment can be 
rehabilitated to prevent biodiversity loss, and ensure that social and economic life of indigenes 
and communities in petroleum producing regions are not adversely affected by petroleum 
exploitation.   
By these measures, governments therefore exercise economic instruments to control 
environmental behaviour, by transferring the burden on the perpetrators of the polluting act. 
Useful incentives or deterrents to promote environmental management and sustainable 
development would therefore comprise: pollution charges (including emission charges, user 
charges, product charges, administrative charges, and tax differentiation). User charges are fees 
for direct cost of collective or public treatment of pollution, paying for units, industrial 
effluents, or even spills discharged in surface water.414   
The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) is also beneficial in promoting green accounting measures 
like the elimination of environmentally harmful subsidies.415 This is because fossil fuel 
subsidies could accrue to astronomical sums and are a major challenge to governments from 
both economic and environmental perspectives as they favour the polluter and encourage the 
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undesirable polluting activity.416 Consequently, energy subsidies undermine sustainable 
development goals, by promoting higher consumption and waste,417 Similarly, fossil fuel 
subsidies aggravate the harmful effects of energy use on the environment, and are also the 
harbinger of heavy burdens on government funds with the capacity to attack economic growth 
potentials of states.418 They are often accountable for undermining private and public 
investment in the energy sector, thereby restricting economic growth and exacerbating 
poverty.419  
Moreover, most benefits from fossil fuel subsidies go to the richest households thus creating 
wider disparity between the rich and poor, which is entirely averse to the interests of sustainable 
development.420 Fossil fuel subsidies also impede the expansion of distribution networks and 
the development of more environmentally benign energy technologies, and ironically fail to 
benefit the low-income groups at which it is targeted.421 Ultimately, it is essential that for 
petroleum producing states to sustainably develop their petroleum resources, the cessation of 
fossil fuel subsidies must be prioritized.422 
1.6.3. Inter-generational Equity and Petroleum Exploitation 
Having considered equity in its intra-generational dimension, this sub-section appraises equity 
in the inter-generational context. Inter-generational equity relates to “the right of future 
                                                             
416Whitley, Shelagh. "Time to change the game: Fossil fuel subsidies and climate". Overseas Development Institute. 
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417 Principle 8 Rio Declaration. 
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419 United Nations Environment Programme, Division of Technology, Industry and Economics. (2002). Reforming energy 
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generations to enjoy a fair level of the common patrimony”.423 Intergenerational equity also 
presupposes that each generation holds the planet on trust, and is obliged to pass it to all future 
generations in no worse condition than that which they enjoyed and to provide equal access to 
its cultural and natural resources.424 Thus, the present generation has a right to use and enjoy 
the resources of the earth but is under an obligation to consider the long-term impact of its 
activities including sustaining the resource base and the global environment for the benefit of 
future generations of humankind. In this context, “benefit” is given its broadest meaning as 
including, inter alia, economic, environmental, social, and intrinsic gain”.425  
Inter-generational equity in terms of sustainable development has also been considered as a 
means of development, economic restructuring and fulfilling inter-generational responsibility, 
whilst typically representing inter-temporal distribution of resources.426 This view is further 
reiterated by French who posits that, “it is the idea that the present generation owes a debt to 
previous generations bequeathed to it and consequently has an equal responsibility to ensure 
that future generations have equal access to the environment and other natural resources”.427  
The ethical foundations for the commitment to sustainable development is accordingly 
premised on the futurity concept. This generally devolves from human inability to fathom the 
future, thereby generating genuine fears of the unknown implications of current development 
                                                             
423 See, Fifth Report on the Principles of International Law relating to Sustainable Development (London: ILA, 2002), ILA 
Resolution 3/2002: New Delhi Declaration of Principles Of International Law Relating To Sustainable Development, 
Available online at: http://www.ila-hq.org See also, UNEP "Concepts and Principles in International Law." See Final Report 
of the Expert Group Workshop on International Environmental Law Aiming at Sustainable Development, at 10-14, 
UNEP/IEL/WS/3/2, (1996). 
424 Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and 
Intergenerational Equity (United Nations University, 1989). 
425 Joseph F. Dimento, The Global Environment and International Environmental Law, (1st Ed., Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2003). See also, Training Manual on International Environmental Law, UNEP, at 26. Principles And Concepts Of 
International Environmental Law. 
426 See the Brundtland Commission’s definition. See also, H. Bugge and L. Watters, ‘A Perspective on Sustainable 
Development after Johannesburg on the Fifteenth Anniversary of ‘Our Common Future’: An Interview with Gro Harlem 
Brundtland’, (2003) 15 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 359 at 363. Also see, A. Kolo, ‘Dispute 
Settlement and Sustainable Development of Natural Resources in Africa’, in F. Botchway (ed.) Natural Resource Investment 
and Africa’s Development (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2011) 71 
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activities. Also implicit in the petroleum exploitation context, is that, despite limitations in 
comprehending the values and interests of future generations there is a need to preserve 
petroleum resources for the benefit of future generations and the maintenance of access to these 
petroleum resources for the benefit of future generations should be guaranteed.428  
Notwithstanding the vast potential of petroleum resources in guaranteeing benefits for the 
present and successive generations, they remain prone to depletion as hydrocarbon resources 
are finite.429 This sums up the obvious need for fairness in the maintenance, allocation or 
distribution of the petroleum resource revenues to preserve the options and opportunities of 
future generations.430 Overall, the crux of the inter-generational equity debate considerably 
infers that, the present generation is in a predominant position, and it is altogether morally 
justifiable not to exploit this unequal position in maximising our own utility without any 
concern for the future.431 Indeed, the fore-going have been criticized as unclear and entirely 
impractical formulations, because the distribution of rights, benefits, privileges or burdens 
amongst generations are not feasible nor guaranteed at international law for future 
generations.432  
Nonetheless, the provisions of the Rio Declaration and other international instruments 
consistently emphasize on inter-generational equity for attaining sustainable development.433 
In view of this complexity, engendering inter-generational equity in national policy and 
planning and as a tool for sustainable development would therefore require ingenious 
approaches. Exemplifying such innovative measures could include the creation of petroleum-
                                                             
428 E. Brown Weiss, “Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment” 84 AJIL (1990) 198 at 204 
429 See Jonathon E Snow, ‘Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources: Surprises for the Geologist’ (2000) Inaugural Lecture 
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based savings or funds especially in developing petro-states. Similarly, such resourceful 
approaches to safeguard the interests of future generations should remain overriding 
considerations for petro-states. This is especially as not just petroleum depletion but also 
decarbonization, poses valid and looming threats to the long-term sustainability of petroleum 
exploitation. 
1.6.4. Sustainable Development, Petro-business and Sovereign Wealth Funds: Any Room 
for “Equity”? 
In continuation of the relevance of equity for operationalizing sustainable development, this 
sub-section considers inter-generational equity and its input, if any, towards the creation of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF). The sub-section also determines the utility of sovereign 
wealth funds as tools to optimize sustainable development of the petroleum industry. Evidently, 
equity, has been considered instructive in the creation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).434  
Despite other reasons ranging from the need to enhance diversification of state funding or 
national wealth, optimize revenue stabilization or achieve higher returns on investment,435 the 
need to carry on wealth to future generations remains an underlying factor for establishing 
sovereign wealth funds.436  
Indeed, Wouter et al posit that, Sovereign wealth funds and investments remain significant 
issues in contemporary debates relating to diversification of national economies and the 
preservation of inter-generational wealth.437 A notable example is that of the Norwegian 
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sovereign wealth fund which is mandated to grow in perpetuity and preserved to benefit future 
generations.438 Moreover, 34 plus countries have established sovereign wealth funds as tools 
of resource management to benefit present and succeeding generations.439 
Furthermore, Sovereign Wealth Funds notwithstanding their variations, are usually 
government funded investment tools with enormous potential to trigger sustainable 
development especially in petro-states. This is because they can substantially boost economic 
growth by diversifying the economy. Likewise, the capacity of petroleum resources to facilitate 
lucrative wealth funds is evinced by the fact that oil production forms a sizeable portion of 
global sovereign wealth investments. Indeed, an estimated 60% of total global funding for 
sovereign wealth funds are derived from oil and gas resource revenues.440 The foregoing are 
therefore pointers to the fact that oil funded sovereign wealth funds from developing petro-
states, wield enormous development potential to benefit present and succeeding generations. 
Even though the rationale for the creation of oil based sovereign wealth funds may be 
controversial as it is possible to view the creation of wealth funds as a purely economic growth 
or business strategy.441 It is nonetheless argued that where the manifest intention of the creators 
of a wealth fund is to form ringed or hedged funds or create savings from petroleum 
investments, preserved to benefit future generations, in the event of petroleum resource 
depletion or decarbonization, it becomes evident that inter-generational equity considerations 
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drives that agenda or the motive and rationale for the wealth fund despite the envisaged 
economic gains. Creation of petroleum-based sovereign wealth funds thus serves to ensure that 
savings accruing from percentages of petroleum tax revenues are deposited and re-invested for 
the benefit of future generations.442 The underlying principle for such action is that, in the event 
of depletion of petroleum resources, these funds, the resource rents and interests generated can 
provide requisite funding for social goods or services for the benefit of succeeding 
generations.443  
1.7. Conclusion 
This chapter is an assessment of the principles of sustainable development in relation to 
petroleum exploitation. It appraises the challenges evident in the operationalization of such an 
all-encompassing concept despite its global character and popularity. The chapter thereafter 
scrutinizes the SDGs to determine their efficacy for operationalizing the sustainable 
development agenda in petro-rich states. In this vein, the chapter identifies a suitable balance 
between legitimate interests affecting all three pillars of the SD paradigm and petroleum 
production to engender a sustainable petroleum industry. 
In fulfilling these aims, the chapter identifies the tools essential for sustainable development of 
the petroleum industry. Similarly, it unveils the environmental goals for a sustainable oil 
industry comprising the protection of terrestrial and aquatic eco-systems and elucidates the 
necessity of sustainable development tools like the EIAs and SEAs to optimize planning and 
decision making for ecosystem protection during oil and gas production. The chapter also 
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posits that, atmospheric protection regulations are more effective or preventative in fostering 
atmospheric protection targets when they contain clear and practical guidelines regarding 
equipment stipulations for re-injection or storage of associated gas during oil exploitation.  
Moreover, economic growth tools to diversify the economy and prevent inflation, are assessed 
including their ability to boost the economic growth indicator relating to GDP growth of non-
oil sectors. The chapter also finds essential tools of social development in the oil industry to 
include access and participation rights before and during oil exploitation to allay petroleum 
related concerns whilst encouraging consensus positions beneficial to both people and the 
environment. Another core finding of the chapter relates to HRIAs for the oil industry. The 
chapter convincingly argues that HRIAs are competent tools of engendering the social 
development pillar while optimizing states’ collaborative efforts towards obligations of due 
diligence, to preserve and protect against state and corporate violations of human rights during 
oil exploitation. 
The scrutiny of sustainable use of petroleum resources and Equity in both the inter and intra-
generational dimensions constitute relevant elements of sustainable development that may be 
operationalized in the oil industry and in developing states via the polluter pays principle (PPP). 
While sovereign wealth funds are posited as useful tools of equity in the oil industry context. 
Moreover, sustainable governance which is crucially reliant on tools and platforms such as 
multi-stake holder collaboration and international partnerships for the actualization of the 
SDGs are stressed as essential towards petroleum industry sustainability that would be 
considered in the Nigerian context, through the perusal of law and policy to verify their capacity 






Petroleum Resource Exploitation in the Niger-Delta: A Perusal of Law and Challenges to 
Sustainable Development Goals? 
Introduction 
In accordance with deliberations from the first chapter, sustainable development as expressed 
in international legal instruments, case law and the sustainable development goals (SDGs) 
remains a significant means of policy and regulatory reforms in the petroleum industry. This 
chapter therefore undertakes a scrutiny of the legal regime governing the Nigerian petroleum 
industry. The chapter likewise unveils the impact of environmental, economic, social and 
governance challenges accruing from nearly 6 decades of unsustainable oil production patterns 
in Nigeria. Moreover, the extant oil and gas legal framework comprising: the principal Acts, 
enabling petroleum Regulations,444 policies and the contractual framework in the Nigerian 
petroleum sector, is juxtaposed with the SDGs, tools or indicators identified in the previous 
chapter to pinpoint their areas of alignment or divergence with sustainable development 
objectives.  
Consequently, oil industry governance in Nigeria and the accompanying challenges in both the 
upstream445 and downstream446 aspects of the petroleum industry are scrutinized to assess the 
feasibility of achieving reforms towards a green economy in the context of sustainable 
development. Another relevant issue for determination is the extent to which the Nigerian legal 
                                                             
444The term regulation can have different meanings, as defined in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to 
Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (2007).  In the context of this chapter, petroleum regulation means the deliberate 
attempt of the State to establish, monitor and enforce legal rules relating to the exploitation of petroleum. See also, Tina 
Hunter, Legal Regulatory Framework for the Sustainable Extraction of Australian Offshore Petroleum Resources; A Critical 
Functional Analysis.  
445 The upstream sector, also called Exploration and Production (E&P) includes the search and obtaining of underground or 
underwater crude oil and natural gas fields, drilling exploratory wells, subsequently drilling and operating the wells that 
recover and bring the crude oil or raw natural gas to the surface. 
446 The downstream sector affects the refining, transportation and marketing of petroleum or its derivatives, including the 
processing and purifying of raw natural gas. 
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and policy frameworks requires reinforcements to modify and improve state and corporate 
conduct towards oil exploitation in the Niger-Delta. Likewise assessed is the extent to which 
the current Nigerian rules are equipped to expedite core themes of sustainable development 
affecting eco-systems protection, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable use of 
petroleum resources, including their capacity to engender equity and secure the interests of 
present and succeeding generations of Nigerians. The purpose of this appraisal is to determine 
the extent of consistency with international legal instruments, whilst assessing their capacity to 
trigger and maintain sustainable development. 
 
2.1. The Nigerian Oil and Gas Regulatory Framework: A Concise Overview 
A proper overview of the Nigerian oil and gas regulatory framework entails an 
acknowledgement of its jurisdictional background. The jurisdictional background is often an 
embodiment of the overarching rationale for the adoption of specific legal regimes, and the 
regulatory framework for oil exploitation is no different. The Nigerian petroleum regulations 
are patterned after the United Kingdom (UK) regulations by virtue of the British colonial 
influence prevalent at the commencement of oil and gas exploratory activity in Nigeria.447 
Some erstwhile regulations like the Mineral Oils Ordinance evolved into the Nigerian 
Petroleum Act (PA) its amendments and subsidiary legislation.448 These include the Petroleum 
Drilling Regulations (for monitoring petroleum drilling operations) and the Petroleum Refining 
Regulations (which constitute the regulatory parameters for petroleum refining operations in 
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Ordinance of 1914. See also, J.G. Frynas, “Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and litigation between oil companies and village 
communities” (1999) 




the oil industry).449 The Nigerian PA, which is also reminiscent of the UK Petroleum Act, 
remains the primary legislation overseeing petroleum activities in Nigeria. It provides a 
framework for regulating upstream and downstream petroleum activities. The Associated Gas 
Reinjection Act (1979) provides statutory basis for the control of gas flaring in Nigeria.450 The 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act (1992) provides a regulatory framework for EIAs as a 
part of project development. The Minerals Ordinance (1914) prohibits the pollution of 
watercourses in the process of mining and prospecting for minerals in Nigeria and incidentally 
amended in 1925, 1950, and 1958. The Oil Pipelines Act was enacted in 1965 to provide a 
legislative framework for the prevention of land and water pollution during oil transportation 
via pipelines.  
In the same vein, the Mineral Oils Act (1963) provides a framework for health, safety and 
environmentally friendly exploration and production activities. The Hydrocarbons Oil 
Refineries Act451, the Petroleum Regulations (1967) also provide a framework for safe 
petroleum operations, including environmental protection. The Oil in Navigable Waters Act452, 
essentially prohibits discharge of oil into navigable water courses and other areas. There is also 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Act No 33 of (1977) which empowers 
the Corporation to engage in all activities relating to the petroleum industry and to enforce all 
regulatory measures relating to the general control of the petroleum sector through its 
Petroleum Inspectorate Department. The Act also provides appreciable opportunities for the 
NNPC to be engaged in petroleum activities without limitations by ensuring that the NNPC is 
an operator, participant and regulator of the Nigerian oil and gas industry.453 Other relevant 
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Petroleum Act of 1969. 
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452 Oil in Navigable Waters Act (1968) also discussed in later sections 
453 NNPC functions include inter alia: exploration and production, refining, purchasing and marketing of petroleum, its 




laws include pertinent sections of the Federal Constitution of Nigeria (1999) and the Land Use 
Act (1979). Each law is accountable for different but significant roles in the administration and 
regulation of the petroleum industry. Moreover, they establish the regulatory agencies for 
implementing government policies whilst optimizing compliance mechanisms towards 
corresponding statutes. 
In accordance with the administrative and regulatory obligations vested on the petroleum 
minister by the PA, the petroleum Ministry is accountable for the formulation, implementation 
and co-ordination of government policies for the industry.454 The Ministry also exercises its 
regulatory functions through the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), which is 
responsible for the monitoring and supervision of the petroleum industry and its operations. 
Industry operations are normally executed via petroleum licences and leases in the country, 
while the DPR ensures compliance with the applicable laws and regulations in line with good 
oilfield practices. The Minister of Petroleum Resources oversees the DPR with overarching 
regulatory powers.455 This encompasses powers to grant the rights for the exploration, 
extraction and production of oil and gas in Nigeria through the issuance of oil exploration 
licences (OELs)456, oil prospecting licences (OPLs)457 and oil mining leases (OMLs).458 The 
                                                             
crude oil, constructing equipping and maintaining tank farms, research and development and doing anything for giving effect 
to agreements entered into by the Nigerian Government with a view to seeking participation by the Government or the 
Corporation in activities connected with petroleum. 
454 See, Section 2(1) Petroleum Act 1969 
455 See, Section 2 Petroleum Act 1969 
456 See, S. 2 (1) (a) Petroleum Act, 1969 An Oil Exploration Licence (OEL) is granted for one year for the search of oil only. 
The nature of the interest granted is to confer on the licensee the right to explore for petroleum. This right is however not 
exclusive to the licensee as another OEL may be granted to another applicant over the same area. This right granted by an 
OEL extends to conducting aerial and surface geological and geophysical surveys, excluding drilling below 91.44 metres. 
An OEL is also renewable. 
457 S.2 (1) (b) Petroleum Act, an oil prospecting licence (OPL) is granted for five years and is also renewable for the search, 
drill, win and disposal of oil. It confers on the licensee the right to explore, carry away and dispose of petroleum discovered 
and won in the area covered by the licence. This grant is exclusive so that another OPL may not be granted in respect of the 
same area. 
458 S.2 (1) © Petroleum Act, an oil-mining lease (OML) is granted for twenty years and is renewable for the search, win and 




Minister may also authorise other contractual arrangements, such as production sharing 
contracts (PSCs)459 and service agreements or service contracts (SCs).460  
Other supervisory agencies for the oil and gas industry include: The Federal Ministry of 
Environment (FME) which is responsible for administering environmental impact assessments 
(EIAs) for public and private schemes, as well as oil and gas projects. The DPR also has 
primary responsibility for the enforcement of safety and environmental standards in the oil and 
gas industry. Whereas, the Petroleum Inspectorate, operates as a department within the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), it is responsible for issuing permits and 
licences for activities connected with petroleum exploration and exploitation.461 Also, the 
National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) is responsible for preparing, 
detecting and responding to oil spillages. Likewise, the agency undertakes surveillance of oil 
exploration activities including securing compliance with all existing environmental 
legislation, particularly in spills detection.462 
 
2.2. Sustainable Development Goals and Oil Exploitation in Nigeria: A Case of Multiple 
Trade-Offs and Elusive Synergies? 
As argued in chapter 1, the SDGs are designed to enhance synchronisation between 
development goals and environmental protection. In the petroleum industry context, it is further 
stressed that the integration of the 17 goals articulated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
development remains integral for achieving a green and sustainable petroleum industry. One 
however acknowledges that synergies across all 17 goals though ideal, may not always be 
                                                             
459 See, David Smith & Louis T. Wells: “Minerals Agreements in Developing Countries: Structure and Substance” 69 AJIL 
560. 
460 See, M. Taylor and S. Tyne: Joint Operating Agreements (London, Longman, 1992) p. 20. 
461  See, Section 5 (1) (a-g) of the NNPC Act 1977; 
462 See, Section 5 of the NOSDRA Act, 2006 
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feasible and the likelihood of trade-offs remain realistic considerations in the administration of 
an industry as global, complex and dynamic as the petroleum industry. Notwithstanding this 
limitation, global and planetary sustainability is dependent on goals harmonization across 
SDGs especially as it affects the oil industry and its ability to impair the environment via 
unsustainable exploitation processes. This section thus undertakes an assessment of the 
Nigerian petroleum regulations to ascertain their feasibility for achieving sustainable 
development. 
A scrutiny of the Nigerian oil and gas rules at this juncture is thus relevant to determine whether 
adequate consideration and application of the SDGs in relation to oil exploitation are evident. 
In other words, the questions regarding Nigerian oil and gas regulations remain: Are there 
apparent synergies across the 17 SDGs and the Nigerian petroleum laws? More importantly, 
are the Nigerian petroleum regulations and policy compliant with specific environmental goals 
represented in the SDGs? For instance, do Nigerian petroleum regulations effectively 
engender: goal 13 affecting climate action, goal 14 (aquatic system protection), as well as goal 
15 (terrestrial ecosystems / bio-diversity protection) including their associated targets? Are the 
rules realistic and capable of optimizing the social development pillar as well as ensuring green 
economic growth or is the current Nigerian scenario a case of zero synergies and excessive 
trade-offs? In view of these foregoing issues, Nigeria’s efforts at securing all three pillars of 
the sustainable development paradigm is thus considered in the proceeding sub-sections, 
commencing with the environmental protection pillar, followed by the economic growth and 
social pillars. 
2.2.1. Environmental Protection Guidelines in Nigerian Petroleum laws 
In addressing the preceding issues, a state’s cognisance, adoption and implementation of 
international environmental treaties as policy instruments to optimize SDGs during oil 
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exploitation becomes relevant. Apparently, Nigeria’s willingness to commit to environmental 
goals may be inferred from the considerable number of international legal instruments that it 
is party to. Pertinent treaties or instruments from the oil industry context include: The 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its accompanying 
Protocols, the 1995 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone 
Layer463, International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 
of 1992464, Convention on Biological Diversity465 and a host of others that foster the aims of 
sustainable development in the petroleum industry.466 This section thus considers the extent to 
which these international environmental treaties have influenced oil exploitation in Nigeria. 
Further attention is given to the successes or failings of the Nigerian attempts at inter-linking 
the SDGs, achieving sustainable development and a green petroleum industry via 
environmental regulations. 
The underlying foundation of environmental law and policy in Nigeria is traceable to Section 
20 of the Nigerian Constitution which stipulates the provisions for: environmental protection, 
preservation of water, air, land, forests and wildlife in Nigeria.467 Other legislative enactments 
in furtherance of environmental protection, administered by the Federal Ministry of 
Environment comprise of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act of 1988 denoted 
as the FEPA Act and its accompanying regulations.468 The associated regulations also impact 
on oil industry operations in the areas relating to habitat protection and waste management 
                                                             
463 Nigeria signed this Protocol on the 10th of April 1996 
464 Nigeria became a signatory on the 27th of November 1994  
465 See UNCED (1992), Nigeria also signed this Convention in November 1994  
466 Other Environmentally protective treaties which Nigeria is signatory to include, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea  the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel 
Convention)  the Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) the Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention)  the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage  the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, etc 
467 See S.20 Federal Republican Constitution of Nigerian 1999. 
468 Other regulations under the Act include; National Environmental Protection (Effluent Limitation) Regulations, the 
National Environmental Protection (Pollution Abatement in Industries and Facilities Generating Wastes) Regulations, the 




comprising: the Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 1992 (EIA Act), the National Oil 
Spills Detection and Response Agency Act, (NOSDRA)469, which provides statutory backing 
for the agency of the Federal Ministry of Environment to optimize oil pollution controls. The 
Agency is empowered to tackle preparedness, detection and response to all oil spillages in 
Nigeria.470 Similarly, the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry 
in Nigeria (EGASPIN)471 as codified by the DPR, pursuant to the Petroleum Act of 1969 
crucially provides regulatory and compliance guidelines to secure performance of 
environmental objectives during petroleum exploitation. 
 
In the same vein, the Petroleum Act’s environmentally relevant aspect is hinged on the fact 
that it provides a nominal framework for the observation of safety procedures, health 
guidelines and pollution prevention during petroleum operations.472 Indeed, S.9. (1) of the PA 
stipulates that;  
“the Minister may make regulations prescribing anything requiring to be prescribed for 
the purposes of this Act; by providing generally for matters relating to licences and 
leases granted under this Act and operations carried on thereunder, including, the safe 
working, the conservation of petroleum resources, the prevention of pollution of water 
courses and the atmosphere….”473  
Although these provisions seem to lend environmental support during oil exploration, they are 
however vague, prone to subjective interpretation and difficult to enforce. A further perusal of 
S.9 of the PA indicates a recommendation for the Minister to make regulations for oil pollution 
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prevention.474 Though well-meaning provisions, they lack specific guidelines for effective 
implementation or enforcement. This is because it relies heavily on excessive discretion of the 
minister who is not obliged to make specific regulations that would guarantee environmental 
protection. This has resulted in the claims that the PA has been partly responsible for the poor 
environmental state of the Niger-delta, as the regulations lacked clear or comprehensive 
environmental guidelines and proffer minimal standards.475  
 
Furthermore, the provisions relating to the grant of oil prospecting license and oil mining 
leases under the Act, wherein license holders must relinquish portions of the lease after ten 
years, exacerbate this issue of inadequate and unclear environmental guidelines conferred by 
the PA.476 S.12 of the PA inadvertently serves to attenuate environmental goals by engendering 
trade-offs which expedite the exploitation process for economic growth, but impinge on 
environmental protection and sustainable production goals as the oil companies are less keen 
to remediate oil-impacted sites before decommissioning. This is obviously in a bid to exploit 
the utmost gains from their leases and investments, thereby culminating in a severely degraded 
Niger-delta.477  
 
Apparently, the PA mostly reproduced the provisions of the colonial legislation albeit in a 
different title and did very little to improve on the limitations of the erstwhile regulation.478 
This substantiates why the PA was criticised as an environmentally lacking legislation, having 
scant provisions against water, atmosphere and land pollution and fails to optimize goals and 
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targets across goals 6, 13, 14 and 15. The PA is further constrained in its scope of enforcement 
and fails to provide comprehensive environmentally protective guidelines regarding habitats 
or species preservation during petroleum exploitation.479 Ultimately, the extant PA remains 
weak and incapable of triggering or driving synergies across the SDGs to engender a green oil 
industry in Nigeria, but requires reforms to guarantee its relevance as a tool of environmental 
sustainability in the Nigerian petroleum industry.  
2.2.1.1. Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations in Nigeria 
The Nigerian government established an institutional framework to tackle environmental 
problems via the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act of 1988 which was 
subsequently amended by Decree 59 of 1992. FEPA was empowered to oversee the 
environment and undertake measures and policies to expedite environmental protection and 
pollution control. Thereafter state governments were also authorised to establish state 
environmental protection agencies. FEPA subsequently published the National Environmental 
Protection (Pollution Abatement in Industries and Facilities Generating Wastes) Regulation 
1991 wherein EIA was made obligatory, requiring compliance within 90 days. In furtherance 
of the UNCED objectives480, Nigeria enacted the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Act.481 Before the EIA Act, most projects in Nigeria complied with feasibility reports based 
on a cost and benefit analysis statement with minimal attention given to the environmental 
risks or possible environmental impacts of proposed development projects.482  
 
A closer contemplation of S.1 of the EIA Act reveals the primary intent of the Act, which 
stipulates that an EIA must be conducted to determine the likely environmental impacts of a 
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project, and the extent to which the proposed activity would significantly or otherwise affect 
the environment or the environmental effect of projects or proposed industrial activities 
instigated by individuals, corporate and public entities.483 The EIA Act by virtue of sections 3 
and 4 (a-h) also requires that the proponent of a project, obtain the Ministry‘s approval before 
proceeding with a project. The EIA Act also sets out the EIA process by the provisions of 
sections 16, 17 and 19 of the Act, which commences from an EIA proposal to its approval for 
implementation, resulting in the issuance of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and 
certificate.484 The EIA stages identified by the Act include screening which entails project 
appraisal for potential environmental effects, scoping which sets out the spatial and temporary 
dimension of environmental effects including detailed base line studies for determining the 
environmental conditions prior to project implementation.485  
 
The Act also gives a detailed definition of the environment to mean the components of the 
Earth comprising; (a) Land, water, and air, including all layers of the atmosphere; (b) All 
organic and inorganic matter and living organisms; and (c) The interacting natural systems 
that include components referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b)486 with the aim of promoting a 
broader scope of application. Furthermore, S. 4 of the Act requires an EIA to indicate the 
description of the proposed activities, expatiate on the potentially affected environment 
including specific information necessary to identify and assess the environmental effects of 
the proposed activities, including the details of the practical activities envisaged.  
 
Likewise, S.4 requires an assessment of the likely or potential environmental impacts of the 
proposed activity and the outline of alternatives, including the direct or indirect, cumulative, 
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484 See Part II, Sections 16-19 of the EIA Act (1992) 
485 S.63(1) of the EIA Act 
486 EIA definition also affects the socioeconomic and biophysical attributes of the environment. 
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short-term or long-term effects and available mitigating or palliative measures. The Act also 
provides sanctions for noncompliance with the provisions of S.4, which includes the 
imposition of a fine or imprisonment but not both.487 Moreover, the Act commendably 
prohibits individuals, public and corporate bodies from embarking on or authorizing projects 
without consideration of their environmental impacts at the earliest stages. It further provides 
that decisions cannot be concluded either against or in support of the proposed activity without 
the contribution and opinion of government agencies, experts and members of the public.488 
Notwithstanding these commendable attributes of the EIA Act, it is however not flawless. Its 
major weakness lies in the fact that it fails to stipulate the need for continuing EIAs through 
the lifetime of a development project. In addition, the approval and permits process often 
involve undue concurrence with the federal, state and even local government authorities where 
the proposed industrial activity is sited. This is highly problematic because the states and local 
governments consider the award of permits, approvals and other related EIA certification 
procedure to be a revenue generating measure for the ministry or environment departments as 
opposed to an environmental protection initiative.489  
Frequently, other regulators including State EPAs unnecessarily charged with matching 
responsibilities as the FEPA, rather than synchronizing with FEPA, undermine its efforts by 
demanding economic benefits from the IOCs as an essential part of EIA certification 
procedures. This occurs particularly where FEPA involves them only at the review stage of the 
EIA process.490 Quite unfortunately, confusion and bureaucratic delays in implementing 
industry related EIAs become unavoidable due to such replication of regulatory agencies, 
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leading to enormous cost and unnecessary waste of time. This impacts negatively on the 
objectives of the EIA Act and its corresponding performance. Thus, some EIA processes are 
often avoided because the penalties for breaching the cumbersome nature of permit approvals 
are cheaper and less burdensome than conducting EIAs for every project or environmentally 
intrusive activity.  
Moreover, the Act fails to stipulate the recruitment of environmentally experienced or expert 
personnel to ensure full compliance with the EIA directives. It is clarified that, the use of 
experienced EIA consultants is a critical element towards strengthening and optimizing EIAs, 
as there exist interlinkages between EIA quality and the expertise of consultants and planning 
authorities. Essentially, inexperience on a general level not only hinders decent quality impact 
assessments but jeopardises the knowledge and data that is built with experience.491 This 
further complicates EIA enforcements as it threatens the ability to generate and accumulate 
indispensable data, which should normally provide the technical solutions crucial for 
mitigation measures. Likewise, the Nigerian reality portrays the absence of alternative sites for 
consideration in EIA applications, should there be negative outcomes of an EIA.492 An 
additional unfavourable situation created by the Act is that it places an unhealthy reliance on 
the project proponents for provision of environmental information and reports of environmental 
studies, thus, its aims are easily circumvented.  
Furthermore, a visible and relevant flaw of EIA processes conducted under the Act relates to 
the issue of public participation during EIAs and the difficulties experienced by private persons 
in ensuring EIA performance via judicial process.493 These foregoing factors formed the crux 
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of the controversy in the case of Oronto Douglas v. Shell Petroleum Development Company 
and Ors.494 The appellants in this case filed an action against the respondents who were jointly 
engaged in a liquefied natural gas project. Before commencing the project, the respondents 
failed to conduct an environmental impact assessment, thereby infringing the provisions of the 
Act. The appellant contended that the respondents had failed to comply with statutory 
provisions and sought declaratory and injunctive reliefs restraining the respondents from 
continuing and/or carrying on with the liquefied Natural Gas project until a proper 
environmental impact assessment has been conducted strictly in accordance with the terms of 
the EIA Act. The trial court (Federal High Court Lagos) rather than considering the merits of 
the case in accordance with the EIA Act to determine issues affecting the alleged statutory 
infringements, dismissed the suit based on the preliminary objections raised by the respondents 
who contended that the Appellants lacked locus standi and that the mode of commencement of 
the action was procedurally defective. The Court maintained that, in the absence of the plaintiff 
showing that he had suffered a personal loss by the failure to conduct the environmental impact 
assessment, his suit could not be sustained.495 
The suit was thus frustrated at the trial stage by an extremely strict or narrow construction of 
standing or locus standi, to deny the plaintiffs access to remedy. Thus, procedural technicalities 
and rules of court relating to the form of application stalled the enforcement of a core aspect of 
the EIA Act, relating to EIA performance, or associated public consultations, before 
commencement of an environmentally invasive activity. However, the Court of Appeal 
upturned this decision and ordered a re-trial.496 Regrettably, and in a rather unexpected turn of 
events, a re-trial proved to be impossible as the “Res” or subject matter of the litigation, the 
                                                             
494 Oronto Douglas V. Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd. & Ors (1998) (Unreported) CA/L/143/97 
495 Ibid. See also, Obiora Chinedu OkaforI, Basil Ugochukwu, “Raising legal giants: The agency of the poor in the human 
rights jurisprudence of the Nigerian Appellate Courts”, Afr. hum. rights law j. vol.15 n.2 Pretoria 2015 1990-2011. 
496 See Appeal Court decision in Oronto Douglas v. Shell (1999) 2NWLR at 475, the court of Appeal thereafter set aside the 
decision of the learned trial Judge. Belgore, C.J, on the 17th day of February 1997. 
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Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) project had been completed in the Niger-Delta and commissioned 
before the commencement and determination of the Appeal in Lagos, effectively foreclosing 
any chance of a properly executed EIA for such an high risk, environmentally intrusive project. 
 
Also, in accordance with Nigeria’s objectives for improving environmental policy in the 
petroleum industry, the DPR was empowered by the PA to make regulations for pollution 
prevention and abatement. Consequently, the DPR created and endorsed the Environmental 
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry (EGASPIN) in 1991 with a view to 
enforcing EIAs in the oil industry. However, these provisions also duplicate those of the earlier 
mentioned EIA Act and creates undue replication of similar objectives. Moreover, the 
EGASPIN is responsible for ensuring proper environmental management and averting threats 
posed by oil exploratory equipment and installations.497 Part VIII, Section A of the EGASPIN 
governs EIA processes, while Articles 1.3 and 1.6 stipulate the performance of EIA studies 
prior to exploratory and operational activity to protect and enhance environmental resources 
in an eco-efficient manner. Article 1.4 makes the EIA report an essential part of the EIA.  
 
The EGASPIN further promotes protection of the environment via, the Environmental 
Evaluation (post-impact) Report (EER) which is a systematic process, requiring a project 
proponent or operator to provide the preliminary assessment of impacts through a screening 
process before an initial report is submitted to DPR. It is only when significant impacts are 
identified for a project or activity that full EIA studies and report preparation is authorised. 
The EGASPIN is however flawed in that it fails to mandate EIAs in circumstances where 
petroleum wastes from exploration and production require transfer from one site location to 
                                                             





another production facility for disposal. This is an important but currently overlooked area as 
it poses serious environmental hazards.498 This is because, some oil production facilities 
classified as off-shore locations like the Forcados and Escravos oil terminals are inextricably 
linked with the Niger-delta inland waterways and environment, thus the failure or non-
performance of an environmental risk assessment before transfers and disposal of petroleum 
wastes generates significant environmental problems.499 This omission thus proves 
detrimental to optimizing the aims or targets of goals 14 and 15 of the SDGs in securing aquatic 
and terrestrial systems protection during oil exploitation to prevent environmentally adverse 
impacts.   
2.2.1.2. Atmospheric and Climate Protection Regulations in Nigeria 
As argued in chapter 1, environmental regulations, which mitigate climate change, enhance 
atmospheric protection, whilst fulfilling the targets of SDG 13 relating to climate action are 
crucial tools of sustainable development in the petroleum industry. Nigerian Petroleum 
regulations are also embedded with atmospheric protection provisions following the 
ratification of the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone layer, the UNFCCC and 
additional protocols.500 However, the effectiveness of the Nigerian regulations in generating 
viable synergies towards atmospheric protection and securing the objectives of SDG 13 is 
another matter altogether. Indeed, Nigeria has oil and gas regulations like the Associated Gas 
                                                             
498 Petroleum wastes include any unavoidable materials resulting from oil and gas operations for which there is no economic 
demand or value and which must be disposed of. See H. Bashat, Managing Waste in Exploration and Production Activities 
of the Petroleum Industry (Paper presented at the 4th International Conference & Exhibition for Environmental 
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499 See, Anwuli Irene Ofuani, ‘Environmental Regulation of Offshore (E&P) Waste Management in Nigeria: How 
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Kyoto Protocol and the International Energy Industry: The Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in Nigeria, in Cameron, 
P.D., and Zillman, D., (ed.), Kyoto: From Principles to Practice, 345-355 (2001). 
 120 
 
Re-Injection Act, which has commendable provisions for climate and atmospheric protection. 
The Act specifically provides for oil companies in Nigeria, 
 “…to submit to the Minister a preliminary programme or schemes for the viable 
utilization of all associated gas produced not later than 1st April 1980 and provide 
detailed programmes and plans for either the implementation of programmes relating 
to the re-injection of all produced associated gas or schemes for the viable utilization 
of all produced associated gas no later than 1st October 1980”.501 
The essence of these provisions is to phase out gas flaring in Nigeria, prevent atmospheric 
pollution and reduce carbon emissions from the flares which is an essential step towards 
achieving the targets of goal 13 regarding climate action on a national level. Nevertheless, 
incredible amounts of gas continue to be flared each day unabated in the Niger-delta.502 Despite 
the Act’s articulation of timelines for the cessation of gas flaring for April and October 1980. 
Previously, the penalty for breaching anti-flare provisions was a forfeiture of the concession. 
This penalty was however considered unduly harsh and inimical to investment.503 The initial 
penalty for not re-injecting associated gas was thereafter changed to a low fine, which made it 
more economical for companies to flare than to market or re-inject associated gas. The IOCs 
or multinational Oil companies found it cheaper to flare gas at a cost of 1 million US Dollars 
as against the 56 million US Dollars cost of new infrastructure to enable switching from water 
to gas injection.504  
Regrettably, the alteration of Government’s position as against the penalty of 1980 was due to 
factors ranging from lack of Infrastructure for associated gas utilization, including the financial 
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implications of switching gas infrastructure. The Government was expected to contribute, 
based on the existing Joint Venture agreements to the cost of any gas injection facility. 
Incidentally, government’s input has not been significant as greater consideration has always 
been paid to short-term economic goals than building resilient and efficient infrastructure in 
accordance with goal 9, to optimize environmental goals and a long-term green economy.505  
Sadly, the Act has since been amended to reflect a gas flaring deadline shift to January 1985 
and beyond, when the Associated Gas Re-injection (Continued flaring of gas) Regulation of 
1984 came into force and provided for exemptions to the general ban on flaring. Although there 
are other attempts at amendments towards curtailing gas flaring such as the Associated Gas 
Re-Injection Act of 2004 and the Associated Gas Re-Injection (Amendment) Act of 2004506, 
these appear to be window-dressing of the 1979 Act with negligible adjustments towards fines 
for flare exemptions. Sadly, the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill which would hopefully 
resolve regulatory lapses, and allegedly entails an overhaul of the extant regulatory framework, 
to actualize holistic, sustainability geared regulatory and policy reforms for the Nigerian oil 
and gas sector remains stalled in a knotty and complex political bog that has spanned 14 years 
and 3 legislative terms. 
Furthermore, flaring phase out dates have been problematic in Nigeria mostly because they 
have been predicated on public statements of successive governments, without legislative 
backing or regulatory enforcement measures, accompanied with a dismal lack of political will 
to implement the ban.507 The more disturbing issue of continued delays and political 
ambivalence towards the enforcement of the stipulated date for the cessation of flaring 
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activities has proved counterproductive to the aims of sustainable development as it has 
resulted in an incalculable level of atmospheric pollution in the Niger-delta.508 
Unfortunately, the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act fails in delivering sustainable development 
on all three pillars of the sustainable development paradigm509, bearing in mind that gas flaring 
has continued unabated because of the failure of the Act’s enforcement and inadequate or 
inappropriate sanctions under the Act. This has resulted in severe environmental damage and 
significant economic loss. The gas flaring problem and its attendant effects on Niger-delta 
communities was also addressed in the case of Jonah Gbemre & Ors. V. Shell Petroleum 
Development Company.510 Where the appellants sought the enforcement of their fundamental 
human rights to life and a healthy environment. They contended that, their right to a clean and 
poison free, healthy environment were violated because of the persistent gas flaring in their 
Niger-delta communities by the respondents. The Appeal Court held that; 
 “…these constitutionally guaranteed rights inevitably include the right to clean, 
poison-free, unpolluted and healthy environment. That the actions of the 1st and 2nd 
respondents in continuing to flare gas during their oil exploration and production 
activities in the applicants’ community is a gross violation of their fundamental right to 
life (including healthy environment) and are therefore unconstitutional, null and void 
by virtue of section 1(3) of the same Constitution”.511 
                                                             
508 The Energetic Solution Conference (2004) estimates that the Niger Delta region has about 123 gas flaring sites. T. Agbola 
and T.A.Olurin, ”Land use and Landcover Change in the Niger Delta”.  (2003) stated that about 45.8 billion kilo watts of 
heat is discharged into the atmosphere from 1.8 billion cubic feet of gas daily in the Niger Delta region, leading to 
temperatures that render large areas uninhabitable. Several postulations suggest that, harsh penalties or deterrents would 
result in economic dislocation or folding up of the IOCs, loss of jobs, reduce government revenue and probably discourage 
foreign investment”. 
509 See WSSD 2002, Paragraph 2, Agenda 21. See also, D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable 
Development, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005) UN Doc A/CONF.199/20. See also, UNCSD 2012, 
510 (Unreported) (suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05). In that case, gas flaring was held to be illegal and a violation of communities’ 
human rights. The case is however on appeal. 
511 The Appeal Court ruled that Gas flaring violated the dignity of the human person as enshrined in the Constitution. That 
section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act and section 1 of the Associated Gas Re-Injection (Continued 




Based on these findings, the reliefs claimed by the applicants as stated in their motion were 
granted. However, the court could not award damages or compensation and costs as sought by 
applicants for breach of the Associated Gas Act’s provisions against gas flaring, despite the 
losses incurred by the Plaintiffs. This judicial shortcoming indicates a manifest failure of the 
Act as it lacks practical and realistic compensatory measures to victims of gas flare induced 
environmental degradation. Even more damning is that, such environmental harm ensues from 
state approved or authorised activity. Undoubtedly, the appropriate sanctions or compensations 
could have proved realistic in curbing gas flaring. Moreover, appropriate sanctions would 
better align with industry standards or international best practices whilst positively targeting 
SDG 13 towards climate action and promoting sustainable development in Nigeria.  
 
2.2.1.3. Biodiversity Protection Regulations in Nigerian Oil and Gas Laws 
As also identified in the previous chapter, environmental sustainability in the oil industry 
predicates the need for regulations affording biodiversity protection. Such an approach better 
accommodates the aims of SDGs 14 and 15 covering aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. This 
subsection therefore considers Nigerian petroleum regulations and their effectiveness in 
fulfilling the obligations articulated in the Biodiversity Convention and the African Convention 
on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources which have Nigeria as signatory.512 Also 
considered is the competency of these petroleum regulations to ensure an environmentally 
sustainable system for biodiversity preservation and restoration. A perusal of the 
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Constitution513 and relevant oil legislations affecting the environment and supporting 
ecosystem mostly reveal legislative provisions endorsing “reasonable measures” or “safety 
measures”514. For instance, the Petroleum Drilling Regulations in Sections 23 and 27 prohibits, 
without lawful permission, the cutting down of trees in forest reserves. Section 25 posits that 
reasonable measures be taken to prevent water pollution and to end it, if it occurs.  
In as much as these regulations appear environmentally relevant, they are regrettably minimal, 
limited in their scope of application as they lack realistic compliance measures and standards 
for enforcement. The lack of specific rules for pollution prevention of designated and protected 
areas in the EIA provisions weaken the laws and render them highly prone to subjective 
interpretation and non-performance.515 Some other statutes like S.17 of the Petroleum Drilling 
Regulations, recommend the protection of lands considered sacrosanct.516 For instance, S.1 sets 
out the requirements and documents to accompany the application for an oil prospecting license 
or oil mining lease. It also states the rights and powers of licensees and lessees, and sets out the 
limitations in their rights; such as entry into lands considered sacred.517  
Likewise, S.25 of the regulation imposes obligations on the licensees and lessees to take 
necessary precautions to prevent pollution, or control and ensure its cessation when it occurs.518 
                                                             
513 The Nigerian Constitution (FRCN) 1999, acknowledges the relevance of environmental protection in Section 20. Section 
12 also purports that international treaties (including environmental treaties) ratified by the National Assembly should be 
implemented as law in Nigeria. 
514 See for example, Section 9 of the Petroleum Act, S.25 Petroleum Drilling Regulations, S.43 of Petroleum Refining 
Regulations merely requires that the manager of a refinery should take “measures” to prevent and control the pollution of the 
environment. 
515 See the Petroleum Drilling Regulations 2004. Also, D. Omoweh, Shell Petroleum Development Company: The State and 
Underdevelopment of Nigeria’s Niger Delta “A Study in Environmental Degradation (Eritrea, Africa World Press, 2005) 52 
516Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations: Section 17 (1) (b) places restrictions on licensees from using land within 
fifty yards of any building, dam, reservoir, public road, etc. Section 23 and 27 prohibits, without lawful permission, the 
cutting down of trees in forest reserves. Section 25 establishes that reasonable measures be taken to prevent water pollution 
and to end it, if it occurs.  
517Entry on land (1) The licensee or lessee is not authorised to enter upon or occupy, or to exercise any of the rights and 
powers conferred by his licence or lease in relation to-(a) any area held to be sacred (the question whether any area is held to 
be sacred being decided, if necessary, by the State authority, whose decision shall be final);  
518 S.25. Prevention of pollution; “The licensee or lessee shall adopt all practicable precautions, including the provision of 
up-to-date equipment approved by the Director of Petroleum Resources, to prevent the pollution of inland waters, rivers…if 




However, a closer observation of these provisions show that they are inadequate and rather 
limited to the extent that they mostly apply to religious areas and not the entire oil producing 
areas. Thus, the Petroleum Drilling Regulations also fail to identify the relevant forms of 
precaution and control measures, rendering it subject to debate or varied interpretation to the 
detriment of the environment. 
Currently, the Niger-delta effectively lacks protected areas and is deprived of enforceable 
statutory provisions to safeguard its forests, lands, aquatic and other habitats.519 This situation 
cannot expedite the achievement of the sustainable development goals. Moreover, the lacunae 
created by the PA and Drilling Regulations failure to stipulate habitats and species protection 
guidelines, while affording protection of just sacred trees has resulted in rapid deforestation in 
the Niger-delta accruing from the execution of oil concessions and leases. This is accountable 
for the elevated level of CO2 emissions, erosions and desertification of the Niger-delta region.  
The Nigerian oil and gas regulations also fail to clarify how the biodiversity in operational 
areas may be maintained. This has also negatively impacted on its ability to guarantee 
biodiversity preservation in most petroleum producing communities. Both fauna520 and flora 
have been depleted by decades of unsustainable oil exploitation and production in operational 
areas. The paramount considerations like nature conservation and biodiversity protection 
evident in the Biodiversity convention, which Nigeria is party to, is not manifest in the oil and 
gas laws.521 The PA which ought to be a fully competent or self-contained legislation with 
adequate provisions to ensure that petroleum production does not deleteriously impact the 
Niger-delta environment has unfortunately failed to identify and engender synergies between 
                                                             
519The closest legislation with some relevance to biodiversity protection in the Niger-delta is the Endangered Species Act, 
Cap E9, LFN 2004.This Act focuses on the protection and management of Nigeria’s wildlife and some of the species in 
danger of extinction because of overexploitation, however it hardly relates to petroleum exploitation and the consequent 
impact on Biodiversity. 
520 Amaize, Emma. "Nigeria: Pollution in Niger Delta - Oil Firm, Fish Farmers Fight". Vanguard. allafrica.com. Retrieved, 
20th November 2014). 
521 Article 6. Of the Biological-Diversity Convention (1992) 
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environmental goals, bio-diversity protection and oil industry sustainability. It has 
unfortunately provoked unfavourable trade-offs resulting in the extinction of rare fauna and 
flora species, including massive deforestation of the Niger-delta for the speedy execution of oil 
concessions and petroleum leases.  
 
2.2.2. Petroleum Exploitation in Nigeria: Clarifying Endemic, Economic and 
Unsustainable Governance Challenges 
As previously identified in chapter 1, goal 8 of the SDGs relating to sustainable economic 
growth remains an embodiment of the economic growth pillar of sustainable development in 
the petroleum industry. This section therefore considers the Nigerian petroleum regulations 
and their capacity to deliver the utmost economic benefit from the exploitation of petroleum 
resources whilst maintaining a green petroleum industry. In furtherance of these aims, the 
NNPC is chiefly considered as it is the Nation’s bastion of economic growth, while its multiple 
roles as an oil and gas producer as well as a regulator of the Nigerian petroleum industry are 
appraised. The pertinent issue regarding this situation is to ascertain the extent to which 
Nigerian regulations and policy formulations orchestrated by the NNPC in the petroleum 
industry have optimized good governance objectives to engender oil sector transparency. 
Moreover, the NNPC’s competence at achieving oil industry capacity upgrades and 
institutional strengthening to prevent bribery and corruption, whilst sustaining GDP and green 
economic growth are assessed. These are core factors which constitute relevant indicators for 
oil industry governance. This appraisal is also needful as it serves to determine how a host state 
like Nigeria has managed the peculiar economic challenges of developing its petroleum 
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resources via a state-owned enterprise (SOE) such as the NNPC and if by so doing, it has 
achieved sustainable development goals.522  
Evidently, the petroleum industry is uniquely prone to oil price volatility and is frequently 
plagued with uncertainties.523 Oftentimes, this instability in oil prices negatively affects the 
sustainable development of petroleum resources by frustrating national planning measures.524 
Furthermore, the highly valuable net worth of petroleum in the International market and its 
capacity to generate super-profits, exclusive of production costs promotes sharp practices in 
the sector.525 This often encourages oil multinationals in developing countries with weak 
institutions, to vie for regulatory regimes that expedite profit maximisation to the detriment of 
environmental objectives or social development.526  
However, green economic growth initiatives envisage that states institute regulatory modalities 
that effectively counteract the economic challenges in the petroleum industry. Such economic 
challenges often represent inhibitors of the corresponding economic growth indicators relevant 
for the oil industry, which in the Nigerian context include: The level of transparency and 
comparable extent of bribery and corruption experienced within the public sector. Likewise, 
the level of dependence on resource rents and the impact of petroleum resources on the GDP 
becomes relevant. More so, the adequacy of budgetary and regulatory measures and the level 
                                                             
522 Richard M. Auty and Raymond F. Mikesell, Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies at 86-87 (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1998). See also, Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States (Univ. of California Press 
1997) 
523 Jeffrey Davis, Roland Ossowski, James Daniel and Steven Barnett, Stabilisation and Savings Funds for Non-Renewable 
Resources: Experience and Fiscal Policy Implications (2001), 6. 
524 The price of petroleum swung wildly in the years 2004-2008, including 2012-2013. Crude was priced at around US$30 
per barrel in January 2004, rising to a record high of almost US$150 in July 2008, and then quickly plummeting to around 
US$40 per barrel in December 2008. See oil prices history at EIA, Petroleum Navigator. 
525 Sometimes ranging from (500%-1000%). In 2000, petroleum revenue accounted for over 90% of export earnings. This 
included Nigeria (99.6 %), Algeria (97.2%), and Saudi Arabia (92.1%) Furthermore, for some countries petroleum exports 
comprised more that 40% of the GDP. This included Bahrain (50.9%), Turkmenistan (493.7%), Nigeria (48.7%), Saudi 
Arabia, 44.7%), and Trinidad and Tobago (41.1%). In comparison, in the same year, petroleum exports comprised 23.7% of 
Norway’s GDP. See Michael L Ross, Nigeria’s Oil Sector and the Poor (2003), 19. 
526 Partha Dasgupta and Geoffrey Heal, Economic Theory and Taxable Resources (1979) 153, 153. 
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of Nigeria’s competence in gaining petroleum revenues through taxation and pricing 
mechanisms also constitute pertinent issues which are subsequently considered. 
2.2.2.1. Corruption, Regulatory Gaps and Enforcement Failures in the Nigerian Oil 
Industry 
As previously argued in chapter 1, sustainable governance of the oil industry presupposes the 
achievement of economic development goals evident in goal 8 of the SDGs in tandem with 
goals 16 and 17 which interlinks building: effective, accountable, transparent and inclusive 
institutions at all levels and strengthening the means of implementing the SDGs. Such means 
of implementation of sustainable development thus envisages oil industry governance devoid 
of corruption.527 More so, in stressing the crucial challenges posed by corruption and the 
exigency of subduing and eradicating its pervasive influence, it is recapitulated that, Corruption 
remains synonymous with "the abuse of public office for private gain".528 When corruption 
becomes so widespread and seeps through a state’s political and economic institutions, it 
becomes indicative of poor governance and the chances of actualizing sustainable development 
become remote.529 
Moreover, due to the seriousness of the threats corruption poses, the UN in the United Nations 
Corruption Convention (UNCAC), stresses that, combating corruption requires multi-
stakeholder cooperation and international participation.530 Corruption thus constitutes a 
complex challenge, as it is borderless or without frontiers531, universal in scope, even though 
                                                             
527 See Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.98.III.B.18). 
528 Enery Quinones, "What is Corruption?" Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The OECD Observer. 
220 (2000): 23-4. ProQuest. 23 Apr. 2018. 
529 S. Okogbule, "Regulation of money laundering in Africa: the Nigerian and Zambian approaches." Journal of money 
laundering control 10, no. 4 (2007): 449-463. 
530 General Assembly resolution 58/4 of 31, United Nations Convention against Corruption. (UNCAC) 2003 
531 F. Galtung, "Transparency international's network to curb global corruption", in Caiden, G. et al. (Eds), Where 




more palpable in some regions where institutional and funding mechanisms to tackle the 
problem is lacking than in places with more competent systems.532 Additionally, the impacts 
of corruption are generally more devastating on the poor or most vulnerable who end up more 
deprived, as social goods and welfare benefits become increasingly inaccessible.533 These 
crucial factors thus substantiate the UN’s call for cohesive efforts towards national, regional 
and international participation, to eradicate the menace of corruption.  
Undoubtedly, corruption in all its forms and as affecting petro-business in Nigeria remains a 
topical issue as it significantly impacts on the pathways and the means of implementation of 
sustainable development in the petroleum industry. Indeed, the Extractives Industries 
International Index (EITI) ranked Nigeria 55th from 89 valuations in the 2017 Resource 
Governance Index (RGI), with a score of just 42 out of 100 points.534 Considering that Nigeria 
has the largest oil and gas reserves in sub-Saharan Africa with an estimated 37 billion barrels 
of oil and 188 trillion cubic feet of gas,535 these poor scores are suggestive of severe 
transparency, corruption and other governance challenges in the oil industry decision and 
administration chain. To corroborate this point, Nigeria was again recently ranked 148th by the 
Transparency International (TI) index, which ranks 180 countries and territories by their 
perceived levels of public sector corruption.536 The 2017 index found that more than two-thirds 
                                                             
532 See, L. Manzetti, L. and C.H. Blake, "Market reforms and corruption in Latin America: new means for old ways", 
Review of International Political Economy, (1996) Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 662-97. 
533 Michel. Dion, "What is corruption corrupting? A philosophical viewpoint." Journal of Money Laundering Control 13, no. 
1 (2010): 45-54. 
534 Available at: https://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2017/06/28/nigeria-%EF%BF%BC2017-resource-governance-index-
oil-and-gas-by-natural-resource-governance-institute/ Accessed on 6 June 2018 
535 See NNPC News and Updates. Available at: 
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of countries scored below 50, while the overall average score was 43, Nigeria scored 28, which 
is even lower than the Sub-Saharan African average score of 32.537  
Likewise, preceding arguments in chapter 1, clarified the nexus between transparency, 
sustainable governance including the accompanying impact on regulatory outcomes and 
corruption. These are further ascertained by scrutinizing the petroleum regulatory framework 
and how it impacts core areas of oil and gas exploitation. Such areas as governed by the 
petroleum regulations oversee specific aspects of the oil industry value chain538 encompassing: 
Awards of Petroleum Contracts/Exploration and production licenses, Public procurement, 
Accounting and Petroleum Revenue Management, as well as Oversight and Enforcement 
Actions. In the same vein, transparency in the awards of Petroleum contracts and mining leases, 
remains crucial to achieving the SDGs and sustainable development in the oil industry. This is 
because, transparency and accountability remain key tools to forestall corruption and optimize 
the SDGs. Consequently, the extent of transparency and accountability evident in the Nigerian 
oil industry becomes a relevant focus point for ascertaining the sustainability of oil sector 
governance in Nigeria. 
Apparently in Nigeria, oil industry processes, including oil contracts and bids transparency 
remain problematic as bid rounds have perennially been trailed by controversy.539 These 
controversies range from: discretionary award allegations, shadowy and obscure bidding 
arrangements or procedures as bidding processes are sometimes shielded from public scrutiny. 
Worse still, there have been allegations of arbitrary awards of OMLs to the oil producing 
                                                             
537See Corruptions Perceptions Index of the Transparency International, (TI) 2017. Available at: 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 Accessed at 26 April 2018 
538 See, The EITI value chain: “Strengthening Governance Along The Extractive Industries Value Chain” Available at: 
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subsidiary of the NNPC known as the NPDC540 through circumvention of bid rounds or due 
process.541 Evidently substantiating these irregularities, the EITI in its 2017 index scored 
Nigeria 17 out of 100, ranking it 77th amongst 89 countries contracts and licensing 
assessments. These scores and rankings are thus implicit of elevated levels of opacity and 
corruption in core areas of decision-making affecting petroleum contracts and licensing, 
corporate classifications,542process rules and disclosure.543  
To a large extent, many of these challenges are a throw-back from the Nigerian military era in 
the early 70’s, where the competence, economic proficiency and institutions to account for and 
manage petroleum wealth during unexpected petroleum resource booms left such juntas largely 
unprepared to tackle patronage and rentier state complications.544 As already argued in chapter 
1, a rentier state or patronage system inevitably relies on a continual stream of income such as 
oil revenues while inherently generating incentives at odds with sound economic management, 
ultimately fomenting and institutionalizing corruption.545  
Indeed, the all-encompassing fiat of military heads of states at the commencement of 
commercial oil discoveries, set the backdrop for systemic corruption in the oil industry. 
Especially as the military could unilaterally award contracts, oil blocks and licenses to 
themselves, allies546 and even effect nationalization or expropriation policies instantaneously 
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542 D. Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria, Princeton, Princeton 
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543 See, Corruptions Perception Index (CPI) and EITI – changes on the horizon, available at: https://eiti.org/blog/cpi-eiti-
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via military decrees.547 However, Nigeria now urgently needs to move on and ensure more 
concerted efforts in line with its democratic status since 1999, through transparent governance 
of petroleum industry processes for sustainable development. 
Notwithstanding, there have been sporadic efforts in the Nigerian oil industry targeting 
improvements in process transparency, depending on the prevailing administration’s 
willingness to tackle corrupt practices.548 For instance, bid rounds in 2005-2008 were made 
public, open and accommodating a more competitive process.549  The available oil blocks and 
relevant bidding criteria were even advertised in accordance with the Nigerian Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (2006).550 However, more needs to be done as corruption 
still mars oil and gas bidding processes in Nigeria as publication of bid rounds remains 
irregular. In some cases, bidders make bids which they expect to review or negotiate 
downwards by capitalizing on the often-obscure process and the minister or government’s 
discretionary powers.551 There are also instances of forced mergers with third-party agents on 
undisclosed grounds, while Signature bonus payments deadlines were irregularly enforced.552 
In extreme cases, companies lacking capacity to execute petroleum contracts secured leases or 
acreages.553 Although the legislative chambers conducted investigations regarding these 
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EITI serves to promote international good practice for bid rounds whilst concretising the sustainable reforms agenda for 
revenue transparency in Extractive industries. 
551A. Gillies, “Reforming Corruption Out of Nigerian Oil? Part Two: Progress and Prospects” U4 Brief, 2009 See also, A. 
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irregularities and revoked several blocks, much more still needs to be done to make the 
contractual and licensing phase more transparent and ensure sustainable development of the 
industry. 
Furthermore, crude oil commodity sales and transactions negotiated by the NNPC constitutes 
another core challenge in the Nigerian petroleum industry. This is attributable to the fact that, 
NNPC crude sales remains an intractable aspect of the petroleum industry value chain. 
Allegedly, NNPC crude sales are shrouded in mystery, fraught with corrupt practices, financial 
irregularities, illicit cash flows and unaccounted funds.554 Accounting for this challenge is the 
fact that, the NNPC via its Domestic Crude Allocation (DCA) scheme is vested with far-
reaching discretionary powers regarding crude oil sales. The DCA comprises the government’s 
portion of the joint venture (JVs) and production sharing contracts (PSCs), accruing to 1 million 
(bpd).555 Indeed, NNPC authorizes and determines the buyers, manner of sale and the 
corresponding remittances of generated sales revenues to the national treasury. Also, NNPC 
decides what sums to remit and what to retain for its administrative and operational 
requirements. Even more alarming is the fact that, NNPC has retained as much as $7 Billion 
(USD) per annum or sometimes amounts accruing to ½ (half) the cost of each barrel of crude 
sold.556 This created serious controversy regarding the validity of such retention of funds.557  
The DCA or domestic crude allocation system operated by NNPC is a military era scheme 
which allows NNPC’s Crude Oil Marketing Division (COMD) to sell an estimated 500,000 
barrels (bpd) of crude on an inter-company basis to NNPC’s downstream marketing subsidiary 
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PPMC. (the Petroleum Pipelines and Product Marketing Co.). Basically, the PPMC reserves 
the option to send some of the crude to domestic refineries or resell as exports or convert it as 
exchange for petroleum products. Thereafter PPMC makes necessary payments to the NNPC, 
which in turn remits payments to a joint NNPC-Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Naira 
denominated account. The thrust of the ensuing challenges thus involves: NNPC in a conflict 
of interest situation where it can be both the seller, and the buyer as PPMC is its downstream 
subsidiary.558  
More so, NNPC decides on its own behalf, the most favourable or convenient price terms and 
conditions in dollars denominated transactions which are extremely opaque.559 Moreover, 
NNPC decides on the remittances conversion rates, converting Dollars into Naira, and adopts 
a considerably lower rate than the CBN’s, inevitably remitting drastically reduced sums to the 
CBN which are tough to verify. This resulted in the claim by the Nigerian Extractives Industries 
Initiative (NEITI) that this unilateral conversion practice has accrued to astronomical losses 
which amounted up to $217 million per year for 2009 to 2011.560 Ultimately, NNPC retains 
more funds from the DCA scheme than the government, resulting in confusion, escalating 
government debt profile, mismanagement and misappropriation of public funds, which could 
have been better utilized for public or social goods, including optimizing more synergies across 
the sustainable development goals. 
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Regarding oil industry procurements, similar records of irregularity and corruption are evident. 
Indeed, a massive portion of Nigerian government revenues accruing over 80 percent561, mostly 
from oil sources are disbursed through industry procurement. Also, in the military or pre-1999 
era alone, the Nigerian government suffered colossal losses exceeding US$ 300 million 
annually to procurement fraud and inefficiency.562 Procurement irregularities and corrupt 
practices range from: budget opacity or inconsistencies, to rampant inflation of contract costs, 
the award of contracts for fictional projects, over-invoicing, diversion of public funds to foreign 
banks, and low project quality due to inexpert contractors.563  
Evidently, due to the significant level of bureaucratic bottlenecks, ineptitude and opacity 
evident in conducting business in a developing petro-state like Nigeria, business in the sector 
and with NNPC is accompanied with considerable time and over-head costs. All too often the 
process becomes severely prone to bribery and corruption as IOCs and investors seek 
opportunities to secure favourable acreages, contracts, including fast tracking their bids and 
applications.  
Similarly, a considerable number of licenses, contracts and acreages, with even minimal cost 
thresholds require the NNPC’s approval and are subjected to a three-tier verification process 
consisting of: NAPIMS564 the investment subsidiary of the NNPC Group, the NNPC Group 
Executive Council, including the NNPC Board. Occasionally, awards with higher cost 
configurations require the approval of the Federal Executive Council (FEC).565 To further 
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worsen and complicate issues, the review period could span through 24 months whereas the 
global industry average is about 6-9 months.566 
Likewise, bidding processes, fiscal in-flows, expenditures and other procurement processes, 
frequently become severely compromised and vulnerable to grandiose bribery schemes or other 
forms of corruption perpetrated by international actors. The most notorious of these 
procurement irregularities with significant media attention, included, the bribery scandal 
involving associates of the Halliburton oil servicing subsidiary. Halliburton Co. via Kellogg, 
Brown and Root which paid-up, US$ 180 million in bribes to Nigerian government officials in 
exchange for US$ 6 billion worth of contracts to build liquified natural gas plants.567 The case 
proceedings revealed that, fake firms were also set-up to conceal the illicit funds and paper 
trail.568  
A more recent scenario unfolded with the past Minister of petroleum resources, Mrs. Diezani 
Alison-Madueke who was the Nigerian petroleum minister between 2010-2015 and a former 
OPEC President.569 She was accused of diverting monstrous sums of money ranging from $6 
billion (USD) or 1.2 trillion Naira equivalent570 to $20 billion (USD) from the NNPC.571 She 
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was also indicted for awarding petroleum contracts, acreages and licenses without recourse to 
due process572, as well as inappropriate spending of government funds on private jets.573  
Similarly, the Nigerian Senate allegedly indicted the former minister for the transfer of 1.2 
billion Naira into the private accounts of a company without due process therefore violating 
the terms of concession agreements.574 She was further charged by the anti-financial crimes 
agency, Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as well as the UK’ 
National Crime Agency, (NCA) for money laundering and other financial crimes.575 This 
catalogue of financial crimes and corruption perpetrated by no less than an ex-Minister and 
former OPEC President576 typifies the extent to which corruption is ravaging the NNPC and 
by extension the Nigerian oil industry.  
The Petroleum Act (PA) is thus, considerably flawed as a regulatory instrument for tackling 
corruption since it allows an extreme level of regulatory discretion and state bureaucratic 
interference especially via the NNPC during award of petroleum leases or contracts, arbitrary 
crude oil sales and remittances, as well as severely obscuring due process, fiscal and 
procurement transparency. The foregoing issues are therefore indicative of crucial areas 
requiring reforms, institutional and capacity strengthening to tackle corruption, financial 
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crimes whilst engendering transparency and accountability for sustainable development in the 
Nigerian oil industry. 
Moreover, other attenuating aspects of the Nigerian oil regulations responsible for challenges 
to oil sector governance include unclear petroleum regulations and guidelines. These can prove 
detrimental to achieving the SDGs, as is largely the case in Nigeria. To a substantial extent, the 
Nigerian Petroleum Act (PA) including other regulatory controls for the petroleum industry 
appear vacuous. In many cases the roles of regulators are poorly defined, as the directives are 
either opaque, ambiguous, or failing to give adequate guidelines, whilst often conferring 
excessive discretionary powers on the petroleum minister. This has proved detrimental to 
transparency and accountability for regulatory and administrative actions in the oil industry.  
Another anomaly is evident where, the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) is accredited with excessive discretionary powers, while the industry regulator or 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) appears constrained and lacking in human and 
technical capacity.577 More so, the extant legal framework fails to clearly define roles and 
responsibility between the NNPC and the DPR. Initially, the Petroleum Inspectorate, which 
was a department within the NNPC, was also responsible for petroleum monitoring, issuing 
permits and licences for activities connected with petroleum exploration and exploitation.578 
Since the inspectorate appeared to replicate DPR’s functions relating to monitoring and permits 
approvals, it was excised in 1988 with the DPR absorbing its functions, albeit as a part of the 
Ministry of Petroleum resources along with the NNPC.579 However, this evolution of both 
government agencies has been riddled with confusion and inconsistencies. Often, the NNPC 
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which is more financially buoyant assumes DPR functions and intrudes into the DPR’s 
regulatory mandates, by unilaterally monitoring its own subsidiaries engaged in exploration 
and production.580 
More so, issues of accountability for unjustifiable conduct of the NNPC, financial impropriety 
or unsustainable exploitation patterns are inadequately addressed or poorly enforced. Reason 
being that conflicts of interest between the DPR and NNPC are inevitable and mar enforcement 
mechanisms against NNPC for breach of environmental, social or other procedural safe-guards 
that optimize sustainable development in the oil industry. These unsustainable scenarios are 
however offshoots of an erstwhile era when the DPR at its inception in 1970 and for much of 
2 decades stayed a departmental unit under the NNPC.581 Thus resulting in a dilemma where 
the regulator (DPR) remains subservient to the NOC and the industry’s biggest player. In a 
nutshell, the foregoing point to the urgency of petroleum industry reforms towards clearer and 
expansive petroleum guidelines, including their enforcement and combatting corruption in the 
NNPC. Although these portend to be ominous or daunting tasks, as the possibility of quick fix 
scenarios remain slim. Nevertheless, these effectively constitute inevitable, essential and 
substantial pathways towards a holistic achievement of green economic growth and poverty 
eradication for sustainable development. 
2.2.2.2. Budgetary and Tax Limitations in Nigerian Petroleum laws 
Core legislations governing economic growth objectives in the Nigerian petroleum industry 
include the Petroleum Act and the Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA).582 The Petroleum Profits 
Tax Act (PPTA) improves on the Petroleum Act, and is deemed a remarkable tool for revenue 
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generation and for curbing inflation whilst regulating taxation of companies engaged in 
petroleum operations.583 The Act defines petroleum operations as: 
“[…] the winning or obtaining and transportation of petroleum or chargeable oil in 
Nigeria by or on behalf of a company for its own account by any drilling, mining, 
extracting or other like operations or process, not including refining at a refinery, during 
a business carried by the company engaged in such operations, and all operations 
incidental thereto and sale of or any disposal of chargeable oil by or on behalf of the 
company”.584  
Any other activity not covered by the given definition is liable to tax under the Companies 
Income Tax Act (CITA), 1990.  
 
Moreover, this definition specifically applies to the upstream sector of the petroleum industry 
and as a result, only companies in the upstream sector are charged with petroleum profit tax 
(PPT). As also previously ascertained, efficient taxation and economic growth are inextricably 
linked. In the Nigerian case, the PPT has been accountable for the major chunk of total tax 
revenue available to the Nigerian government. The Federal Government presumably harnessed 
N4.62trillion from tax collections in 2011 alone.585 A breakdown of this N4.62tn indicates that 
N1.51trillion was collected as taxes from non-oil sources. By implication, the excess of 
N3.11trillion was collected from oil revenue which amounts to 67.32 per cent of total tax 
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earnings.586 Other claims entail that the Federal Government made a total of N1.7trillion from 
taxes in the first three months of year 2012.587 
 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Act has been undermined by the ability and tendencies 
of IOCs to evade taxation.588 Analysts have argued that the petroleum profit tax structure, in 
Nigeria, has been characterized by tax evasion, tax avoidance, corruption and poor tax 
administration.589 This is well illustrated by the Chevron case where on 1st July 2005, ABZ 
Integrated Limited, a Nigerian company based in Abuja publicized a $10.8 billion tax evasion 
and fraud by the Nigerian branch of the Chevron Corporation of Houston, Texas. Following 
the disclosures, ABZ was authorized by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) of Nigeria to recover the unpaid taxes from Chevron Nigeria Limited. In the last 
quarter of 2005, the House Committee on Petroleum Resources (Upstream), had a public 
hearing regarding the allegation of $10.8 billion tax evasion and fraud against Chevron Nigeria 
Limited. And in September 2006, the Chairman confirmed that Chevron evaded tax as alleged 
and was ordered to refund the sum of $492 million. However, Chevron only refunded a fraction 
of the total Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) evaded, without paying the penalties required by the 
PPTA. Not much was done to redress this issue as the penalty for the breach was ridiculously 
insignificant.590  
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More so, the PPTA fails to provide a system of checks and balances by the lack of a competent 
or expert oversight body for monitoring the veracity of accounts, statements-returns and 
information supplied by companies and certified as correct by the FBIR staff who are mostly 
inexpert and easily induced due to poor wage remunerations.591 Similar to the other appraised 
oil laws, the PPTA remains unduly reliant on the oil companies for information relating to: 
accounts, returns, schedules, reports of asset base, balance sheet of profits and losses etc. 
Consequently, the objectives of the Act are easily undermined, resulting in negative impacts 
on economic growth.  
 
As also clarified in the previous chapter, another economic growth indicator in the petroleum 
industry, relates to the level of resource dependence for GDP growth and how effectively 
petroleum regulations can prevent undue resource reliance.592 This indicator of sustainable 
development in the oil industry serves to ascertain Nigeria’s level of dependence on petroleum 
resource rents for economic growth as against the adoption of efficient petroleum taxation. It 
also applies to the level of the national income predominated by petroleum resource inputs as 
well as the impact of such petroleum resource inputs on the Gross domestic product (GDP).593  
 
A scrutiny of the PPTA however shows that it has not been able to arrest the resource rent 
pattern that has been prevalent in Nigeria since the production of oil in commercial 
quantities.594 This view is substantiated by an assessment of the percentage of petroleum tax 
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revenues generated by OPEC member countries where Nigeria’s petroleum export earnings 
accounted for about 90% of its GDP whereas the tax revenues generated from the oil industry 
only accrued to less than 1% of the national income.595 Indeed, the NEITI financial audit in 
2005 and onwards till 2014 is indicative that the government revenue service is yet to grasp the 
complexities of the petroleum profit taxation regime reposed in MOUs and contracts, thus IOCs 
in Nigeria can manipulate such loopholes to access extremely favourable interpretations of the 
tax rules.596 
 
Ultimately, such ineptitude in recouping the utmost gains from petroleum resources, 
complicated by unclear tax guidelines is highly detrimental to the aims of sustainable economic 
growth highlighted in goal 8 of the SDGs. These buttress why goal 17 of the SDGs proposes 
international partnerships and capacity development with international agencies to tackle tax 
challenges in developing countries.597 Reason being that the failure to forestall such a situation 
of poor taxation places a heavier demand on the stock of petroleum resources for revenue 
generation. This undue resource dependence is also accountable for the incessant unrest in the 
Niger-delta as local indigenes are concerned about the depletion of petroleum resources, 
without significant improvements in their environment.598 In effect, Nigeria is still 
predominantly dependent on oil rents, is weak at harnessing oil revenues through efficient 
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taxation, directly causing the decline of other sectors of the economy.599 Consequently, the 
PPTA does not optimally perform as a legislation for guaranteeing green economic growth 
objectives or sustainable development in the Nigerian oil industry. 
 
2.2.3. Social Development in Nigerian Oil and Gas laws 
As emphasized in the first chapter, social development tools constitute vital means of 
operationalizing sustainable development in the context of petroleum exploitation. 
Implementing the social development pillar during oil exploitation therefore envisages a 
recognition of the interlinkages between participatory rights and human rights articulated 
across much of the SDGs.600 Consequently, this section appraises: Public participation, access 
to information and justice, as articulated in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration including human 
rights impacts assessments, all identified in this research as social development tools, in the 
Nigerian oil industry context to determine their efficacy for achieving the sustainable 
development goals.601  
2.2.3.1. Public Participation in the Nigerian Oil Industry 
The pertinent issues regarding implementation of the social development pillar in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry considers the extent to which participation has fostered: Openness, 
inclusive societies, justice and a partnership with the public to develop and manage the vast 
wealth of petroleum resources. A closer observation of Nigerian petroleum regulations has not 
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shown very positive results in this area. Apart from the EIA Act which provides for the report 
of an EIA to be published, other regulations are silent on participation.602 
Furthermore, the issue of the Nigerian government’s ownership rights over subsurface minerals 
as provided by Part 1, S.39 the Nigerian Constitution603, the Land Use Act and the PA604 seem 
to obviate the need for consultations with the public on matters affecting those natural resources 
which are directly under state patrimony. Apparently, this seems to be a pattern with some oil 
producing states like Ecuador which prompted the observation of the ILO Committee in the 
Confederación Ecuadoriana Case.605 Although the ILO Convention does not specifically apply 
to Nigeria, the observation of Clavero regarding the relationship between states, their citizens 
and the natural resources within their jurisdictions is quite instructive and proves beneficial for 
oil producing states and affected communities.606  
Notwithstanding that the people of the Niger-delta do not directly come within the 
classification of “indigenous peoples607” they however constitute the local communities and 
populations whose very lives and well-being depend on the environmental decisions concluded 
on the region.608 The Niger-delta environment constitutes their ancestral homelands, hence 
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requiring statutory protection, not just for themselves but for their environment and future 
generations.609 Due to the position articulated by Article 15 of the ILO Convention,610 and 
stressed in the Ecuador Report,611 it is quite instructive for Nigeria as an oil producing state, to 
make necessary adjustments in its petroleum regulations regarding consultations with local 
communities to guarantee sustainable development. As also earlier deliberated in the Ogoni-
land case,612 the Nigerian authorities performed poorly in providing environmental information 
during and after emergencies and spills of disaster proportions, equally failing to inform on the 
impact of those spills including the toxicity generated by the spills on freshwater sources as 
well as on food crops and other vegetation. All of these shortcomings prove antithetical to the 
aims of sustainable development. 
Moreover, most of the Nigerian oil and gas laws, comprising sixteen (16) in number fail to 
recognize core issues relating to access rights of the oil producing communities. Some of the 
legislations in the petroleum industry specifically exclude the public on access to relevant 
environmental information. A typical example of a petroleum regulation that effectively serves 
to withhold information and public participation during and after spills occurrence, including 
its clean-up implications is evident in the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency 
Act (NOSDRA Act).613 The primary objective of the Act is the responsibility for preparedness, 
detection and response to all oil spills in Nigeria. By virtue of section 5 of the Act, the Agency 
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is mandated among other things to ensure a safe, timely, effective and appropriate response to 
oil pollution and to identify high risk and priority areas for clean-up.  
However, the provisions of section 24 of the Act, entail that oil spills information are to be 
treated as strictly confidential matters by the agency or board officials, and could only be 
divulged by a court order.614 This requirement for a court order before information can be 
disclosed on critical issues like oil spills in the Nigerian petroleum regulations and justice 
system undermines transparency or accountability for such spills, and is inimical to the interests 
of sustainable development. More so, it frustrates credible efforts of informants regarding spills 
information and data collection that is crucial for a more preventative approach against 
environmental damage by oil spills. This provision thus serves as a major hurdle against the 
equitable norms of good faith by barring access to vital environmental information whilst 
incumbering participatory and access rights of the public. Consequently, the right to demand 
immediate response and remediation of oil spills impacted areas and hold polluters accountable 
for oil pollution are grossly eroded. 
The Nigerian petroleum policies also fail to identify the relevant stakeholders for a quality 
representation within the oil-producing communities and this becomes detrimental to the 
enforcement of access rights and participation. As also clarified in the previous chapter, the 
provisions of international legal instruments like the Rio declaration and Art. 6 of the Aarhus 
Convention purports that, the duty to consult the public entails the duty to inform them about 
the proposed activity and the application on which a decision will be taken. This ensures that 
the public make adequate preparations for effective participation during the decision-making 
process. The Nigerian petroleum laws even as provided by the EIA Act does not stress this 
requirement for enhanced or informed public contribution on relevant environmental issues 
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accruing from oil exploitation. In other words, the public is not involved on matters relating to 
petroleum site description, lack information about the physical or technical characteristics of 
oil exploitation and the immediate or protracted impacts, nor are they made aware of any 
estimates relating to the expected emissions or residues, the local communities are not informed 
about any mitigatory measures, worst of all they are totally ignorant of any alternatives.  
Regrettably, the largely illiterate and uninformed local communities are often taken advantage 
off due to the absence of non-technical summaries published in relation to EIAs performed in 
the industry, as the petroleum laws offer them minimal protection. More often, publicity for 
EIAs is minimal to avoid controversy and save costs.615 The consequences of these gaps in the 
petroleum laws has thus resulted in extreme distrust and animosity between oil industry 
operators, the government and oil producing communities. This has led to incessant protests, 
militancy and pipelines vandalism, all of which have negatively impacted on the environment, 
economy and socio-cultural life of the people.616 These factors constitute drawbacks against 
sustainable development and a green petroleum industry in Nigeria. 
2.2.3.2. Human Rights Impact Assessment for Social Development in Nigerian Petroleum 
laws 
As initially argued in the previous chapter, human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) are 
essential tools that optimize the social development pillar whilst shielding against human rights 
violations accruing from a state authorized activity such as oil exploitation. HRIAs thus 
optimize the aims of the SDGs, especially forming a viable means of engendering SDGs 1-6 
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to prevent a degraded environment and associated food crises or severe health consequences 
for people in oil producing regions. Moreover, Nigeria is a signatory to both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as well as the regional African Covenant for Human 
Rights.  
Nevertheless, the accompanying responsibility to protect the human right to a healthy 
environment, prevent human rights violations and degradation occurring from oil exploitation 
via a tool as remarkable as the HRIA is unfortunately absent in Nigerian petroleum law and 
policy. Undoubtedly, such an inadequacy in the petroleum regulations regarding HRIA 
performance at the earliest stages of exploration, affecting screening, scoping and baseline 
submission stages can impair the aims of sustainable development in the oil industry. 
Apparently, the absence of human rights provisions in the petroleum regulations has also 
resulted in the neglect of the health and well-being goals articulated in the SDGs which are 
crucial for the sustainable development of oil producing regions.617 In as much as a plethora of 
factors, ranging from corruption, to weak governance structures or even paucity of regulations 
and a lack of capacity development may be blamed for the unprecedented level of human rights 
abuses recorded in the Nigerian petroleum industry, the fact remains that, enhanced impacts 
assessments and implementation of HRIAs will undoubtedly improve the status quo. 
Ultimately, the situation in the Niger-delta can drastically improve if HRIAs which are crucial 
tools to optimize local participation, foster health and well-being goals whilst eliminating 
human rights abuses are included in Nigerian petroleum regulations to achieve the SDGs. 
                                                             
617 In the Ogoni-land Case, the African Commission was also of the view that the Nigerian government’s disregard of human 
rights including a manifest breach of Art.24 was a violation of the right to a healthy environment.  
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2.2.3.3. Access to Justice and Judicial Review in Nigerian Petroleum Regulations 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the issue of access to environmental justice is relevant on 
two fundamental levels. These include; access to justice to challenge regulators in respect of 
projects, (especially for non-compliance with regulations) and to seek redress including, 
holding polluters accountable for a polluting activity or environmentally harmful occurrence 
during oil exploitation.618 Despite the level of environmental and economic collapse in the 
Niger-delta due to petroleum production activities, the indigenes often find it an uphill task in 
securing justice or access to courts and judicial proceedings. Several statutory limitations like, 
statutory time lapse or statutory bars, “locus standi rules”, abound in Nigerian regulations in 
relation to negligence or environmental damage claims against national or multinational oil 
companies.619  
Oftentimes procedural hurdles relating to standing or “locus standi” and the right to enforce 
environmental actions on a personal or representative capacity deter legitimately affected 
persons from pursuing such actions.620 All too often, the rather strict and narrow judicial 
construction of standing or “locus standi” for petroleum induced environmental pollution, 
constitutes a challenge faced by litigants in pursuing judicial review for environmentally 
harmful activity. The situation is further compounded by the substantial costs of litigation, 
including, the low guarantees of success in view of the powerful or influential government or 
IOC defendants. Thus, the courts which ought to be channels to preserve the rights of the poor 
to secure justice in the face of environmental degradation and the consequential negative 
                                                             
618 See, Oronto Douglas v. Shell & Ors. (Unreported) Suit No FHC/2CS/573. Here, the plaintiff alleged that the mandatory 
provisions of the EIA Act, regarding the conducting of an EIA before project commencement had not been complied with by 
the proponents of the Gas project. The plaintiff also sought to restrain the Defendants from carrying out or commissioning 
their project until an environmental impact assessment was carried out with public participation by those to be affected.  
619Section 12 of the NNPC Act provides that “no suit against a member of the board or an employee of the Corporation for 
an Act done or in respect of an alleged neglect or harm shall be instituted in any court unless it is commenced within 12 
months after the act or the neglect complained of thereby imposing a strict statutory limitation of action and unduly 
insulating the board or an employee from legal action that may be brought against them. 
620 See, Oronto Douglas v. SPDC, (Unreported) Suit No FHC/2CS/573. The Federal High Court struck out the suit on the 
ground inter alia that the suit was baseless, and that the Plaintiff had no standing to institute the suit. 
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impacts on the incomes, social systems, or livelihoods of oil producing communities, become 
inaccessible. This further entrenches poverty and frustrates the efforts of these communities to 
lift themselves and their families out of poverty. Indeed, regarding standing, it has been opined 
that; 
 “…the Nigerian standing rule has a very narrow concept of personal standing (one that 
focuses on private legal rights) and no concept of representative standing. Hence, 
persons with a real interest in an issue of local or national importance invariably will 
be denied standing; even if what is assailed involves obvious illegality”.621 
Furthermore, in instituting claims concerning compensation for environmental pollution or 
damage caused by oil and gas activities, the vagueness of corresponding statutory provisions 
renders the process futile. Reason being that the prevalent petroleum regulations fail to clarify, 
modalities for compensation and how to ensure a “just and adequate compensation622” by 
specific mathematical standards or scientific calculations.623 Likewise, other justice challenges 
include the problematic situation of conferring exclusive jurisdiction on specific courts. Indeed, 
S. 251 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High 
Courts in respect of oil and gas matters.624 Consequently, actions can only be instituted at the 
Federal High Courts instead of the States’ High Courts which are within reasonable proximity 
to the Niger-delta environment where the alleged acts of pollution and damage occurred. In 
                                                             
621 See, TI Ogowewo 'Wrecking the law: How article III of the Constitution of the United States led to the discovery of the 
standing to sue in Nigeria' (2000) 26 Brooklyn journal of International Law 529. See also, Obiora Chinedu OkaforI, Basil 
UgochukwuII “Raising legal giants: The agency of the poor in the human rights jurisprudence of the Nigerian Appellate 
Courts, 1990-2011” (2015) African Human Rights Law Journal. 
622 See, Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 with amendments in 1995 and 1996, S.23. Fishing rights; If 
the licensee or lessee exercises the rights conferred by his licence or lease in such a manner as unreasonably to interfere with 
the exercise of any fishing rights, he shall pay “adequate compensation” therefore to any person injured by the exercise of 
those first- mentioned rights. This was an issue in the case of R. Mon & Anor. V. Shell BP (1970-72) RSLR 71 
623 See also Jonah Gbemre and Ors. V. SPDC and Ors. supra 
624See S. 154 (1) (n) which provides “Notwithstanding anything to the contained in this Constitution and in addition to such 
other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and 
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters relating to:-mines and minerals (including 




many instances, the indigent victims lack the funds, knowledge, finesse, or expertise to pursue 
such technical, financial or time-consuming claims to achieve environmental and economic 
relief. Thus, the plight of the indigenes is exacerbated by these judicial setbacks as they unduly 
suffer loss of their income and damage to their environment and in most cases denied 
compensation625.  
Another aspect of this problematic issue is that, due to the state’s ownership and control over 
mineral rights in Nigeria, compensation cannot be claimed on mineral and oil resources as it 
comes within the purview of state patrimony626. However, land owners are entitled to make 
claims on surface rights, which affect their title and land occupancy. As a result, the Land Use 
Act provides the parameters for compensation where land is compulsorily acquired for oil 
mining purposes and for purposes connected thereunder.627 Section 29 (2) (b) provides that 
“the occupier of land acquired for mining purposes is entitled to compensation as provided 
under the Minerals Act or the Mineral Oils Act or the Petroleum Act or any legislation replacing 
the same”. However, the terms, scope or adequacy of compensation is not subject to 
participatory decision making. Neither is it justiciable in any Nigerian court. Section 47(2) of 
the Land Use Act provides, “No court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into any question 
concerning or pertaining to the amount or adequacy of any compensation paid or to be paid 
under this Act.”628 As a result, compensation rates are decided without the input of local 
communities, pre-determined rates categorised under “government approved rates” and 
                                                             
625 See African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center 
for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, A, Comm. No. 155/96, 2001. (Ogoniland Case) 
626 See Section 44 of Federal Republican Constitution 1999 
627 Section 28 (3) (b) Land Use Act 1979. 




“industry rates”629 influence the modalities for compensation of victims of oil exploitation, 
notwithstanding the extent of loss or damage suffered on a realistic or pecuniary scale.630  
Moreover, these compensation rates, be they government or industry rates often fail to consider 
adjustments regarding inflation and even future crop yields in situations of compulsory 
acquisitions of plantations, agricultural or farm lands which are crucial for a fair assessment of 
damages.631 Thus exacerbating poverty in such regions. Despite some improvements in the 
industry rates which are better than the government approved rates, challenges remain evident 
as they are also concluded by the Multinational companies without consultation or participation 
of local communities. More so, the IOCs compensations likewise disregard prevalent market 
rates and inflation.632 Ultimately and quite ironically these local communities inadvertently end 
up getting exploited along with the petroleum resources derivable from their ancestral lands. 
Arguably, the sustainable development tool of access to justice and judicial proceedings for 
social development is virtually absent in Nigerian oil and gas laws. This lacuna requires redress 
and underscores a need for Nigerian petroleum policy and regulatory adjustments to 
accommodate this social empowerment tool.  
                                                             
629 The “industry rates” are set by the Oil Producers Trade Section (OPTS) of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce (an 
association of oil-producing companies). These rates though inadequate are substantially higher than the government 
approved rates which are old and have not been reviewed for decades, they are unrealistic and currently amounts to very 
little, even in Nigeria. For instance, in 1997 the OPTS rates for rice was =N=15,860 (£53) per hectare while the 1995 
government rate was =N=1,924 (£7) and according to the World Bank, based on an annual rent of =N=5,000, (£16) the 
amount of compensation should not be less than =N= 50,000 (£160) per hectare yet, companies operating in the Niger-Delta 
states paid only =N= 1,000 (£3) per hectare a sum that cannot be regarded as fair and adequate under international standards. 
630 See, A. Rhuks Temitope and A.A. Adedeji, “Public Participation: An Imperative to The Sustainable Development Of The 
Nigerian Oil Industry” in R. Ako, Nigeria's Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental Justice. Journal of African Law, 
(2009) 53(2), 289-304. doi:10.1017/S0021855309990076 
631 See, the Petroleum Drilling Regulation (1969) and (2004). Although the regulation has been periodically amended to 
reflect current economic realities in terms of fees, rents and royalties, there are no clearly defined provisions on penalties for 
offences resulting from breach of the regulations, the requirement of “a fair and adequate compensation” has also been 
subject to judicial misapplication. Section 21(2) of the Act states, If the licensee or lessee cuts down or takes any other 
productive tree, he shall pay fair and adequate compensation to the owner thereof:  S. 23. Fishing rights; if the licensee or 
lessee exercises the rights conferred by his licence or lease in such a manner as unreasonably to interfere with the exercise of 
any fishing rights, he shall pay adequate compensation therefore to any person injured by the exercise of those first- 
mentioned rights. This was an issue in the case of R. Mon & Anor. V. Shell BP (1970-72) RSLR 71 





2.2.4. Integration of technological innovations in Nigerian petroleum laws 
As also argued, the adoption of modern, environmentally sound and efficient technology for 
the extraction, production and management of petroleum resources remains vital to the 
achievement of sustainable development in the petroleum industry. SDG 9 further corroborates 
the need or exigency of innovative technology or environmentally sound technologies for 
sustainable development. Similarly, goal 9 also targets the upgrade of infrastructure to make 
them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and 
environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes.633 However, an observation of 
the Nigerian oil regulations indicates the absence of specific rules regarding technological 
innovations for optimal efficiency during petroleum operations, to optimize holistic approaches 
with benefits to eco-systems and society.  
Moreover, the rules remain inchoate in terms of the failure to harness safety guidelines for 
application of best practice, best techniques or technologies for the entire range of petroleum 
industry activity that pose environmental and social risks. Thus, missing the point in what 
constitutes the essence of adopting science as a means of checks to forestall negative oil 
development impacts on people and environment, whilst enhancing positive aspects. More so, 
the Nigerian oil regulations lack specific equipment stipulations to curb pollution, which 
remains a target of goal 9, requiring the use of environmentally sound technology to control 
pollution and industry wastes in the most eco-efficient manner. This creates enforcement 
problems as there is no transparent or clear means of assessing compliance, while mere 
deterrence fails to produce desired effects. Thus, IOCs often choose cost cutting production 
and exploration measures over expensive environmentally enhancing techniques or 
technologies. The NNPC, is likewise a culprit as they fail to innovate and upgrade industry 
                                                             
633 See, 4th Target, Goal 9, A/RES/70/1 - Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
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infrastructure, reinforcing poor regulatory gaps that undermine industry best practices or global 
best standards.  
Furthermore, the government regulators rely on the multinational companies for virtually all 
forms of technical assistance, and such reliance is undesirable and unfavourable for sustainable 
development as it promotes undue dependence on external forces for efficient petroleum 
resource exploitation and maintenance. This also creates a major monitoring and enforcement 
challenge as the government officials lack the technical or expert capacity to quickly detect 
and respond to spills and other violations.634 This has been accountable for the poor 
infrastructure maintenance and security patterns evident in the petroleum industry ultimately 
responsible for incessant spills from ageing pipelines.  
The SPDC “recorded an average of 221 spills per year since 1989 in its operational areas. This 
involved a total of 7,350 barrels of oil a year”.635 There are also further claims of as many as 
9,640 spills incidents in 2008 alone from worn infrastructure.636 Due to the evident 
infrastructural, technical and technological limitations indicated by the quantum and frequency 
of these oil spills in the Niger-delta environment, sustainable development of petroleum 
resources cannot be guaranteed in Nigeria. Unless of course, regulatory improvements 
regarding resilient infrastructure and environmentally innovative technologies, which further 
superimpose clear industry specifications and guidelines are articulated and implemented. 
                                                             
634 See Serac v. Nigeria before the ECOWAS Court of Justice in Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12, (December 14, 2012) 
at paras 15- 121 
635 See, F. Onuoha, Why the poor pay with their lives: Oil pipeline vandalization, fires and human Security in Nigeria, 
Disaster 33(3):369-389. 17. 
636 Freedom Onuoha,” Poverty, pipeline vandalization/explosion and human security. Integrating disaster management into 




2.3. Elements of Sustainable Use of Petroleum Resources in Nigerian Oil and Gas Laws 
As clarified in the first chapter, a sustainable oil industry requires a stable resource base, 
engendered by sustainable consumption and production patterns envisaged by goal 12 of the 
SDGs. In the oil industry context, such sustainable production can be achieved via regulatory 
tools for control of extraction and depletion rates as well as enhanced recovery methods.637 It 
is however pointed out that, though preserving the petroleum resource base is crucial for 
sustainable development, Nigeria is still deficient in contemporary regulatory measures to 
sustain the petroleum resource base via control of extraction and depletion rates.638 Thus, the 
essential regulatory safe-guards to ensure specific performance of this sustainable consumption 
and production measure in the oil industry is lacking in Nigerian rules.  
Regrettably, the extant Nigerian petroleum laws cannot prevent over-exploitation of the non-
renewable petroleum resources as they fall short of precise means of engendering sustainable 
use advocated by SDG 12. This is due to the absence of enabling statutes and regulatory 
parameters required for the prudent monitoring and control of petroleum extraction rates of 
specified fields. The Petroleum Drilling Regulations in S.52 articulates the modalities for 
measuring the extracted crude oil.639 The relevant detail for consideration is that these 
provisions as afforded by Sections 52, 53 and 62 of the Regulations however emphasize the 
extracted crude quantities and measurements in the interests of royalties, taxation, and 
remuneration and not for petroleum resource conservation and sustainable use or management 
of resources.640 This view is substantiated by the specific provisions of S.52 (4) (b) which 
                                                             
637 See previous discussion on sustainable use of petroleum resources 
638 Mineral resources are non- renewable or exhaustible resources that do not regenerate, and include petroleum. See 
Jonathon E Snow, ‘Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources: Surprises for the Geologist’ (2000) Inaugural Lecture for the 
Habilitation degree, University of Mainz, Germany, 21 June 2000 Extraction of Exhaustible Resources: Economic Theory.  
639 See the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations [L.N. 69 Of 1969.] Under Section 9. S.52. Measurement and 
weighing of crude oil and natural gas: (1) “The licensee or lessee shall, with volume and gravity correction to 60 OF and by 
a method or methods approved by the Director of Petroleum Resources in writing, measure or weigh-(a) all crude oil won 
and saved and casing-head petroleum spirit recovered from the relevant area; and (b) all natural gas sold”. 




prohibits erroneous recordings of crude extracted as it would provoke a corresponding impact 
on the royalties payable by such companies.641  
Furthermore, the Petroleum Drilling regulations which provides modalities for oilfields and 
wells abandonment or decommissioning in S.36 of the Regulations only after obtaining 
approval from the DPR is however limited as it is silent on the need for technology and research 
to determine the maximum or minimum depletion levels of oil fields before 
decommissioning.642 Thus, Nigeria cannot guarantee the stability of the petroleum resource 
base or optimize the aims and targets of SDG 12 regarding sustainable consumption and 
prudent use of natural resources. Likewise, Nigeria remains wholly dependent on the 
multinational oil companies for the generation of data and analysis relating to the volumes of 
oil extracted and the resultant stock of petroleum reserves.643  
2.4. Assessing Equity in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Laws 
As considered in chapter 1, equity remains an indispensable aspect of the sustainable 
development discourse in terms of oil exploitation. Having assessed its role via the polluter 
pays principle, common but differentiated responsibility and its utility as a tool for optimizing 
petroleum wealth funds for the benefit of future generations, this section considers how and in 
what ways equity has been applied to operationalize sustainable development in the Nigerian 
context. 
 
                                                             
641 See Petroleum Drilling Regulations, S.52 (4). 
642 See Petroleum Drilling Regulations S. 39 “The licensee or lessee shall use approved methods and practices acceptable to 
the Director of Petroleum Resources for the production of crude oil or natural gas from any pool or reservoir, and shall in 
particular take all necessary steps- (c) to cause every pool in each well to produce within the limits of its maximum efficient 
potential or rate as may be determined from time to time by the licensee or lessee”. 




2.4.1. The Polluter Pays Principle as a Tool of Intra-Generational Equity in Nigerian Oil 
Regulations 
Nigeria in signifying commitment to the aims of pollution prevention during oil and gas 
exploitation has become signatory to several international treaties. Some of these include: 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation,644 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage,645 Protocol concerning Cooperation in combating Pollution in cases of 
Emergency,646 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,647 etc. 
Moreover, in consonance with international agreements on oil pollution prevention, Nigeria 
established the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency, (NOSDRA),648 to 
engender preparedness, detection and response to all oil spillages in Nigeria. S. 5 of the Act 
provides for the co-ordination and implementation of the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan 
for Nigeria.649 S.6 of the Act clarifies the functions of the agency which include, surveillance 
and ensuring compliance with all existing environmental legislation as well as oil spills 
detection in the petroleum sector.  
 
Furthermore, NOSDRA is empowered to receive reports of oil spillages and co-ordinate oil 
spill response activities throughout Nigeria.650 The NOSDRA Act by virtue of S.6 (2) and (3) 
further provides penalties for breach of its provisions or failure to report spills and instigate 
clean-up of spills impacted sites.651 Notwithstanding these efforts to curtail oil pollution, there 
                                                             
644 Nigeria signed this Convention on 13th May 1995  
645 Nigeria signed this Convention on the 10th of December 1987  
646 Nigeria signed this Convention on 23rd May 1981 and subsequently ratified it on 5th May 1984  
647 This Convention was ratified in Nigeria on 27th January 1980 after it was signed on 23rd May 1969 
648 Ss. 5, 6 & 7 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) (Establishment) Act, CAP 157 LFN 2006 
649 S. 5(a-n), ibid; See also, Second Schedule to the NOSDRA Act. The Plan is mandatory for Nigeria as a party to the 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Cooperation (OPRC).     
650 See, S.6 (1) (a-e) of the NOSDRA Act, 2006. 




is still a prominent level of oil spill incidents in the Niger-delta.652 This situation has also been 
aggravated by the substantial level of wastes (industrial wastes, refinery wastes and E & P 
wastes653) with inadequate means of their disposal in Nigeria.654 The laws also fail to protect 
community leaders, victims and informants who draw attention to environmental harm from 
spill incidents. This complicates their situation as they often become targets of aggression.655 
Such omissions constitute flaws in the oil regulations as they undermine pollution 
enforcement, frustrate broader SDGs by increasing inequalities and exacerbating poverty, 
security and health crises in oil producing regions. 
 
Moreover, efficient forms of spills mitigation are lacking in Nigeria due to poor funding or 
poor facilities, giving rise to indiscriminate dumping. Worst of all, prosecutions for pollution 
are hardly carried out.656 These shortcomings have been attributed to: paucity of contemporary 
and realistic directives or guidelines, poor enforcement provisions, human and technical 
capacity deficiencies, corruption, inadequate deterrents prescribed for infringements, as the 
offenders would often rather commit the stated offence and pay fines that are inconsistent with 
current economic realities.657 This is deducible from the provisions of the Petroleum Refining 
Regulations and the Oil in Navigable Waters Act.658 The Act provides for the prevention of 
                                                             
652 Kadafa, Adati Ayuba. "Oil exploration and spillage in the Niger Delta of Nigeria." Civil and Environmental Research 2, 
no. 3 (2012): 38-51, “the Niger Delta region is one of the five most severely petroleum damaged ecosystems in the world. 
Studies have shown that the quantity of oil spilled over 50 years was at least 9-13 million barrels, which is equivalent to 50 
Exxon Valdez spills.”  
653 E&P wastes  are already clarified as waste accumulated in the course of exploration and production of crude petroleum, 
see details under discussion of EIAs. 
654 John Vidal, "Nigeria's agony dwarfs the Gulf oil spill. The US and Europe ignore it". The Observer. Retrieved 27 May 
2015. Nigeria’s national oil spill detection and response agency (NOSDRA) says that between 1976 and 1996 alone, more 
than 2.4m barrels of oil were spilled in the region. 
655 See African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center 
for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, A, Comm. No. 155/96, 2001. See also, S.I. Skogly, Complexities in Human 
rights Protection: Actors and Rights Involved in the Ogoni conflict in Nigeria, in: 15 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
(1997), 47-60. 
656 See Kadafa, Adati et al (Ibid) 
657 Petroleum Refining Regulation Section 43 (3) requires the Manager of a refinery to take measures to prevent and control 
pollution of the environment, Section 45 makes any contravention punishable with a fine of N100 about (49Pence) or an 
imprisonment term of six months. 




oil pollution in the navigable waters of Nigeria, by oil transporting vessels. S.1-3 of the Act 
prohibits the discharge of oil into the territorial sea area and makes it an offence by making 
the owner or master of the ship responsible for such discharge of oil, criminally liable.659 
However, the stipulated monetary penalty in S.6-7 of the Act, for the stated offences are also 
unrealistic and inadequate.660 The law, which is primarily meant to enforce safety and 
protection of the marine ecosystem and accompanying environment, is therefore ineffective 
because of the weak penalties. The impact is that clean up demands for oil spills in the 
country’s territorial waters are easily avoided, as polluters prefer to pay the cheap fines.  
 
Another Act, which has failed to live up to its potential, is the Hydrocarbons Oil Act.661 This 
Act provides modalities for the licensing and control of the refining of hydrocarbon oils for 
purposes of excise and such related matters.662 It also prescribes parameters for liabilities and 
enforcement under the Act. It has however become obsolete due to current economic and 
social realities, thus requiring expeditious review.663 In other situations, the oil and gas laws 
like the Petroleum Act, merely suggest the adoption of “good oil field practice” which ought 
normally to serve as a protective and precautionary measure for regulators to upscale pollution 
prevention requirements and enforce international best standards. However, Nigerian 
petroleum regulators have failed to harness the full potential of the “best oil field practice” 
maxim. This has ultimately led to the adoption of minimalist operational standards that have 
failed in curbing pollution or preventing waste accumulation in the Nigerian petroleum 
                                                             
659 Sections (1 and 3). The owner or master of a vessel, or place on land or apparatus from which oil or any mixture 
containing oil is discharged into the sea within the territorial waters of Nigeria is guilty of an offence. 
660 Sections 6 and 7. Of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 
661 The Hydrocarbons Oil Refineries Act of 1965 provides a framework for health, safety during petroleum refining 
activities. 
662 See Hydrocarbons Oil Refineries Act of 1965 No.17 
663 “Offences under section 1 of this Act (1) Any person who refines hydrocarbon oils in contravention of the provisions of 
section 1 of this Act shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable (a) on summary conviction, to a fine of not less than 
four hundred naira about (£1:50) or more than two thousand naira (£8)  or to imprisonment for a term of two years, or to 
both; (b) On conviction or indictment, to a  fine of an unlimited amount or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five 
years, or to both.” 
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industry. These weaknesses in Nigerian pollutions control and regulatory mechanisms prevent 
regulators from enforcing compliance as the regulations are vacuous and require modification. 
More so, the lack of strict liability provisions also frustrates the immediate remediation of 
pollution while the failure to impose stiff sanctions for violations or unapproved discharges 
has also made operators grossly negligent in oil spill prevention and remediation. In many 
cases, there is failure of government intervention and the public must withstand the worst of 
the pollution instead of the operators.  
 
Another regulation for the control of oil industry pollution is the EGASPIN.664 The EGASPIN 
regulates the discharges of produced water, drill cuttings and chemical residues from oil and 
gas operations via permits.665  EGASPIN requires permits for the discharge of produced water 
and imposes the penalties of fines, imprisonment and/or revocation of the permit or petroleum 
licence.666 However, the EGASPIN is inadequate to the extent that it does not cover all aspects 
of oil production activities essential for curbing pollution. It does not provide permits or proper 
oversight in relation to unplanned discharge of produced water or the transfer of produced 
water and drilling muds to other fields for treatment and their subsequent re-injection. 
Similarly, the DPR crucially fails to set out parameters for determining what comprises 
noncompliance, including articulating a clearly defined system for sampling and analysis of 
produced water.667 
 
                                                             
664 See the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN), Part III,  
665 See, Anwuli Irene Ofuani, ‘Environmental Regulation of Offshore (E&P) Waste Management in Nigeria: How 
Effective?’, 7/2 Law, Environment and Development Journal (2011), p. 79, available at http://www.lead-
journal.org/content/11079.pdf. See also, http://www.britannica.com/place/Forcados-River assessed at 1st November 2015.  
666 See the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN), Part III, Article 
3.2.1.  Article 3.2.3., part III and part IX, Articles 4.6.2.3 & 4.7. Article 4.6.2.3 provides that when the effluent quality of 
discharges is exceeded by twenty per cent of the allowed daily/monthly average concentration per parameter, a fine of 
N5,000.00 for every 50m3 of water discharged is imposed. 
667Drilling mud/fluids are substances that are used to control temperature and pressure in drilled boreholes, to cool and 
lubricate the drill bit and to remove drill cuttings from boreholes. Moreover, there are no defined parameters for carrying out 
sampling and analysis of produced water. See also, Aguinda v. Chevron (supra) 
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Whereas, the EGASPIN provides for contingency permits and transfer permits, it falls short 
of providing a proper permits process encompassing all stages of oil and gas production which 
remains crucial for pollution controls and effective recycling. Moreover, there is a need for 
improvements in effluents limitations contained in the produced water. The current effluent 
limitation in produced water in Nigerian regulations is 40mg/1.23 as opposed to the effluent 
limitation for the discharge of produced water in other jurisdictions like Norway, and the UK 
which have 30mg/l.23 as the effluents limit.668 Essentially, these highlighted factors in the 
Nigerian petroleum regulations have prevented the attainment of the sustainable development 
goals to minimize pollution, promote efficient recycling and re-use of waste components 
which is crucial for a sustainable and green petroleum industry.  
 
2.4.2. Green Taxes and Emissions Charges  
As initially argued in the first chapter, using green taxes and accounting measures to curtail 
polluting behaviour constitutes a relevant tool for optimizing the equity element of sustainable 
development. A perusal of the Nigerian petroleum regulations apparently indicates the 
relegation of this very important feature of sustainable development in the oil industry. This 
is because of the continued adoption of the unsustainable practice of fossil fuel subsidies and 
fuel importation, which indulges a propensity for polluting behaviour and reckless use of finite 
petroleum resources. Initially, petroleum subsidies were considered an equitable tool of 
poverty eradication to optimize wealth distribution and intra-generational equity in Nigeria. It 
also appeared to be a government solution necessitated by the moribund state of the nation’s 
refineries and industry infrastructure.  
 
                                                             
668 See. Anwuli Ofuani, Ibid. 
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Even so, it has become all too evident that continuing petroleum subsidies would be 
antithetical to the aims of sustainable development. Whereas Nigeria produces up to 2.4 
million barrels of crude daily, it still must export these products for refining abroad, at 
subsidized prices. Years of corruption and lack of transparency, administrative inefficiency 
and failure to harness and properly invest the gains of crude sales, not to mention neglected 
infrastructure have also fuelled incessant fuel crises and scarcities, making Nigeria dependant 
on refined imports. The result is that Nigeria imports 70% of its gasoline (about 250,000bpd 
of petroleum products, to be sold to Nigerians at subsidized rates. However, these fossil fuel 
subsidies cost the nation as much as $8 billion in 2011 alone and is said to have shot up to 1.3 
trillion Naira in 2012, which translates to more than £60 billion as at 2012.669  
 
A further dimension to the subsidy problem includes its escalating negative impact on 
economic stability, which normally accrues from oil price volatility. Crude oil prices also 
increased from $30.4 per barrel in 2000 to $94.90 in 2010. In this period, Nigeria also saw a 
rapid increase in population from an estimated 123 million to 158 million. This situation 
resulted in sustaining a petroleum subsidy with mounting and significant overhead costs which 
easily and ultimately eroded the gains from the excess crude earnings or profits. Moreover, 
the fuel subsidy in Nigeria negatively impacts growth of other economic sectors, costs more 
than the fiscal allocations for education and even health and is also responsible for the 
stagnation in the downstream sector of the industry as investors shun the unattractive offers 
for refining and marketing products in Nigeria due to the uncompetitive rates. These facts 
coupled with fuel subsidy accounting for 30% of the Nigerian government’s expenditure in 
2011, 4% of the GDP and 118% of the capital budget, caused the Nigerian government to 
                                                             




acknowledge that the fuel subsidy was no longer sustainable and sought its removal, but were 
met with the stiffest of opposition from its populace.670  
 
2.4.3. Economic Inclusion for Equity and Poverty Eradication in Nigerian Petroleum 
laws? 
In line with earlier discussions on forging synergies across the SDGs in the first chapter, 
sustainable development of petroleum resources creates the need for equitable distribution of 
opportunities, resources and the benefits accruing therefrom to optimize the SDGs and foster 
more inclusive societies as advocated by Goals 10 and 16.671 Moreover, Goals 1-6 stress on 
equality enhancement across goals affecting poverty eradication, food security, health or well-
being, gender equality, quality education, water and sanitation. These provide a background 
for the representation and involvement of petroleum producing areas in the economic gains 
derivable from petroleum exploitation to minimize environmental, economic and social 
impacts sustained from decades long adversative oil exploitation efforts.672  
Undoubtedly, such economic involvement and petroleum revenue sharing arrangement would 
naturally serve as vital tools of poverty eradication, especially in the Niger-delta where the 
casualties from aggressive petroleum exploitation spanning over 5 decades remain high.673 
More so, the extant Derivation Principle afforded by Section 162 (2) of the 1999 Constitution674 
                                                             
670 N, Moyo and V. Songwe, Removal of Fuel Subsidies in Nigeria: An Economic Necessity and a Political Dilemma. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/10-fuel-subsidies-nigeria-songwe Accessed at 11 June 2015 
671 See, A/RES/70/1 - Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Available at; 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld Accessed, 30 February 2018. 
672 This is distinguished from public participation as a social development tool of sustainable development discussed in the 
previous chapter and subsequent sections. 
673  Cyril I. Obi “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria's Oil-Rich Niger Delta”, Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienned'études du développement, (2010) 30:1-2, 219-236 To link to this 
article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2010.9669289  
674 S.162 (2) of the Nigerian Constitution (1999) directs the mandatory payment of not less than 13% derivation to the 





relating to the percentage of retainable revenues by oil producing states from petroleum or 
other mineral sources is currently 13%.675 Whereas, the derivation formula is intended as a 
compensatory measure to benefit minerals producing states, the 13% value attributed is 
considered grossly inadequate for meaningful improvement of the Niger-Delta.676 This 
perception is largely due to the appreciable benefits and profits accruing to the federal 
government from oil and gas production and the undeniable level of damage that oil 
exploitation has impacted on the Niger-Delta.677 Consequently, there is a palpable discontent 
in the Niger-Delta with recurring clamour for resource control, fiscal redress and the devolution 
of more funds to the states or local governments and indeed the oil producing regions.678  
 
Although in a bid to improve the Niger-delta situation, the Nigerian government established 
the defunct Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) as an 
institutional arrangement to accommodate welfare and environmental issues of the region, 
including creating the Niger-delta Development Commission (NDDC), not much has been 
achieved.679 OMPADEC was a governmental development agency required to administer the 
allocation accruing to the oil producing states from oil and gas revenue and at the same time 
                                                             
675 In the repealed Nigerian Republican Constitution of 1958 up until the early 60’s, the Derivation formula accruing to the 
regions was 50%. However, with the advent of military dictatorships from 1968 till 1995 it was unfortunately reduced to 
10%. And thereafter increased to 13% under the military government of General Sani Abacha. 
676 See, Adedotun O. Phillips (2003) Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues. Nigerian Institute of Social 
and Economic Research. (2003) http://publius.oxfordjournals.org  See also, Afrrev Ijah “Oil Economy and the Revenue 
Allocation Debacle in Nigeria”. An International Journal of Arts and Humanities Bahir Dar, Ethiopia Vol. 1 (1), February 
2012:1-13 Agiobenebo, T. J. “Assignment, Criteria and the Fiscal Constitution: An Excursion into a Theory of    
Rational   Fiscal     Federalism”. In: Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic Development, Proceedings of the  
1999 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, 25-51. 
677 See, Obi, Cyril I. "The struggle for resource control in a petro-state: A perspective from Nigeria." (2007). See also, 
Douglas, Oronto, and Ike Okonta. "Where vultures feast: Shell, human rights, and oil in the Niger Delta." (2003). 
678 See, Cyril Obi “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria's Oil-Rich Niger Delta”, Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienned'études du développement, (2010) 
679 See, Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) Decree No 23 of 1992 and Niger Delta 
Development Commission [NDDC (Establishment) Act], No 6 of 2000. Also, C.O. Ikporuku “Petroleum, fiscal federalism 
and environmental justice in Nigeria” (2004) 8/3 Space and Polity 321 at 336, observing that the establishment of these 
bodies was not mainly for benevolent reasons: “The militancy of community groups was a fundamental factor, for it was 





coordinate development projects in the region. However, OMPADEC turned out to be largely 
unsuccessful in its endeavours.680 Authors claim that this failure was particularly because of 
the very poor representation of local communities in the governing board, the exclusion from 
participation in project selection and execution as well as corruption of its officials.681 It was 
thereafter replaced by the NDDC via the NDDC Act of 2000 with similar objectives.  
 
The NDDC quite unfortunately has also been fraught with similar controversies faced by the 
OMPADEC, namely; corruption, poor administration, lack of transparency and failure of 
public consultation in terms of project selection and implementation.682 Apparently, the 
missing links in the Niger-delta scenario, comprising a more co-ordinated and representative 
approach to enhance social and economic inclusion, development interests and participation 
are those that essentially form the platforms necessary for optimising equity and reducing 
inequalities in the Niger-delta.683 In other words, the issue of the devolution of petroleum 
resource incomes to the communities where they have been generated must be addressed in the 
Nigerian petroleum regulations before there can be reasonable guarantees of sustainable 
development in the region. This is because devolving development funding to oil-producing 
regions for environmental and social rehabilitation serve as an equitable tool that would 
eventually create a crucial and cost-effective pathway of nurturing the sources of petroleum 
                                                             
680See, S. Omotola “From the OMPADEC to the NDDC: An assessment of state responses to environmental insecurity in 
Niger Delta, Nigeria” (2007) 54/1 Africa Today 72 at 79. 
681See, Y. Omorogbe “The legal framework for public participation in decision-making on mining and energy development 
in Nigeria: Giving voices to the voiceless” in D. Zillman, A. Lucas and G. Pring (eds) Human Rights in Natural Resource 
Development: Public Participation in the Sustainable Development of Mining and Energy Resources (2002, Oxford 
University Press) 549 at 560. 
682 See, Chilenye Nwapi. A Legislative Proposal for Public Participation in Oil and Gas Decision-Making in Nigeria. Journal 
of African Law, (2010) 54, pp 184-211.”The key objectives of these two bodies were largely the same: to rehabilitate and 
develop the oil producing region; to tackle ecological problems that result from oil exploitation; and to embark on 
development projects”, See also, K.S.A. Ebeku “Appraising Nigeria’s Niger-Delta Development Commission Act 2000” 
(2004) 25/1 Statute Law Review 85 at 85. 
683 See, Freedom Onuoha,” Poverty, pipeline vandalization/explosion and human security. Integrating disaster management 
into poverty education in Nigeria. See also, Onuoha, F. (2009)’’ Why the poor pay with their lives: Oil pipeline 
vandalization, fires and human Security in Nigeria, Disaster 33(3):369-389. 17. Ugwuanyi, E. (2013).” Stemming vandalism 





wealth, while simultaneously promoting peaceful and inclusive societies as envisaged by Goal 
16 of the SDGs. Likewise, viable economic development and socially beneficial projects in 
these regions will halt or greatly minimise oil induced conflict, illegal bunkering, pipelines 
vandalism and other hostilities associated with oil exploitation as identified in the Ogoni-land 
case against Nigeria.684 
 
2.4.4. Inter-Generational Equity and the Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Progressing from earlier arguments in chapter 1 regarding the utility of sovereign wealth funds 
for implementing the inter-generational equity element of sustainable development, this section 
assesses the Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Funds. This section considers the viability of the 
Nigerian model of Sovereign Wealth Funds and its utility as a tool for engendering wealth 
creation for the benefit of future generations. Likewise, considered is how the significant 
economic growth potential realizable from these oil-based wealth funds, including their 
efficacy for economic stabilization in petro-states have been adapted in the Nigerian context to 
benefit present and future generations.  
Nigeria established a sovereign wealth fund in 2011, by virtue of the Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Act which is managed by the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (the Authority).685 The 
fund was set up as depository of the surplus income produced from Nigeria's excess oil 
reserves. This sovereign wealth fund was also created to manage and invest these oil revenues 
and funds on behalf of the government of Nigeria.686 Moreover, Nigeria’s wealth fund 
commenced operations in October 2012 and was allocated an initial $1 billion USD in seed 
                                                             
684 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, A, Comm. No. 155/96, 2001. See also, S.I. Skogly, Complexities in Human rights 
Protection: Actors and Rights Involved in the Ogoni conflict in Nigeria, in: 15 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
(1997), 47-60. 
685 See the Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Fund Act (NSIA) 2011 
686 Ibid at Sections 1-3 of the NSIA 
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capital. The aims and objectives of the Act are denoted in S. 3 of the NSIA, which provides 
that, the mandate of the Authority is necessary “to prepare for the eventual depletion of 
Nigeria's bi-carbon resources”. The Act further empowers the investment Authority to build a 
savings base for the Nigerian people, enhance the development of Nigerian infrastructure, 
provide stabilization support in times of economic recession and carry out such other matters 
as may be related to the above objects.687 To realize this mandate, the Authority is to establish 
three separate “ring-fenced” Funds. These are “the Future Generations Fund” (FGF), a 
diversified investment portfolio for the benefit of future generations of Nigerian citizens, “the 
Nigeria Infrastructure Fund” (NIF), dedicated to servicing an investment portfolio for “the 
development of critical infrastructure in Nigeria that will attract and support foreign 
investment, economic diversification and growth” including “the Stabilization Fund”, a 
portfolio of investments geared at providing supplemental stabilization funding for the 
government of Nigeria in times of need, especially when other funds set aside for fiscal 
stabilization purposes are insufficient for that purpose”.688 Likewise, the Authority is expected 
to invest the savings gained on the difference between the budgeted and actual market prices 
for oil to earn returns that would benefit future generations. 
Notwithstanding these commendable objectives of the Act, the detracting feature is its marginal 
seed investment of $1 Billion. Despite Nigeria’s placement amongst the top 12 oil producing 
states globally, with immense oil generated revenues, its oil fund capital is about one of the 
smallest, ranking 39 on the list of sovereign wealth funds.689 Moreover, Nigeria’s current $1.5 
billion sovereign wealth fund is one of the lowest in the world, constituting one of the least in 
                                                             
687 See Section 4 of the Act 
688 See also, J.C. Ezeani, “An Overview of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority” available at 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/swfi/pdfs/2012/NigeriaSWFFinal.pdf last assessed at 19 December 
2015. 
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global rankings. Likewise, in terms of the savings deposits, which is really poor in comparison 
with the annual budget, consisting only an estimated 10%.690 Indeed, these figures are derided 
as only ahead of war-torn Iraq and crisis ridden Venezuela, and only by a negligible margin.691 
Although political will and oil price fluctuations have been considered responsible for the 
minimal investment, the situation however requires statutory improvements to engender inter-
generational equity and sustainable development. This is even more urgent as just 32.5% of the 
fund has been allocated as the investment share applicable to the interests of future generations, 
in the event of depletion of petroleum resources.692  
Even more recently, Nigeria was criticized as having one of the lowest natural resource revenue 
savings globally.693 Apparently, the balance in the three component funds of the Nigerian 
sovereign wealth investments comprising: (Stabilization fund, Excess Crude Allocation and 
Nigeria Infrastructure Fund) is less than $3.9 billion, which is grossly inadequate in funding 
even 20% of Nigeria’s current annual budget.694 Even more damning is the fact that, within the 
time-frame of 2005 to 2015, wherein $201.2 billion accumulated in the Excess Crude Account 
(ECA), a whopping $204.7 billion was withdrawn from the ECA by the end of 2015. This 
scenario obviously translates into withdrawals accruing to 102% of deposited funds, which is 
indicative of a lack of prudent or robust oil revenues savings to weather oil price volatility or 
its impacts on government budgeting and expenditure.  
Moreover, the governance and application of the Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Fund appears 
problematic and porous. Reason being that, the profits of the Nigerian Wealth Fund (SWF) can 
                                                             
690 See, NEITI “The Case for A Robust Oil Savings Fund for Nigeria” NEITI Occasional Paper Series. 2, JULY 2017 
Available at: https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/neiti-ops2-180717.pdf Accessed 26 January 2018. 
691 Ibid. 
692Inokotong, Joseph (21 May 2013). "Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority unfolds areas of interest". Retrieved 11 June 
2015.  
693 NEITI “The Case for A Robust Oil Savings Fund for Nigeria” NEITI Occasional Paper Series. 2, JULY 2017 Available 





be withdrawn by up to 60% to fund national expenditures, while the whole of the stabilization 
funds or 100% can be withdrawn by securing the approval of a National Economic Council.695 
The Council answers to the President, wields considerable or occasionally, unfettered 
discretion, often displaying inchoate or unclear rationale for triggering Fund withdrawals. This 
creates complications and avenues for opacity and corruption in the Funds management or 
application. Quite curiously, the Fund even gets overdrawn despite soaring oil prices, to fund 
domestic budgets, rather than securing deposits into the Fund as expected from the excess crude 
earnings. A clear example occurred in 2013 when Nigeria evidently gained a considerable $58 
billion USD from excess crude earnings, which ought to have been deposited in the Fund, but 
as at 2014/2015 when oil prices crashed, Nigeria’s Fund contained just an estimated $2 billion 
USD, triggering economic shocks and a recession that impacted the whole continent.  
The foregoing examples effectively undermine the mandate and essence of Nigeria’s Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (SWF), manifesting a clear failure of safeguards to optimize the SWFs to 
guarantee the interests of succeeding generations.696 As also clarified by the NEITI report, the 
current value of Nigeria’s SWF cannot fund one-tenth of Nigeria’s annual budget while 
Norway in comparison has 37 years of budget funding capacity accruing from its SWF. Even 
more worrisome is the extant, designated timescale for the peaking and subsequent decline of 
Nigeria’s oil reserves, occurring in the next 38years. Such a situation portends a catastrophe 
should such profligacy persist in Nigeria.697 This bleak scenario thus creates the urgency for 
reforms towards the governance and application of sovereign wealth funds in Nigeria, to 
optimize and deliver on its mandate of stabilizing the economy against shocks in the event of 
                                                             
695 The National Economic Council is often comprised of political appointees or other government nominees, wielding 
significant discretionary powers. See also, Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute representing: (fund size); countries’ ministries of 
finance (budget); UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs (population); (fiscal rules) 
696 See, NEITI Audit Report 2013. See also, Obiageli Ezekwesili, “Safeguarding and Smoothening Fiscal Adjustments in 
Nigeria: Policy Options” (2016) 
697 NEITI asserts that, as at June 2017, there was less than $3.9 billion dollars in all of Nigeria’s oil revenue funds. Which 
was inadequate to finance 16% of the last year’s 2017 budget of N7.44 trillion. 
 171 
 
petroleum depletion and secure the well-being of future generations, especially in the event of 
a carbon redundant future. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter is an assessment of the oil and gas regulations governing the Nigerian petroleum 
industry. It effectively portrays the weaknesses in the regulations and their lack of capacity to 
achieve a green oil industry and sustainable development goals in the Niger-delta region and 
Nigeria at large. It assesses how these regulations fail to meet international oil industry 
standards and how they have greatly compromised issues of environmental protection, social 
development in a bid for economic growth, which ironically has not been achieved as 
sustainable development entails the integration of all three pillars of the sustainable 
development paradigm. The chapter also portrays the failure of the Nigerian oil rules to 
promote vital synergies across the SDGs, but instead accommodates recurrent trade-offs which 
compromise environmental and social goals. 
Moreover, the chapter highlights the limitations in the regulations ranging from: weak 
environmental legislation, scarce or minimal access to environmental information, dearth of 
environmental awareness aggravated by illiteracy in the region and failure of public 
participation. Likewise, acute levels of corruption in the oil industry fuelled by lack of revenue 
and process transparency, excessive government discretionary powers, inexpert bureaucracy 
and the incompetency of the tax regime to secure optimal revenue in-flows from oil and gas 
exploitation completely mar the aims of SDG 8 for sustainable economic growth.  
Likewise, the chapter illustrates the fact that, weak or absent compliance mechanisms attenuate 
environmental and social goals in oil industry regulations, whilst poor monitoring procedures, 
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inadequate sanctions, failure of enforcement provisions, inadequacy of appeal procedures and 
a virtual lack of political will to promote, enact, modify and enforce environmentally protective 
and socially beneficial regulations trigger human rights violations, exacerbate inequities and 
poverty. Altogether, these factors have resulted in the pathetic state of the Niger-delta region 
and the under performance of the Nigerian petroleum industry. Notwithstanding this grim 
scenario, Nigeria can still achieve tremendous improvement via lessons learnt and 
implemented from jurisdictions that have succeeded in enmeshing sustainable development 
goals in petroleum exploitation whilst effectively preserving their environment. This invariably 
leads us to an appraisal of relevant sustainability entrenched oil and gas regulations available 








Sustainable Development and Petroleum Exploitation: Salient Contributions from the 
UK and Norway 
Introduction 
Having previously considered opportunities for synergies between sustainable development 
approaches and petroleum exploitation, including the necessity of nurturing sustainability 
engendered perspectives in oil exploitation to achieve not just local but global sustainable 
development goals, this chapter by using the tools identified in this thesis assesses the 
petroleum law and policy contributions from the UK and Norway. The UK and Norway are 
compared as they are oil and gas producing contemporaries. Both countries like Nigeria, 
commenced exploitation of hydrocarbon resources nearly 6 decades ago in the 1960s.698  
Moreover, the chapter juxtaposes the oil and gas regulations from two states with different 
jurisdictional backgrounds, (common and civil) to analyse how any points of convergence and 
divergence between both countries have impacted on the aims of sustainable development 
during petroleum exploitation. This assessment entails an examination of the efficiency and 
ease with which the elements of sustainable development relating to the integration principle, 
equity and sustainable use discussed in the first chapter, expedited UK and Norway’s escape 
from the petro-curse phenomenon and triggered economic growth. The petroleum regulations 
of these jurisdictions are also assessed in terms of their capacity to engender human or social 
                                                             
698 Gas production from the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) began in the late 1960s followed by the production 
of oil in the mid-1970s. Per reports by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 42 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent have been produced with an estimated 12 to 14 billion reserves outstanding. After the initial exploration 
successes, almost 55 million have been discovered in more than 400 fields across the UKCS. Currently, nearly 300 fields are 
in production and approximately 100 fields are yet to be developed. Also, the UK exports of oil-related goods and services 
have been estimated at more than $40 billion a year in value. Norway commenced oil investments in May 1963, by asserting 
its sovereign rights over natural resources in its sector of the North Sea. Oil exploration started in July 1966, although initial 
exploratory yield was insignificant, oil was discovered in commercial scale by August 1969. The earliest field called 




rights including the absence of adverse ecological footprint from hydrocarbon exploitation. In 
furtherance of the above stated aims, this chapter adopts the comparative methodology as 
earlier discussed, by comparing and contrasting petroleum regulations of the UK and Norway. 
The chapter essentially utilises the “functional approach” to comparative research methods699 
in assessing how the petroleum regulations of both jurisdictions optimize the SDGs. The 
chapter also considers the extent to which EU and international law have influenced the 
realization of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) in both economies. 
3.1. Oil and Gas Regulatory Framework: Overview of the UK and Norwegian Models 
To critically assess and compare the oil and gas regulations of the UK and Norway for 
ascertaining their alignment with the sustainable development goals, it is vital to lay a 
foundation to scrutinize the oil and gas institutional framework of both states. This is because 
these regulatory models account for the relative successes in the petroleum industries of both 
jurisdictions that could also positively impact oil regulations in a developing state like Nigeria. 
It is thus pertinent to acknowledge that the United Kingdom (UK) like the Kingdom of Norway 
(Norway) have since the commencement of oil and gas production in the 1960s, established 
functional and encompassing oil and gas regulations to accommodate the most relevant aspects 
of petroleum exploitation. Norway as an EEA state700 and the UK have a vital point of 
commonality, that of being oil producers in Europe with corresponding EU Directives.701 The 
bulk of these EU Directives encompass regulations relating to economic development, 
                                                             
699 See earlier discussion on comparative research methodology. 
700 The European Economic Area (EEA) provides for the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital within the 
internal market of the European Union (EU) between its 28 member states, as well as three of the four member states of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. States which join the EEA participate in the 
EU's internal market without being EU members, adopting almost all the relevant EU legislation apart from laws regarding 
agriculture and fisheries. 
701 Notwithstanding the UK’s recent vote to leave the EU in June 2016 and the activation of Article 50 of the EU law in 
March 2017, EU Directives in the oil and gas sector remain applicable unless specifically jettisoned by the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018, which is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that provides for repealing the European 
Communities Act 1972. The Act entails the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on 29 March 2019, 
the second anniversary of notice of withdrawal under Article 50 (2) of the Treaty on European Union. 
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environmental protection and social development to enhance sustainable development of 
petroleum resources and a green economy.  
Furthermore, to promote a sustainable petroleum industry, both jurisdictions have established 
specific regulatory agencies to oversee vital aspects of oil and gas production pertaining to all 
three pillars of the sustainable development paradigm. Consequently, the UK and Norway have 
statutory bodies regulating environmentally intrusive activity during petroleum exploitation. 
Some of these agencies include the UK’s Environment Agency (EA) in England702, Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) in Scotland, Natural Resources Wales (NRW) and the 
Norwegian equivalent of the Ministry of Environment as well as the Climate and Pollution 
Control Agency (CPA).  
More so, both jurisdictions have regulatory agencies that monitor and implement the social 
development aspects of oil exploitation. While the UK authorises the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) to enforce health and safety regulations in the oil industry, Norway operates 
through the Norwegian Labour Ministry to monitor the health, safety, working conditions and 
environment of the oil and gas industry. Basically, the primary petroleum regulatory agency of 
the UK is the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) which is headed by the 
Secretary and Minister of State for Energy and Climate Change. The Secretary of State, is 
empowered by the Petroleum Act on behalf of the Crown with administrative and oversight 
responsibilities on Petroleum activities for offshore and onshore areas of the UK.703 The DECC 
is also responsible for petroleum licensing and regulation of the upstream oil and gas sector.704 
                                                             
702 The Environment Agency operates as the environmental regulator for all onshore oil and gas operations 
703 See, Ss.3 and 4 of the UK Petroleum Act 1998 
704 See the UK Petroleum Act 1998, These Regulations consolidate with amendments to the provisions of the Petroleum 
(Production) Regulations 1982 (as amended) in relation to (a) applications to the Secretary of State for petroleum production 
licences in respect of seaward areas and (b) applications to the Secretary of State for petroleum exploration licences in 




Additionally, the DECC administers energy and climate change mitigation policies, as well as 
establishing a framework for expediting the policy objectives of these targeted areas.705  
Moreover, there is the recently established Oil and Gas Authority (the “OGA”), which acquired 
the licensing and regulatory oversight functions performed by DECC, on behalf of the 
Secretary of State.706  The DECC also empowers the Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil 
(OUGO) with the responsibility of promoting the safe, responsible and environmentally sound 
recovery of the UK's unconventional reserves of gas and oil707, while the OFGEM is 
responsible for the regulation of the downstream gas market. OUGO also undertakes 
supervision of the gas transmission and distribution networks as well as third party access 
applicable to downstream gas infrastructure in furtherance of the UK’s economic development 
objectives to harness the utmost gains from gas resources and achieve sustainable economic 
growth.708  
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is the primary regulatory body governing the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry and is accountable for the efficient management of the 
petroleum sector and associated resources.709 The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), 
operates under the MPE and acts as an important advisory body to the MPE.710 Its functions 
are similar to the UK DECC and are crucial for the sustainable development and management 
of petroleum resources in Norway.711 The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) like the 
                                                             
705 See, S.4 UK Petroleum Act 1998 
706 Initially, the OGA was established as an executive agency of DECC. However, the OGA has been an autonomous 
government regulator since the 1st of October 2016. Available at, https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/regulatory-
framework/overview/Accessed at 4th of October 2017. 
707 See Mineral Workings (Offshore Installation) Act (1971) 
708 See, the Gas Act 1986, the Energy Act 2004, the Energy Act 2008. The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), is 
the government regulator for the electricity and downstream natural gas markets in Great Britain. It was formed by the 
merger of the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) and Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas). 
709 See the Norwegian Petroleum Act 29 November 1996 no 72 relating to petroleum activities,  
710 See, S.3, S.86 of the Norwegian Petroleum Act 
711 See, Regulations to Act relating to petroleum activities. Laid down by Royal Decree 27 June 1997 pursuant to Act 29 
November 1996 no 72 relating to petroleum activities, section 10-18, public administration, section 13 c third paragraph and 




UK HSE, has regulatory responsibility for safety, emergency preparedness and the working 
environment in petroleum activities.712 Also, the Norwegian Climate and Pollution Agency 
(CPA) established on 18 January 2010 oversees climate or pollution control regulations in the 
oil industry. Moreover, CPA as a directorate under the Ministry of Environment is tasked with 
implementing government policy on pollution as well as expediting sustainable development 
goals on environmental protection.  Some of its crucial functions entail exercising regulatory 
authority, carrying out inspections, managing and enforcing the Pollution Control Act, the 
Product Control Act, and the Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Act.   
Likewise, the CPA grants permits, establishes requirements in setting emissions limits and 
carries out inspections to ensure compliance. The petroleum sector also includes: Petoro AS, a 
state-owned company engaged in the management of Norway’s direct financial interest. There 
is also Statoil ASA,713 by which Norway, via the MPE, operates a 67% ownership of oil and 
gas investments in the NCS. This is a point of divergence from the UK which has no state-
owned oil and gas investments on the UK Continental Shelf. Norway also authorises Gassco 
AS, an independent state-owned company operating an integrated system for transporting 
natural gas from the Norwegian continental shelf to other European countries to optimize trade 
in gas resources and expedite economic growth.  
More importantly, the regulatory basis for oil and gas production in the UK is reposed in the 
Petroleum Act of 1998, Cap.17. It defines “Petroleum” in S.1 and establishes the regulatory 
regime for oil and gas operations while vesting oil and gas rights in the Crown or Her Majesty 
in S.2.714 The UK Secretary of State is however vested with powers to grant licences for the 
search and winning of oil to competent persons.715 The requirement for competency of persons 
                                                             
712 See, Chapter 3, Section 2 of the Norwegian Petroleum Act 
713 See, Section 3-6 on State participation which provides that “the King may decide that the Norwegian State shall 
participate in petroleum activities according to this Act”.  
714 See Part I, Ss. 1 and 2 the UK Petroleum Act 1998 
715 See, S.3 of the UK Petroleum Act 1998 
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is essentially to ensure that the UK’s vast hydrocarbon reserves can be efficiently developed to 
achieve the sustainable development goals (SDGs). The DECC issues licences through 
competitive licensing rounds that occur annually, to guarantee that the best bids, which target 
all pillars of the sustainable development paradigm including innovative technology are 
granted licenses for the sustainable development of the UK oil and gas reserves.716  
Thus, a company wishing to participate in the UK upstream oil and gas sector must bid for a 
licence, or seek to acquire an interest in existing assets, with any such acquisition being subject 
to regulatory permits and approvals.717 Likewise, the principal regulatory framework for oil 
and gas exploitation in Norway resides in the Norwegian Petroleum Activities Act of 1996 
(PAA).718 Similarly, the rights to the petroleum resources on the Norwegian continental shelf 
are conferred on the Norwegian state by virtue of Section 1.1 of the Norway PAA which 
provides that “The Norwegian State has the proprietary right to subsea petroleum deposits and 
the exclusive right to resource management”.719  
Just like in the UK, the regulatory regime for Norwegian petroleum activities is based on a 
licensing system whereby companies are accorded oil and gas exploratory and production 
rights via petroleum licences.720 The Norway PAA specifically regulates the award of licences, 
the oil and gas exploratory phases, field development and infrastructure, joint activity and field 
unitization as well as decommissioning and cessation of petroleum activities. These regulations 
                                                             
716 See Part I, S.4, s.5, Part III, S.15 UK Petroleum Act 
717 There are three main types of licences: Seaward Production Licences, which are granted in relation to offshore fields. 
They cover the full life of a field, from exploration to production. These are categorized into Petroleum Exploration and 
Development Licences (PEDLs), which are granted in relation to onshore fields. These also cover the full life of a field. 
There are also Seaward Exploration Licences, which cover offshore exploration activities only. 
718 See, S.72 of Norway Petroleum Activities Act of November 1996 (PAA) hereinafter Norway PA or PAA 
719See, Section 1-1 Norwegian Petroleum Act. The rights to the petroleum resources on the Norwegian continental shelf are 
vested in the Norwegian state. Time-limited licences to explore for and produce oil and gas on the shelf are granted under 
the Petroleum Act by the King in Council 
720 See, Section 1-3 which pertains to licensing requirements etc. which provides “None other than the State may conduct  
petroleum activities without the licences, approvals and consents required pursuant to this Act”.  Chapter 2, Sections 2- 4, 




serve to ensure that the Norwegian petroleum reserves are sustainably developed for the benefit 
of present and succeeding generations.721 The Norway PAA like the UKPA also provides 
liability for oil pollution and resulting damage as essential control measures to drive sustainable 
development goals. 
 
3.2. The Integration Principle and Petroleum Exploitation in the UK and Norway 
Previous discussions in the first and second chapters considered the importance of integrating 
economic, environmental and social development goals in oil and gas exploitation to achieve 
sustainable development whilst instituting the regulatory agencies to advance those aims. This 
section therefore examines the environmentally protective regulations of Norway and the UK 
petroleum industry. The essence of this examination is to determine the extent to which both 
states have achieved a seamless integration of environmentally protective regulations with oil 
production to optimize the SDGs in their jurisdictions. 
3.2.1. Environmentally Protective Regulations in UK and Norwegian Petroleum 
Legislations 
Earlier discussions in chapter 1 clarify the efficacy of environmentally protective regulations 
in the oil and gas industry for achieving synergies across the SDGs. Moreover, crucial stages 
for conducting environmental assessments during oil exploitation were also stressed. These 
phases are recognised in the UK Petroleum Act and the Norwegian PAA to include: the Pre-
commencement Phase regulations which encompass, permits or approvals that must be 
obtained prior to initiating oil and gas operations, regulations during Operational Activities and 
                                                             




necessary permits or approvals for regulating exploration, production as well as regulations 
affecting conclusion of operations and decommissioning.722 The UK petroleum regulations as 
administered by the DECC and likewise the Norwegian PAA administered by the MPE and the 
NPD seek to promote a preventative approach to environmental protection by underscoring the 
need for consultations prior to the commencement of petroleum operations or before the 
issuance of petroleum licences.723  
Furthermore, the DECC like the Norwegian NPD in fulfilling their regulatory mandates may 
refrain from issuing petroleum licences in environmentally sensitive areas.724 For instance, in 
the UK’s 14th offshore licensing round, 35 blocks nominated by the industry were not offered 
for licence because their location made them highly sensitive.725 Moreover, the high court’s 
decisions in the Greenpeace cases are further illustrative of the incumbent powers of the UK 
petroleum regulatory bodies to enforce precautionary measures prior to and during petroleum 
operations. In R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Greenpeace726, the 
principal issue entailed whether EC Directive 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and 
wild fauna and flora applied up to the 200-mile limit of the UK continental shelf.727 The 
Directive had been implemented in the UK through the Conservation (Natural Habitats) 
Regulations of 1994.  
                                                             
722 See, Act 29, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the Norway PAA No. 72 of 1996 and Cap. 17 UK Petroleum Act 1998, Pt. I-IV. 
723 See S.22 of the Norway PAA and Part V comprising Schedules relating to work programmes and Model Clauses for all 
petroleum exploiting activities. 
724 The NPD via the MPE in Norway refrained from opening up the oil rich Lofoten Islands in Norway for petroleum 
exploitation due to its ecological sensitivity (to be addressed further). See also Section 3. SI 1988 No 1213. Consultations 
prior to offering blocks for licence See SI 1990 No. 1332, SI 1992 No. 2378, SI 1995. Firstly, before a licensing round 
begins, the DTI will consult 1435 and SI 1996 No. 2946. 
725 See, Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, Environmental Regulation of the UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in, Journal Of Energy 
& Natural Resources Law Vol 18 No 3 2000 at 270. See also, Daintith and Willoughby, Chapter 9 of UK Oil and Gas Law 
(A Hill ed, Sweet & Maxwell. 





Moreover, the Natural Habitats Conservation Directive applies to marine areas which it defines 
as “any land covered continuously or intermittently by tidal waters or any part of the sea in or 
adjacent to Great Britain up to the seaward limit of territorial waters and the continental 
shelf”.728 The Court held that the Directive was applicable and it upheld the prescriptive nature 
of the provisions of Articles 3-11 of the Directive as binding on the DECC (then DTI) for the 
protection of habitats and species.729 In the subsequent Greenpeace case, Greenpeace 
challenged the failure of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry for failing to carry out 
its licensing function in accordance with the Habitats Directive during the 19th Licencing 
round.730 The affected areas to be licensed in the 19th round within the Atlantic Frontier were 
outside the 12-mile limit of territorial waters but within the area of the UK continental shelf. 
Mr Justice Kay concluded that the reference in the Habitats Directive to the 'European territory 
of the Member States' (Article 2 of the Directive) included the area up to the 200-mile limit of 
the UK continental shelf. The significance of this judgment rests on the particular attention 
accorded to environmental protection of natural habitats in not just the onshore producing areas 
but the offshore locations which had been initially overlooked.731 
In addition, the Norwegian Environmental regulations impose statutory consultations during 
the planning applications conducted by the MPA. These consultations are also required in the 
assessment of the EIAs conducted for both onshore and offshore oil installations, exploration 
and production activities.732 For instance, the Offshore Productions and Pipelines (Assessment 
                                                             
728 See, the Conservation of Natural Habitats Regulations 1994 
729 R v. DTI (supra) 
730 See, R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Unreported), Queen's Bench Division, 5 November 1999. See also, 
SI 1994 No 2716 and Regulation 2 of the EC Directive 92/43. 
731 A further aspect of the pre-commencement phase of the environmentally protective petroleum regulations in England and 
Wales, include, environmental permits issued under the Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR 2010). 
732Offshore operations involving the use and or discharge of ‘defined’ chemicals must be the subject of a chemical permit 
which came into force on 15 May 2002. Amendments to the Offshore Chemicals Regulations 2002, made under Schedule 2 
of the Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution Prevention and Control) Regulations 2005 (OPPC) increase the powers 
of DECC inspectors to investigate non-compliances and risk of significant pollution from chemical discharges, including the 




of Environmental Effects) Regulations imposes the requirement of permits and approvals for 
offshore pipelines subject to public participation and involvement.733 More so, the Best 
Environmental Practice (BEP) adopted in the UK and Norway by EC regulations ensure more 
environmentally protective measures during oil exploitation. It is described as “the application 
of the most appropriate combination of environmental control measures and strategies”.734 The 
BEP considers specific issues, ranging from: the development of codes of good environmental 
practice, public access to information, sustainable use of resources, recycling and reuse of 
resources or by-products, substitution by less polluting activities or substances, including a 
commitment to continual monitoring and reassessment of what constitutes BEP.735  
 
3.2.1.1. Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations in Norway and UK Petroleum 
Law 
Environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessments in petroleum 
industry regulations are essential tools for fulfilling environmental goals in the oil industry. 
Accordingly, the UK and Norway have optimized impacts assessments regulations for 
environmental protection during oil and gas exploitation via SEA regulations, EIA regulations 
and environmental statements. The UK through the DECC imposes the requirement for a 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) to assess the environmental implications of 
                                                             
733The 1999 Regulations implemented the EC Directive on the assessment and effects of certain public and private activities 
on the environment.  The 1999 Regulations came into force on 14 March 1999. The 2007 amendment implemented the 
requirements of the Public Participation Directive and came into force on 16 April 2007 





potential offshore oil and gas activities736 in accordance with international obligations under 
the SEA Directive 2001/42/EC (Kyiv Protocol).737  
 
In the same vein, the Norwegian MPE by virtue of S.22 and S.45 of the Norway PAA also 
mandates SEA for oil and gas operations in line with the objectives of the Kiev Protocol.738 
SEA therefore requires that the state parties evaluate the environmental consequences of their 
official draft plans and programmes by ensuring a comprehensive assessment. Strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) is undertaken much earlier in the decision-making process 
than project environmental impact assessment (EIA), and it is therefore seen as a key tool for 
sustainable development.739 In Norway for instance, the MPE considers the impact of the 
proposed petroleum activities in a holistic manner as it borders on trade, industry and the 
environment.740 The likelihood or possibilities of pollution as well as any economic and social 
effects resulting from the petroleum activities are thus evaluated with a final decision or 
recommendation from the MPE.  
 
In addressing EIAs conducted in the petroleum industries of both jurisdictions, it is pertinent 
to note that the primary regulators in Norway include the MPE as empowered by the Norw 
PAA and the NPR.741 Whereas the UK oversees petroleum industry EIAs via the DECC. 
Typically, EIAs conducted in the UK oil and gas industry are regulated by the Infrastructure 
Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations of 2009. The Regulations require 
                                                             
736 Updated guidance has been issued by DECC relating to: Environmental statements and direction applications. Oil 
pollution emergency plans, Environmental reviews and inspections. See also, Courtney Fidler Bram F Noble “Advancing 
strategic environmental assessment in the offshore oil and gas sector: Lessons from Norway, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 04/2012; DOI: 10.1016/J.EIAR.2011.11.004 
737 Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (Kyiv, 2003). The Kiev (SEA) Protocol, which entered into force on 11 
July 2010. 
738 Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (Kyiv, 2003). The Kiev (SEA) Protocol. 
739 See previous discussions on SEA 
740 See, S.22A Norway Petroleum Regulations (NPR) 1997 
741 See also, Chapter 2a, S.6 and S.22 of the Norwegian Petroleum Regulations 1997 (as Amended by the Royal Decree of 
2012 No. 729)  
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development consent for nationally significant infrastructure and its ambit includes onshore 
pipelines. These regulations also impose pre-application consultation relating to activities such 
as oil installations with a potential for substantial impacts on the environment, local 
communities and other legitimate uses of the sea. This new requirement specifically allows 
local communities, environmental groups and other interested parties to comment on any 
proposed development in its preliminary stages, before an application for a marine licence is 
even submitted.742 
 
Moreover, the scope and content of EIA requirements in both jurisdictions indicate a penchant 
for precautionary approaches towards the environment and relevant communities. Thus, both 
the Norwegian and UK EIA regulations indicate specific measures to protect the environment 
from harm before, during and after cessation of oil and gas operations. Similarly, both 
jurisdictions impose preliminary impacts assessments of new sites and continuous assessments 
of work programmes and field development programmes as well as impacts assessments before 
decommissioning of oil fields or oil wells. Norway regulations require that EIA proponents 
highlight the likely impacts of opening new oil exploratory sites on the environment, on 
commercial activity, the accompanying social impacts as well as the possibility of pollution.743 
Also, the UK petroleum regulations require that a licensee or oil and gas operator must 
undertake not only a preliminary assessment but also an overall assessment of the likely 
impacts on the environment of the proposed petroleum activity.744 In other words, the initial 
                                                             
742 The Pipeline Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2000, proposed that onshore pipelines (except those 
of public gas transporters, the government and water companies) which are more than 10 miles (16 km) long require a 
Pipeline Construction Authorisation (PCA) from the Secretary of State, under Section 1 of the Pipelines Act 1962. 
743See, S.6 & 22 of the Norway Petroleum Regulations 2012. 




EIA is summarized into specific conclusions in an environmental statement, (ES). This ES is 
thereafter submitted to the DECC.745  
 
Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities require assessment of all relevant interests affiliated to 
the affected or proposed sites for oil and gas activity.746 The EIA proposal must also give a 
description of, the proposed development and relevant development solutions as well as the 
likely impact on other commercial activities and the environment. Likewise, the UK imposes 
the requirements for EIAs for the award of grants and renewals of production consents for field 
developments, drilling and deep boring of oil wells, construction and installation of production 
facilities and pipelines in the UK Territorial Sea and on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS). 
DECC also requires that all ES carried out by oil and gas operators by themselves or by proxy 
be of the required standards and imposes strict liability on the operators for EIA commitments 
made thereunder.747  
Furthermore, international instruments such as the Biodiversity Convention, the OSPAR and 
the EC Habitats Directive748 for the protection of habitats and species bear direct impact in the 
conduct of EIAs within the UK and Norway. The import of these regulations in relation to oil 
exploitation in the UK and Norway is that they prescribe environmentally protective measures 
that trigger the acceptance of environmentally-friendly oil and gas regulations. Accordingly, 
Norway in fulfilling international obligations derived from international environmental 
instruments, enacted provisions like S.6 of the Petroleum regulation requiring that, “an impact 
assessment must provide a description of the impact of opening the area for petroleum 
                                                             
745 See, Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipelines (Assessment of 
Environmental Effects) Regulations 1999 (as amended)). 
746 Section 22 of the PA Norway provides that “Well in advance of submission of a plan for development and operation of a 
petroleum deposit, the licensee shall present to the Ministry a proposed programme for environmental impact assessment….” 
747 See Part II, SS.10-13 UK Petroleum Act. 




activities”.749 These regulations also influenced the 2003 Norwegian government’s decision 
not to open the ecologically sensitive Lofoten Islands to oil exploration until 2005, this 
illustration also indicates high environmental priorities and influence of EIAs over the issuance 
of oil licenses in Norway.750 The directive was again re-issued in 2013 not to open-up the 
“Lofoten Islands for exploration and drilling for another four years”.751 Although this decision 
was essentially predicated on environmental objectives in preserving fishing and biodiversity 
in that region, it also satisfies both the integration principle and the principle of resource 
conservation to achieve not just a “green” petroleum industry in Norway but also green 
economic growth.752 
Similarly, Norway in a bid to implement precautionary measures, imposed a moratorium on 
deep sea oil drilling on the Norwegian Continental Shelf after the US Gulf of Mexico 
incident753. Norway thereafter banned deep water oil drilling in new areas based on 
environmental concerns and adopted such measures in favour of sustainable development 
objectives during oil exploitation. The moratorium has however been lifted since 2014 with 
recommendations for more extensive EIAs for such activity.754 Likewise. in the UK, the 
adoption of these international environmental regulations and EU Directives has served as a 
ground for their enforcement via EIAs undertaken for the petroleum industry. This formed the 
                                                             
749S. 6 c (e) Requires that an impact assessment must provide a description of the impact of opening the area for petroleum 
activities in relation to, i.e.: living conditions for animals and plants, the sea bed, water, air, climate, landscape, emergency 
preparedness and risk, and the joint impact of these;  
750  See ‘Norway’s decision to put nature before oil is a turning point in history of oil development in sensitive areas’ WWF 
International, Press Release, 15 December 2003. Accessed at: http://www.panda.org.  
751 http://www.foeeurope.org/yfoee/lofoten-secured-oil-free-01-10-2013 accessed at 08/03/2013 
752 See also, Regulations relating to Protection of the environment in Antarctica, Published in May 1995, also, Protocol on 
environmental protection to the Antarctic Treaty”. 
753 See the Deepwater Horizon (the Gulf rig that exploded on 20 April 2010) Robertson, Campbell; Krauss, Clifford (2 
August 2010). "Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say" see the New York Times, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html?_r=2&fta=y Accessed at 25 February 2016 
754See, the press statement of Norwegian Energy Minister Terie Riis-Johnson, “Norway will not allow any deep-water oil 
and gas drilling in new areas until the investigation into the explosion and spill in the US Gulf of Mexico is complete,” 




thrust of Greenpeace’ argument in R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Environment755 where 
the high court upheld the provisions of Articles 3-11 of the EC Habitats Directive. The 
Directive provides that, before consenting to a plan or project which is likely to have a 
significant impact on a European site, an appropriate environmental assessment of the 
implications for the site's conservation objectives must be undertaken. If the assessment shows 
that the plan or project will adversely affect the integrity of the site, consent cannot be given 
unless there is no alternative solution and there exist imperative reasons of overriding public 
interest why the plan or project should be carried out.756  Although the Directive does not 
specifically define the phrase 'imperative reasons of overriding public interest', it however does 
not preclude social or economic interests, unless of course the EU has earmarked such a site as 
a priority natural habitat type or a priority species. If the site has been so designated, the 
imperative reasons would be restricted to issues of human health and public safety.757 
 
Moreover, EIA participation and consultation is encouraged in both jurisdictions even though 
there exist perceptible differences in the Norwegian and UK approaches. In the UK, the DECC 
requires the EIA proponent to consult interested parties and stakeholders such as the local 
authorities and environmental rights groups. Also, a scrutiny of the UK PA and the Norway 
PAA indicate more public consultation or collaboration in the UK regime at the various EIA 
stages than in the Norwegian rules which only promote consultations and participation at pre-
commencement stage.758 As evident from the Norway PAA, it is specifically at the point of 
opening-up of new areas (the Pre-commencement phase) that public consultation is carried out. 
                                                             
755Unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 5 November 1999. SI 1994 No 2716. 2 Regulation 2. [1998] Env LR 415. '4 See 
also, the discussion about the appropriate date in Greenpeace 2. Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law Vol 18 No 3 
2000 
756 See Articles 6.3-6.4 of the Directive 
757 See, Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, Environmental Regulation of the UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in, Journal of Energy 
& Natural Resources Law Vol 18 No 3 2000 at 273 
758 See S.22 Norway PAA and S.6 Norway Petroleum Regulations 
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Thereafter, public consultation is discontinued and the MPE decides on the administrative or 
other procedure to be followed on a case by case basis depending on the outcomes of the EIAs 
conducted in development and decommissioning stages. The licence holder is only required to 
carry out all the stipulations for the impact assessment in relation to all oil wells and oil field 
developments and it is only on rare occasions that the MPE allows opportunities for public 
consultation at the secondary phase.759  
 
Thus, the MPE reserves the right to make the decisions regarding continuation of the project, 
the way it may proceed and what circumstances or conditions that may be imposed to reduce 
the risk, or what compensatory and mitigatory measures should be undertaken to counteract 
potential adverse impacts and thereafter publishes its EIA decisions in the Norwegian Gazette. 
Essentially, Norway implements the production stage EIAs based on purely scientific, technical 
and administrative considerations. It is however pointed out that, such lack of consultation 
could largely impede the assessment of the adequacy of the scientific standards and 
considerations applied. This may reduce the robustness of consensus required for optimizing 
safeguards that should benefit the environment. 
 
In furtherance of the aims of consultations to ensure effective environmental safeguards, EIA 
and SEA directives760 were thus modified to reinforce the provisions of Article 6(2) of the EIA 
Directive to ensure that the public is informed early in the decision-making process in relation 
to on-shore exploitation and undertaking SEA in connection to off-shore production.761 It is 
also pointed out that the two Directives are to a significant extent complementary. The SEA 
                                                             
759   See, Henrikk Agar-Hensen, “The Exploitation of Norwegian Oil and Gas” in Energy Policy 
760 See, Articles 3-6 of Directive 2003/35/EC which amends EIA Directive 1985/337/EEC 
761 On the application and effectiveness of the Directive on Strategic Environmental Assessment (Directive 2001/42/EC) 





has been categorized as "up-stream" and identifies the best options at an early planning stage, 
while the EIA is classified as "down-stream" and refers to the projects that are coming through 
at a later stage.762 In theory, an overlap of the two processes has been deemed unlikely even 
though the possibility of potential areas of overlap in the application of the two Directives may 
not be precluded.763 The EIA as well as SEA Directives also provide that the public concerned 
shall be given early and effective opportunities to participate in the environmental decision-
making procedures.764 Moreover, the importance of carefully timing public participation is 
emphasised in paragraph 6, Article 3 of Directive 2003/35/EC which amends EIA Directive 
1985/337/EEC. And it states that reasonable time-frames for the distinct phases shall be 
provided, allowing sufficient time for informing the public and for the public concerned to 
prepare and participate effectively in environmental decision-making subject to the provisions 
of this Article.765  
 
Nevertheless, Article 9 of the EIA Directive 2003/35/EC imposes an obligation on the UK and 
Norway to specify the rationale for administrative decisions relating to EIAs conducted for the 
oil industry. In addition, information about the public participation process must be stated as 
well as the main mitigation measures proposed.766 Furthermore, the import of Article 10a of 
the EIA Directive is that it affords opportunities for members of the public to have access to a 
review process in law courts or before independent tribunals or panels to challenge the legality 
of oil and gas decisions affecting the environment.767 This provision thus offers considerable 
                                                             
762 C. Voigt, ed. Rule of law for nature: new dimensions and ideas in environmental Law. (Cambridge University Press, 
2013). 
763See, Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the application and effectiveness of the Directive on Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (Directive 2001/42/EC) /* COM/2009/0469 
764 See EIA Directive Article 3(4), See also, Strategic Environmental Assessment (Directive 2001/42/EC) 
Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of certain public and private projects on the environment as amended 
765 N. Hartley, C. Wood / Environmental Impact Assessment Review 25 (2005) 319–340 321 
766 See, Article 3(6)(a) of EIA Directive 2003/35/EC 




improvements to the EIA Directive as it also provides that the procedures shall be fair, 
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.768 The directive also stipulates that 
information regarding judicial procedures is also to be made available to the public. 
Notwithstanding these appreciable modifications for the reinforcement of public participation 
procedures during EIAs, a discernible weakness of the provisions is that, the interpretation of 
the terms “early and effective participation”, are not defined in either the EIA Directive or the 
SEA Directive but left to the states discretion to transpose into the respective local 
legislations.769 
 
3.2.1.2. Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change Regulations in the UK and 
Norwegian Petroleum Regulations 
A scrutiny of environmentally protective regulations as sustainable development tools in the 
UK and Norwegian oil industries entails addressing the atmospheric protection regulations of 
both jurisdictions. This serves to determine their efficacy for greening the petroleum industry 
and preventing atmospheric pollution. Such an assessment includes flares and vent regulations 
applicable to the oil and gas industry in the UK and Norway, as well as international and EU 
regulations relating to atmospheric protection. In the UK like Norway, the following 
international regulations are particularly relevant, the Geneva Convention on Long Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979 and accompanying Protocols770, the Montreal Protocol 
                                                             
768 See, Article3(7) EIA Directive 2003/35/EC 
769 See, Directive 2003/35/EC was seeking to align the provisions on public participation with the Aarhus Convention on 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. See also, N. Hartley, C. Wood / 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review 25 (2005) 319–340 
770 The Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution has addressed some of the major environmental problems of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) region through scientific collaboration and policy 
negotiation since 1979. The UK signed this Convention in 1979 and it entered into force in 1983. Since implementation, the 





of 1987771, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)772 and 
the UN-ECE Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR).773 Also, relevant 
to both the UK and Norwegian oil and gas industry are the: EU Commission Decision 
2014/738/EU which stipulates the best available techniques (BAT) conclusions for the refining 
of mineral oil and gas as well as Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions which requires 
the Commission to organise an information exchange on industrial emissions between Member 
States, the industries concerned and non-governmental organisations. This is for promoting 
environmental protection to facilitate the drawing up of BAT reference documents. The 
Directive came into force on the 6 January 2011. Annex 1 to this Decision 2014/738/EU came 
into force as at 9 October 2014 and it also outlines the BAT conclusions for the refining of 
mineral oil and gas.774  
 
Furthermore, to facilitate atmospheric protection, the UK Petroleum regulations impose 
various air quality measures775 and the requirements for consent and approvals from the DECC 
for venting under the Energy Act776 and flaring under the PA.777 The DECC is also authorised 
                                                             
771 See, Oil and Gas UK Atmospheric Regulations. This Protocol which entered into force on 1 January 1989, required 
several EC Regulations to underpin the system to control and monitor use of Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) and other 
greenhouse gases (see Ozone Depleting Substances Regulations 2015). 
772 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, which entered into force on 21 March 1994 and 
accompanying Protocols, target GHG and CO2 emissions to expedite global atmospheric protection and sustainable 
development. The major feature of its most notable Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol is that it sets binding targets for 37 
industrialized countries and the European community for reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. 
773 As per EC Directive 93/389. The Protocol became international law binding its Parties as at 8 October 2009. As of 7 
January 2014, the Protocol had been ratified by 32 countries and the European Union. 
774 See also, EC Regulation No 744/2010 amending EC Regulation No 1005/2009 with regard to the critical use of halons 
The EC Regulation No. 744/2010, of 18 August 2010, sets various cut-off and end dates for all halon critical use applications 
(located in Annex VI).  The cut-off date and end date for halon use in oil, gas and petrochemical facilities is 31 December 
2010 and 31 December 2020 respectively. See also, Oil and Gas UK available at: 
http://oilandgasukenvironmentallegislation.co.uk/ Assessed at 15 February 2016 
775 The Act sets up a framework for the UK to achieve its long-term goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and 
to ensure steps are taken towards adapting to the impact of climate change. The Climate Change Act 2008 received Royal 
Assent on 26 November 2008. This was further updated by the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 which received Royal 
Assent on August 4, 2009. 
776 The Energy Act which was passed in November 1976, requires consent for natural gas to be disposed of by flaring or 
venting and this applies to all onshore hydrocarbon fields as well as offshore fields. 
777 See, Clean Air regulations like the Clean Air Act. There is also the Climate Change Act of 2008 which committed the UK 
to reducing CO2 emissions by 50% in 2030, and up to 80% by 2050. See also, the Carbon Accounting Regulations which 
introduced the carbon accounting system which is used to monitor compliance with the targets for reducing greenhouse gas 




to ensure that licensees eliminate all unnecessary or wasteful flaring and venting of gas.778 
Operators are required to minimise such flaring and venting by implementing best practice at 
an early stage in the design of the development and by continuing to improve on these designs 
during the subsequent operational phase.779 Similarly, the Norwegian petroleum regulations780 
prohibit the flaring and venting of gas exceeding the quantities required for normal operational 
safety.781 The MPE expedites atmospheric protection targets in the oil and gas industry via the 
use of permits and regulatory approvals or licenses just like the UK. However, Norway quite 
unlike the UK categorises these permits into: Permits essential for the commencement of 
production in a new field, permits essential for regular operations and permits required because 
of operational challenges, which include difficulties associated with re-injection of gas into the 
reservoir. It is pointed out that, the whole point of these categorizations is to further restrict gas 
flaring approvals in the oil industry to the barest minimum for atmospheric protection782. 
Norway thus grants these gas flaring permits in the form of an aggregate amount of flared gas 
per quarter and this amount is restricted to what is required for safety reasons to expedite 
normal operations.783 
 
Moreover, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) by S.29 of the Petroleum Regulations 
requires an information plan relating to technical solutions, or other solutions for the prevention 
of environmentally harmful and gaseous emissions. And as concerning new field developments 
                                                             
778 See, Climate Change: The U.K. Programme, Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, November 
2000. Also, the Environment Agency and SEPA do not permit “Open flares” for well tests in the UK. And, the release of 
unburned gas is prohibited. 
779 See, the Petroleum (Current Model Clauses) Order 1999. An objective of the Petroleum Act 1998 is to conserve gas, a 
finite energy resource, by avoiding unnecessary wastage during the production of hydrocarbons from the UKCS. The actual 
Model Clause may vary depending on when the Block Licence was granted, but in recent licences, flaring is covered by 
Paragraph 3 of Model Clause 21, and states that the Licensee should not flare any gas from the licensed area or use gas for 
gas lift except with written consent. This Order came into effect on 15 February 1999. 
780 See, the provisions of the 5th Commandment of the Norwegian Oil Commandments which provides, “that flaring of 
exploitable gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf must not be accepted, except during brief periods of testing;” The 
Norwegian 'Ten Oil Commandments' were approved by the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) on 14 June 1971. 
781 See, Chapter 4 Section 4- 4 Norway Petroleum Act. 
782 See, Sections: 4-2, 4-3, 5-3 of the Norway Petroleum Act and S.30a of the Petroleum Regulations Norway 




and wells, there is an imposition of monthly renewals of gas flaring permits to improve the 
checks and monitoring efforts of the NPD. More importantly, Norway has undertaken to reduce 
its overall NOx emissions by up to 23% by 2020 compared with the 2005 level in accordance 
with the Gothenburg Protocol.784 Emissions from the petroleum sector are also directly 
regulated by conditions included in plans for development and operation (PDOs) and in permits 
under the Pollution Control Act. Also, Norway in a bid to reduce CO2 emissions became the 
first country to operate an industrial-scale carbon capture and storage project via Statoil at 
the Sleipner oilfield in 1996.785 By this process, carbon dioxide is stripped from natural gas 
with amine solvents and is deposited in a saline formation. The carbon dioxide which is a waste 
product of the field's natural gas production contains 9% CO2, more than is allowed in the 
natural gas distribution network. The underground storage or sequestration averts this problem 
and enables Statoil to amass savings worth hundreds of millions of euros in carbon taxes, whilst 
storing about one million tonnes of CO2 a year at Sleipner.
786  
 
Essentially, the perusal of the environmentally friendly regulations available in the UK and 
Norway indicates that while the UK has a more expansive network of regulations and 
regulatory bodies, Norway however with fewer regulations has adopted a highly innovative 
approach in driving environment-friendly objectives. This is discernible from its carbon 
sequestration efforts and through the deliberate restriction prohibition of oil and gas exploration 
in ecologically sensitive areas for biodiversity preservation. Thus, portraying a greater 
                                                             
784 See, the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone (known as the Multi-
effect Protocol or the Gothenburg Protocol). It is a multi-pollutant protocol designed to reduce acidification, eutrophication 
and ground-level ozone by setting emissions ceilings for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds and 
ammonia to be met by 2010. As of August 2014, the Protocol had been ratified by 26 parties, which includes 25 states and 
the European Union. 
785 Sleipner Fact Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project “Company/Alliance: Statoil Location: Norway, North 
Sea” Also available at https://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/sleipner.html .See also, "Norway: Statoil Hydro's Sleipner 
carbon capture and storage project proceeding successfully". Energy-pedia. 8 March 2009. 
786Statoil and other license partners commenced the injection of 1 million tons of CO2 per year into sands of the Utsira 
Formation at the Sleipner field in the North Sea, since 1996. 
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commitment to the aims of sustainable development than the UK’s environmentally protective 
petroleum regulations. 
 
3.2.2. Sustainable Economic Growth and Petroleum Taxation: The UK and Norwegian 
Models 
This section scrutinizes the UK and Norwegian petroleum regulations to determine their 
effectiveness in harnessing the utmost benefits from petroleum exploitation, whilst 
engendering fiscal stability and a green economy in accordance with the aims of goal 8 of the 
SDGs. Both the UK and Norway have established petroleum taxation models with the clear 
aims of raising government revenue, eliminating potential distortions of investments which 
might impair petroleum resource value whilst utilizing incentives to optimize risk allocation 
between government and multinationals.787 Moreover, an assessment of the petroleum taxation 
approaches in both jurisdictions indicate that both economies have instituted regulatory, 
physical and economic constraints to deter tax avoidance and at the same time ensure efficient 
petroleum resource accounting to achieve the SDGs.788 For instance, the UK which has a robust 
tax system for the petroleum industry implements various taxes like the Petroleum Revenue 
Tax (PRT). This is a field-based tax charged on the profits arising from oil and gas extraction 
of individual oil fields and excludes the aggregate profits from all oil fields owned by relevant 
operators.789 PRT only applies to fields for which development consent was given before 16 
                                                             
787 See, James L. Smith,” Modelling the Impact of Taxes on Petroleum Exploration and Development” WP/12/278   
IMF Working Paper, Fiscal Affairs Department. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12278.pdf Accessed at 
09/06/16 
788 See earlier discussions in chapter 1 on synergies across the SDGs, oil exploitation, including petroleum resource 
accounting and budgetary measures for sustainable economic growth. 
789 The Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) is a direct tax introduced under the Oil Taxation Act of 1975, in the aftermath of the 
1973 energy crisis, and was intended to ensure fairer national share of profits from the exploitation of the UK's continental 
shelf, whilst ensuring suitable returns on the capital investment by oil companies. In 2011/12, the Treasury received £6.53bn 
in direct revenue from taxes on UK oil and gas production. Available at, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/320222/edu_booklet_aug_13.pdf  Accessed at 




March 1993.790 Ring Fence Corporation Tax (RFCT) and the Supplementary Charges are also 
payable on profits from these fields, however the PRT which is levied at the rate of 50% is 
deducted when calculating these charges. The Ring Fence Corporation Tax (RFCT) on the 
other hand is a variation of the Corporation Tax that applies to all companies by way of a "ring 
fence".791 In contrast to PRT where each individual field is separately ring fenced on a field by 
field basis, RFCT includes all oil and gas exploration and production activity carried on by the 
relevant company.792 It aims to prevent profits from oil and gas extraction activities and rights 
in the UK from being reduced for tax purposes by the setting off losses from other trading 
activities or by excessive interest payments and applies regardless of when development 
consent was granted.793 The profits from oil and gas extraction activities and rights are "ring 
fenced" and treated for tax purposes as a separate trade, so that only losses derived from these 
activities can be set off against profits from these activities794. The Norwegian state regulates 
petroleum tax via the Petroleum Act and derives economic benefits directly and indirectly from 
petroleum exploitation partly via its participation through Petoro AS and its shareholding in 
Statoil ASA.795  
Moreover, in a bid to encourage development of remaining reserves or new marginal fields, 
the UK introduced field allowances in 2009 for certain qualifying oil and gas fields to offset 
against the Supplementary Charge on profits from those qualifying fields. The field allowance 
incentive recognises that some fields, because of their remoteness, depth, maturity or other 
                                                             
790 See, HM Revenue and Customs, “Statistics of Government revenues from UK oil and gas production” PRT is charged on 
super profits arising from the exploitation of oil and gas in the UK and the UK's continental shelf. After certain allowances, 
PRT is charged at a rate of 50% (falling to 35% from 1 Jan 2016) on profits from oil extraction. Also available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/government-revenues-from-uk-oil-and-gas-production--2 Accessed at 21 February 
2016 
791 Ibid 
792 Available at, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/government-revenues-from-uk-oil-and-gas-production--2 
accessed at 21 February 2016. 
793 Ibid 
794 Ibid 




characteristics, are more expensive to develop. Thus, qualifying fields with respect to field 
allowances include: small fields, ultra-heavy oil fields, ultra-high pressure/elevated 
temperature fields or remote deep-water gas fields796. This economic incentive therefore 
encourages oil and gas investments in such marginal or challenging fields and boosts economic 
growth for sustainable development. Furthermore, the UK obtains most oil revenues from oil 
and gas taxation by imposing annual rental payments on each licence797.  The UK does not 
derive economic benefits from oil and gas production via royalties, as the royalty regime was 
abolished in January 2003798. Likewise, Norway has no royalty regime for petroleum activities. 
By its model joint operation agreement, each of the participants is obliged to pay the direct 
chargeable taxes, which includes all taxes, duties and levies charged by the authorities for joint 
operations799.  
Norway also generates income from petroleum exploitation via direct taxes paid by companies 
operating within the oil and gas industry. This form of taxation denoted as corporate taxation 
also applies to the state’s incomes from offshore and onshore oil and gas operations. As earlier 
discussed, due to the oil and gas industry capacity to engender super profits, especially on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf, a separate and special petroleum tax scheme is instead adopted 
for off-shore petroleum income. While the normal corporate tax rate is 27%, which is the same 
as onshore800, the special petroleum tax rate is 51%. To ascertain the basis for both types of 
                                                             
796 See also, International Comparative Legal Guides, available at;  
http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/oil-and-gas-regulation/oil-and-gas-regulation-2016/united-kingdom#chaptercontent2 
Accessed on 21 February 2016. 
797Available at, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/government-revenues-from-uk-oil-and-gas-production--2 
Accessed at 21 February 2016 
798 Her Royal Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HRMRC) See, Statistics of government revenues from UK oil and gas 
production, including data for fields subject to Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT). 
799 See, Deloitte, “Oil and Gas Taxation in Norway” Available at, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-er-oil-and-gas-taxguide-
norway.pdf . Accessed at 21 February 2016. 
800 See, Deloitte, “Oil and Gas Taxation in Norway” Available at, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-er-oil-and-gas-taxguide-




taxes, investments are depreciated on a straight line over six years801. Deductions are available 
for costs related to exploration, research and development, financing, operations and 
decommissioning.802 
Furthermore, Norway, like the UK adopts tax incentive measures by providing the option of 
screening-off normal returns from the special petroleum tax rate, known as the “uplift” which 
amounts to 22% of the investment (5.5% per year for four years). Thus, companies not currently 
taxable probably due to the absence of income, may carry forward deficits and uplifts with 
interest. Such companies can also apply for a cash refund of the tax value of their exploration 
expenses. This has become an important way of funding exploration activities for new entrants 
on the Norwegian continental shelf and it has served to enhance the sustainable economic 
growth of the Norwegian petroleum industry.803  
Having considered the oil and gas fiscal regulations of both countries, it is needful to stress that 
the major differences in both regimes pertain to the target driven approaches adopted by both 
economies to optimise national revenues from oil and gas resources. While the UK promotes 
the field allowance incentive to encourage development activity on small, high-pressure, high-
temperature and deep-water fields, Norway prefers the unique tax refund model that protects 
operators from 78% of the cost of a dry exploration well. This has ultimately engendered 
growth and a relative stability of Norway’s fiscal regime.804 This is because by charging higher 
                                                             
801 Norway's income tax on oil and gas profits has two components: A 27 percent tax on profits (the same income tax 
charged on all businesses in Norway), and a special 51 percent tax on profits from offshore oil and gas production, for a total 
tax of 78 percent. (All of Norway's oil and gas production comes from offshore federal leases.) For example, the owners of 
gasoline stations and the two refineries in Norway pay just the 28 percent tax rate, even if they are owned by an offshore oil 
and gas producer - the profits are counted separately. Available at, http://www.arcticgas.gov/norway%E2%80%99s-
different-approach-to-oil-and-gas-development Accessed 21 February 2016. 
802 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/government-revenues-from-uk-oil-and-gas-production--2  
803 See, Licensees may claim up to 78% of an annual cash refund on exploration costs accrued, as far as the costs do not 
exceed losses. Available at, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-
er-oil-and-gas-taxguide-norway.pdf  Accessed at 21 February 2016. 
804 Available at http://www.infield.com/articles/fiscal-regimes.pdf Accessed at 21 February 2016. 
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taxes for new developments, which remain unchanged for decades, investors are provided the 
incentives to develop new fields.  
Thus, oil and gas investors are afforded the stability and confidence required for such long-
term, high-risk, capital-intensive investment decisions as oil and gas production. In contrast, 
the UK has made various modifications to the petroleum tax and fiscal regime, often 
announcing numerous rates and inconsistent incentives. This resulted in a shocking and chaotic 
scenario in the UK petroleum industry in 2011 after the Chancellor made the third major tax 
rise in nine years on the supplementary charge with a 12% increase, subsequently crashing the 
shares of UK E&P as well as investor confidence805. However, because the UK promotes the 
development of smaller and often unconventional fields, mostly due to lack of recent major 
discoveries, the UK thus has a far greater number of small and marginal field developments, 
but a relatively weaker level of exploration activity in comparison to Norway. Notwithstanding 
these differences in exploratory approaches and incentives, both economies have harnessed and 
sustained huge economic gains from oil and gas exploitation via efficient tax mechanisms 
whilst engendering a green petroleum industry. 
 
3.2.3. Integration of Social development strategies in Norwegian and UK Petroleum Law 
As earlier argued in the first chapter, forging synergies across the sustainable development 
goals remain vital to achieving sustainable development and the 2030 Agenda. This section 
therefore considers the UK and Norway’s approaches to securing access rights and social 
development in the oil industry. 
                                                             
805 See, Drilling Finance, “Fiscal Regimes: UK versus Norway”, Petroleum Review, June 2012. 
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3.2.3.1. Public Participation in the UK and Norway Petroleum Rules 
Public participation was discussed in the environmental subsection to enhance the role played 
by EIAs in the protection of the environment. Regarding the social aspects, public participation 
is thus assessed with a view to empowering local communities. The UK and Norway are parties 
to the Aarhus Convention which entered into force on 30 October 2001.806 By the tripartite 
pillars of the Aarhus Convention which offers access to environmental information, access to 
justice and public participation, the UK and Norway are obliged to implement its provisions 
via the accompanying EC Directives 2003/35.807  
Moreover, these provisions are relevant for fulfilling social development objectives during oil 
and gas exploitation. The EC Directive 2003/4/EC on Public Access to Information transposes 
the first pillar of the Aarhus convention into EU legislation by requiring all public authorities 
to provide members of the public with access and dissemination of the relevant and available 
environmental information, including environmental data as it affects oil and gas 
exploitation.808 The information must be provided to any natural or legal person at their request, 
without them having to prove an interest and at the latest within two months of the making of 
such request.809 The access to justice pillar provides the right to resort to administrative or 
judicial procedures to contest acts and omissions inimical to environmental protection, thus 
fostering social development and empowerment. The third pillar of the Convention, relating to 
                                                             
806 See, The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters adopted on 25 June 1998 in Aarhus at the 
Fourth Ministerial Conference as part of the "Environment for Europe" process. 
807 See, EC Directive http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/legislation.htm See, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32005D0370  
808 The Directive entered into force on 14 February 2003 and the deadline for transposition in Member States was February 
2005. Available at http://oilandgasukenvironmentallegislation.co.uk/legislation-index/eia-and-public-participation-
legislation.htm Accessed at 22 February 2016 
809 See also, EC Directive 2014/52/EU Directive 2014/52/EU makes provision for improvements to the EIA procedure. 
Significant changes are also made to Annex 3 and 4 with a new Annex 2a detailing information that needs to be provided 
when determining whether projects listed in Annex II require an EIA. The new EIA Directive entered into force on 15 May 




public participation, was addressed in Directive 2003/35/EC, and seeks to strengthen the public 
participation provisions.810 The Directive as set out in the preamble states that:  
“Effective public participation in the taking of decisions enables the public to express, 
and the decision-maker to take account of, opinions and concerns which may be 
relevant to those decisions, thereby increasing the accountability and transparency of 
the decision-making process and contributing to public awareness of environmental 
issues and support for the decisions taken”.811 
Ultimately, the EC Directives as afforded by the Directive 2001/42/EC and the Public 
Participation Directive (PPD) seek to ensure that the timing and effectiveness of public 
participation procedures affecting oil exploitation are enhanced. These vital regulations 
therefore serve to optimize social development goals in the oil and gas industry of both 
jurisdictions.812 
3.2.3.2. Human Rights and Social Development in Norway and UK Oil Laws 
Essentially, the purport of this subsection is to address human rights, including the extent if 
any that human rights standards are applicable and operational as tools of social development 
to foster petroleum industry sustainability in both jurisdictions. It is however clarified that both 
jurisdictions do not specifically conduct HRIAs, but they do address relevant human rights 
interests via EIAs authorised for the development of hydrocarbon resources. As earlier 
discussed, international human rights provisions such as the, Universal Declaration on Human 
                                                             
810 Regulation (EC) N° 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of the provisions of the 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, p.13) entered into force on 28 
September 2006 and became of application on 17 July 2007. 
811 Ibid 




Rights (UDHR)813, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)814, Maastricht Principles815 as well as the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights 
have influenced the petroleum industry in the fulfilment of economic and social rights 
obligations in both jurisdictions. The UK and Norway impacts assessment regulations also 
inculcate human rights norms enunciated in the above named international legal instruments. 
For instance, the preamble to the ICESR stress that;  
….” the obligations and primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms lie with the State, and that States must protect against human 
rights abuse within their territory”816.  
This position is also endorsed by the Guiding Principles, which extends the obligation to protect 
and promote human rights to third parties and transnational corporations working extra-
territorially.817 Basically, these guidelines have formed the bedrock for the relevant human 
rights engendered regulations in the petroleum laws of both jurisdictions. Furthermore, an 
assessment of the petroleum laws in these jurisdictions portray a distinction in approaches to 
strengthen the social development pillar in the oil and gas industry.818 While both jurisdictions 
via the impacts assessment regulations try to safeguard human rights819, Norway in comparison 
                                                             
813 See Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 1948. See also the UN Charter arts 1.3, 56 
814   See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Art. 2(1). 
(1966).  See also, Gillian MacNaughton, Human Rights Impact Assessment: A Method for Healthy Policymaking Health and 
Human Rights 17/1, June 11, 2015 
815Although the Maastricht Principles were drafted by a group of experts, and is not per se a legally binding document, it is 
reflective of current international human rights law and its Principle 3 is instructive as it provides that, “All States have 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, both 
within their territories and extraterritorially" 
816 See the Preamble to ICESR (1966) 
817See, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council, Res. 17/4, 16 
June 2011.  Reproduction of the Principles can be found at: 
 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; quote from page 3-4.  
Hereinafter ‘UNGP’  
818 See, previous discussions on Implementation of Intra-Generational Equity in Petroleum Exploitation 
819 See previous discussions on the social development integrative strategies. The UK and Norway are both parties to the 
Arhus Convention, to ensure public participation, access to environmental information and environmental justice, both 




with the UK has more articulate provisions for human rights and environmental protection. For 
instance, the Norwegian Constitution in Article 110b states; 
 “…that every person has a right to an environment conducive to good health and to a 
natural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained820”.  
Accordingly, state authorities in fulfilment of international human rights objectives are 
expected to issue specific legal provisions for the implementation of these human rights 
principles within their jurisdictions. Consequently, Norway thus targets the fulfilment of 
economic and social rights objectives during oil exploitation and goes further to consider 
succeeding generations, to expedite the aims of social development across generations in the 
sustainable development of petroleum resources.  Ultimately, Norwegian provisions coupled 
with the SEA requirements and objectives implicitly form the cluster of issues that HRIAs are 
meant to secure. Norway’s acknowledgment of the environmental and human rights of citizens 
is further evidenced by S. 6c of the Norway PAA which requires that impact assessments 
should provide;  
“…a description of assumed impacts on employment and commercial activities, as well 
as expected economic and social effects of the petroleum activities….”821  
These regulations thus provide the basis for preventing human rights violations during 
petroleum exploitation in Norway. There are also specific regulations mandated for oil 
exploitation in the onshore areas such as Svalbard in Norway.822 These provisions stipulate the 
                                                             
820  See, the Norwegian Constitution – Complete Text, Stortinget (Norwegian Parliament) website, The-Constitution 
https://www.stortinget.no/en/In-English/About-the-Storting/The-Constitution/The-Constitution/   (unofficial source; in 
English); Kongeriget Norges Grundlov [Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway] (May 17, 1814, as amended June 18, 
2006), Lovdata, http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-18140517-000.html (in Norwegian). 
821 See S. 6 Norway PAA and S.3-1 of the Act of 29 November 1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities which provides; 
“Prior to the opening of new areas with a view to granting production licences… an assessment shall be made of the impact 
of the petroleum activities on trade, industry and the environment, and of possible risks of pollution, as well as the economic 
and social effects that may be a result of the petroleum activities”. 
822 See S.57-S.59 Svalbard Environmental Protection Act. 
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requirements for permits and approvals as well as environmental impact statements 
highlighting the likely impacts of the proposed oil and gas activity on the environment of 
existent local communities. The regulations also ensure that the effects are considered during 
the planning of activities and when a decision is taken to ascertain the precise conditions for 
carrying out such activities.  
Whereas, the UK indicates a preference for more consultations in consonance with the SEA 
Protocol and various health safety and environment (HSE) regulations. These consultations in 
the UK tend to promote site visits and meetings between stakeholders to engender legitimacy 
of EIA and SEA outcomes and allow for the improvement of final decisions of project 
assessments. The consultations are also meant to encourage local input and more public 
examination of expert opinions. The rationale for the UK consultations is also to create easy 
acceptance of the final decisions of such assessments. This is because collaboration in decision 
making are enhanced by affected parties who should have equal chances to influence final 
outcomes.  
Consequently, the UK implements the protection of human health and safety during oil 
exploitation, via these HSE, EIA and SEA regulations which embed: economic, environmental 
and social rights as whilst stressing contingency planning for this purpose.823 The aim of these 
UK assessment provisions is thus to tackle and protect in a holistic manner, the social, 
economic and environmental rights of citizens in oil and gas producing regions. However, a 
consideration of the earlier cited international legal instruments on business and human 
rights824, propose the need for HRIAs as they serve as effective and realistic precautionary 
                                                             
823 See, Article 130 of the Rome Treaty, also the Single European Act 1986, and the Treaty on European Union of 1992 
(adopted by the Maastricht Agreement) and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which sets out the following objectives: To 
preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment; to contribute towards protecting human health; and To ensure 
prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources. 
824 See, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council, Res. 17/4, 




measures to minimize the impairment of human rights in the petroleum industry of both 
jurisdictions. Ultimately, such adoption of HRIAs in the petroleum industries of both 
jurisdictions would provide invaluable opportunities for strengthening the social development 
pillar during petroleum exploitation to achieve sustainable development.825 Thus, this omission 
of HRIA stipulations in the Norwegian and UK petroleum laws undoubtedly count as detracting 
factors which can be improved upon for a more sustainable oil industry. 
 
3.2.4. Adoption of technological innovations in the Petroleum laws of the UK and Norway 
As previously argued in the preceding chapters, the adoption of innovative technology is 
essential for a sustainable and green petroleum industry. This section therefore highlights 
technological innovations in the petroleum industry of the UK and Norway that have expedited 
the aims of all three pillars of the sustainable development paradigm. Norway promotes 
innovative and efficient technologies via the provisions of Section 4-1 of the Norwegian 
Petroleum Act, while the UK provides for pipelines modifications by Part III of the UK PA 
without specifying innovative technology, this renders any modification process subject to the 
“BAT” by virtue of EU Commission Decision 2014/738/EU. This directive approves the best 
available techniques (BAT) for the refining of mineral oil and gas” which similarly applies to 
Norway as an EEA state.826 Furthermore, innovative technology has been crucial in ensuring 
access to unconventional wells and marginal fields in both the UKCS and the NCS. The reason 
being that the North Sea is quite a challenging terrain for accessing valuable petroleum 
                                                             
825 See earlier discussions on HRIAs for fulfilling intra-generational equity in the petroleum industry. 
826 See, “Best Available Technics (BAT)” BAT is defined as “the latest stage of development (state of the art) processes, of 
facilities or of methods of operation, which indicate the practical suitability of a particular measure for limiting discharges, 
emissions and waste”. Available at http://www.oilandgasukenvironmentallegislation.com/Contents/pages/statutory.htm 




stocks.827 Unpredictable and often hostile weather conditions in Europe's North Sea have made 
drilling in the region particularly hazardous and has been accountable for loss of lives.828 The 
prevailing conditions aggravate a costly extraction process. It was even asserted in the 80’s that 
costs for developing new methods and technologies to make the extraction process safe and 
effective, far surpassed “NASA's budget to land a man on the moon”.829  
 
An assessment of both the UK and Norwegian oil industries indicate substantial investments 
in innovative technology to achieve not just local but global sustainable development goals. 
Scotland in relation to oil and gas investments on the UKCS allocated £10.6 million for a new 
Oil and Gas Innovation Centre (OGIC)830 to promote innovative technologies in support of 
enhanced petroleum recovery methods. This is essentially meant to harness the petroleum 
resources estimated at 24 billion barrels of oil equivalent valued at £1.5 trillion reposed in the 
North Sea fields.831 The center also aims to encourage research in seismic and reservoir 
characterization, shale gas exploitation, hydrocarbon resource integrity and life extension, 
decommissioning, production optimization and a host of other vital means of sustainably 
developing hydrocarbon resources. The OGIC will also support industry aims to increase 
production and reduce costs in the UKCS by enabling the delivery of crucial and technical 
                                                             
827 The "North Sea" often includes areas such as the Norwegian Sea and the area known as "West of Shetland", "the Atlantic 
Frontier" or "the Atlantic Margin". The largest UK field discovered in the past 25 years is the “Buzzard” located off 
Scotland, found in June 2001 with producible reserves of almost 64×106 m³ (400m bbl) and an average output of 28,600 m³ 
to 30,200 m³ (180,000-190,000 bbl) per day. The largest field found in the past five years on the Norwegian part of the North 
Sea, is the “Johan Sverdrup” oil field which was discovered in 2010. Total reserves of the field are estimated at 1.7 to 3.3 
billion barrels of gross recoverable oil and Johan Sverdrup is expected to produce 120,000 to 200,000 barrels of oil per day. 
Production date is set for 2018. It is one of the largest discoveries made in the Norwegian Continental Shelf. As of January 
2015, the North Sea is the world's most active offshore drilling region with 173 active drilling rigs. 
828 The offshore can be a hazardous environment. In March 1980, the 'flotel' (floating hotel) platform Alexander L. Kielland 
capsized in a storm in the North Sea resulting in the loss of 123 lives 
829 See, "High costs, high stakes on the North Sea". Time. 1975-09-29. 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,913489,00.html  Retrieved, 23 February 2016. See also, 
O. Petterson, A. Storli, E. Ljosland, et.al, "The Gullfaks Field," in Giant Oil and Gas Fields of the Decade, 1978–1988, 
(1992) AAPG Memoir 54, Halbouty, M.T., editor, Tulsa: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, ISBN 
0891813330, pp. 429–446 Alex Kemp, The Official History of North Sea Oil and Gas. Volume I: The Growing Dominance 
of the State; Volume 2: Moderating the State’s Role (2011) 





solutions to minimize the challenges of drilling in the UKCS.832 Apart from the improvement 
in recovery rates of petroleum through innovative technology, there also exists appreciable 
opportunities for carbon capture and storage to reduce CO2 emissions in the UKCS and NCS. 
Carbon capture storage technology (CCS) also forms a vital aspect of the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources.833 According to the European Commission, some 30% of 
CO2 emissions from the power sector could be captured in this way by 2030 and increased to 
almost 60% by 2050.834  
 
A further use of innovative technology is exemplified at the Wytch Farm onshore field in the 
UK.835 The farm’s use of horizontal drilling has also served to preserve an environmentally 
sensitive area comprising a stretch of World Heritage Coastline.836 Norway likewise adopts 
innovative technology in Snøhvit in the Barents Sea and part of the NCS where petroleum 
drilling is carried out, by avoiding the use of surface installations. The seabed facilities are thus 
designed to allow trawler fishing despite ongoing oil and gas exploitation. Essentially, the 
adoption of innovative technology in oil and gas exploitation by both jurisdictions especially 
in the North Sea as well as in their respective onshore areas has succeeded in achieving 
discoveries of new oil fields, making unconventional fields more accessible, more cost 
effective, expedited maximum reuse and recycling of by-products and altogether promoted 
safer and less time consuming drilling processes whilst reducing adverse ecological footprint 
to achieve the interests of sustainable development in the petroleum industry. 
                                                             
832 http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/-10-6m-for-oil-gas-innovation-9a2.aspx Accessed at 9 June 2016 
833 See, Robert Eckard, “Enhanced Oil Recovery: Technologies and Global Markets” ISBN: 1-56965-524-3   
BCC Research. www.bccresearch.com information@bccresearch.com EGY071B 
834 See, Robert Eckard, “Enhanced Oil Recovery: Technologies and Global Markets” ISBN: 1-56965-524-3   
BCC Research. www.bccresearch.com information@bccresearch.com EGY071B 
835 See, P.W. Cox, and C.M. Hearne, “Redeemed from the Heath: the archaeology of the Wytch Farm oilfield” (1991) Dorset 
Natural History and Archaeological Society. “Wytch Farm is an oil field and processing facility in the Purbeck district of 
Dorset, England. It is the largest onshore oil field in western Europe….” 
836 See, Robert Eckard, “Enhanced Oil Recovery: Technologies and Global Markets” ISBN: 1-56965-524-3   




3.3. Sustainable Use of Petroleum Resources: Extraction Control Measures in Norway 
and the UK 
Having considered in the previous chapters that, the management of the petroleum resource 
base is vital for prolonging the life-span and utility of finite petroleum resources in accordance 
with goal 12 of the SDGs, this subsection assesses regulations and strategies adopted in the UK 
and Norway to achieve the aims of sustainable use and production of petroleum resources. 
Norway in Section 4-1 of the Norway Petroleum Act provides for “prudent production”837, 
which is inherently related to prudent or reasonable use of natural resources, especially finite 
resources.838 The UK via the DECC’s Energy Development Unit, undertakes field 
measurements and allocations on the UKCS to maximise the hydrocarbon resource potential 
and recovery.839  
As regarding control of extraction and depletion rates, Norway initially adopted a regulatory 
approach in the 1980’s to control extraction and depletion of the petroleum resources by 
mandating a production ceiling of 90million standard cubic metres of petroleum per annum, 
not necessarily for environmental or resource conservation reasons but to prevent petro-curse 
and inflation. However, this approach did not achieve sustainable development in Norway and 
retarded the oil industry.840 Due to supervening economic problems, international recession, 
                                                             
837 Section 4-1 Norway PA “Production of petroleum shall take place in such a manner that as much as possible of the 
petroleum in place in each individual petroleum deposit, or in several deposits in combination, will be produced…. “The 
production shall take place in accordance with prudent technical and sound economic principles and in such a manner that 
waste of petroleum or reservoir energy is avoided”.  
838 Section 26 of the Norway PA, covers petroleum metering and measurements. Norway keeps consistent track of the 
petroleum extraction rates to ensure “Prudent Production”. 
839 The Petroleum Measurement & Allocation Team is responsible for: Developing the UK regulatory regime for the 
measurement of oil & gas on the UK continental shelf; Inspecting offshore and onshore installations to ensure compliance 
with ‘good oilfield practice’ as advocated by “BAT” and as described in DECC’s Measurement Guidelines; 
www.gov.uk/oil-and-gas-measurement-of-petroleum  Reviewing Licensee’s proposals to ensure that all new field 
developments (or modifications to existing developments) conform to an agreed Method of Measurement (PON6); 
840 Erling Roed Larsen, Escaping the Resource Curse and Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught Up With and 




the disintegration of the Norwegian incomes policy and challenges with restructuring of the 
industrial sector, the imposed oil production limitations policy was discarded in favour of the 
field production licence scheme.841 
Moreover, as earlier discussed, both the UK and Norway have effective control over the 
extraction and depletion of their respective oil and gas reserves as they both implement 
licensing systems, where the state decides on the best or most suitable licensees for oil field 
allocations. The state also exerts development control over its petroleum resources by deciding 
which fields should be developed and by means of regulatory powers it mandates the 
submission of field development plans like in the UK, or plans for development and operations 
(PDO) in Norway.842  
Accordingly, both jurisdictions ensure that the licensees use the “Best Available Technics 
(BAT)” to guarantee reasonable extraction and sustainable use of the finite hydrocarbon 
resources to expedite sustainable development goals. For instance, in the early 1990s, there 
were concerns regarding the safety of the Ekofisk field on the NCS due to subsidence843, 
deteriorating facilities and poor maintenance. The oil licensee, Conoco-Phillips sought 
decommissioning permits for parts of the Ekofisk field because of the low production and 
degraded facilities. However, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) directed Conoco-
Phillips to submit a revised PDO in 1994, resulting in the redevelopment of Ekofisk production 
                                                             
841 Sven Gjednum, “From Oil and Gas to Financial Assets: Norway’s Government Pension Fund (2008)” Also, Tina Hunter, 
“Legal Regulatory Framework for the Sustainable Extraction of Australian Offshore Petroleum Resources A Critical 
Functional Analysis”  
842 See, Chapter 4, S.21-23 of the Norwegian Petroleum Regulations (1997) as amended by Royal Decree 2012.  Norway 
requires that the licensees submit a plan for development and operation (PDO). The process ensures that all relevant 
arguments for and against the project are known before a decision on development is taken. A PDO/PIO consists of a 
development plan and an impact assessment. 
843 See, J. Geertsma, “Land subsidence above compacting oil and gas reservoirs, Journal of Petroleum Technology, June 
1973, v.25 n.6 p.734-743. Subsidence relates to the sinking of land, it may occur after considerable production of oil or 




facilities and the use of enhanced recovery techniques.844 Subsequently, the enhanced oil 
recovery technology meant that it was possible for Ekofisk though previously deemed to be at 
the end of its production life to eventually accumulate a massive boost of up to 50 per cent of 
accessible oil reserves.  
Norway’s intervention through NPD to compel Conoco-Phillips to continue production and 
improve recovery in Ekofisk illustrates the regulatory control that Norway has as part of the  
broad principle of 'prudent production' under section 4-1 of the PAA and the Petroleum 
Regulations.845 Although Conoco-Phillips wished to close the field, State review of the 
production potential of the field prevented the closure. Instead, the State directed Conoco-
Phillips to employ enhanced oil recovery techniques or innovative technology to maximise the 
recovery of petroleum from the field.846 Norway’s initiative has been lauded as the appropriate 
socio-economic decision. This is because it positively impacted on the sustainable development 
of Norwegian petroleum resources on the NCF, as doing otherwise would have amounted to 
avoidable investment failure, resource waste, field abandonment and field sterilization.847  
Ultimately, the control of petroleum extraction and depletion rates via enhanced recovery 
methods or prudent extraction techniques for resource optimization and reasonable use have 
been accountable for the boost in oil and gas recovery in the UK and Norway. Both jurisdictions 
successfully revitalised their resource base and petroleum industries by ensuring access to 
unconventional and erstwhile inaccessible or marginal fields. This invariably triggered the 
                                                             
844 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Fact Pages: Ekofisk (2008), www.npd.no/engelsk/ cwi/pbl/en/index.htm at 19January 
2009. 180 Stig S Kvendseth, Ekofisk The First 20 Years (1991), 194. 181 Phillips, 'Norway Reach Agreement on New 
Platform, Extend Licence' (1994), The Journal Record, www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-5655454.html  at 12 December 2009. 
182 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Fact Pages: Ekofisk (2008), www.npd.no/engelsk/ cwi/pbl/en/index.html at 19 
January 2009, and Phillips, note 181 above. 183 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, note 182 above, 9. 184 The specific 
techniques included pressure injection and directional drilling. See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
845 See, S.11 Petroleum Regulations (1997), Norway. 
846 See, T. Hunter, “Sustainable Socio-Economic Extraction of Australian Offshore Petroleum Resources through Legal 
Regulation: Is It Possible”, 29 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L. 209 (2011) [ 38 pages, 209 to 246] 




discovery of new fields and hydrocarbon resource renewal which in the long run serve the 
interests of sustainable use and sustainable consumption as articulated by Goal 12 of the SDGs. 
3.4. Equity, Petroleum Exploitation and How “the Polluter Pays”: The UK and 
Norwegian Approaches 
As previously argued in earlier chapters, equity in its inter or intra-generational dimensions, is 
a relevant tool to ensure proper distribution of responsibility for social disruptions and 
environmental harm incurred during petroleum exploitation. As also contended, the reduction 
of inequities and inequalities in the course of oil and gas exploitation envisages the use of 
pollution control mechanisms to ensure that the polluter effectively pays for polluting activity. 
Thus, costs of remediation from oil spills, emissions charges and carbon taxes come within this 
ambit for curtailing adverse environmental impacts accruing from petroleum exploitation. 
Moreover, these measures ensure that poverty is not exacerbated nor public health impaired as 
the case often is when the public bear the brunt of oil and gas pollution. This view also takes 
cognisance of the fact that, the poor often have minimal adaptive capacity towards climate 
change or its impacts and should be shielded from negative externalities arising from petroleum 
exploitation.  This subsection therefore assesses the regulatory parameters guiding the core 
areas of pollution prevention and efficient recycling in the petroleum regulations of the UK 
and Norway for actualising the aims of sustainable development in oil and gas operations. 
The UK and Norway in fulfilment of international agreements like the OSPAR, the Bonn 
Agreement for Cooperation in dealing with pollution of the North Sea by oil and other harmful 
substances 1983848 have, established pollution control regulations for the oil industry. 
Moreover, the EU Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 96/61/EC (IPPC 
                                                             
848 Within the Bonn Agreement (1983) area there are two further interstate agreements which set out provisions for a joint 
response by the Contracting States and also how state intervention may be utilised when one or the other’s interests are 
threatened. The instrument of accession entered into force on 1 April 2010. 
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Directive) was formally adopted on 24 September 1996 and applies to both the UK and 
Norway. The Directive requires Member States, as from 30 October 1997, to ensure that none 
of the installations listed in Annex I of the Directive (which includes oil refineries) operate 
without a permit issued in accordance with the Directive. Such permits are to be issued subject 
to conditions setting, emission limit values for all emissions into the environment based on the 
(BAT). The IPPC Directive has been enacted in the UK by the Pollution Prevention and Control 
Act 1999 (PPC Act). This Directive institutes the Integrated Pollution Control (IPC)849, IPPC850 
and Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO).851 In effect, these regulations empower 
regulatory agencies to enforce compliance, initiate immediate remediation of pollution and 
impose stiff sanctions for violations or unapproved discharges. There is also the imposition of 
strict liability for breach of regulations in both the UK and Norway852 and the operators are 
fully responsible for costs in the event of government intervention.853 
Similarly, in Norway, discharges of produced water, drill cuttings or chemical residues from 
drilling operations are governed through permits issued under the Pollution Control Act, by the 
                                                             
849 IPC developed out of the realisation that pollution control concentrated in any one environmental media, (water, air, soil, 
etc.) could often lead to damage in another media and that what was required was an integrated approach to pollution control 
that considered all media in order to minimise damage to the environment as a whole. The concept was first implemented in 
UK legislation with the entry into force of part I of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
850 IPPC has a wider ambit than IPC, including the consideration of waste reduction and recovery, energy efficiency, 
prevention of accidents and site restoration. IPPC also takes into account more environmental impacts than IPC and requires 
comprehensive information on which to base the permit conditions and limits. IPPC has now fully replaced IPC in the UK. 
851 The BPEO concept evolved from the recognition of the need for co-ordinated pollution control but with wider 
implications. The BPEO requires a systematic approach to decision taking in which the practicality of all reasonable options 
is examined and in which environmental impact constitutes the overriding factor in final decision making. 
852 See, Art. 7-3, para. 1 of Norway PA. The UK also imposed special rules for pollution caused by an offshore installation 
via the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement of 1975.  The OPOL Agreement was introduced as an interim measure 
during the negotiation phase of the Convention of Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from Exploration for 
and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources. 
853 The OPOL agreement thus goes into effect if any operator defaults on paying clean-up costs, with a current cap of 
US$120 million. The OPOL Agreement is a voluntary oil pollution compensation scheme that provides guarantees of 
payment for claims up to US$120 million for all members of OPOL to “provide an orderly means for compensating and 
reimbursing any Person who sustains Pollution Damage and any Public Authority which incurs costs for taking Remedial 
Measures as a result of a Discharge of Oil from any Offshore Facility.” Although membership in this organization is 
voluntary, however, it is a license requirement to either be a member or have the same liability coverage provided for by 




Norwegian Environment Agency.854 Likewise, oil and gas wastes, effluents and discharges 
require treatment and oftentimes necessitate deposition below the seabed as hazardous waste 
to avoid the liabilities imposed for oil pollution damage.855 The provisions in Chapter 7 of the 
Norway PAA are instructive on this point as they apply to liability for oil pollution damage 
(Art. 1-4, para. 6).  Pollution damage under the PAA also refers to “damage or loss caused by 
pollution because of effluence or discharge of petroleum from a facility, including a well, and 
costs of reasonable measures to avert or limit such damage or such loss, as well as damage or 
loss as a consequence of such measures” and “damage or loss incurred by fishermen as a 
consequence of reduced possibilities for fishing856”. It is also remarkable that Norway in the 
bid to minimise oil and gas pollution and in keeping with the OSPAR Convention established 
a zero-discharge target for hazardous substances released through petroleum activities in 
1997.857 This target has been achieved for chemical additives or releases. In Norway, just as in 
the UK, operators are strictly liable for dealing with acute pollution resulting from their own 
activities858 and must maintain appropriate levels of emergency preparedness and response.859 
Another significant area of interest regarding pollution control strategies and recycling in the 
oil and gas industry relates to decommissioning and the regulatory approaches adopted in both 
                                                             
854 The Norway Pollution Control Act (PCA) stipulates under Article 2, (Item 5) that efforts are to be made to prevent any 
occurrence or increase of pollution and to limit any pollution that does occur; that the costs of preventing or limiting 
pollution are to be met by the person responsible for the pollution….” 
855 Disposal of waste products is regulated by the Norwegian Pollution Act. The diverse types of waste must be classified 
and transported to the correct type of onshore waste disposal facility. Hazardous waste and industrial waste must be reported 
to the authorities. As the disposal of waste can cause pollution, the waste disposal facility must have a licence to receive 
waste products under Chapter 3 of the Pollution Act. The waste disposal facility must pay a fee to the Treasury to cover the 
costs related to procedures and control activities. 
856 See, Art. 7-1, para. 1), which also provides that ships used for stationary drilling are deemed a facility; ships that store 
petroleum in conjunction with production facilities are regarded as part of the facility, as are ships for transport of petroleum 
when loading from the facility results in pollution. (Art. 7-1, para. 2). 
857 Available at http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/petroleum-act/ Accessed at 26 February 2016 
858 Liability for pollution damage is governed by Chapter 7 of the Petroleum Act, which states that licensees are strictly 
liable for pollution damage, i.e. they are liable regardless of fault. 
859 Also, the Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO), which is owned by several operators and 
licensees on the NCS, also administers and maintains preparedness and response resources including personnel, equipment 
and vessels. NOFO has five bases along the coast, at Stavanger, Mongstad, Kristiansund, Træna and Hammerfest. In 
addition, NOFO equipment is permanently deployed on some fields. NOFO has a total of 16 offshore recovery systems and 




the UK and Norway to ensure sustainable development. The decommissioning of offshore oil 
and gas installations and pipelines on the UKCS and likewise the NCS is governed by the 
OSPAR Convention. Furthermore, the UK decommissioning process is regulated by the PA 
and the Energy Act 2008 as well as the Offshore Production and Pipelines (Assessment of 
Environmental Effects) Regulation 1999 as amended. The 1999 Regulations implemented the 
EC Directive 1997/11/EC on the assessment and effects of certain public and private activities 
on the environment.  The process usually commences with the service of a Section 29 notice 
to a licensee. The Secretary of State through DECC authorises a S.29 notice in accordance with 
the PA for the submission of a decommissioning programme.860 The DECC thus undertakes 
effective measures by the adoption of the S.29 and S.34 notice for a decommissioning 
programme to ensure that the public or taxpayer does not bear the burden or costs of such 
decommissioning projects.861  
The position in Norway is quite similar as the licensees must provide a decommissioning plan 
to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) before the cessation of petroleum activities.862 
The MPE has a wide discretionary power to decide what happens to the installations, facilities 
and pipelines after the end of petroleum activities, this can range from outright removal or 
recommendations for alternative use. The Norwegian state can also choose to take over the 
installations or facilities. The licensees and owners of the installation, facilities and pipelines 
ultimately bear the decommission costs and are jointly liable for damage or inconvenience 
caused by the decommissioning, regardless of fault, wilful misconduct or negligence. 
                                                             
860 A decommissioning programme sets out the measures to decommission disused installations and/or pipelines, and will 
describe in detail the work implications. Once the decommissioning programme is approved, following DECC's review of 
the details including the cost estimates, the section 29 notice-holders are legally obliged to carry it out on a joint and several 
liability bases. If a programme is not carried out or its conditions are not complied with, the Secretary of State may, by 
written notice, require remedial action to be taken. Failure to comply with any such notice is an offence and the Secretary of 
State can carry out the remedial action and recover the costs from the person to whom the notice was given.  
861 See Sections 29-34 UK Petroleum Act. 
862 Section 43 of the Norway PA relating to Decommissioning plan. “The decommissioning plan which is to be prepared 
pursuant to the Act section 5-1, shall consist of one part dealing with disposal and an impact assessment. The 
decommissioning plan may contain proposed disposal of several facilities. See also Ss.44-45 of Norway PA. 
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Basically, this regulation of decommissioning procedures is a crucial approach for ensuring 
sustainable development of the UK and Norwegian oil and gas industry. This is because it 
conforms with the paramount agenda of sustainable development on all pillars as it ensures not 
just the protection of the environment by guaranteeing proper means to prevent pollution from 
redundant oil and gas infrastructure or installations, it also goes a step further to safeguard 
economic growth by shielding government expenditures from unwarranted expenses. 
Ultimately this approach secures public protection as an equitable and social development 
imperative to prevent the general public from dealing with the dangers, nuisance, or 
inconvenience which may accrue from such abandoned facilities.  
Notwithstanding these forgoing safeguards in favour of the environment to ensure pollution 
controls in the oil industry operating on the NCS and UKCS, the major drawback with the UK 
offshore regulations is in its enforcement. Authors have argued that though the DECC is 
charged with oversight functions encompassing economic growth, environmental protection 
and social development of the petroleum industry, its primary focus remains economic 
growth.863 The DECC’s bid to encourage prompt exploitation of the petroleum resources for 
national economic gains via the issuance of petroleum licenses with limited time-frames, has 
also been fraught with conflict of interests as environmental protection concerns are sometimes 
relegated in favour of economic objectives.864 Furthermore, the DECC made only very few 
prosecutions in breach of the 1971 “Prevention of Oil Pollution Act”.865 The DECC has also 
                                                             
863 See, Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, “Environmental Regulation of The UK Offshore Oil And Gas Industry” Journal OF 
Energy & Natural Resources Law Vol 18 No 3 2000 
864 See the first subsection relating to the overview of the Petroleum industry, the UK petroleum licences and PEDLs  
865 Jeremy, Rowan-Robinson, (id) It was noted that in the first 30 years of oil and gas operations on the UKCS there were 




been criticized for employing insufficient inspectors to oversee offshore installations and 
operations.866 
 Moreover, to enforce these inspections they tend to be reliant on the offshore oil operators for 
transport to such facilities as they are usually difficult to access. This dependence for access 
impinges on the possibility of unannounced visits or spot checks and affects the quality of 
regulation and inspection. Although there have been marked improvements through increased 
aerial surveillance to monitor oil spill contingency planning867, there is however a heavy 
reliance on the oil industry to monitor itself and voluntarily make reports for accidental 
discharges, or the level of oil concentrations in produced water as well as spill incidents.868 
Such a subjective approach to monitoring is likely to be counterproductive as it impacts directly 
on the adequacy of control measures to enforce environmental protection and sustainable 
development of the UK oil industry.869   
3.4.1. Green Taxes and Tariffs in the UK and Norwegian Petroleum laws  
Having considered the importance of green taxes and accounting measures as core tools of 
optimizing equity to minimize polluting behaviour and restrain consumption patterns that 
escalate carbon impact on the environment in Chapter 1, this section deals with the regulatory 
provisions available in the UK and Norwegian oil and gas provisions which target green taxes 
                                                             
866 See the Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1988, SI 1988 No 1213, Sched 4, model clause 23(9). 11 
Marine Conservation Society, Press Release 'Government "oil rigs watchdog" is toothless, blind and lame', 21 October 1996. 
Department of Trade and Industry, Energy Report (1998), para 4.19. 4 Ibid, para 4.17. Considering that there were some 220 
fixed and floating platforms in the North Sea. It was claimed that from 1990-1994 there was only one inspector. Although 
the number of inspectors subsequently rose to eight, it still reflects a lack of adequate supervisory personnel 
867 See, Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, “Environmental Regulation Of The UK Offshore Oil And Gas Industry” Journal OF 
Energy & Natural Resources Law Vol 18 No 3 2000 “During 1997, over 300 hours of flying time were spent on 55 
'dedicated' rig patrols” 
868 See, G Picton-Turbervill, 'Decommissioning of Offshore Installations: The Legal Aspects' [1998] OGLTR 221. 
869 The PEDLs or petroleum licenses constitute the principal mechanisms of environmental control. Also, the model clauses 
provide for direct action and/or revocation in the event of default. However, the DECC faces a challenge in imposing 
sanctions. This is because, Revocation or the “threat thereof” of the petroleum license, though possible as an economic 
sanction, which could prove effective, merely revoking a licence for any spill incident would unfortunately raise serious 




or carbon taxes870 and other environmental protection levies.871 Essentially, the UK and 
Norway have instituted various instruments to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Norway for 
instance has the carbon tax872 and the Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Act.873 These are 
Norway’s most important cross-sectoral climate policy instruments for cost-effective cuts in 
greenhouse gas emissions.874 Both instruments apply to the petroleum industry, while other 
sectors either must take part in emissions trading or pay the carbon tax.875 Similarly, the UK 
and Norway via EU and EEA obligations conform to the EC Directive relating to the 
EUETS.876 More so, this directive in accordance with climate action indicators for goal 13 of 
the SDGs, stipulates obligations on reporting of emissions whilst imposing penalties for 
carrying out unauthorised activities, under-reporting or failure to report emissions prior to 
2013. The EUETS thus amends the Green House Gas Trading Regulations Scheme of 2005.  
Moreover, there remains the climate change levy (CCL) in the UK.877 It is an environmental 
tax on downstream activities and is chargeable on taxable supplies of taxable commodities, 
                                                             
870 A carbon tax is a tax levied on the carbon content of fuels. It is a form of carbon pricing. Carbon taxes offer a potentially 
cost-effective means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. See, I. Bashmakov, et al.  "6.2.2.2.1 Collection Point and Tax 
Base". In B. Metz; et al. Policies, Measures, and Instruments. Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Contribution of Working 
Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK, and New York, N.Y., U.S.A, 2001. 
871 P. Hoeller, and M. Wallin, OECD Economic Studies No. 17, Autumn, 1991. Energy Prices, Taxes and Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions (PDF). OECD website. (1991) Staudt, A.; et al. (2008). "Understanding and Responding to Climate Change" 
(PDF). U.S. National Academy of Sciences. 
872Norway was one of the first countries to impose a carbon tax in 1991. This is levied on all combustion of gas, oil and 
diesel in petroleum operations on the continental shelf and on releases of CO2 and natural gas, in accordance with the CO2 
Tax Act on Petroleum Activities. 
873See the Norwegian ETS 2005-2007 which applies to CO2 emissions, covers 51 installations accountable for 10-15 % of 
total GHG emissions, includes industry (energy facilities above 20 MW, refineries and some others). 
874 Norway is a member of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), also known as the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme. EUETS is the world’s largest trading scheme and was launched in 2005 to fight Global 
warming. See also, Denny A. Ellerman, B.K. Buchner, "The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, 
Allocation, and Early Results". Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 1 (January 2007 (1): 66–87.) 
doi:10.1093/reep/rem003.  
875Norway’s CO2 tax started at a high rate of US$51 per tonne of CO2 on gasoline, with an average tax of US$21 per tonne. 
It is also claimed to be the highest amongst OECD member states. See, Annegrete Bruvoll; Bodil Merethe Larsen, 
"Greenhouse gas emissions in Norway Do carbon taxes work?" (2002) (PDF).  Statistics Norway, Research Department. p. 
28. OECD (1998). 
876Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:122:0001:0059:EN:PDF  2 Directive 2009/29/EC  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:EN:PDF     
877The Climate Change Levy (CCL) is a tax on energy delivered to non-domestic users in the United Kingdom. Its aim is to 
provide an incentive to increase energy efficiency and to reduce carbon emissions. It was introduced on 1 April 2001 under 
the Finance Act of 2000. 
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which are supplies of commodities used as fuels for lighting, heating and power by business 
consumers. The applicable areas or taxable commodities include: electricity, natural gas as 
supplied by a gas utility, petroleum and hydrocarbon gas in a liquid state (including LPG) and 
solid fuels. In a nutshell, the adoption of these strategies in the UK and Norwegian petroleum 
regulations appear as cost effective measures to curb carbon externalities on the environment 
and reduce emissions for the benefit of sustainable development in these jurisdictions. 
 
3.4.2. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Any lessons from the UK and Norway? 
As initially argued in the previous chapters, equity, specifically denoted by inter-generational 
equity forms a fundamental objective of sustainable development to preserve the opportunities 
and options of future generations. Whereas, oil funds or petroleum based sovereign wealth 
funds form crucial tools of engendering equity in petroleum wealth distribution across 
generations. This subsection therefore considers the UK and Norwegian petroleum rules to 
identify equity’s influence via sovereign wealth funds.  
Norway’s Government Pension Fund or oil fund was established in 1990.878 This was in line 
with the Storting or parliamentary decision to counteract the impact of the fall in oil prices and 
stabilize the economic effects of oil price fluctuations.879 Norway’s fund constitutes a re-
investment of portions of the large surplus generated by the Norwegian petroleum sector.880 
This is mostly created from taxes on oil companies, but also involves funds generated from oil 
                                                             
878 The Government Pension Fund (Norwegian: Statens pensjonsfond Utland, SPU) is a fund into which the surplus wealth 
produced by Norwegian petroleum income is deposited. The fund was renamed in January 2006 from “Petroleum Fund of 
Norway”. 
879 Norway’s Oil Fund attracts the surplus wealth produced by Norwegian petroleum income. As of the valuation in June 
2011, it was the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world. 
880 Since 1998 the fund has been allowed to invest up to 40 percent of its portfolio in the international stock market. In June 
2009, the ministry decided to raise the stock portion to 60 percent. In May 2014, the Central bank Governor proposed raising 
the rate to 70 percent. See also, Mohsin, Saleha (7 May 2014). "Norway Wealth Fund Wins Labor Backing to Buy New 




exploration licenses and Norway’s direct financial interest accruing from dividends in the 
partly state-owned subsidiary Statoil.881 Norway succeeded in securing current revenues from 
the petroleum sector which it estimated to be at its peak period since 2004882 to save it from 
the impacts of decline in future decades.883  
Quite unlike Norway, the UK is yet to establish a pension fund or sovereign wealth fund from 
hydrocarbon resources.884 Even though there has been some speculation about the possibility 
of instituting a pension fund from the exploitation of shale gas, that situation is yet to 
materialize.885 Notwithstanding, on this issue of the preservation of the interests of succeeding 
generations via sovereign wealth funds from oil revenues, Norway proves to be far ahead of its 
oil exploiting contemporaries on the North Sea. This includes the UK that has no substantive 
wealth fund from hydrocarbon resources.886 Consequently, such absence of petroleum 
generated wealth funds in furtherance of the equity indicator of sustainable development places 
the UK on less than equal footing in comparison with Norway. Norway’s petroleum industry 
thus reflects a more sustainability engendered approach for the benefit of future generations. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter accomplishes a comparative assessment of the petroleum regulatory regime of the 
UK and Norway. Notwithstanding their disparate jurisdictional backgrounds, the outcome of 
                                                             
881 As of 29 January 2016 its total value was NOK 6.974 trillion ($802.6 billion), holding one percent of global equity 
markets. With 1.78 percent of European stocks, it is also claimed to be the largest stock owner in Europe 
882 See, http://www.mining.com/web/peak-oil-impacting-norwegian-and-saudi-2013-production/  Accessed at 13 June 2016. 
Norway's petroleum production peaked in 2004 at 4.54 million bpd, but by 2011 production had fallen to 3.8 million bpd. 
According to the Oljedirektoratet (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate), in 2012 companies operating in Norwegian waters 
made 14 discoveries totalling 709 million barrels of oil. 
883 http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ accessed at 09/03/2015 
884 Available at; http://www.spectator.co.uk/2008/04/why-hasnt-britain-got-a-sovereign-wealth-fund/ Accessed at 28 
February 2016  
885 Available at; http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/10/uk-proposes-shale-gas-sovereign-wealth-fund 




this comparison indicates that, the evolving pattern in the oil and gas regulations of both 
economies is that which is geared towards the achievement of a sustainable oil and gas industry 
in accordance with the three-pillar paradigm of sustainable development. This chapter 
realistically demonstrates that such sustainability prone regulatory objectives are due to the 
considerable points of commonality in both oil and gas regimes. This nexus includes 
international law and EU law pertaining to the oil and gas industry, which expedite sustainable 
development of hydrocarbon resources and a green economy. Indeed, the substantial influence 
of international law successfully obliterates gaps that could have arisen from jurisdictional 
differences between both states.  
Ultimately, the chapter finds that a core point of commonality between both the UK and 
Norway that has been fundamental to achieving sustainable development of their petroleum 
industries remains the optimization of goals 16 and 17 of the SDGs relating to multi-
stakeholder participation. Clearly, both states succeed in operationalizing this integral aspect 
of the SDGS by co-opting national and regional collaboration, inclusive societies and ensuring 
international platforms and partnerships as essential means of implementing sustainable 
development.  This is evident from both jurisdictions plethora of environmental and social 
partnerships, ranging from the Public Participation Directive (PPD) Arhus Convention, SEA 
collaborations as directed by the Kyiv Protocol, the OSPAR, including pollutions controls 
partnerships like the UNECE-LRTAP, the Montreal Protocols, the Kyoto Protocol, OPOL 
pollutions liability agreements, including the EUETS carbon trading schemes. All of these 
agreements and collaborations have served to optimize reporting and compliance mechanisms 
which remain essential indicators of goal 17 towards achieving sustainable development.887 
                                                             
887 See Goal 17, Indicator, 17.16.1 of the Sustainable Development Goals.  
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Another crucial factor of success evidenced by both jurisdictions remains the elevated level of 
innovation and dynamism employed in tackling all three pillars of the sustainable development 
paradigm. These serve to engender growth and multifarious synergies across the SDGs for oil 
industry sustainability. This is manifest in the progression of partnerships that initially tackled 
a single environment media for protection such as the EU Pollutions Control Directive, which 
evolved into the Integrated Pollutions Control Directive, (IPC) and eventually expanded into 
the EU Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC Directive) to anticipate 
and accommodate all environment media in the fight against pollution. Such dynamic and 
innovative approaches adopted by the UK and Norway evidently serve as the essential launch-
pads for securing a green economy in the context of sustainable development. 
In a nut shell, this assessment evokes the deduction that, regardless of jurisdictional 
backgrounds, regulatory parameters within the oil and gas industry can be positively impacted 
by international instruments to achieve sustainable development in states. This is especially 
valid when dynamic and nuanced approaches are adopted to accommodate the evolutive nature 
of sustainable development. This therefore forms a basis for the proceeding chapter, which 
advocates lessons and approaches for the Nigerian oil and gas regulatory regime to actualize 









Sustainable Development Goals and Petroleum Exploitation in Nigeria: Harmonizing 
Regulations or Policies from the UK, Norway and International Law 
Introduction 
Having deliberated on the considerable influence of regulatory and policy approaches to trigger 
successes or challenges in an industry as complex and multifaceted as the petroleum industry, 
this chapter pinpoints the areas where the SDGs, including regulatory inputs from the UK, 
Norway and international law can optimize a green oil industry in Nigeria. Consequently, this 
chapter advocates the infusion of sustainability tenets evident from the UK and Norwegian 
jurisdictions. The envisaged harmonization therefore targets all three pillars of the sustainable 
development paradigm to enable a green petroleum industry in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, this chapter expounds on realistic measures for the improvement of Nigerian 
petroleum regulations in consonance with the sustainable development tools identified in this 
thesis. These tools as introduced in the first chapter, set out the conceptual or regulatory 
framework for operationalizing sustainable development during petroleum exploitation, whilst 
catalysing viable synergies for sustainable development instead of recurrent trade-offs. 
Similarly, chapter 2 buttresses the sustainable development discourse in the Nigerian oil 
industry by clarifying the points of similarity and divergence with the SDGs. Chapter 2 further 
highlights the integral weaknesses in the Nigerian petroleum regulations in terms of the 
identified tools for measuring and implementing sustainable development in oil producing 
states.888 Whereas, chapter 3 articulates the dynamic and innovative approaches adopted by the 
                                                             





British and Norwegian oil regulations towards bridging the gap between petroleum exploitation 
and the achievement of sustainable development goals.889 
Accordingly, this fourth chapter considers the viability of infusing foreign oil and gas 
regulatory approaches into the Nigerian rules and proposes legal transfers, transpositions or 
legal transplantation for fulfilling these aims in a developing petro-state like Nigeria. This 
chapter also examines how this legal transfer option can surmount the pervading challenges 
evident in the Nigerian political, economic, industrial and social climate to guarantee desired 
outcomes and achieve sustainable development. Moreover, the idea of legal transplants,890 
legal fusion, or legal transpositions891 as a feasible means of triggering law reforms in states is 
not exactly novel as authors argue that many jurisdictions have mixed legal systems which 
often reflect the migration of law from diverse sources.892 Such migration of law has 
subsequently served to engender legal reforms provoked through seepage, imitation, 
inspiration, reception or imposed reception of the desired legal ideas.  
Notwithstanding criticisms of the idea of legal transplants as posited by Legrande, who stressed 
that legal transplants are impossible,893 Orucu contends, likewise this thesis, that law does 
indeed move, connect, disconnect, change, and contribute to change.894 This is mostly because 
the movement of legal institutions and ideas is trans-border and forms an essential part of legal 
development.895 Consequently, this chapter purports that, the further development of Nigerian 
                                                             
889 See, Chapter 3, Sustainable Development, Petroleum Law and Policy of Other Jurisdictions: Salient Contributions from 
the UK and Norway 
890 See, Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974). 
891 Esin Orucu, Law as Transposition 206 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, R. Sacco, 'Legal Formants: A 
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment H1 of II)' (1991) 39"Am J Comp Law, 395. 
892Esin Orucu, Law as Transposition 206 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, R. Sacco, 'Legal Formants: A 
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment H1 of II)' (1991) 39"Am J Comp Law, 395. See also, Esin. Orucu, The 
Judge and Jurist in Scotland: On the Verge of a Second Renaissance {2003] A Second Renaissance In Scotland 91 
893 P Legrand, 'The Impossibility of Legal Transplants' (1998) 4 MJ, 111 
894 Esin Orucu, “Law as Transposition” 206 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, R. Sacco, 'Legal Formants: A 
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment H1 of II)' (1991) 39"Am J Comp Law, 395. 
895 See E. Orucu, Ibid. Also, Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard say, 'The existing formal legal order in most countries around 
the world was shaped by transplanting formal legal systems that have evolved in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 




petroleum laws to ensure alignment with sustainable development objectives can greatly 
benefit from the transmigration of ideas, rules or institutions, including partnerships for 
sustainable development. This lends credence to the general axiom that the amount of 
innovation in law is small, therefore borrowing and imitation is pivotal for legal change. 
However, legal change is crucially contingent upon a proper consideration or assessment of the 
special needs, circumstances or regulatory requirements of the receiving state to ensure a 
coordinated integration, as a ‘one-size fits all’ model of legal configuration is hardly plausible. 
Moreover, the proposition for the transposing or infusing of Nigerian rules with UK inspired 
petroleum regulations is predicated on the fact that, the Nigerian legal system is already 
significantly influenced by the UK Common law due to its colonial origins. Thus, this 
transposition can benefit from the existent platforms to circumvent intractable challenges. 
Certainly, the Nigerian regulatory framework is a product of directly imposed legal rules or a 
reception of transfers comprising the English common law, doctrines of equity and Statutes of 
General application.896 Similarly, most of the petroleum regulatory provisions are directly 
inspired or even borrowed from corresponding English statutes. These already established 
structures need not be discarded but can instead be bolstered to expedite the SDGs via the 
reception of contemporary, foreign petroleum rules of the UK and Norway to green oil 
exploitation or trigger better synergies for sustainable development in Nigeria. 
Likewise, this legal heritage further entrenches the desirability and viability of transforming 
the Nigerian oil and gas legal framework via elements of sustainable development incorporated 
in international legal instruments. This is crucial for Nigeria to not only optimize urgent oil 
sector reforms but also to achieve the SDGs. Whilst it is pertinent to acknowledge the 
                                                             
Pistor and J-F Richard, 'Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect', Law and Development Paper No 1, 
CID Working Paper No 39, Mar 2000, Center for International Development at Harvard University at [ICLQ vol 51, April 
2002 pp 205-223] 
896 See previous discussions in chapter 2, on the Overview of the Nigerian Regulatory Framework 
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uniqueness of every legal system and jurisdiction due to specific peculiarities like cultural, 
social, economic, geographical, political or even religious differences which ultimately 
influence the outcomes or effectiveness of transplanted or imported rules within a legal 
system,897 it is however submitted that, sustainable development remains a dynamic and at the 
same time, a malleable concept. Consequently, it accommodates and requires innovative 
approaches which can be reproducible in countries, including developing states. Nonetheless, 
such replication ought to be tailored to country specific contexts via intervention of law and 
policy as advocated in this research.  
Albeit, this chapter will provide recommendations targeted at driving the sustainable 
development agenda in the Nigerian petroleum industry. The chapter also notes the potential 
role of law “enforcers”898 to fine tune the foreign rules with the realities of the Nigerian oil 
industry to achieve a smooth transmission and reception of reforms that can expedite 
sustainable development goals in the Nigerian context. More importantly, such tuning is reliant 
on taking cognizance of the likely challenges that could impact on the outcomes of the imported 
rules. Thus, the tripartite areas targeted for reforms to guarantee cohesion of the mix of 
Nigerian and foreign rules to achieve sustainable development objectives include: 
environmental protection regulations, economic growth regulations and social development 
regulations.  
Another requisite factor strenuously advocated in this research, as it represents a bulwark for 
the 3 mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development is the issue of sustainable 
governance. This is because sustainable governance of the oil industry remains a game-
                                                             
897 For an analysis of mixed systems see Esin Orucu, “A Theoretical Framework for Trans-Frontier Mobility of Law”, in 
Trans frontier Mobility of Law 5, 7-16 (R. Jagtenberg et al. eds., 1995); Esin Orucu, Mixed and Mixing Systems. - A 
Conceptual Search, in Studies on Legal Systems: Mixed and Mixing 335, 345 (Esin Orucu et al. eds., 1996). 
898 Ibid. Such law enforcers or translators include: industry regulators, law interpreters such as judges, jurists, law teachers, 
and in this research, partners for sustainable development such as NGOs, civil society or international finance and 
development agencies, etc. 
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changer, fully capable of making or marring oil industry reforms to actualize the SDGs. 
Similarly, a crucial ancillary component to optimize governance, includes, embracing multi-
stakeholder partnerships and international collaboration. This is strongly advocated in the 
research as a vehicle to efficiently drive the sustainable development agenda. More 
importantly, these proposed partnerships are considered in terms of their efficacy on both a 
national, regional and globalized scale to engender sustainable governance of the oil industry 
and simultaneously forge synergies across the broad spectrum of sustainable development 
goals to achieve designated targets in an oil industry context. 
Thus, the chapter commences with a discussion of the envisaged reforms targeting Nigerian oil 
industry governance. These reforms embrace the challenges in the Nigerian oil industry 
traversing: regulatory upgrades, corruption controls, compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms, whilst recommending multi-stakeholder and international partnerships as vital 
catalysts or agents for the desired restructuring. The chapter thereafter discusses specific 
reforms that can optimally align petroleum exploitation in Nigeria with sustainable 
development objectives via: strengthening of the environmental and social development 
regulations, including the efficacy of technological innovation in achieving the SDGs. The 
chapter also assesses reforms towards the sustainable use of petroleum resources in Nigeria 
and appraises how equity can be reinforced in the Nigerian oil industry via the polluter pays 
principle and the optimization of sovereign wealth funds. 
 
4.1. Sustainable Development and Governance of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry: Any 
Room for International Partnerships? 
In accordance with earlier deliberations regarding the exigency of regulatory and governance 
reforms in Nigeria for securing sustainable development in the oil industry, this section further 
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amplifies international alliances for oil industry governance. The section thus appraises the 
utility of such international collaboration in tackling governance challenges in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry. Indeed, to fulfil these aims, this section evaluates the extent if any, that, 
International partnerships for sustainable development, including multi-stakeholder 
collaboration typified by international organisations for combatting corruption can expedite 
sustainable oil industry governance in Nigeria. 
4.1.1. Oil Industry Governance in Nigeria: Tackling Corruption Via International and 
Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration 
Preceding arguments posited sustainable governance and corruption controls as 
incontrovertible elements and facilitators of sustainable development. This subsection recaps 
earlier issues relating to oil sector corruption and irregularities in the Nigerian petroleum 
industry with a view to proffering feasible solutions for sustainable development in Nigeria. 
Evidently, the genesis of endemic corruption in the Nigerian oil industry flows from the 
innately complex character of the global petroleum industry. More so, the industry is extremely 
financially liquid, generating humongous revenues, whilst affording multifarious interactions 
between government officials and investors.899  
Furthermore, the oil sector in Nigeria as administered by the NNPC is supremely opaque, 
affording excessive covert and overt discretionary powers to the Minister and other public 
officers, thus aggravating an already convoluted situation. Also, petroleum or crude commodity 
is subject to substantial price volatility, reliant on sophisticated price mechanisms, including 
varied conversion ratios, hence accommodating hordes of cases of mammoth scale corruption. 
These cases accruing from the sector encompass global financial and crude commodity flows, 
cutting across agents and actors with multiple jurisdictions, rendering tracking of highly 
                                                             
899 See, Chapter 2 on the Governance challenges in the Nigerian oil Industry. 
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complex, covert or fraudulent transactions, problematic. The foregoing substantiates why, the 
capacity of Nigeria as a developing state, with undue petroleum reliance and weak institutions, 
to single-handedly curb such global scale corruption obtainable in the petroleum sector seems 
highly improbable. 
Consequently, it is argued that, oil industry sustainability and governance in Nigeria can be 
reinforced via the competence of international partnerships and multi-stakeholder engagement. 
This position is similarly re-iterated by the UN, in the 2004 UN Convention Against 
Corruption,900 the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention901 and particularly Goals 16 and 17 of the 
SDGs, which stress the importance of engendering transparent and sustainable governance, 
especially in developing states via international partnerships. This is obviously predicated on 
the fact that, erstwhile efforts at solutions to corruption controls in developing states, that 
wholly relied on such states with poor governance institutions to resolve their governance 
challenges have been futile. In this vein, it has been argued that, “[A]ny putative remedies to 
petroleum sector corruption that focus their attention solely, or even primarily, on the 
developing world are destined to fail”.902 This observation is mostly hinged on technical, 
capacity and governance limitations experienced by developing states. 
Furthermore, the OECD in proposing a global approach towards tackling corruption, identifies 
the necessity of exposing areas and tools of illicit cash flows, whilst paying requisite attention 
to both supply (the IOCs) and demand (public official) sides of oil industry corruption, 
nationally and internationally.903 It is in deciphering or decrypting these shady areas that the 
                                                             
900 See, Cap.1. Art. 1(b) General Assembly resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003 United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. 
901 See, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(1999). 
902 Longchamp, Olivier, and Nathalie Perrot. "Trading in corruption: Evidence and mitigation measures for corruption in the 
trading of oil and minerals." U4 Issue (2017). 
903 See, 2016 Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention Special focus on International Co-operation. Available 
at; https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Anti-Bribery-Convention-Enforcement-Data-2016.pdf See also, OECD 




EITI as an international partnership, becomes relevant through engendering petroleum sector 
transparency affecting all areas of the oil industry value-chain comprising: Petroleum Contracts 
and Licensing, Revenue in-flows and out-flows, Petroleum Accounting, Taxation, Budgeting 
and Procurements, including Expenditures on development goods or projects. 
4.1.1.1. Governance Reforms and Corruption Controls: Securing the Nigerian Oil 
Industry Value Chain for Sustainable Economic Growth 
As already stressed, oversight and accountability along the petroleum industry value chain 
remains crucial to the achieving of sustainable development in Nigeria. In a further bid to 
achieve the aims of sustainable governance of the Nigerian oil industry, the government 
proposed the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). The draft reform Bill proposes transparency and 
elimination of discretionary contracts awards and license allocations which the current PA 
engenders via excessive petroleum ministry fiat.904 In other words, steps towards passage of 
the over-protracted Bill into Law should be expedited as a core step in the reforms process. 
The Petroleum Industry Bill which has lagged over 10 years since its proposal via the Oil and 
Gas Reform Implementation Committee (OGIC) in 2008, has been mostly stalled by political 
controversies with the Nigerian parliament needlessly prevaricating over its passage.905  
The Bill essentially seeks to repeal the extant Petroleum Act to enhance regulation and efficient 
management of the oil and gas sector. The Bill thus targets principal areas of the industry 
affecting governance of oil exploration, exploitation and production including, awards of 
petroleum contracts.906 Moreover, considering that the earlier identified challenges 
experienced in the Nigerian petroleum industry, especially regarding the awards of acreages 
                                                             
904 See, S. 2, of the Petroleum Act (PA), Chapter 2 on Economic and Corruption Challenges 
905 The reform was instigated under the President Obasanjo administration in 2000. See, Awele Okigbo, “Nigeria: Petroleum 
Industry Bill History, Objectives, Institutions, and Controversies” Nextier Advisory Policy Brief. 2012. 
906 Awele Okigbo, “Nigeria: Petroleum Industry Bill History, Objectives, Institutions, and Controversies” Nextier Advisory 
Policy Brief. 2012 
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constitute fall-outs from the influence of earlier military dictatorships and inept civilian 
governments since the inception of petroleum exploitation in Nigeria, reforms towards 
wresting control of the oil industry from governmental and political dominance would be most 
welcome. As obviously, such reforms would produce the platforms for the operation of free 
and transparent processes across the petroleum industry value chain for sustainable 
development. 
Evidently, the idea of Contracts and Licensing reforms in the oil sector is not new, as the 
examples from Angola, Brazil and even Indonesia, show that the Nigerian oil industry has 
everything to gain from actively and sincerely implementing oil industry reforms.  However, a 
major constraint is that, Nigeria requires capacity development in securing these reforms to 
engender sustainable development. Thus, technical affiliations with international partners to 
optimize bid rounds, promote international best practice and select the most profitable contracts 
from bidders would be a right step towards achieving core improvements in oil industry 
productivity and economic growth. Likewise, in the bid to improve licensing rounds, Nigeria 
can undertake a multi-stakeholder participation approach, including co-opting other producing 
states participants such as the USA, UK, Norway, Brazil and even Indonesia907 with emerging 
economy status, to observe and share ideas on practical steps towards optimizing information 
technology and technical capacity for improving transparency of bid rounds. This also 
engenders goal 17, towards international partnerships in sustainable governance of the oil 
industry.  
 
                                                             
907 Apparently, Indonesia has likewise experienced struggles with political and cultural influence in its industry, including 
corruption and transparency in its oil industry. However, it has begun to secure better EITI rankings of its oil industry. 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/113978/corruption-scandal-shakes-indonesias-oil-and-gas-
industry  See, Stop talk of KKN Archived 26 October 2014 at the Way-back Machine.. The Jakarta Post (24 August 2001). 
Robin Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power Within Islam and Politics in Indonesia, Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2009, ISBN 9812308768, page 111 
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i. Petroleum Contracts and Licenses Transparency 
As previously highlighted, petroleum contracts and licensing transparency remain vital arms 
of corruption prevention in the oil industry. The NNPC as a state owned or national oil 
company oversees the upstream and downstream sectors of the oil industry, with full autonomy 
over contracts authorization. More so, the significant level of bureaucratic bottlenecks, 
ineptitude and opacity evident in conducting business in a developing petro-state like Nigeria, 
fosters considerable time and over-head costs. This is inimical to economic growth objectives 
and discouraging to potential investors. 
Erstwhile Nigerian efforts at tackling and improving petroleum licensing and contracts 
procedures, resulted in the NNPC’s creation of an electronic portal and database system 
NIPEX.908 NIPEX aims to modernize and engender a more transparent bids and procurements 
process in the oil sector. However, challenges still abound as the process remains obscure. 
Investors and contractors are still unable to self-monitor the process and report irregularities.909 
Thus, funding and capacity training towards system upgrades, to guarantee a more transparent 
and functional NIPEX electronic portal to international standards is essential. Similarly, 
investments quotations and bidding thresholds can be reviewed upwards to unclog approval 
process bottlenecks. This can help in fast-tracking approvals processes and reflect durations 
consistent with global industry average of 6-9 months, as also obtainable in the UK and 
Norway, instead of the 24 months average prevalent in Nigeria. More importantly, such 
measures would lessen undue third-party go-betweens and bureaucratic interference to 
engender efficient bids reviews whilst cutting avenues for bribery and corruption. 
                                                             
908 The Nigerian Petroleum Exchange (NIPEX) is a Division of NAPIMS, a Corporate Service Unit of NNPC. NIPEX is 
supposed to be an electronic one-stop transaction centre to improve on value procurement in the oil and gas industry whilst 
endeavouring world-class contracting processes in Nigeria.  
909 See, Alexandra Gillies, “Reforming Corruption Out of Nigerian Oil? Part Two: Progress and Prospects” U4 Brief, 2009.  




ii. Petroleum Industry and Public Procurements Transparency 
Nigeria has also made some efforts towards effecting reforms and resolving procurement 
challenges by enacting the Public Procurement Act of 2007. The objectives of the Act include:  
monitoring and oversight of public procurement, harmonizing the existing government policies 
and practices by regulating standards, including, developing the legal framework and 
professional capacity for public procurement in Nigeria and for related matters.910 More so, the 
Act seeks to stream line public procurements by means of improving technical support and 
transparency. In furtherance of these aims, a Due Process office was established to eliminate 
corrupt practices and irregularities. These included: over-invoicing, awards for non-existent 
contracts, diversion of public funds and non-performance of awarded contracts.911 These areas 
were broadly targeted by establishing procurement boards in relevant government agencies and 
parastatals to optimize monitoring and reporting of procurements, in a bid to secure compliance 
with the objectives of the Public Procurement Act. 
Even though the Due Process offices and Procurement boards apparently registered some 
successes at eliminating “ghost contracts”, non-existent or bloated contracts in several 
government agencies, the oil industry still requires more concerted efforts to engender process 
transparency. Thus, Reforms towards better funding, equipping and training of due process 
officers to tackle corruption, decrypt covert procurements processes or transactions in the 
NNPC to improve transparency is required. 
iii. Petroleum Revenues Transparency 
Nigeria’s efforts to improve petroleum revenues transparency comprising: revenue in-flows 
(government’s oil incomes) and expenditure resulted in the establishment of the Nigerian 
Extractives Industries Transparency (NEITI) Act of 2007. This partnership with the EITI 
                                                             
910 See, Public Procurement Act, (2007) ACT No. 14 
911 Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi, and Philip Osafo-Kwaako. "Nigeria's economic reforms: Progress and challenges." (2007). 
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entailed that Nigeria was obliged to publish petroleum revenues and expenditures annually. At 
its inception, NEITI covered huge gaps by a multi-stakeholder collaboration of experts, civil 
society, corporate and government agents and unearthed several financial irregularities via its 
audit spanning 1999-2004. However, post the President Obasanjo administration that initiated 
and fully supported the NEITI, the agency has been inactive, with its inertia resulting in 
sporadic audit reports. This could be attributable to a lack of funding and technical capacity, 
heightened by the severely opaque Nigerian oil industry that they must contend with. 
Nevertheless, a resuscitated NEITI wields a lot of potential for sustainable development in 
Nigeria and indeed the oil and gas sector. More so, current global realities regarding sustainable 
development of the oil sector envisages service delivery that is widely and easily accessible. 
NEITI requires considerable funding and capacity development to achieve world class and 
authentic oil sector audits. This can serve to improve public access to petroleum revenue data, 
engender quality debates and more accountability to block lee-ways or avenues for corruption 
in the oil sector. However, this initiative appears susceptible to the political will of respective 
government administrations, as the compradors or persons with vested interests in preserving 
a weakened or comatose NEITI may be the bane of such a brilliant initiative. Reason being 
that, the fight against corruption often seals off the sources of patronage enjoyed by the 
powerful beneficiaries or cabals of power in the Nigerian oil industry and would most likely 
be resisted.912 
 
                                                             
912 See, former President Goodluck Jonathan’s claim of a cabal that was accountable for the loss of 1.4 Trillion Naira Oil 
subsidy funds that should have benefited the poor Nigerian masses. Available at: 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/3205-jonathan_defends_oil_industry_cabal_says_they_re_good_guys.html See 






iv. Petroleum Revenues: Taxation Reforms 
Earlier discussions regarding the pivotal roles of tax and fiscal regulations in the Nigerian oil 
industry to expedite economic growth objectives for sustainable development involved the 
Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA).913 It is herein clarified that the purpose of tax mechanisms 
raised in this sub-section is not to exhaustively assess all taxation matters affecting oil and gas 
business in Nigeria or the PPTA, as that would greatly exceed the scope or objectives of this 
research topic. However, the Petroleum Act (PA) and the Petroleum Profit Tax Act (PPTA) 
were addressed to determine their capability to promote economic growth of the petroleum 
industry via its capacity to eliminate petroleum resource dependence (petro-curse 
phenomenon)914, engender GDP growth and stimulate expansion of other sectors of the 
economy.  
 
Albeit both regulations, the PA and PPTA were observed to have performed poorly in securing 
the stated objectives.915 Accordingly, it is posited that, the PPTA which fails to optimize 
Nigeria’s revenue generation potential through efficient petroleum taxation and pricing 
mechanisms requires alterations to effectively achieve the aims of goal 8 of the SDGs affecting 
sustainable economic growth of the oil industry. Instituting tax reforms to provide sufficient 
safeguards and prevent tax evasion constitutes a key step towards achieving goal 8 and 
economic sustainability. Evidently, tax evasion is an intricate or complex issue directly 
affecting policy making and it is not the purpose of this section to undertake a lengthy 
examination. However, because of the interlinkages between taxation and economic growth in 
the oil industry, including, the high positive impacts it bears on GDP, |Nigeria needs to make 
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regulatory adjustments that will eliminate opportunities for tax evasion. Reason being that, tax 
evasion ultimately triggers undue petroleum resource dependence or rentier state problems.916  
 
Moreover, it is quite apparent that the Nigerian inland revenue officers (FIRS), generally have 
insufficient training in the particularities of the petroleum industry and the complex 
calculations used to determine royalties, deductions, and the PPT under the petroleum contracts 
and MOU frameworks.917 Ultimately, the lack of competent regulations, including clumsy 
enforcement via inexpert DPR and FIRS officers promotes tax evasion. Recurrently, IOCs 
interpret the porous tax rules in extremely favourable contexts to achieve tax avoidance 
undeterred and unopposed. Thus, to achieve sustainable development just like the UK and 
Norway have done, Nigeria must institute petroleum tax reforms.918 
 
Nigeria like many other oil producers such as the UK and Norway, obtains much of its oil 
revenues from oil taxation and by the imposition of annual rental payments on oil leases or 
licenses.919 However, the Nigerian PPTA remains flawed as it engenders deficits due to the 
employment of inefficient and retrograde fiscal schemes like the royalty system.920 It is also 
stressed that successful oil and gas producing economies like the UK921  and Norway922  have 
                                                             
916 See, James L. Smith,” Modelling the Impact of Taxes on Petroleum Exploration and Development” WP/12/278   
IMF Working Paper, Fiscal Affairs Department. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12278.pdf Accessed at 
09/06/16. Also, the rentier state theory has been discussed in earlier chapters. 
917 See,Thurber, Mark C., Ifeyinwa M. Emelife, and Patrick RP Heller. "NNPC and Nigeria’s oil patronage 
ecosystem." Working paper# 95, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (2010): 1-52. 
918See, Macroeconomic indicators for the petroleum sector, 2015.Available at; 
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Accessed at 21 February 2016 
920 See previous discussions in chapter 2 on Economic growth petroleum regulations in Nigeria which addresses the Royalty 
fiscal system. 
921Carole Nakhle, Petroleum Taxation Sharing the oil wealth: a study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today and tomorrow 
(Routledge 2008), p. 40  




discarded their royalty regimes923 in favour of the profits-based tax which is more effective in 
achieving economic growth objectives for sustainable development than a gross-based 
royalty.924 It is however submitted that, the political intricacies and peculiarities of the Nigerian 
governmental structure might create challenges in the discarding of royalty schemes as the oil-
producing communities which also benefit from royalties paid by the IOCs may revolt against 
its cessation. Nevertheless, such protests may be averted if some reasonable part of the 
derivable profits are repatriated back to the oil producing regions.  
 
Furthermore, the enforcement and expertise required to fully harness petroleum tax revenues 
which often involve sophisticated technology and personnel for effective tracing, tracking and 
deciphering of operator accounts to prevent tax evasion and other inconsistencies is still largely 
absent in Nigeria.925 Whilst acknowledging these limitations which account for Nigeria’s 
preference for the royalty scheme, it is suggested that, Nigeria can invest more in efficient 
technologies and training of personnel to tackle and frustrate petroleum tax evasion. This is 
because, such reforms measures enable the transition into the more economically viable profits-




                                                             
-Centre 2007), p. 12. See also, Philip Daniel, Michael Keen, Charles McPherson, The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: 
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923 Royalties were simple to administer and generated early revenues for the government. However, they were regressive, 
non-neutral and not targeted on economic rent. The royalty rate was fixed at 12,5 per cent on the gross revenues of each field 
with a deduction for conveying and treating costs, it ended in 1989 in Norway, while the UK abolished its Royalty regime in 
January2003. See also, Anar Isayev, Oil and Gas Tax Law in the UK and Norway. 
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924 Larry Persily, Norway ‘s different approach to oil and gas development ‘(Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Projects, 
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v. NNPC Crude Sales Reforms 
As stressed in chapter 2, NNPC crude oil sales remains a very opaque area. However, with the 
benefit of the NEITI audits, declining oil revenue patterns are observable. NEITI indicates that, 
the total revenue streams diminished from $68.442 billion in 2011 to $24.791 billion in 2015 
representing a 63.78% decline.926 Moreover, NNPC Crude Sales of 2015, as publicized by 
NEITI was 153.24 million barrels of crude oil. NNPC delivered 37% to PPMC its marketing 
subsidiary, as unprocessed crude for exports, 57% for offshore processing; and 6% as 
Refineries deliveries. NNPC however treated these transactions as 100% Sales to itself, further 
entrenching itself as both Seller and Buyer of the Federation’s Crude, with executive fiat to 
determine: production or withholding costs, payment rates, tariffs and final remittances to the 
Nigerian Central Bank.927 As earlier pointed out, these opaque, uncertain, bureaucratic and 
altogether dysfunctional approaches to NNPC crude sales and products marketing, engenders 
an extremely insecure terrain for investors, heightens patronage or corruption and renders the 
NNPC an awfully unprofitable and non-performing entity. 
To engender reforms towards this area, there is thus a severe need for regulatory and 
governance restructuring to actualize regime clarity or transparency and eradicate excessive 
bureaucracy. This can enhance profits, security of investments and sustainable development of 
the oil industry. In as much as it has been argued that, “Nigeria’s dysfunctional equilibrium in 
the oil sector will be difficult to dislodge”.928 Especially as an appraisal of the NNPC has been 
a revelation of how corruption, bureaucracy and non-market pricing929 regimes for oil sales 
                                                             
926 This substantial drop in revenue flows was adducible to factors comprising: Fall in global prices of crude oil in 2015, 
Instability in the Niger Delta, Production and Crude losses due to destruction of production facilities and pipeline breakages, 
Crude Theft and militancy. 
927 See, NEITI Audit Report for Oil and Gas 2015. Available at: http://www.neiti.gov.ng/index.php/neiti-audits/oil-and-
gas/category/174-2015-audit-report  
928 See,Thurber, Mark C., Ifeyinwa M. Emelife, and Patrick RP Heller. "NNPC and Nigeria’s oil patronage 
ecosystem." Working paper# 95, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (2010): 1-52. 
929 Non-market pricing generates profitable opportunities to arbitrage between controlled and free or black markets, with 
public officials able to dispense access to these opportunities as a means of patronage. Implementation of controlled pricing 




reinforce each other. More so, these conditions worsen intermittently in the event of fuel 
scarcities in Nigeria, as the NNPC battles respective political administrations for domination 
or control of its commercial operations. This is invariably unavoidable in a polity where serving 
Presidents can operate as defacto ministers of petroleum resources.  
Nonetheless, concrete reforms to improve NNPC’s chances as a commercially viable entity 
would entail curtailing the conflict of interests’ scenarios where it can operate as both buyer 
and seller. NNPC can thus be reconstituted as a private company, listed on the stock exchange 
and empowered to re-invest its own generated revenues without state interference and 
bureaucratic encumbrances. Thus, NNPC should be able to negotiate joint venture 
arrangements with IOCs, generate its revenues and be independent of incessant cash-calls and 
the capacity to capriciously retain or misappropriate government funds. That way, it can be 
more functional as a regular profit making corporate entity. More so, a separate, independent 
company can be empowered to manage petroleum assets and optimize investment strategies 
with the IOC’s, independent of the NNPC. This serves to limit the capacity constraints imposed 
on the NAPIMS as an NNPC subsidiary and similarly encumbered with bureaucratic and 
political interferences. Moreover, the DPR can be better empowered to generate its own 
revenues, to effectively exercise its oversight functions.  
The foregoing recommended approaches indeed draw parallels from the Norwegian model 
which is functional and more economically viable. The points of commonality are: NNPC like 
the Norwegian Statoil or (NOC) can operate as a private company which is commercially 
vibrant, and likewise listed on the stock exchange. An independent petroleum ministry such as 
the Norwegian MPE can also be instructive as an autonomous body to determine policy and 
contemporary guidelines in accordance with international best practice for the Nigerian oil 
industry. While an empowered DPR can be tailored after the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
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(NPD) which is a more proactive and quasi-independent regulator, unlike the DPR. More so, a 
sustainability endeared and reformed NAPIMS could capture the policy patterns adopted by 
Norway’s state-owned Petoro AS, a listed company under the Norwegian stock exchange, 
which optimizes Norway’s stakes and interests via efficient management of Norway’s oil and 
gas assets.930  
However, the main challenges that may be experienced in these targeted areas of regulatory 
reforms, would invariably be, translating the reforms from paper or written mandates to actions 
in the Nigerian industry context. Albeit, the pertinent issue remains, how these functional 
approaches that have secured all three pillars of the sustainable development paradigm in 
Norway, including triggering several synergies across the SDGs can survive the Nigerian 
economic and political climate? Indeed, the targeted reform areas aim at capacity strengthening 
of the severely weakened regulators comprising: an underperforming DPR due to NNPC’s 
towering influence and interference caused by regulatory gaps and inconsistencies. And an 
extremely opaque, stunted NNPC that ultimately cannot function as a truly economically 
workable, corporate entity due to: inchoate regulations, excessive bureaucratic interference and 
systemic corruption. Notwithstanding, this grim scenario which is symptomatic of acute 
patronage tendencies and political intrigues from past and subsisting governments, it is posited 
that the earlier recommended reforms are still a possibility. Nevertheless, purely “paper” 
regulatory reforms are insufficient to tackle the complex challenges of the Nigerian oil 
industry. Other relevant reform areas should embrace: compliance and enforcement actions, 
including, broader policy measures affecting market reforms.  
Undeniably, petroleum market reforms can allow for market liberalization, bargaining parity 
and operation of free market forces of demand and supply, rather than persistent government 
                                                             




imposition of subsidies, or artificially influencing oil prices or products.931 Indeed, it is trite 
that market reforms can foster oil sector transparency and competition, which is crucial for a 
sustainable oil industry. It has even been further proposed that a reform strategy that has had 
success in other developing country contexts is the encouragement of emerging new markets 
in parallel to established ones, as this can effectively undermine the capacity of entrenched 
patronage interests to block reforms.932 
4.1.1.2. Oil Industry Governance Reforms: Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms 
Furthermore, the fight against corruption and financial crimes or malpractices in the oil sector 
requires the concentration of efforts to expose bribery, fraud or other manifestations of 
corruption, including enforcing appropriate sanctions. In this regard, the Nigerian government 
instituted two anti-corruption agencies to achieve these aims, although it is clarified that the 
scope of these agencies extends beyond the oil industry. They include: The Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)933 and the Independent and Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC).934 Both agencies have been accountable for the prosecution of high 
profile Nigerian political figures, bureaucrats and technocrats. These include: state governors 
for embezzlement of public funds, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, the past 
Group Managing Director (GMD) of the NNPC, Andrew Yakubu, from which the EFCC 
recovered the sum of $9.8 million (USD).935 Likewise, the previous petroleum minister and 
former OPEC President, Allison Diezani-Madueke was charged on various counts of money 
                                                             
931 This is a broad area, the details of which extend beyond this research. 
932 See, Thurber, Mark C., Ifeyinwa M. Emelife, and Patrick RP Heller. "NNPC and Nigeria’s oil patronage 
ecosystem." Working paper# 95, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (2010): 1-52. 
933 See, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (Establishment) Act, 2004 
934 See, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. Act No.5 
935 The past NNPC Group Managing Director (GMD) was charged with money laundering and other financial crimes. And 
the EFCC recovered $9.8 Million USD, £750,000 and unnamed amount of Naira. Available at: 




laundering affecting $115 Million (USD).936 Notwithstanding the sensational achievements, 
especially in terms of corruptions prosecutions, the anti-corruption efforts of these agencies 
have been blemished by controversies and allegations. These range from abuse of office, to 
engendering the political objectives of the prevailing administration in subjugating political 
opposition, including bribery and corruption.  
Nevertheless, it is argued that these agencies have enormous potential for securing needed oil 
sector reforms via partnering or instituting collaboration networks with international anti-
corruption agencies and actors. These actors could include: The OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention parties such as the UK and Norway, including the US Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (FCPA) enforcement Agencies as in the earlier cited Halliburton and Kellogg scandal.937 
For instance, such a collaboration was also evident in securing the arrests and subsequent 
prosecution of former Nigerian governors: James Ibori and Diepriye Alamieseigha of the 
Niger-Delta region who were charged in both the UK and Nigeria with several counts of 
money-laundering or theft of oil monies and public funds accruable from petroleum 
resources.938 The collaboration involved the Nigerian EFCC, the Interpol, the UK Metropolitan 
Police, including the Crown Prosecution Service. The UK law enforcement agents authorized 
raids on the London offices of the ex-governor’s legal and financial associates Bhadresh Gohil, 
Daniel Benedict McCann and Lambertus De Boer. Also, damning evidence retrieved by the 
UK police and furnished at the trial included computer hard-drives evincing details of 
                                                             
936 The EFCC allegedly, filed money laundering charges of $115 Million (USD) against the former Minister and recovered 
jewellery worth £28 Million (British Pounds) at a raid conducted on her residence. Available at: http://punchng.com/diezani-
loot-efcc-arraigns-rivers-ssg-fo-allegedly-laundering-n750m/  
937 Reuters “Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay...,” Washington, 11 
February 2009 
938 Scandals related to financial crimes, money laundering and embezzlement of state funds and oil monies were uncovered 
by the UK financial crimes agency against: James Ibori ex-governor of Delta State, with headlines captioned, “James Ibori 
pleads guilty to fraud and money-laundering charges in the UK: Police to repatriate stolen assets after former governor of 
Nigeria's oil-rich Delta state changes initial plea” Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2012/feb/27/james-ibori-pleads-guilty-fraud Accessed at: 2 May 2018. Also related is the Alamyieseigha ex-
governor of Bayelsa State case. See, Rory Carroll, “Nigerian state governor dresses up in drag to escape £1.8m money-




numerous off-shore companies, managed for James Ibori by Gohil. These accomplices to 
Ibori’s financial crimes and theft of oil funds accruing up to N40 billion ($266 million) from 
the Niger-Delta were subsequently sentenced to a total of 30 years imprisonment.939 
Altogether, such international partnerships as stressed in this case, serve as the vital tools for 
exposing and curtailing financial crimes and corrupt acts of foreign associates of public 
officers, investors or IOCs who often constitute the supply side of corruption in the oil sector. 
Moreover, efficient networking with these international actors, FCPA940 and the OECD can 
move investigations forward in Nigeria to identify and apprehend the demand side of the 
corrupt act, money-laundering or receiving of bribes, who are normally the: government 
officials, public officers, regulators or relevant government agents.  
To further showcase the immense potential of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to tackle 
both the demand and supply sides of corruption in the oil industry, an unprecedented turn of 
events relating to a corruption trial of industry giants has commenced in Milan. The trial in 
Milan tackles the supply side of the alleged bribery and corruption against former senior 
executives of ENI (AGIP) and Shell.941 This also prompts another trial in Nigeria to tackle the 
demand side of the alleged bribery and corruption. Both cases proceed from events in 2011 
when Shell and ENI supposedly transferred $1.3 billion (€1 billion) into a Nigerian government 
bank account. These transactions were made as both companies needed to acquire the rights to 
an oil field designated as OPL245. Per relevant valuations, OPL245 was worth $3 billion, the 
alleged bribe was paid to Malabu Oil owned by a former Nigerian petroleum minister Dan 
                                                             
939 Shirbon, Estelle "Britain freezes assets of former governor". Reuters (IOL). Independent News & Media. 17-12-2007. See 
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Etete and served as a conduit for the outstanding funds.942 Both companies also paid up bribes 
amounting $310 million USD to expedite the acquisition of acreages. It has been further argued 
that, "[T]his [corrupt] deal with Shell and ENI cost the people of Nigeria a sum as high as its 
public health expenditure in 2017".943 Altogether, the OECD Convention and enforcement 
procedures of member countries thus gives teeth to the agreement and makes the possibility of 
heavy penalties or criminal sanctions for curtailing oil industry bribery and corruption towards 
sustainable development in Nigeria realistic. 
In a nutshell, international partnerships for control of corruption as envisaged by the UN 
Convention Against Corruption, are supremely advocated as tools to amplify focus and efforts 
on international and local anti-corruption regulations. Similarly, partnerships are recommended 
for funding, training, including human and technical capacity development to optimize: 
prosecution of money laundering offences, ensure assets repatriation of corrupt public officials, 
engender public awareness to effectively support accountability mechanisms. These are 
identified as essential to eliminate entrenched corporate corruption in the oil sector and remain 
crucial to achieving sustainable development in the Nigerian oil industry. 
4.2. Sustaining Oil Exploitation in Nigeria: Integrating the Environmental Protection 
Pillar via International Regulations and Partnerships 
Considering that the integration principle for sustainable development of petroleum resources 
has been discussed in detail in previous chapters, this section proffers ways of improving the 
earlier identified shortcomings in the Nigerian petroleum regulations by highlighting measures 
to achieve better synchronisation of environmental objectives and social development goals 
across the SDGs. This section thus employs initiatives articulated at international law, the UK, 
                                                             





and Norwegian petroleum regulations. The section also clarifies possible areas where the input 
of international organisations can engender better integration of all pillars of the sustainable 
development paradigm to achieve the SDGs in the Nigerian petroleum industry. 
4.2.1. Accessing Environmentally Sustainable Pathways: Approaches from International 
law, the UK and Norway 
In progressing prior discussions, this subsection expatiates on how the environmentally 
protective rules echoed in international law, the UK and Norway can influence the 
environmental impacts assessment and atmospheric protection laws in Nigeria. The overall 
essence of this assessment is thus to portray how and to what extent the flawed Nigerian 
environmental rules, can be reinforced by a synergy of best international practices and 
environmentally friendly regulations to achieve sustainable development goals in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry. 
 
4.2.1.1. Nigerian Environmental Impacts Assessment Regulations: Moving the Reforms 
Agenda Forward 
Evidently, the discussions in Chapter 2, clarify that Nigeria has a legal framework providing 
for environmental protection via EIAs. Nevertheless, salient areas of the EIA regulations need 
to be strengthened and improved. A significantly ignored area in terms of environmental 
assessments for the oil industry includes strategic environmental assessments (SEA). Nigeria 
certainly needs to modify the petroleum rules, especially EGASPIN to incorporate SEAs which 
are currently lacking in the extant regulations. The incorporation of the SEA is recommended 
to cover off-shore/up-stream exploration and production activities as this area remains 
technically unplanned for. Such a deficiency serves to potentially undermine the aims of goal 
14 targeting protection of aquatic eco-systems. Moreover, in optimizing the aims of holistic 
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environmental planning and the Best environmental practices (BEP), envisaged reforms can 
co-opt regional participation or multi-stakeholder collaboration as advocated by goal 17 of the 
SDGs.  
 
Thus, instituting multi-stakeholder SEAs with international partners to engender synergies for 
environmental protection in the offshore oil producing areas, envisages partnering with 
international organisations such as the UNEP for technical and knowledge assistance and other 
oil producing states along the Gulf of Guinea.944 This collaboration can comprise of 
“newcomers” and established oil producers such as: (Sao Tome and Principe, Angola, 
Cameroun, Gabon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea and Chad) to foster regionally coordinated and 
integrated SEAs. Such a collaboration could not have been realistic previously. This may be 
adducible to varied factors comprising: a dearth of experience towards SEA arrangements 
which were still evolving at the onset of exploratory activities in the 60’s, fiscal or technical 
incapacity and the fact of Nigeria’s predominantly onshore oil production. Indeed, Nigeria’s 
foray into offshore production is relatively recent, especially in terms of the quantum of crude 
production per day.945 Also, apart from Angola, the others are relatively emerging oil producers 
in terms of oil discoveries and production capacity. More so, the governance platforms were 
severely lacking, due to political and civil unrests in some of these states.946 
 
                                                             
944The Gulf of Guinea Region comprises the West and Central Africa coast made up of Nigeria, Ghana, Chad, Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, and Congo, which are considered developing countries. Also, 
these countries are either currently producing offshore oil or are exploring for oil offshore 
945 See, NEITI Audit Report for Oil and Gas 2015. Available at: http://www.neiti.gov.ng/index.php/neiti-audits/oil-and-
gas/category/174-2015-audit-report 
946 See, Adrian Gonzalez, “Petroleum and its Impact on Three Wars in Africa: Angola, Nigeria and Sudan” Journal of Peace, 




Nonetheless, regional SEAs collaboration remains a strategic option for oil producing states in 
Africa with proven oil reserves of 132.1 billion barrels.947 Likewise, the West African sub-
region, is a repository of approximately 50 per cent or 60 billion barrels, with much higher 
offshore oil and gas prospects.948 Indeed, the proven oil reserves of Nigeria and Libya are 
higher than those of the US, China, Brazil, India and other petro-states such as Azerbaijan and 
Mexico.949 Moreover, an envisaged IOC migration towards offshore production by 2020 
predicates the need for an organised multi-level collaboration towards regional SEAs.950 Such 
regional SEA arrangements are already prevalent amongst oil producers on the North Sea as 
observed in the comparative appraisal of the Norway and UK oil regulations in chapter 3. This 
has better served to optimize environmental protection of the North Sea offshore producing 
areas. In effect, these statistics signify the relevance of the Gulf of Guinea oil producing areas 
as global energy suppliers for some time to come, thereby evoking the need to adopt 
precautionary measures to avoid the mistakes that accrued to the despoliation of the Niger-
Delta.  
 
Ultimately, a regional collaboration would engender a framework or protocol to tackle 
environmental protection of the off-shore regions. Such an agreement should articulate specific 
provisions tailored after the Best Environmental Practices offshore guidelines (BEP) and the 
Best Available Techniques (BAT) to cover: projects/risks categorizations, all SEA/EIA phases 
(screening, scoping, baseline data including environmental statements), seismic surveys, siting 
of oil installations, contingency planning measures, drilling discharges and E&P wastes 
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africa-the-new-persian-gulf-not-yet/ 
948 Ibid. 
949 See, Damian Mane, “Emergence of the Gulf of Guinea in the Global Economy: Prospects and Challenges” IMF Working 
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minimization strategies. Also, the SEAs should adequately cover relevant provisions regarding: 
decommissioning, compliance and enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Furthermore, this research posits that, such international collaboration creates the platforms for 
international finance institutions and donor agencies to be effective in monitoring compliance 
with environmental requirements overlaid in funding agreements. This is because much of the 
funding for such oil and gas development projects in developing states are contingent on 
environmental and social sustainability conditionality imposed on the respective clients’ states 
and IOCs. Thus, the earlier identified UNEP, World Bank and Equator Banks standards or 
projects/risk categorizations and their incumbent actions highlighted in chapter 1 become 
particularly relevant.951 More so, the similarity of projects categorizations in these instruments 
fosters correlation of protective measures, determination of safety measures, adequacy of 
impacts assessments for easier identification of safeguards and thresholds, affecting 
environmental risk areas of oil exploration projects. Currently, such viable industry 
collaborations in Nigeria, apart from other World Bank infrastructure projects, include, IFC 
financing and funding towards the strengthening of the financial sector in Nigeria and funded 
gas projects like 7 Energy952 and Azura-Edo.953 These were concluded with low environmental 
and social externalities.954 Another important multi-stakeholder alliance which comprised the 
Nigerian government, the IOCs, UNEP and IFIs involves the $1Billion USD escrow fund for 
the clean-up and remediation of Ogoniland.955 The collaboration relies on the UNEP’s expert 
                                                             
951 See, the UNEP/IE guidelines, the World Bank Environmental guidelines for the oil and gas industry and the Equator 
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team’s projected time-frames of 25-30 years to restore Ogoniland to a pristine condition. All 
stakeholders are thus optimistic that the targets would be met towards rehabilitating one of the 
world’s most unfortunate cases of oil induced environmental despoliation. 
 
The research further argues that the desirability of a regional SEAs approach becomes more 
evident as the rules, guidelines and procedures of the international funding and development 
institutions become simultaneously applicable to all the collaborating states parties. 
Undoubtedly, this can engender uniformity in the application, monitoring and enforcement of 
environmental safeguards in the off-shore and mid-shore oil and gas locations. Similarly, these 
measures would serve to protect the region from adverse impacts of oil exploitation and 
optimize reporting on actions involving the relevant E&P areas. This is a more efficient or 
capacity maximizing measure towards EIA/SEA implementation in developing states as it 
accommodates bottom-up and top-down strategies. Thus, the respective states can enforce 
reporting and data acquisition relating to offshore production and the extent of protection 
efforts undertaken by the IOCs licensed under their respective jurisdictions, in partial fulfilment 
of their funding obligations. Likewise, clarification of the adequacy of specific preventive or 
protective steps towards offshore environment protection, implemented by each of these states 
for sustainable development of the region is eventually made possible.  
 
Other scope for environmental reforms towards sustainable development of the oil industry is 
considered in respect of onshore areas. The research places importance on the modifying of the 
EGASPIN to mandate EIA permits and approvals for all stages of petroleum production. Thus, 
the pre-commencement phase should impose development consent for all significant petroleum 
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infrastructure.956 The ambit of such permits should also comprise onshore pipelines and other 
oil and gas installations, which is lacking in the current rules.957 Furthermore, pre-
commencement phase regulations should articulate detailed guidelines to gather the most 
information from EIA proponents or oil and gas producers before oil exploration to achieve 
effectiveness and robustness of the EIA screening phase. The rules should also target better 
coordination of scoping stages to accommodate not just project pollution impacts or pollution 
control requirements, but to identify the overall probable environmental impacts, to drive 
precautionary and best industry approaches as deducible from BEPO.958 EIA rules should also 
be modified to facilitate monitoring of proponents by regulators whilst ensuring increased 
representative or quality consultations.959  
 
Furthermore, there should be modifications imposing stipulations for clear outlines of 
alternative sites for the proposed project in the event of negative outcomes of the EIA. The 
research stresses the stipulation of alternative sites in EIA regulatory reforms as proactive 
criteria for environmental protection, which remains lacking in the extant EIA rules. Moreover, 
the confidentiality of EIA reports for the Nigerian oil industry should be discouraged. The 
reports should be more accessible, simplified and easily verifiable to ensure timely and 
adequate reviews.960 This is because the effectiveness or essence of EIAs for the oil industry is 
to ensure efficient integration of the assessment findings to influence project decision making 
and its incorporation at the earliest planning stages to optimize environmental protection goals 
for sustainable development.  
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documents applicable in the protection of onshore/offshore oil producing areas embracing the UKCS and the NCS. 
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Equally, at exploration and production (E&P) phases, EIAs should be imposed in relation to 
effluents or discharges accruing from hydrocarbon drilling. Thus, EIAs should be imposed for 
all chemical and petrochemical discharges, not just for produced water but for drilling muds, 
as these areas are lacking in the extant rules. Also, EIA should be made compulsory for the 
removal and transfers of all E&P wastes to alternative sites for disposal or treatment to better 
incorporate the aims of goals 14 and 15 towards aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems protection. 
This approach has been adopted in the UK and Norway and it has proved effective in curbing 
environmental damage via erstwhile undetected E&P wastes in these states.961 Even though 
Nigeria may not yet be able to achieve zero chemical discharges like Norway, due to 
technological limitations, the imposition and enforcement of EIAs for the listed discharges 
would still substantially protect the environment and eventually strengthen all mutually 
reinforcing pillars for sustainable development of the Nigerian oil industry.  
 
In addition, EIAs should be mandated for the final phase of oil and gas production which affects 
decommissioning and abandonment of petroleum installations. This is because it remains an 
efficient means of ascertaining the risks such abandonment would pose to the environment and 
public whilst identifying safe removal procedures or permanent sealing of such installations. 
This will also address measures to minimize the activities of vandals on abandoned petroleum 
infrastructure, which if overlooked inadvertently cause extreme pollution. It is likewise posited 
that, achievement of the foregoing can be better executed with expert partnerships. Indeed, 
international financial institutions, donor and development agencies can also define specific 
provisions in funding treaties and agreements to clarify the available forms of technical 
assistance, capacity development, including measures towards industry innovation as a 
                                                             
961 See, Chapter 2a, S.6 and S.22 of the Norwegian Petroleum Regulations 1997 (as Amended by the Royal Decree of 2012 
No. 729)  
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package deal to better optimize synergies across the SDGs from the commencement of funding 
negotiations. This serves to entrench and operationalize sustainable development at the 
contracts source than as a half-hearted addendum which can be cursorily dispensed with.  
 
Likewise, international collaboration is endorsed towards NGO and civil society participation 
in Nigeria. This is because international partnerships can and often buttresses NGO capacity 
towards ensuring EIA transparency, performance, independent reporting and more 
accountability. Overall, the import of these international and multi-stakeholder collaboration 
referenced in this section, serves to highlight areas where development agencies, international 
finance institutions and developing petro-states can co-operate, to facilitate synergies across 
the SDGs while securing compliance with environmental conditionality superimposed in oil 
and gas projects for sustainable development. 
 
However, a pertinent observation is that, these international partners, in as much as they 
constitute core agents for oil industry reforms towards sustainable development, they still 
cannot subjugate Nigeria’s role in the implementation of environmental or social goals. They 
may all too well experience challenges, due to Nigeria’s development constraints in terms of 
human and technical capacity that could result in a less stringent application of their safeguard 
policies. For instance, the World Bank has been known to grapple with securing states’ 
compliance of their safeguards conditionality. This was the scenario in the ‘90s Chad-
Cameroun Pipelines Case concerning an escrow fund of $3.7 Billion USD for 1070km 
pipelines and development of 300 oil wells, co-funded by the World Bank and the IFC which 
unfortunately recorded high negative environmental and social externalities. This eventually 
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resulted in the inglorious exit of the IFC from the project due to mounting NGO pressure and 
consequential embarrassment.962 
 
Arguably, the Bank might not appear vigilant in monitoring environmental aspects of projects 
to its conclusive stages and may whittle down aggressive monitoring of such projects after its 
commencement, which in the long run undermines full compliance with environmental or 
social safeguards.963 Similarly, critics of the Bank purport that, the execution of World Bank 
funded projects in Lagos, Nigeria allegedly disrupted environments and communities.964 Also, 
that though the government relocated displaced citizens, not much was done about securing 
access to lost livelihoods. Indeed, civil society and NGO groups like the Amnesty International 
have accused the World Bank of failing to fully monitor the effects of its sponsored projects in 
Nigeria, as more reliance is placed on paper compliance without real-time or on the spot 
checks.965  
 
Moreover, the IFI’s emerging competition from the BRICS966 countries (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) who can facilitate development funding without environmental or 
social conditionalities also portends the possibility of trade-offs or discounting of strict 
environmental stipulations in funding instruments. In other words, the increased likelihood of 
a milder application of these World Bank or Equator Banks safeguards to protect the Bank’s 
economic interests and guarantee business continuity becomes a factor to contend with. 
                                                             
962 See, Susanne Breitkopf Urgewald,” The Chad Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project: Risky Business” 
(September 2000) Available at: http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IFCCSChadCameroon.pdf  
963 See, Sarah Steffen, “World Bank failed to protect the poor, research shows” (DW, 2015) Available at: 
https://www.dw.com/en/world-bank-failed-to-protect-the-poor-research-shows/a-18388491 
964 Ibid.  
965 See, Sarah Steffen, “World Bank failed to protect the poor, research shows” (DW, 2015) Available at: 
https://www.dw.com/en/world-bank-failed-to-protect-the-poor-research-shows/a-18388491 
966 James Fontanella-Khan, Brics Nations Threaten IMF Funding | Financial Times, March 29, 2012. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/a3b88472-7982-11e1-8fad-00144feab49a  See also, Raj Desai and J. Vreeland, “What the New 




To circumvent these challenges, ensure environmental sustainability and obtain lasting 
solutions to oil production in the Niger-Delta, it is recommended that Nigeria cannot afford to 
be passive, complacent or abdicate responsibility for securing environmental protection during 
oil exploitation conducted within its jurisdiction. Nigeria thus needs to be vigilant via effective 
regulations, governance and enforcement of international best practices and standards towards 
attaining ecosystem protection goals, within the considerable platforms afforded by these 
partnerships. This constitutes the only sustainable path which other oil producers, established 
and emergent tread on, with specific reference to Nigeria’s contemporaries, Norway and UK. 
Ultimately, the immense, accruable benefits of oil production tampered by eco-system 
sustainability and achieving of the SDGs far outweigh the short-term gains of harnessing oil 
revenues along with enormous environmental costs, as the Ogoniland case starkly portrays. 
 
4.2.1.2. Nigerian Atmospheric Protection Regulations: Reforms Ideas from the UK and 
Norway 
Having previously considered the weaknesses in the Nigerian atmospheric regulations, this 
sub-section considers appropriate reforms measures to strengthen the Atmospheric Regulations 
in Nigeria. Earlier deliberations on the SDGs, the Paris Agreement in concurrence with the 
CBDR principle, envisage that developing states like Nigeria, need to target a multi-lateral 
approach towards atmospheric protection and climate action. Also, the thrust of the “Paris 
Agreement” when paired alongside the SDGs (especially goals 13 and 17) infers a need for 
Nigeria to develop comprehensive national strategies and optimize partnerships to significantly 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions during oil exploitation. Moreover, a Nigerian national 
strategy towards controlling emissions from its oil industry constitutes a core aspect of 
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transparent planning measures, which foster accountability regarding specific steps towards 
carbon reporting, to ultimately engender mitigations during oil exploitation.967  
 
Furthermore, it is recommended that, Nigeria adopts petro-business strategies that harmonize 
with national strategies, towards effectively implementing Agenda 2030 and the Long-Term 
Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategies to 2050, called for in the Paris 
Agreement.968 Thus, the Nigerian government and oil companies could consider their current 
resources, infrastructure investments, future fossil-fuel demand, technology, research and 
development, to identify strategies that can cushion the effects of a gradual transition and 
adaptation process to prevent energy poverty. Likewise, a collaboration between companies, 
governments, academia and civil society in promoting innovation such as large-scale Carbon 
Capture technologies, can contribute to the policies and actions needed for effective, proactive, 
technology-based pathways at eco-systems protection in the Niger-Delta whilst strengthening 
efforts towards climate action. 
 
A more specific and expedient regulatory reform measure for Nigeria as part of its National 
strategy, would be the immediate amendment of the Associated Gas Act.969 The essence is to 
improve its efficacy in the prevention of atmospheric pollution. Such a reform measure is 
inevitable as the Act’s effectiveness is undermined by the Associated Gas Re-Injection 
(Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations970 which justifies the need for expedited modifications. 
The alterations should encompass the Act’s title which portrays complete disregard for core 
                                                             
967 “Pathways to deep decarbonization,” Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (September 2015); “More energy, lower 
emissions: Catalyzing practical action on climate change,” Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (October 2015); “Paris 
Agreement,” FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Art. 7.9. See also, “Paris Agreement,” FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Art. 4. 
968  “A post-Paris overview and analysis of BP’s climate reporting,” Share Action (April 2016); “The Heat is On,” Critical 
Resource (November 2015). See, “Paris Agreement,” FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Art. 7.9. See also, “Paris Agreement,” 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Art. 4. “Making the energy sector more resilient to climate change,” International Energy 
Agency (2015). 
969 See, Sections 1-6 of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act of 1979 
970 See, [S.1. 43 of the Associated Gas (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations 1984.] under sections 3 and 5 
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environmental objectives affecting atmospheric protection, climate change mitigation and 
carbon emissions reduction as subsumed in Goal 13 of the SDGs. More so, the provisions 
which altogether recommend continued gas flaring should be amended to be more in sync with 
the aims of sustainable development. It is thus imperative that Nigerian atmospheric protection 
regulations which appear lenient or grossly inadequate to tackle gas flaring and climate change 
mitigation be upscaled in terms of guidelines reflecting international best practice and 
standards. 
 
Moreover, other reforms towards atmospheric protection can involve taking a cue from the 
more robust UK and Norwegian petroleum regulations. This entails the imposing of a formal 
permits process incorporating EIAs, quality control checks whilst adopting the BAT (Best 
Available Technology) in oil and gas exploitation to harness, purify and re-inject associated 
gas to minimize carbon emissions in the interest of a sustainable and green oil industry. 
Ultimately, for the Nigerian atmospheric protection regulations to be successful on all three 
pillars of the sustainable development paradigm, the grossly environmentally harmful, socially 
menacing and economically regressive problem of gas flaring in the Nigerian petroleum 
industry must be discarded or at least carry heavy obligations to pose as deterrents in cases 
where operators wish to activate exemption clauses. 
 
Notwithstanding, it is pointed out that, a major hurdle towards efficient performance of gas 
regulatory reforms remains the complex problem of inadequate or unprofitable gas markets 
regimes to engender investments in associated gas. Gas regulations and policy reforms could 
indeed be more productive if Nigeria can optimize a core petro-business strategy by 
commencing upgrades in its gas pricing. This would prove more commercially viable and 
attractive to securing investments and ultimately discourage gas flaring, atmospheric pollution 
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and engender goal 13 towards climate action. It would at the same time generate considerable 
revenues for Nigeria whilst levelling energy poverty and huge power generation challenges in 
Nigeria. Therefore, concerted efforts to establish goal synergies across the SDGs, driven by 
competent regulations, strong institutions, to achieve genuinely competitive gas markets, 
including participation of indigenous gas producers will add value and secure oil industry 
sustainability. Indeed, these are measures that can more cumulatively and holistically off-set 
atmospheric and gas flaring challenges, as the associated gas would cease to be wasted, but 
instead recycled for sales to engender productivity in the Nigerian gas sector. 
 
4.2.2. Oil Exploitation in Nigerian Petroleum Laws: Enhancing Social Development Tools 
Social development tools targeting: improved public consultations, enhanced environmental 
awareness, access to environmental information and access to justice are addressed in this 
section. Also, human rights impacts assessment is further considered as a crucial means of 
human rights protection in the Niger-delta to trigger social development in oil producing areas. 
4.2.2.1. Engendering Public Consultations and Access to Justice in Nigerian Oil Laws 
As earlier discussed, social development tools evident from the Nigerian Petroleum rules are 
contained in the EIA provisions and the EGASPIN. Both instruments make provisions for 
public participation.971 However, the major limitation of these provisions is that they fail to 
truly empower the public in demanding international environmental standards during oil and 
gas production. Nigeria has failed to harness these crucial social development tools of prompt 
access to environmental information, adequate public consultations and access to justice. 
Nevertheless, this situation can be remedied to ensure more meaningful and effective 
participation. Ultimately, Nigeria can improve on its oil and gas law by amending 
                                                             
971 See, especially S.22 (1) (b), also S.26 of the EIA Act which provides for the report of an EIA to be published, other 
regulations are silent on participation 
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environmental regulations to guarantee access to non-technical summaries of project EIAs and 
SEAs in the petroleum industry.972 Thus, Nigerian petroleum policy or regulatory adjustments 
should ensure the optimization of impacts assessments to specifically aid and inform the public 
on aspects of oil exploitation that are environmentally degrading. This may also be achieved 
via oral consultations. Such participatory strategy promotes the aims of Goal 16 towards 
participatory or inclusive societies, facilitates appropriate consensus and informed choice on 
what aspects of the oil and gas project should be improved on and what should be abandoned 
in the interest of sustainable development. 
 
Moreover, regulatory adjustments to obviate the need to show personal interest and proof of 
damage before accessing environmental information should be expunged from the Nigerian 
rules. Similarly, the problematic requirement of “locus standi” before commencement of legal 
actions or judicial review to enforce environmentally protective measures as earlier addressed 
in the Oronto Douglas case should be discarded to facilitate access to justice. These foregoing 
measures towards reforms would thus ensure that the public is suitably equipped to make 
meaningful decisions which prevent environmentally harmful and unsustainable patterns of oil 
exploitation.973 Notwithstanding these laudable regulatory approaches to ensure social 
development reforms already practiced in more developed states like the UK and Norway, the 
success of these measures in Nigeria are however dependent upon progress in basic education 
which needs upgrading in the Niger-delta.974 
  
Furthermore, because of the interlinkages between environmental protection and social 
development to guarantee sustainable development of petroleum resources, this section 
                                                             
972 See Principles 40-41 of Rio +20 
973 See also the previous subsection on EIAs with the UK petroleum regime favouring more public consultation during 
impacts assessments. 
974 See S.3 Agenda 21 on Combating Poverty via provision of education, health care and restoration of degraded resources. 
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reiterates the Nigerian challenge of poor environmental awareness as the major bane to 
meaningful participation of local populations in environmental decision making. It is thus 
proposed that in the interest of sustainable development, environmental awareness campaigns 
or training need to be intensified in the oil producing regions to truly empower the indigenes.975 
This can halt the disruption of the people’s lifestyle due to oil pollution, improve the standard 
of living and expedite steps towards poverty eradication.976 Such awareness creation and social 
upgrades can be achieved through specific governmental policies in collaboration with civil 
society groups and the private sector to eliminate the social problems created by environmental 
devastation in the Niger-delta.977 Accordingly, clearer articulation of environmental policies 
that encourage multi-stakeholder collaboration should be expressed in the Nigerian petroleum 
regulations. Thus, partnerships to improve the Niger-delta environment on an extensive scale 
should be instituted between regulators, local communities, corporations engaging in E&P, 
petroleum transportation and their distribution chains to increase environmental consciousness 
and protection. This is the norm in the UK and Norway and it is recommended for Nigeria as 
the appropriate means to achieve or optimize consensus, better monitoring and performance of 
environmental standards in the oil industry.978  
 
Notwithstanding, government could go a step further to engender environmental awareness by 
instituting fiscal or tax incentives towards corporate entities engaging in extensive public 
awareness schemes and consultations, including towards IOCs involved in more sophisticated 
surveillance and training programmes for host communities. This is because these efforts can 
                                                             
975 See, Earlier subsection on EIAs for more on environmental awareness creation. See also, Rio+20, Agenda 21, Rio 
Declaration. 
976 See chapters 1 on the social development tools and chapter 2 on the social problems in the Niger-delta due to oil pollution 
and environmental devastation. See also, Principle 30, Rio+20 
977 See Principle 13 of Rio+20. Which endorses the provision of adequate opportunities for people to influence their lives 
and future, participate in decision-making and voice their concerns as fundamental steps to achieving sustainable 
development. 
978 See Chapter 3, “Sustainable Development Indicators in Petroleum Law and Policy of Other Jurisdictions: Salient 
Contributions from the UK and Norway” 
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reduce sabotage of oil installations and serve as preventive measures against oil pollution which 
constitute endemic challenges triggered by oil exploitation projects in the Niger-delta. More 
importantly, such a strategy can encourage indigenes of the oil-producing regions to place a 
higher value on securing corporate and governmental commitments to environmental 
protection for the benefit of succeeding generations.979 Certainly, it is a more sustainable 
approach than the forfeiture of the local fishing or farming occupations due to pollution induced 
displacement and awarding of purely monetary compensation for environmental damage. This 
is because the monetary reimbursements without commensurate environmental rehabilitation 
merely fosters mass exodus from the region as the dilapidated environment can no longer 
sustain livelihoods. 
 
It is therefore posited that the foregoing measures will thus facilitate social development goals 
whilst promoting the enforcement of petroleum law and policy by sociological re-orientation 
and effective sanctions via regulatory amendments to optimize compliance. Thus, the 
unsustainable pattern of fiscal compensation for environmental damage without restoration of 
the environment should be discouraged as it is inconsistent with the sustainable development 
goals and jeopardises sustainable livelihoods.980 Ultimately, the foregoing measures towards 
environmental awareness for ensuring meaningful participation will thus assist indigenes in 
making informed choices regarding the adequacy of environmental protection safeguards 
during oil exploitation. Likewise, the investment in environmental awareness and social 
development in Nigeria can greatly enhance public ability to reasonably determine the 
competence of safety measures, spills and emergency response actions, as well as the suitability 
                                                             
979 See the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, See also, C. O. Opukri and I. S. Ibaba, “Oil induced environmental degradation 
and internal population displacement in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta”. (2008) Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 
vol. 10(1), pp.173-193, Also, I. Izeze, “Fresh Lawsuits For Niger Delta Oil Spills: Rethinking Shell’s Arrogance Of 
Impunity” Available at: http://saharareporters.com/2016/03/14/fresh-lawsuits-niger-delta-oil-spills-rethinking-
shell%E2%80%99s-arrogance-impunity-ifeanyi-izeze Accessed at: January 15, 2017 
980 See Principle 30 of Rio+20 
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of environmental rehabilitation measures in the event of incidents. It will also substantially 
curb the problems of pipelines vandalism by uninformed Niger-delta indigenes who consider 
vandalization a bargaining tool or a means of expressing grievance against the government and 
IOCs.981 
 
4.2.2.2. Underpinning Social Development in Nigerian Petroleum Laws: The HRIA 
Pathway 
In the earlier chapters, the issue of HRIA as an indisputable tool for optimizing social 
development in the oil and gas industry was addressed. Its importance in terms of eliminating 
gaps and ensuring adequate public, private, including corporate and state protection of human 
rights during oil and gas exploitation was articulated in line with international law 
provisions.982 Essentially, more industry specific instruments like the OECD Guidelines For 
Multinational Enterprises,983 the UN Framework for Business and Human Rights which target 
IOCs and transnational oil companies, were used to highlight the utility of HRIAs as effective 
tools to optimize motivation and efforts towards corporate respect for human rights and fulfil 
human rights obligations "to act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others 
and to address adverse impacts that occur" from their corporate activities.984  
Moreover, owing to HRIAs value as a social development tool and empowerment strategy to 
actualize sustainable development goals, it is important that Nigeria makes adequate policies 
                                                             
981 See, Ambily Etekpe and P. Okolo, “Oil Pipeline Vandalization and the Socio-Economic Effects in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
Region” Article in SSRN Electronic Journal · November 2010 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1723169 Available at, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228275767_Oil_Pipeline_Vandalization_and_the_Socio-
Economic_Effects_in_Nigeria's_Niger_Delta_Region Accessed at, December, 2016 
982 See earlier discussions on HRIA in Chapter 1 
983 Organisation. For Economic. Co-Operation & Development. (OECD), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 3 
(2011 ed.) available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.  
984 See, United Nations, The U.N. "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework for Business and Human Rights, Bus. & 





to promote human rights via HRIAs. This provides viable means of eroding inequities and 
inequalities that culminate in human rights abuses during oil exploitation as evident in the 
Ogoni and Serac cases.985 Even though it may be argued that the UK and Norway, likewise 
some other oil producing states lack HRIAs in their petroleum laws, it is however pointed out 
that, HRIAs are needful in Nigerian rules to expedite better protection for indigenes of oil 
producing regions. This is because HRIAs in Nigeria would be a proactive measure to secure 
positive social interests in consonance with Health and Safety (HSE) rules and maintain 
adequate human rights safeguards in oil exploitation. 
Ultimately, to be more proactive towards ensuring human rights protection in the oil industry, 
Nigeria now more than ever, needs to work closely with IOCs to undertake HRIAs in oil 
development projects to ensure compliance with the relevant human rights instruments.986 This, 
approach can positively optimize assessment of the direct results and impacts of the petroleum 
operations in relevant oil producing areas. Also, Nigeria’s investment in HRIAs will be 
essential in tracking the implementation of strategies, policies and procedures for oil and gas 
development projects. More so, Nigeria can be better alerted towards potential danger signals 
at the assessment levels and can determine the efficiency of management processes. Indeed, 
these HRIAs will pay-off as boosts towards policy co-ordination to clarify challenges and 
opportunities for improvements, whilst properly articulating areas for corrective measures, 
before commencement of the petroleum projects to avoid repetitions of the Ogoniland saga. 
Moreover, it becomes essential for Nigeria to promptly modify its policy and regulations to 
incorporate international standards that will engender environmental protection, public health 
                                                             
985See the, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the 
Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, A, Comm. No. 155/96, 2001. (Ogoniland Case) See also, Judgment No. 
ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12, (December 14, 2012) at paras 15- 121. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) etc. 
986See, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), The international Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Likewise, international standards such as the ILO 
Conventions and Declarations, the UN Global Compact principles, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, etc. 
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and safety including the well-being of industry personnel. Accordingly, Nigerian petroleum 
regulations need to be amended to institute a distinct health and safety regulatory regime in 
line with the recommendations of the Petroleum Act which proposes that the minister make 
regulations “for the safe working….”987 This is because “safe working” is vacuous and 
relatively unenforceable as well as inadequate in dealing with the high-level of oil industry 
accidents in Nigeria. Similarly, the adoption of stiff penal sanctions like corporate 
manslaughter or corporate homicide charges against corporate entities would also serve as 
credible steps to curb the relentless polluting behaviour of oil and gas operators in the Nigerian 
oil industry that has led to numerous fire disasters and needless deaths.988 Also, stiffer penal 
sanctions like corporate manslaughter charges would act as proper checks for the government 
regulators who need to be more proactive and accountable in their enforcement of rules and 
guidelines to achieve a sustainable petroleum industry.  
4.2.3. Reinforcing Technological Innovations in Nigerian Petroleum Laws  
In the previous chapters, the importance of innovative technology as a necessary appendage to 
the three-pillar paradigm for the sustainable development of petroleum resources was 
addressed. Likewise, its efficacy for optimizing the SDGs in developing countries. This 
subsection therefore discusses the extent to which Nigerian oil and gas rules can be influenced 
by international, UK and Norwegian regulatory provisions to foster the adoption of innovative 
technologies in the industry. 
 
As apparent from the second chapter, Nigerian oil and gas provisions are lacking in guidelines 
or standards which impose innovative technologies for the sustainable development of 
                                                             
987 See S.9(1)(b)(i) of the Nigerian Petroleum Act 1969 





petroleum resources.989 Indeed, the gaps culminating in technological and infrastructure 
failures including the abysmal lack of innovation towards adopting environmentally sound 
technologies are even more glaring when the Nigerian scenario is compared alongside industry 
best standards and goal 9 of the SDGs. Essentially, the challenges highlighted by chapter 2 
which entail a catalogue of environmental and social problems in the Niger-delta, could have 
to a considerable extent been eroded by employing the improvements made possible by science 
and technological innovation.  
 
Nevertheless, moving forward in terms of reforms requires adopting appropriate responses to 
tackle environmental and social problems associated with oil exploitation. This envisages, 
concrete steps towards oil industry infrastructure upgrades. Such innovative upgrades can more 
specifically facilitate petroleum resource efficiency, foster cleaner operational mechanisms and 
engender ecosystem sustainability, which encapsulates the essence of Goal 9, relating to the 
adoption of environmentally sound technologies to foster development aims. 
 
Even more crucial in the oil industry context is the necessity of enhancing industrial processes 
whilst securing holistic measures towards environmental protection, prudent use of petroleum 
resources and ensuring minimized CO2 emissions.
990 It is thus posited that in tandem with 
Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration or Goal 9 of the SDGs, it behoves Nigeria to adopt 
environmentally sound technologies with a caveat that its application should be people friendly. 
Bearing in mind that technology can have both positive and negative impacts, especially in oil 
exploitation contexts which can impose negative environmental and social externalities, as in 
                                                             
989 See previous discussions on technological innovations in Nigerian petroleum regulations. 
990 See Goal 9 of the SDGs, targets 9.4. See also, Principle 9 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, advocating for States to cooperate 
in capacity-building for sustainable development by exchanges of scientiﬁc and technological knowledge, and by enhancing 




the Niger-delta scenario. The adoption of innovative technology must thus be geared towards 
the prevention of environmental and social risks in oil producing areas, because eventually, the 
worth of technology remains subject to the value or benefit it adds to society.991  
 
However, determining the appropriateness of such innovative technologies and accompanying 
benefits for oil producing communities would require some level of public engagement or 
dialogue comprising experts, civil society, indigenes as well as oil industry regulators and 
IOCs. This obviously translates into increased participation or consultations and more 
governmental transparency, including information sharing on the proposed innovation. Often, 
developing petro-states would largely consider the cost-benefits associated with such 
innovation, including the ease or extent to which such innovative technology may be subsumed 
within broader national goals and programmes. Invariably, the overwhelming factor remains 
the risks such costs might pose towards attracting or deterring oil and gas investors, thus 
aggravating the likelihood of recurrent subordination of environmental or social goals to 
economic interests. Arguably, all the foregoing comprises threats or hurdles against the 
enactment of innovative technologies in Nigerian oil laws, as ultimately, a state’s prerequisite 
to pursue innovative technologies in its oil industry via its national oil company (NOC) or IOCs 
comes with political undertones. Similarly, such decisions are susceptible to the extent of 
political will towards sustained and progressive commitments to strengthening the 
environmental and social pillars for oil industry sustainability. 
 
Other reforms could entail the infusion of Nigerian petroleum rules with specific guidelines 
and provisions on equipment specifications which stipulate the best available technology 
(BAT) as the applicable standards for oil and gas development. This is because equipment 
                                                             
991 See, Environmentally Sound Technologies (ESTs) Available at: 
http://www.unep.or.jp/ietc/publications/freshwater/fms7/2.asp Accessed at 25 January 2018 
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stipulations allow for transparency in verifying compliance with the rules and engenders 
performance of the prescribed environmentally protective measure whilst promoting 
sustainability in the industry. More so, equipment stipulations extend beyond deterrence to the 
means of achieving compliance as appropriate techniques or technologies are clarified. 
Although as pointed out, such regulatory reforms requiring BAT may encounter enforcement 
problems in Nigeria due to funding challenges and the very high costs or expertise required to 
develop and maintain oil industry specific innovative technology like carbon sequestrations 
and other enhanced oil recovery techniques. 
 
To bridge these gaps in fostering innovative and environmentally sound technology for 
sustainable development, international partnerships and collaboration would be a considerable 
asset. An example of the utility of such a collaboration is typified in the UK firm, 2Co Energy’s 
award towards a £5 billion power station and carbon-capture-and-storage project at Hatfield, 
near Doncaster in 2009. This collaboration involved the EU’s substantial funding of £164m 
with technology giant Samsung, adopting a 15% stake in the project.992 Nigeria thus requires 
such cooperation in the form of financial, technological and technical support to facilitate this 
development goal, especially in terms of achieving the stated targets of goal 9 in the context of 
oil industry sustainability, by 2030. However, in negating a business as usual approach and for 
Nigeria to be prolific in this area, national efforts towards increased investments and financial 
commitments from petroleum revenues for research and capacity development must be 
prioritized. Likewise, identifying cost effective and expert collaboration towards innovation in 
enhancing oil recoveries with negligible adverse externalities, needs to be intensified. More so, 
petroleum contracts and international partnerships that target ecosystem remediation and 
eliminating of adversative environmental impacts from oil exploitation should be sought at the 
                                                             
992  "Samsung backs £5bn Hatfield carbon-capture project". bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 2012-06-19. 
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licensing and pre-exploration stages to expedite consistency in the restoration and sustainability 
of the Niger-delta environment whilst promoting sustainable livelihoods in the region.  
 
4.3. Ensuring Sustainable Use of Petroleum Resources in Nigerian Petroleum laws 
Earlier discussions considered the high relevance of sustainable use of petroleum resources to 
fulfil sustainable development goals, this section therefore provides useful insights on how 
Nigerian petroleum regulations can be improved by elements or patterns of sustainable use of 
hydrocarbon resources discernible from international law, the UK and Norwegian regulations.  
 
4.3.1. Management of the Petroleum Resource Base in Nigerian Petroleum laws 
Previous deliberations on the management of the petroleum resource base identified the utility 
of operationalizing sustainable use of petroleum resources via regulatory controls over the 
extraction and depletion rates of fields. Such an accomplishment as earlier proposed is only 
feasible through the adoption of prudent extraction techniques and enhanced recovery methods 
to prolong the lifespan and utility of petroleum resources in the interest of sustainable 
development.993 This similarly falls in line with arguments in the preceding section affecting 
the adoption of environmentally sound and innovative technologies.994 Indeed, the Nigerian oil 
regulations can further be strengthened to prevent a colossal waste of hydrocarbon resources 
during oil exploitation by stipulating concrete rules or guidelines promoting enhanced 
recovery, field revitalization or prudent extraction methods to avoid unsustainable 
consumption and use of petroleum resources.  
                                                             
993 See previous chapters on sustainable use of petroleum resources. 
994 See, previous section on the integration of innovative technology. 
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Undoubtedly, prudent recovery methods in favour of sustainable use of petroleum are common 
place issues on the North Sea. This is illustrated in the earlier cited Norwegian example where 
Conoco-Philips was constrained to continue field development activities at Ekosfisk to prevent 
waste of crude reserves, investment failure, field abandonment and field sterilization. This gap 
thus requires regulatory and governmental intervention for sustainable use of resources. 
Accordingly, Nigerian petroleum regulations should be amended to incorporate explicit terms 
in the petroleum licences and field development plans, with directives to ensure prudent 
extraction in consonance with the BAT for enhanced petroleum recovery and development of 
unconventional wells and marginal fields which would otherwise go fallow. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian Petroleum Drilling regulations which provide modalities for fields 
and wells abandonment in S.36 of the Regulations and decommissioning only after obtaining 
approval from the DPR is inadequate as it is silent on development of technology and research 
to determine the maximum or minimum depletion levels of oil fields before 
decommissioning.995 This is counter-productive to the aims of sustainable use of petroleum 
resources. More so, detailed guidelines underpinning measurement techniques and equipment 
stipulations including, a clarification of the specific technologies adopted, constitute the means 
by which regulators optimize opportunities to decipher the extraction and field depletion levels 
for necessary governmental action. These also boost government efforts towards accurate 
reporting and regulatory or increased financial involvement to ensure sustainable and prudent 
consumption of petroleum resources. This was all too evident from the Ekofisk case, where 
Norway’s directives and guidelines served to boost and guarantee optimum recovery and utility 
of finite petroleum resources from the NCF.996 It is however conceded that peculiar Nigerian 
factors like undue dependence on the multinationals for essential information or data regarding 
                                                             
995 See Petroleum Drilling Regulations S. 39. 
996 See previous discussions on the Norwegian intervention at Ekofisk field on the NCS and likewise the UK at Wytch farm 
on the UKCS, which resulted in a massive boost of accessible reserves and increased life span of the reserves. 
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the quantities of crude extracted will impede the successful implementation of such a regulatory 
mandate. This is because technological limitations of government regulators, capacity 
limitations and reliance on the IOCs for access to records or fields to ascertain and effectively 
control depletion or extraction rates, exacerbates regulatory complications, or undermines 
enforcement as the veracity of those records maybe compromised and can thus stall proactive 
efforts towards sustainable use and management of petroleum resources. Hence this research 
advocates the need for Nigeria to devote funds towards the development of research and 
investment in measurement and detection technologies to optimize sustainable use of 
petroleum resources as an oil industry sustainability imperative. 
4.4. Upgrading Nigerian Petroleum Laws: Buttressing Equity for Sustainable 
Development 
Deliberations in the first chapter centred on the ways of operationalizing equity as an element 
of sustainable development in the oil industry context. The research at this juncture will 
consider equity in both the intra-generational and inter-generational dimensions to ascertain 
positive measures by which these abstract terms may be transposed into tools of sustainable 
development for driving the 2030 Agenda in the Nigerian oil industry. Likewise, appropriate 
steps towards optimizing oil industry reforms in Nigeria via the strengthening of equity, will 
adopt strategies from the oil regulations of the UK, Norway and international law. 
4.4.1. The Intra and Inter-Generational Equity Elements 
Following from earlier chapters, the appraisal of intra-generational equity and its 
operationalization in the oil industry identified the relevance of the polluter pays principle both 
as a proactive or precautionary measure towards preventing polluting behaviour and as a tool 
for remediating pollution in the event of its occurrence. This section will therefore deliberate 
on the ways and means to expedite these objectives in the Nigerian oil industry for the 
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attainment of the sustainable development goals. Moreover, inter-generational equity in the oil 
industry as considered in this research, identified ingenious approaches such as the creation of 
oil-sourced petroleum wealth funds to benefit future generations, in the event of a decarbonized 
future or depletion of petroleum resources. This section will however consider the Nigerian 
scenario, to determine measures for moving reforms forward and boosting the Nigerian 
sovereign wealth funds for the benefit of future generations. 
4.4.1.1. Reinforcing the Polluter Pays Principle and Intra-Generational Equity in 
Nigerian Petroleum Regulations 
As argued in preceding chapters, the integration of pollution control measures in environmental 
legislation is an essential aspect of environmental protection and intra-generational equity 
during oil exploitation. This subsection therefore considers pollution controls and improving 
the Nigerian petroleum regulations via the operationalization of the polluter pays principle. The 
essence is to ensure that initiators of pollution bear the brunt of such polluting behaviour or 
activity. This sub-section also considers reforms in the area of emergency preparedness. 
Likewise, advocated are green taxes as a pollution deterrent and as a tool of the polluter pays 
principle, to operationalize sustainable development in oil producing states. Green taxes are 
however differentiated from the earlier discussion on efficient petroleum taxation for GDP 
growth which is an economic growth indicator of sustainable development in the oil 
industry.997  
 
Essentially, green taxes are a feasible means of controlling polluting behaviour in oil producing 
states. This is because fossil fuels production and use have tendencies for considerable carbon 
impact on the global environment therefore justifying the use of green or carbon taxes for 
                                                             
997 See previous section on economic growth parameters for the sustainable development of petroleum resources 
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curbing indiscriminate fossil fuels use. This serves to optimize environment protection and 
equity, especially as the impacts of climate change are all-encompassing, affecting both 
indiscriminate users and even non-users of fossil fuels, or the poor who more prudently use 
petroleum products as a necessity.998 Similarly, as clarified in chapter 1, climate change 
imposes a heavier burden on the poor who are less equipped to cope with the costs implications 
of climate adaptations or mitigations as their options are more limited. In this vein, the UK and 
Norway for instance, have instituted instruments like the Carbon Tax Act to control carbon 
emissions as a climate change mitigation measure.999  
 
Furthermore, as steps towards curbing pollution, the federal government of Nigeria recently 
jettisoned the Nigerian fuel subsidy to discourage polluting behaviour and minimise carbon 
footprint on the environment.1000 Nevertheless, a lot remains to be achieved in terms of 
adequacy of preventive measures to avert pollution by oil producers. It is however clarified 
that due to extant Nigerian problems like poverty, under-development, petro-curse syndrome, 
rentier state issues, corruption and misappropriation of petroleum revenues, the imposition of 
such carbon or green taxes would be highly problematic and strongly resisted by the public. 
This is largely due to a perception that the dividends from oil exploitation have so far been 
elusive and hijacked by the political elite, thus green taxation would be deemed a disguise to 
aggravate poverty or impoverish hapless masses.  
 
Although it is possible for Nigeria to decipher appropriate mechanisms to apply such green 
taxes on the polluter or product users to diminish polluting behaviour, the reality is that, the 
                                                             
998 See previous detailed discussions on Green taxes as a realistic tool for pollution control in Chapter 1. 
999 P. Hoeller, and M. Wallin OECD Economic Studies No. 17, autumn, 1991. Energy Prices, Taxes and Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions (PDF). OECD website. (1991) Staudt, A.; et al. (2008). "Understanding and Responding to Climate Change" 
(PDF). U.S. National Academy of Sciences. 
1000 Available at: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/195743-nigeria-scraps-fuel-subsidy-cuts-petrol-price-to-n85-
per-litre.html Accessed at 8 September 2016 
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costs of such taxation do eventually filter down to all persons within the society, including the 
poor. Thus, to pursue and maximize the aims of sustainable development, the Nigerian 
government or local authorities can be more involved in the planning and provision of essential 
services like transportation, health care, welfare, agriculture and energy to foster better 
synergies towards costs optimization of petroleum products, as this better serves the aims of 
intra-generational equity. Undoubtedly, improved government involvement towards 
community services even-out or achieve equity of distribution in oil producing states, which is 
vital as these areas constitute the avenues where environmental or carbon taxes impact on the 
incomes of the poor. It is further clarified that reforms should strive to provide: realistic, cost 
effective, environmentally friendly alternatives to the carbon sources being targeted by heavy 
taxes. This is essential to avoid exacerbating poverty and under-development in the region.  
 
Another positive step for Nigeria would entail better planning and coordination of emergency 
preparedness schemes for the oil industry. Evidently, the Nigerian petroleum rules require 
policy or regulatory adjustments to stipulate funding schemes or fiscal contributions from oil 
and gas operators which can optimize emergency response in the event of operational incidents 
or equipment failure which result in oil spills. These funding schemes are differentiated from 
civil liability regimes accruing from pollution by oil tankers. For instance, Art. 7-3, para. 1 of 
Norway PA and the UKPA stipulate special rules for pollution caused by offshore installations 
via the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement of 1975 (OPOL).  This served to guarantee 
emergency preparedness and prompt response to oil pollution incidents to ensure 
environmental and community protection. Such a funding arrangement is currently lacking in 
the Nigerian regulatory framework and is partly accountable for the slow and shoddy response 
to spills incidents in the Niger-delta. Although Nigeria need not replicate the OPOL 
Agreement, Nigeria however can engage in regional collaboration with other states producers 
 271 
 
in the Gulf of Guinea region as earlier proposed under EIA reforms, for improved SEA 
arrangements.1001 Essentially, such partnering can optimize planning and costs towards 
efficiency of emergency response efforts.  
 
Further reforms in the Nigerian oil industry can target the improvement of policies addressing 
funding safeguards, to ensure prompt response to oil spills incidents in oil producing areas. 
This can substantially protect the public and indigenes of the region from bearing the severe 
impacts of oil pollution.1002 Similarly, these operate as precautionary measures for oil spill 
prevention and constitute pollution deterrents to government or private operators who must 
maintain or secure the fund. This measure would at the same time ensure that the polluter pays 
and shield the people and their means of livelihood from the dire impacts of oil pollution. 
Another bold reform towards holding polluters more accountable would entail the imposition 
of strict liability provisions on oil producers for breach of pollution control measures. This is 
more in line with global standards and best practices, even though absent in the Nigerian rules. 
It can also be effective in guaranteeing higher levels of compliance with international best 
practices in the industry, more so when the IOCs understand the possible import of its 
enforcement in their home jurisdictions. 
 
                                                             
1001 See, Section 4.2.1.1. on EIA reforms. 
1002The OPOL Agreement thus goes into effect if any operator in the UK or Norway defaults on paying clean-up costs, with 
a current cap of US$120 million. The OPOL Agreement is an oil pollution compensation scheme that provides guarantees of 
payment for claims up to US$120 million for all members of OPOL to “provide an orderly means for compensating and 
reimbursing any Person who sustains Pollution Damage and any Public Authority which incurs costs for taking Remedial 
Measures as a result of a Discharge of Oil from any Offshore Facility.”   
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4.4.1.2. Strengthening Inter-Generational Equity in Nigeria: The Instrumentality of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
As previously advocated in earlier chapters, the possibility of achieving all objectives of the 
sustainable development agenda remains elusive without inter-generational equity. In 
accordance with this premise, the issue of sovereign wealth funds from petroleum resources 
has been addressed as a vital link in fulfilling inter-generational equity considerations for the 
benefit of succeeding generations. This subsection therefore considers the adequacy or 
otherwise of the fledgling Nigerian sovereign wealth fund and its capacity for enhancement by 
the flourishing Norwegian example.  
Evidently, Nigeria in a bid to achieve sustainable development goals, established a sovereign 
wealth fund by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Act of 2011.1003 As also clarified, the fund was set 
up as a depository of the surplus income produced from Nigeria's excess oil reserves. However, 
earlier arguments portrayed that the aims of sustainable development in Nigeria cannot be 
effectively tackled by the marginal $1 billion USD in seed capital allocated to the fund, with 
just 32.5% earmarked for future generations. This low allocation appears counterproductive to 
the aims of intergenerational equity, more so when Nigeria is ranked amongst the top 12 oil 
producers in the world.1004  
In further contrast with the Nigerian scenario, Norway, with a far smaller population of 5.2 
million people which corresponds to about 2.8% of Nigeria’s 186 million people has a 
sovereign wealth fund worth, $922 billion USD. Apparently accruing to about 23,641% of the 
$3.9 billion balance in Nigeria’s aggregated oil revenue funds.1005 This translates to 
                                                             
1003 See previous detailed discussions in chapter 1 on the objectives and implications of the Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Fund 
and its establishment Act (NSIA) 2011 
1004 Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
1005 NEITI “The Case for A Robust Oil Savings Fund for Nigeria” NEITI Occasional Paper Series. 2, JULY 2017 Available 
at: https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/neiti-ops2-180717.pdf Accessed 26 January 2018. 
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approximately $185,000 USD saved for every Norwegian in the event of petroleum depletion, 
while Nigeria’s inconsistent, paltry savings spread across its large population translates into 
just $8 USD per person, which is indeed the lowest of all oil-based Sovereign Wealth Fund 
(SWF) ratios.  Presently, Norway’s funds have grown from $381 million USD at the inception 
of the fund in 1990, to $1.035 Trillion USD.1006 Although the Nigerian SWF has managed to 
grow from its $1billion seed investment in 2012 to $1.5billion USD at present, as the years 
2012-2013 did not record any savings, despite soaring oil prices.1007 This figure is dwarfed in 
comparison to dividends from the Norwegian SWF, which exceeded and doubled the total 
earnings accruing from petroleum in 2013 despite very high oil prices, also tripling earnings 
from the Norway’s oil sector in 2016.1008 
Evidently, the situation in Nigeria is rather different as the Sovereign Wealth Funds have not 
been as prolific. In view of the considerable shortcomings plaguing the Nigerian SWF1009, it is 
thus conceded that quick fix schemes towards reforms would be futile. Apparently, the 
Nigerian scenario is more complex with varied political undertones which exceed the scope of 
this research. However, a summary of these political complications relates to the power tussle 
between the 36 state governors and the federal government of Nigeria.  
The thrust of the wrangling is that, oil producing states contend that a compulsory deduction 
of excess crude sales into the wealth funds disregards the revenue sharing formula articulated 
by the Constitution, concerning the devolution of 13% mineral derivatives to the oil producing 
states.1010 Adding that, the federal government cannot unilaterally adopt centrist approaches 
                                                             
1006 See, Linaburg-Maduell Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute Rankings for 2018. Available at: 
https://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/ Accessed on 26 January 2018. 
1007 See, The Nigerian Sovereign Investment Agency’s annual reports; www.nsia.gov.ng 
1008 See, EITI Rankings and Reports of 2016. 
1009 See further details in Chapter 2 relating to the Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Funds. 
1010 See, previous discussions in Chapter 2, 2.4.3. relating to economic inclusion for sustainable development as an intra-
generational equity measure for improvement of the Niger-delta. See also, Emmanuel Ojameruaye, “Resolving The Nigeria 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Debacle” Available at: http://chatafrik.com/articles/nigerian-affairs/resolving-the-nigeria-sovereign-
wealth-fund-debacle#startOfPageId963 Accessed at, 2 May, 2018.Ho 
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towards instituting sovereign wealth funds. The states however opine that the federal 
government may invest in wealth funds from its own share of revenues, after the 
constitutionally approved sharing formula is complied with, to enable the 36 states to institute 
wealth funds of their own, should they so desire. It is however opined that, apart from the 
Bayelsa State in Nigeria which currently operates a sovereign wealth fund,1011 other oil 
producing states have been unproductive in this area. However, if more oil producing states 
can be proactive in this regard and adopt the Bayelsa example in instituting regional SWF’s, 
there would be better protection of the interests of future generations. Nevertheless, the 
probable challenge with state’s instituting SWFs would be the political will of state’s governors 
to timeously constitute, set-up and effectively manage such wealth funds, within the 
constitutionally set 4-year governorship terms, especially in view of governors’ poor track 
records in administering public funds.1012 
Notwithstanding, a credible reforms agenda towards the sovereign wealth funds should tackle 
key issues affecting the legal validity and governance of the wealth funds, the means of 
triggering access to the funds, as well as the application and use of the funds. This research 
therefore proposes that governance issues relating to the constitutionality, legal validity or the 
questions concerning the authority and capacity of the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to be a 
repository for excess oil revenues be speedily determined or resolved at the Supreme Court. 
This is because the state governors and local authorities have considered the Nigerian SWF 
                                                             
1011 The Bayelsa State Sovereign Wealth Fund is worth about $1.5 Billion USD. Like the Nigerian SWF, it was established 
in 2012. Apparently, in terms of growth and management, the Bayelsa fund appears to be doing better. See, the Linaburg-
Maduell Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute Rankings for 2018. Available at: https://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-
fund-rankings/  
1012 Many of the Niger-Delta states governors have been embroiled in national and international scandals related to financial 
crimes, money laundering and embezzlement of humongous state funds and oil monies. Examples include: the James Ibori 
ex-governor of Delta State Case, with headlines captioned, “James Ibori pleads guilty to fraud and money-laundering 
charges in the UK: Police to repatriate stolen assets after former governor of Nigeria's oil-rich Delta state changes initial 
plea” Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/feb/27/james-ibori-pleads-guilty-fraud Accessed 
at: 2 May 2018. Also related is the Alamyieseigha ex-governor of Bayelsa State case. See, Rory Carroll, “Nigerian state 





unconstitutional, a political contraption or relic of the previous administrations hence lacking 
in constitutional capacity to be a repository of federated funds.1013 These contentions thus raise 
the need for judicial intervention at the nation’s Apex court, so as not to detract from a reforms 
process towards the strengthening of the Nigerian Sovereign wealth fund.  
Moreover, erstwhile efforts towards out of court settlement between the 36 state governors, the 
local councils and the federal government have failed and resulted in a stalemate on grounds 
of the legal interpretation of the SWF.1014 Whereas, the federal government purports that the 
SWF is duly constituted as a repository for proportions of petroleum revenues by virtue of its 
enabling Act or NSIA, the state and local government contend that a constitutional amendment 
is required to pay government revenues into other accounts aside from or exclusive of the 
Federation account as articulated by S.162 the constitution.  Basically, S. 162. (1) of the Federal 
Constitution of Nigeria (FCN) provides, “The Federation shall maintain a special account to 
be called "the Federation Account" into which shall be paid all revenues collected by the 
Government of the Federation….”.1015 The SWF is thus considered by the State government 
and local government stakeholders as an aberration which is unsubstantiated by the Federal 
Constitution.  
Evidently, an amendment of S. 162 of the Constitution would be expedient to accommodate 
the SWF as part of the Federal government’s repository. This is essential to validate and justify 
further remittances into the SWF for the benefit of future generations. Ultimately, a failure to 
effect immediate constitutional modifications will perpetually create controversy and defy 
lasting solutions, which will stall continued deposits into the SWF. It is however clarified that 
                                                             
1013 See, The Linaburg-Maduell Institute of Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings for Nigeria. Available at: 
https://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/excess-crude-account/  
1014 See, The Vanguard Newspapers, “Sovereign Wealth Funds for critical infrastructure” January 9, 201612:36 Amin News, 
Oil & Gas Summiteer Available at: /https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/01/sovereign-wealth-funds-for-critical-
infrastructure/  Accessed 2 May 2018. 




a constitutional amendment is no easy task as the process of securing constitutional alterations 
is governed by S.9 of the Constitution.1016 S.9 of the FCN requires 2/3 majority of both Houses 
of Assembly, including a further 2/3 majority of the 36 States’ Houses of Assembly. Arguably, 
the fiercely political nature of the sovereign wealth funds, which is made even worse due to 
the discontent between the non-oil producing regions and the oil-producing states which 
harbour deep-seated sentiments about the whole country unfairly benefitting from their 
petroleum resources or natural heritage, without the non-oil regions having to suffer the 
accompanying environmental impacts or compulsory land acquisitions. This potentially 
complicates the entire process of constitutional reforms. More so, the level of suspicion 
between stakeholders remains very high. 
Moreover, the regional and local government representatives allege that government 
expenditures are not transparent and cite the earlier stated problems of poor accountability in 
the SWF’s administration. Nonetheless, for these allegations to cease, and for instilling 
necessary confidence in the credibility of the Fund and its administration, the Act should thus 
be modified to dissociate government expenditures from oil revenues. This is because, 
continued reliance on the SWF to fund the national budget contrary to its fiscal guidelines and 
mandate, negatively impacts on the economy as well as the Fund’s growth, causes revenue 
volatility, escalates the resource curse syndrome and rapidly depletes the stock of petroleum 
resources which altogether compromises the options and prospects of future generations. This 
it does by attenuating all three pillars of the sustainable development paradigm. While the 
preservation of the reserve funds on the other hand can significantly enhance Nigeria’s capital 
balance and improve investor confidence. Indeed, such a desired boost can potentially attract 
                                                             
1016 See, S. 9. (1) – (3) of the Federal Constitution of Nigeria. (2) “An Act of the National Assembly for the alteration of this 
Constitution…shall not be passed …unless the proposal is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds majority of all 




investments and foreign capital, which when prudently managed can provide infrastructure 
upgrades, welfare and development opportunities for future generations of Nigerians.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Having considered the pivotal issues affecting sustainable development within the context of 
petroleum exploitation in Nigeria, this chapter proposes recommendations which are crucial 
for attaining the sustainable development goals in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. These 
recommendations traverse the integration of all three pillars of the sustainable development 
paradigm, anchoring on interlinkages between environmental protection, economic growth and 
social development regulations in sync with technological innovations for the greening of 
petroleum exploitation in Nigeria. 
 
Moreover, the chapter recommends that, Nigeria needs to seek relevant synergies across the 
SDGs and oil exploitation to engender petroleum industry sustainability. These synergies 
which must correlate EIAs, SEAs, including HRIAs to attain eco-system sustainability goals, 
must at the same time interlock atmospheric protection regulations with climate action goals 
for a diminished carbon emissions trajectory in Nigeria. An integration of sustainability 
focused petroleum regulations is thus recommended for Nigeria, to serve as the fulcrum 
towards influencing sustainable use of petroleum resources and the polluter pays principle to 
tackle inequities and poverty eradication in the Niger-Delta. The chapter also posits that, 
Nigeria has better chances of success at achieving the SDGs via the instrumentality of 
international, regional and national collaboration. These are posited as essential for culling 
corruption and boosting regulatory enforcement mechanisms in Nigeria, whilst optimizing oil 




Sustaining oil exploration and exploitation in the context of sustainable development has 
formed the crux of discussions and arguments posited in this research. The research has 
considered sustainable development from its origins, conceptualization and eventually, its 
operationalization in an oil industry context. It has also deliberated on the substantial negative 
impacts accruing from unsustainable oil exploitation patterns in the Niger-Delta and chiefly 
identifies key elements for the development of a policy and legal framework for sustainable oil 
and gas production, applicable to a developing state such as Nigeria.  
 
Consequently, this thesis analyses from its introduction and first chapter, the hallmarks and 
conceptual framework of sustainable development as articulated in international legal 
instruments and goes further to outline essential governance and substantive tools that drive 
sustainable development goals in a vibrant petroleum industry. These have been carefully 
expressed as prerequisites to fulfilling the integration principle anchored on the three-pillar 
paradigm of sustainable development.  
These tools are typified by governance/institutional tools which comprise: clear and efficient 
oil industry regulations, International and multi-stakeholder partnerships, transparency and 
accountability mechanisms, green taxation and sovereign wealth funds. On the other hand, the 
substantive tools embrace: EIAs, SEAs and HRIAs. Also, pollution controls, innovative 
technology, access to information, justice and public participation are deemed just as relevant.  
Furthermore, the research clarifies the undisputed relevance of international partners for 
sustainable oil industry governance in oil producing states to control corruption whilst 
enhancing the competence of environmental and social reforms in developing petro-states. 
More so, these tools and partnerships form tangible platforms targeting synergies across eco-
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systems protection, climate action policies and EIAs/SEAs regulations to achieve a sustainable 
oil industry.  
Moreover, the research appraised the efficacy of economic growth tools and regulations 
achievable through efficient budgeting, optimization of incentives and tax mechanisms whilst 
advancing the crucial role of social development tools articulated by meaningful realization of 
access rights in the petroleum industry. These access rights as epitomized by access to 
environmental information, access to justice and public participation in consonance with 
HRIAs fulfil social development aims. In other words, this research directly focuses on the 
competence of sustainable development in promoting social development tools that address 
more inclusive and participatory approaches to oil exploitation. 
Also buttressed in this thesis, are vital elements involving sustainable use of petroleum 
resources comprising, prudent extraction, control of field extraction/depletion rates and 
enhanced recovery methods for accessing mature or inaccessible fields. In addition, the 
research advocates that inequities or inequalities of power and distribution amongst those of 
present generations can be eroded via the polluter pays principle to ensure efficient controls 
against polluting behaviour and unsustainable consumption. The research similarly proposes 
sovereign wealth funds from petroleum resources to safeguard the interests, options and 
opportunities of future generations as crucial to achieving sustainable development in the oil 
and gas industry. 
Furthermore, the second chapter highlights the Nigerian challenges, capacity limitations, 
regulatory or policy gaps which remain key culprits in the Niger-delta petroleum induced 
imbroglio. The second chapter likewise weighs up the considerable oil industry governance 
and environmental challenges posed by incompetent regulations, weak institutions, failure or 
deficiency of accountability mechanisms and the heavy economic burdens imposed by a 
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marginally performing national oil company (NNPC). These challenges which were further 
complicated by oil booms, successive military juntas and corruption, in “post-oil” Nigeria, 
similarly gave rise to inflation, significant inequalities, or huge disparities between the rich and 
the poor. Altogether, these constitute endemic issues in Nigeria, that starkly portray the 
avoidable templates of petroleum induced, unsustainable development and petro-curse, that 
justifies the need for urgent reforms. 
The third chapter entails a comparative scrutiny of the UK and Norwegian sustainability 
inclined oil regulatory framework which has engendered a green petroleum industry in both 
states despite their disparate jurisdictional backgrounds. These buttress the research hypotheses 
regarding the possibility of viable improvements in the Nigerian petroleum industry and 
regulatory framework via positive influence of international law, as already operational in the 
UK and Norwegian petroleum regulations. These are argued as viable prototypes, capable of 
transplantation towards advancing the sustainable development goals in Nigeria.  
The fourth chapter of the thesis advocates ways and measures to positively influence Nigerian 
petroleum law and policy. These are proposed as regulatory and policy reforms to guarantee 
sustainable development of the oil sector in Nigeria. Thus, the fourth chapter argues for 
Nigeria’s realignment with international law obligations evident in sustainability endeared 
approaches from the UK and Norway. It thus resolves the research questions on all points to 
illustrate the ways and means by which oil exploitation in Nigeria can ensure poverty 
eradication and foster achievement of the SDGs. 
Moreover, the fourth chapter expatiates on approaches by which international organisations 
such as the: UNEP, OECD, EITI, the World Bank as well as international finance institutions 
can optimize reforms processes towards sustainable development in petro-states and 
specifically Nigeria. These international partnerships are posited as sustainability agents that 
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can afford competent alliances towards the actualization of the SDGs in the Nigerian oil 
industry. These partnerships are thus argued as crucial for reinforcing environmental and social 
protection in Nigeria and regionally during oil exploitation. Likewise, the utility of these 
partnerships and their contemporary foray towards strengthening of accountability and 
transparency mechanisms, to curb oil sector and transnational corruption in developing 
countries is assessed.    
Altogether, this research has argued for the realization of the sustainable development agenda 
in the Nigerian oil industry context via an approach that positions the Niger-Delta environment 
and its indigent and marginalized communities at the core of development goals. The research 
argues that it is possible for oil producing developing states to broaden their focus from a purely 
economic, petro-markets based growth, anchored primarily on boosting the GDP with the 
assumption that the realizable impacts automatically benefits the environment and society, 
since the opposite or unintended effects can become the reality as evident from the Nigerian 
scenario. 
The research further posits that, sustainability geared oil industry reforms are crucial, inevitable 
and the way forward for Nigeria. That these reforms must articulate regulatory and policy 
interventions that emphasize broader opportunities which optimize pro-poor opportunities for 
participation, contribution and empowerment in the management of the Niger-Delta 
environment to engender sustainable livelihoods and efficient use of natural resources.  
Undoubtedly, the research has demonstrated that, even though the platforms afforded by the 
sustainable development agenda as further expressed in the sustainable development goals may 
appear imperfect and imprecise in some areas and occasionally incipient, in the sense of an 
absence of a hierarchical arrangement of the SDGs which could arguably improve states’ 
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prioritization efforts across the goals, nevertheless, from a developing petro-state perspective, 
the SDGs present a launch-pad, albeit rudimentary.  
Certainly, the SDGs proffer runways, even credible avenues towards environmental protection, 
poverty eradication, social development and sustainable use or consumption of petroleum 
resources. Moreover, the SDGs advocate equity from both inter and intra-generational 
dimensions and indeed, inter or intra-state perspectives. They also remain relatable, at least 
from a developing petro-state perspective as the SDGs acknowledge the limitations such as: 
governance, financial, technical and other forms of capacity constraints and proposes 
international and multi-stakeholder platforms for their amelioration. More so, sustainable 
development, including the 2030 Agenda affords the differentiation that crucially serves as a 
life-line for developing petro-states to better plan, organize, strategize or “get their act together” 
as they confront the looming and somewhat inevitability of a decarbonized future, or peaking 
and depletion of petroleum resources. 
In a nutshell, sustainable development as proposed in this thesis is diametrically opposed to a 
business as usual approach to oil exploitation in the Niger-delta. Sustainable development in 
this research therefore resonates the call for regulatory and policy reforms in the Nigerian oil 
and gas laws to effectively halt an impending economic, environmental and social crisis in not 
just the Niger-Delta but Nigeria at large. It urges the need to reinforce crumbling governmental 
and national structure, strengthen weakened political institutions whilst stressing the need for 
proper investment of petroleum resource wealth for the benefit of present and future 
generations. 
The foregoing therefore constitutes compelling and urgent actions which are imperative for 
Nigeria to expedite oil industry reforms towards achieving sustainable development. More so, 
the speedy achievement of sustainable development goals in Nigeria via its currently most 
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viable and valuable export can only trigger a host of positive impacts in Africa. This is 
obviously linked to the Nigerian population demographic which is an estimated 190 million 
people.1017 Indeed, the recent 2014-2016 crash in oil prices that triggered a recession in the 
Nigerian economy reverberated across Africa and similarly impacted negatively on other 
African economies.1018 Thus, sustainable development in Nigeria, ultimately engenders the 












                                                             
1017 See, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division, available at: 
http://countrymeters.info/en/Nigeria Accessed at 15/06/17 
1018 See, The World Bank Special Focus 1, “With the Benefit of Hindsight: The Impact of the 2014-16 Oil Price Collapse” 
Available at: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/910311512412250749/Global-Economic-Prospects-Jan-2018-Topical-Issue-
oil-price-collapse.pdf Accessed at 15/06/2017 
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